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Dear Attorney-General 
 
A Review of Legal Professional Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies 
 
On 29 November 2007, the then Attorney-General, the Hon Philip Ruddock MP, 
issued terms of reference for the Commission to undertake a review of legal 
professional privilege and Commonwealth investigatory bodies.  
Those terms of reference were amended by your letter dated 6 December 2007, to 
extend the reporting date to 24 December 2007, in order to facilitate further community 
consultation. 
On behalf of the Members of the Commission involved in this Inquiry, including 
Justice Robert French, Justice Susan Kenny, Justice Susan Kiefel (until September 
2007) and Justice Berna Collier (from October 2007), and in accordance with the 
Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996, we are pleased to present you with the 
final report in this reference, Privilege in Perspective: Client Legal Privilege in 
Federal Investigations (ALRC 107, 2007). 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Professor David Weisbrot AM 
President 
 
 
   
 
Professor Rosalind Croucher    Professor Les McCrimmon  
Commissioner in Charge    Commissioner 
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 Terms of Reference 
 
 
Legal professional privilege and Commonwealth 
investigatory bodies 
 
I, Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General of Australia, having regard to: 
• the fact that legal professional privilege is a common law privilege 
• the fact that legal professional privilege, like other common law rights, can be 
modified or abrogated by legislation in cases where the legislature affords a 
competing public interest consideration a higher relative priority 
• the fact that questions of legal professional privilege commonly arise in relation 
to the exercise of coercive information gathering powers by Commonwealth 
bodies 
• the many different forms of Commonwealth statutory provisions affecting the 
question of legal professional privilege in that context, and 
• the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 dealing with client legal privilege 
refer to the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘the Commission’) for inquiry and 
report, pursuant to subsection 20(1) of the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 
1996, matters relating to the application of legal professional privilege to the coercive 
information gathering powers of Commonwealth bodies. 
1. In performing its functions in relation to this reference, the Commission will: 
(a) consider the investigatory or associated functions of Commonwealth bodies that 
have coercive information gathering or associated powers including the Australian 
Federal Police, Australian Crime Commission, Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, Australian Taxation Office, Australian Communications and 
Media Authority, Centrelink, Medicare Australia, Commonwealth royal commissions, 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, and any other relevant 
Commonwealth bodies, and 
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(b) consider the following questions: 
(i)  would further modification or abrogation of legal professional privilege in 
some areas be desirable in order to achieve more effective performance of 
Commonwealth investigatory functions? 
(ii) would it be desirable to clarify existing provisions for the modification or 
abrogation of legal professional privilege, with a view to harmonising them 
across the Commonwealth statute book? 
(iii) would it be desirable to introduce or clarify other statutory safeguards where 
legal professional privilege is modified or abrogated, with a view to 
harmonising them across the Commonwealth statute book? and 
(iv) any related matter. 
2. The Commission will identify and consult with relevant stakeholders. 
3. The Commission is to report no later than 3 December 2007.* 
Dated: 29th November 2006 
 
 
Philip Ruddock 
Attorney-General 
 
* In a letter dated 6 December 2007, Attorney-General Robert McClelland MP agreed 
to extend the reporting date for the Inquiry to 24 December 2007. 
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5. Client Legal Privilege in Federal Investigations 
Recommendation 5–1 The Australian Parliament should enact legislation of 
general application to cover various aspects of the law and procedure governing client 
legal privilege claims in federal investigations (hereafter referred to as federal client 
legal privilege legislation) in accordance with the recommendations in this Report. 
Recommendation 5–2 Federal client legal privilege legislation should provide that, 
in the absence of any clear, express statutory statement to the contrary, client legal 
privilege applies to the coercive information-gathering powers of federal bodies. 
Recommendation 5–3 The Australian Government should ensure that any 
legislative scheme which seeks to abrogate or modify client legal privilege does so by 
express reference to the particular sections or divisions within that scheme that confer 
coercive information-gathering powers which abrogate or modify the privilege. 
Recommendation 5–4 To promote national harmonisation, the Attorney-General of 
Australia should lead a process through the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 
to encourage the states and territories to adopt the Commonwealth model proposed in 
Recommendations 5–1 to 5–3 above. 
6.  Modification or Abrogation of Privilege? 
Recommendation 6–1 In accordance with Recommendation 5–2, in the absence of 
any clear, express statutory statement to the contrary, client legal privilege should 
apply to the coercive information-gathering powers of federal bodies. However, where 
the Australian Parliament believes that exceptional circumstances exist to warrant a 
departure from the standard position, it can legislate to abrogate client legal privilege in 
relation to a particular investigation undertaken by a federal investigatory body, or a 
particular power of a federal investigatory body.  
Any such legislative provision should take into account the following factors in 
determining whether client legal privilege may be abrogated: 
(a)  the subject of the investigation, including whether the inquiry concerns a matter 
(or matters) of major public importance that has (or have) a significant impact 
on the community in general or on a section of the community, or is a covert 
investigation;  
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(b)   whether the information sought can be obtained in a timely and complete way 
by using alternative means that do not require abrogation of client legal 
privilege; and especially 
(c)  the degree to which a lack of access to the privileged information will hamper or 
frustrate the operation of the investigation and, in particular, whether the legal 
advice itself is central to the issues being considered by the investigation. 
Recommendation 6–2 In accordance with Recommendation 5–2, in the absence of 
any clear, express statutory statement to the contrary, client legal privilege should 
apply to the coercive information-gathering powers of federal bodies. However, the 
Australian Parliament should amend the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) to allow 
that, in exceptional circumstances, the Governor-General may, as part of the Letters 
Patent establishing the Royal Commission, state that it is not a reasonable excuse for 
the purposes of subsection 3(2B) or (5) of the Act for a person to refuse or fail to 
produce a document on the basis that the document is subject to client legal privilege. 
The following factors should be taken into account in deciding whether client legal 
privilege may be abrogated: 
(a)  the subject of the Royal Commission of inquiry, including whether the inquiry 
concerns a matter (or matters) of major public importance that has (or have) a 
significant impact on the community in general or on a section of the 
community;  
(b)  whether the information sought can be obtained in a timely and complete way 
by using alternative means that do not require abrogation of client legal 
privilege; and especially 
(c)  the degree to which a lack of access to the privileged information will hamper or 
frustrate the operation of the Royal Commission and, in particular, whether the 
legal advice itself is central to the issues being considered by the Commission. 
Recommendation 6–3 The Australian Parliament should amend the Inspector-
General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth), the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) 
and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) to state that 
where client legal privilege cannot be claimed over legal advice given to a Minister, an 
agency or an authority of the Commonwealth, this abrogation applies to litigation 
privilege as well as advice privilege.  
Recommendation 6–4 Federal client legal privilege legislation should provide that, 
five years after it comes into force, a review is to be conducted of the effectiveness of 
its provisions relating to the procedures for making and resolving privilege claims in 
federal investigations. 
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Recommendation 6–5 The Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) should provide that, 
where client legal privilege has been abrogated or modified in a Royal Commission, 
the Commissioner must include within the report consideration of the degree to which 
the abrogation or modification has facilitated the effectiveness of the Royal 
Commission. 
Recommendation 6–6 Federal client legal privilege legislation should provide that 
a person who is required to disclose information under a coercive information-
gathering power of the Commissioner of Taxation is not required to disclose a 
document that is a tax advice document prepared for that person.  
A ‘tax advice document’ should be defined as a confidential document created by an 
independent professional accounting adviser for the dominant purpose of providing 
that person with advice about the operation and effect of tax laws.  
A ‘tax advice document’ does not include ‘source documents’, such as documents 
which record transactions or arrangements entered into by a person (for example, 
formal books of account or ledgers). Source documents, even where given to a tax 
agent for the purpose of obtaining tax advice, will not be protected by the privilege.   
An independent professional accounting adviser must be a registered ‘tax agent’ for the 
purpose of s 251A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) or a nominee or 
employee of a registered tax agent, who is a qualified tax accountant. 
No privilege should apply to ‘tax contextual information’ given for the purpose of 
providing tax advice. ‘Tax contextual information’ is information about: 
(a) a fact or assumption that has occurred or is postulated by the person creating the 
tax advice document; 
(b) a description of a step involved in the performance of a transaction that has 
occurred or is postulated by the person creating the tax advice document; 
(c) advice that does not concern the operation and effect of tax laws. 
No privilege should apply where a tax advice document is created in relation to the 
commission of a fraud or offence or the commission of an act that renders a person 
liable to a civil penalty; or where the person or the accounting adviser knew or ought 
reasonably to have known that the document was prepared in furtherance of a 
deliberate abuse of power. 
Claims that a document is a tax advice document must be made in accordance with the 
procedures set out in Recommendations 8–3 to 8–5. Resolution of claims should be in 
accordance with the procedures set out in Recommendations 8–6, 8–7, 8–11 and 8–14. 
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Claims that a document is a tax advice document may be required to be certified by a 
lawyer in accordance with the procedures set out in Recommendation 8–3. 
7.  Safeguards 
Recommendation 7–1 Federal client legal privilege legislation should provide that, 
if another federal statute expressly abrogates or modifies client legal privilege, such 
abrogation or modification does not extend to legal advice that relates to the 
investigation itself, or to the representation of the client in the investigation.  
Recommendation 7–2 Federal client legal privilege legislation should provide that, 
in the absence of any express statutory statement concerning the use to which 
otherwise privileged information can be put (for example, provisions conferring use 
immunity or derivative use immunity or authorising unrestricted use of otherwise 
privileged information), where federal legislation abrogates the application of client 
legal privilege to the exercise of a federal coercive information-gathering power the 
following default provision should apply: 
(a)  a federal body that seeks to rely on otherwise privileged information as evidence 
in any court proceedings must apply to the court for permission to do so;  
(b)  there should be a presumption against use of the evidence which is able to be 
displaced in the court’s discretion, having regard to the following factors: 
 (i) the public interest in limiting the effects of the abrogation of an important 
common law right; 
 (ii) whether the otherwise privileged information was obtained pursuant to 
the exercise of a covert investigatory power; and 
 (iii) the probative value of the otherwise privileged evidence, including 
whether it reveals matters tending to constitute serious misconduct or 
conduct which has a serious adverse impact on the community in general 
or on a section of the community; and 
(c) a federal body is precluded from using otherwise privileged information against 
the holder of client legal privilege in any administrative penalty proceedings. 
Recommendation 7–3 Federal client legal privilege legislation should provide that 
where client legal privilege has been abrogated or modified in respect of any federal 
coercive information-gathering power, federal bodies should be required to notify 
persons the subject of such powers, as well as those who produce information on a 
voluntary basis, about whether any safeguards apply to the use of otherwise privileged 
information in subsequent proceedings.  
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Recommendation 7–4 If Recommendation 6–2 is adopted, the Royal Commissions 
Act 1902 (Cth) should be amended to provide that a relevant factor to be considered by 
a Royal Commissioner in making an order that evidence be disclosed in camera or be 
subject to a non-publication order is that the evidence may or will disclose 
communications subject to client legal privilege. 
Recommendation 7–5 Federal client legal privilege legislation should provide that, 
in the absence of an express statutory statement to the contrary, where federal 
legislation abrogates or modifies client legal privilege in federal investigations that 
abrogation or modification does not affect the holder of the privilege from maintaining 
privilege against a third party.  
Recommendation 7–6 The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
(CDPP) should amend its Statement on Prosecution Disclosure to make it clear that the 
exception of disclosing unused privileged information to the defence applies 
irrespective of whether the privilege holder is the federal investigatory body that refers 
the matter to the CDPP, or a party that produced information to that federal 
investigatory body in the course of its investigation. 
Recommendation 7–7 If client legal privilege is abrogated or modified in respect 
of any federal body with coercive information-gathering powers, that federal body 
should: 
(a) implement appropriate document management systems to ensure that documents 
the subject of a client legal privilege claim are: 
 (i) clearly identified or recorded as such; 
 (ii) stored and managed appropriately, including restricting access to persons 
in the federal body involved in the relevant investigation; and 
 (iii) returned, as soon as practicable, to the person who produced them; and 
(b) publish its policies and procedures in this regard. 
8.  Practice and Procedure 
Recommendation 8–1 Federal client legal privilege legislation should require 
federal bodies with coercive information-gathering powers—the exercise of which 
raise, or are likely to raise, the issue of the application of the privilege—to notify 
persons the subject of those powers, as well as those who provide information on a 
voluntary basis, whether or not client legal privilege applies to: 
(a)  the exercise of a particular power; and  
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(b)  the voluntary production of information. 
Recommendation 8–2 Federal bodies with coercive information-gathering 
powers—the exercise of which raise, or are likely to raise, the issue of the application 
of client legal privilege—should develop and publish policies and procedures in 
relation to the manner of notifying persons the subject of those powers whether the 
privilege applies to the exercise of such information-gathering powers and to the 
voluntary production of information. 
Recommendation 8–3 Federal client legal privilege legislation should provide a 
mechanism for the making of privilege claims in federal investigations. Those 
provisions should include a requirement that persons be given a reasonable opportunity 
to claim privilege, and if a federal body requests particulars of privileged 
communications not produced pursuant to a coercive information-gathering power, 
that: 
(a) the person specify: 
 (1)  the grounds on which client legal privilege is claimed; and 
 (2)  the facts relied upon as giving rise to the claim;  
(b) where claims are made in respect of communications contained in documents:  
 (1)  the person making the claim describes the documents or in the case of a 
bundle of documents of the same or similar nature, describe each bundle, 
sufficiently to enable the document or bundle to be identified including 
details of the following: 
 (i)  date of the document; 
 (ii)  the nature of the document and the type of communication (for 
example tax advice documents, defined in Recommendation 6–6, 
prepared by a professional accounting adviser should be 
indicated); and 
 (iii)  the names and positions of the authors and recipients of the 
communications (for example, X—partner in Y Law Firm; B—in-
house counsel for C Limited); 
 (2)  if a federal body so requests: 
 (i)  the particulars of the privileged documents and the basis for the 
claims are to be verified on oath or affirmation by the person 
making the claim; and/or 
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 (ii)  where the person is legally represented in the federal investigation 
or has otherwise received legal advice in relation to making a 
claim for privilege, the person’s lawyer is to certify that having 
reviewed the documents the subject of a privilege claim, that in his 
or her opinion, based on the client’s instructions, there are 
reasonable grounds for the making of the claim. A federal body 
may request such certification by a lawyer in the absence of 
requesting particularisation of the communications over which 
privilege is claimed; and 
(c)  where the claims are made in respect of oral communications, the person 
making the claim should provide details of the date, time, parties to, location 
and means by which the communication took place. 
Recommendation 8–4 Federal client legal privilege legislation should specify that 
providing a description of the documents or bundle of documents in accordance with 
legislative requirements of itself will not amount to waiver of the privilege. 
Recommendation 8–5 Federal client legal privilege legislation should specify 
where a federal body has requested particulars of documents subject to a claim for 
privilege, or the verification or certification of privilege claims, those particulars, 
verification or certification are to be provided to the federal body within the time frame 
defined by that body, which must be reasonable having regard to the circumstances of 
each particular request. The types of factors that may be relevant include: 
(a)  the number of documents that a claimant is required to review; 
(b)  the need to access and identify electronically-stored documents;  
(c)  whether the information is required pursuant to the exercise of a search warrant 
(or a search without warrant);  
(d)  the urgency and seriousness of the investigation being conducted by the federal 
body;  
(e)  the time frame for production of documents pursuant to the coercive power; and 
(f)  any adverse effect on the claimant and the claimant’s resources in responding 
urgently. 
Recommendation 8–6 Federal client legal privilege legislation should provide that 
where a person fails to comply with a federal body’s request to provide particulars of 
communications in respect of which privilege is claimed or to verify such claims the 
federal body may apply for a declaration that privilege is not maintainable unless 
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particulars or verification of the claims are provided to the court forthwith or within a 
designated time determined at the discretion of the court. 
Recommendation 8–7 Federal client legal privilege legislation should provide that 
where a federal body requests that any claims for client legal privilege made by a 
person be certified by his or her lawyer (in the terms set out in Recommendation 8–3), 
and the lawyer fails to certify any or all of the privilege claims made by that person, if 
the federal body wishes to pursue the issue, the following steps apply: 
(a)  the federal body, if it is aware of the identity of the person’s lawyer, should 
notify the lawyer that it intends to inform the person of the lawyer’s failure to 
notify; 
(b) the federal body should inform the person that the lawyer has not certified some 
or all of the claims (if it appears that the person may not be aware of this fact) 
and of the consequences of failure to certify (as set out below); 
(c)  the federal body may apply to the court for a declaration that, unless the court 
otherwise orders, if certification is not made within the time provided by the 
court, the claim for privilege is not maintainable; and 
(d)  the person may apply to the court for a declaration that privilege applies  despite 
the lack of certification. 
If the federal body does not wish to press the issue of failure to certify, it can invoke 
the dispute resolution processes set out in Recommendation 8–11. 
Recommendation 8–8 Federal bodies with coercive information-gathering 
powers—the exercise of which raise, or are likely to raise, the issue of the application 
of client legal privilege—should develop and publish their policies and procedures for 
addressing apparent unintentional disclosures by unrepresented persons of material 
likely to be subject to a claim of client legal privilege, particularly the circumstances in 
which they recognise such persons should be given an opportunity to seek legal advice 
about whether to claim or waive the privilege. 
Recommendation 8–9 Federal client legal privilege legislation should provide that, 
where a federal body receives apparently privileged information from a person other 
than the privilege holder (the notice recipient) or the privilege holder’s lawyer, 
pursuant to the exercise of a coercive power that does not abrogate client legal 
privilege the federal body should take steps that are reasonable in the circumstances to 
give the privilege holder an opportunity to establish that privilege had not been waived 
by the privilege holder’s provision of the information to the notice recipient. The 
legislation should recognise that there may be circumstances where it would be 
reasonable for a federal body to take no steps. Relevant factors to be included in this 
regard include: 
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(a)   the nature of the investigation, in particular whether or not it is covert; 
(b)   whether the privilege holder is a covert target of the investigation; and 
(c)   whether the federal body considers, on reasonable grounds, that notifying the 
privilege holder to allow such an opportunity would be likely to prejudice the 
investigation. 
Recommendation 8–10 The Federal Court and the Supreme Court of each state and 
territory should have appropriate arrangements in place to cater for hearing 
applications on short notice concerning disputes about client legal privilege claims in 
federal investigations. 
Recommendation 8–11 Federal client legal privilege legislation should provide that, 
where a federal body (other than a Royal Commission) disputes a privilege claim (after 
having received particulars of the documents in respect of which a claim of privilege is 
made in answer to the exercise of a coercive power): 
• The federal body should be required to give written notification of the fact that it 
disputes the claim. 
• The federal body, in its discretion, may decide to offer the claimant an 
opportunity to agree to an independent review mechanism. If the federal body so 
decides, it should notify the claimant that it has 14 days (or such other time 
agreed to by the parties) either to: 
 (a)  agree to an independent review process; or 
 (b)  commence proceedings in a superior court seeking  
 (i)  a declaration that the disputed material is subject to client legal 
privilege; or  
 (ii)  an order concerning the time within which the substantive 
proceedings determining the claim should be commenced by the 
claimant. 
• Where the federal body decides not to offer the claimant an opportunity to agree 
to an independent review mechanism, it should notify the claimant that the 
claimant has 14 days (or such other time agreed to by the parties) to commence 
proceedings in a superior court seeking:  
 (a)  a declaration that the disputed material is subject to client legal privilege; 
or  
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 (b)  an order concerning the time within which the substantive proceedings 
determining the claim should be commenced by the claimant. 
• The federal body may also commence proceedings within 14 days or such other 
period ordered by the court but the onus of establishing client legal privilege is 
on the claimant. 
• If the claimant  
 (a)  does not agree to an independent review mechanism when offered and 
fails to commence proceedings; or 
 (b)  is not offered an opportunity to agree to an independent review 
mechanism and fails to commence proceedings; 
 the federal body will be entitled to regard the claim as having been waived, in 
the absence of special circumstances that negate this inference. 
Recommendation 8–12 Federal bodies (other than Royal Commissions) with 
coercive information-gathering powers—the exercise of which raise, or are likely to 
raise, the issue of the application of client legal privilege—should develop and publish 
procedures in relation to the resolution of disputed privilege claims. Such procedures 
should, as far as practicable, be uniform. (See Recommendations 8–13 and 8–14). 
Recommendation 8–13 The Attorney-General’s Department in consultation with 
federal bodies with coercive information-gathering powers—the exercise of which 
raise, or are likely to raise, the issue of the application of client legal privilege—should 
establish a model procedure for resolving disputed privilege claims in federal 
investigations. 
Recommendation 8–14 Where a federal body disputes a privilege claim, the model 
procedure for resolving the claim (referred to in Recommendation 8–13) should 
include the following features: 
(a) A federal body should have a discretion to offer the claimant an opportunity to 
agree to an independent review process to resolve the dispute. 
(b)  Where the federal body does not offer the claimant an opportunity to agree to an 
independent review process, the procedures set out in Recommendation 8–11 
are to apply. 
(c)  Where the federal body decides to offer the claimant an opportunity to agree to 
an independent review process, it should notify the claimant of the availability 
and features of the process, and of the statutory time period of 14 days (or such 
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other time agreed to by the parties) for indicating agreement to submit to the 
review process (see Recommendation 8–11). 
 (d)  The claimant may agree to the engagement of a mutually acceptable 
independent reviewer or reviewers (with appropriate legal qualifications) to 
make a non-binding assessment of the claim, although the claimant and federal 
body may agree to accept the assessment as binding. 
(e)  Upon signing a confidentiality undertaking, those conducting the independent 
review should be given access to the documents containing the communications 
in dispute and should make an assessment of each in one of the following 
categories:  
 (i) privileged; 
 (ii) not privileged; 
 (iii) partly privileged; or  
 (iv) unable to make an assessment. 
(f)  The claimant may provide the independent review with access to privileged 
communications not in dispute in order to assist in establishing that a 
communication in dispute is privileged. This may be done on the claimant’s 
initiative or otherwise voluntarily at the request of those conducting the 
independent review. In these circumstances, the disclosure of the non-disputed 
privileged communications does not constitute waiver. 
(g)  Upon receiving the assessment of the independent review, where the parties 
have not agreed to accept the assessment as binding, either party may within 
seven days (or another period agreed to by the parties) commence proceedings 
seeking declarations from a superior court in relation to whether the documents 
are privileged. 
(h)  If the independent review’s assessment is that a document is privileged, the 
claimant is entitled to retain possession of the document unless the federal body, 
having sought declaratory relief within the required time frame, obtains a 
declaration that the document is not privileged. 
(i)  If the independent review’s assessment is that a document is partly privileged, 
the claimant should mask those parts that are assessed to be privileged and 
produce the remainder of the document to the federal body, unless the claimant 
seeks declaratory relief within the required time frame. A federal body may also 
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seek a declaration, within the required time frame, that the parts of the document 
assessed to be partly privileged are not privileged. 
(j)  If the independent review’s assessment is that a document is not privileged, the 
claimant should produce the document to the federal body, unless the claimant 
seeks declaratory relief within the required time frame. 
(k)  If an independent review process takes place, the parties may agree on who is to 
pay the costs of the reviewers but the ordinary presumption is that the costs will 
be shared equally. A federal body may, in its discretion, agree to meet the entire 
costs or a higher proportion of the costs. The independent reviewer may make a 
non-binding recommendation about how costs should be distributed. 
(l)  Liability for costs for any court proceedings are to be determined by courts in 
accordance with their rules. 
Recommendation 8–15 Federal client legal privilege legislation should enable 
superior courts to authorise the extension of a limitation period where a federal body 
intends to challenge a privilege claim, if granting the extension is in the interests of 
justice. 
Recommendation 8–16 Federal client legal privilege legislation should provide that 
where information which may be subject to a claim for client legal privilege is stored 
on the same electronic medium as non-privileged information that falls within the 
scope of a Commonwealth search warrant: 
(a)  the executing officer is not precluded from copying or imaging that medium and 
causing the copy or image to be removed from the premises; and 
(b)  such copying or imaging does not amount to a waiver of privilege. 
Recommendation 8–17 There is a need for guidelines addressing the resolution of 
client legal privilege claims made in response to search and seizure powers in respect 
of electronically-stored information (ESI Guidelines). The Law Council of Australia, 
the Australian Federal Police, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, and 
relevant accounting professional bodies in consultation with (a) federal bodies that 
possess search and seizure powers and (b) computer forensic experts, should devise the 
ESI guidelines. The ESI Guidelines should be adaptable for use at searches of premises 
of lawyers and accountants, other premises and searches of the person, and should be 
provided to persons at the time a Commonwealth search warrant is executed. The ESI 
Guidelines should be consistent with the processes for dealing with the resolution of 
privilege claims in respect of information in paper form. 
Recommendation 8–18 Federal bodies with coercive information-gathering 
powers—the exercise of which raise, or are likely to raise, the issue of the application 
of client legal privilege—should develop and publish policies and procedures in 
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relation to managing and resolving claims for privilege in respect of electronically-
stored information. The policies and procedures should be consistent with the 
processes for dealing with the resolution of privilege claims in respect of information 
in paper form. 
Recommendation 8–19 The Australian Federal Police and the Law Council of 
Australia should revise the General Guidelines between the Australian Federal Police 
and the Law Council of Australia as to the Execution of Search Warrants on a 
Lawyers’ Premises, Law Societies and Like Institutions in Circumstances where a 
Claim of Legal Professional Privilege is Made to: 
(a) refer to the proposed method of making a claim, as set out in the proposed 
federal client legal privilege legislation (see Recommendation 8–3); 
(b) refer to the model procedure for resolving a claim in circumstances where the 
federal body decides to offer the claimant an opportunity to agree to an 
independent review process. The process to be adopted should meet the 
minimum requirements set out in Recommendation 8–14; 
(c) state that, where the claimant is not offered the opportunity, or does not agree, to 
participate in an independent review process, the claimant is to be given 14 days 
(or such other time agreed to by the parties) to either commence proceedings in 
a superior court to (i) establish the claim or (ii) seek an order concerning the 
time within which the substantive proceedings determining the claim should be 
commenced by the claimant; 
(d)  refer to the procedures for making and resolving claims in respect of 
electronically-stored information (see Recommendation 8–17); and 
(e) state that the Guidelines apply to any part of non-legal premises that contain the 
work space of in-house counsel. 
Recommendation 8–20 The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, in 
consultation with relevant federal bodies that possess search warrant powers, should 
amend the following documents which are attached to Commonwealth search warrants: 
Claims for Legal Professional Privilege: Premises other than those of Lawyer, Law 
Society or Like Institution (Non-Legal Premises Notice) and Claims for Legal 
Professional Privilege: Searches of the Person, to include the matters referred to in 
Recommendation 8–19(a)–(d) above. 
Recommendation 8–21 The Australian Federal Police, the Australian Taxation 
Office and legal and accounting professional bodies should negotiate guidelines 
concerning the execution of search warrants on the premises of professional accounting 
advisers in circumstances where a claim of client legal privilege is made. The 
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guidelines should include the matters referred to in Recommendation 8–19(a)–(d) 
above. 
Recommendation 8–22 Federal bodies with coercive information-gathering 
powers—the exercise of which raise, or are likely to raise, the issue of the application 
of client legal privilege—should develop and publish their policies and procedures in 
relation to: 
(a)  notifying persons that they may wish to seek independent legal advice 
concerning their response to a coercive power or, if applicable, seek legal 
representation; and 
(b)  making claims for privilege—which should be consistent with the proposed 
legislative procedures. 
9.  Ensuring Professional Integrity—Education and 
Accountability 
Recommendation 9–1 State and territory legal professional associations should 
ensure that their professional conduct rules provide specific guidance about a lawyer’s 
ethical duties with respect to making and maintaining a claim of client legal privilege. 
Recommendation 9–2 State and territory legal professional associations should 
clarify their professional conduct rules to provide that examples of conduct that 
contravenes the relevant rules may include: 
(a) a certification that there are reasonable grounds for making a privilege claim—
in line with Recommendation 8–3—without reasonable grounds; or 
(b) a failure to certify a privilege claim, without reasonable grounds. 
Recommendation 9–3 University and other legal education programs on legal 
ethics and professional responsibility that are accepted for admission purposes should 
include specific consideration of the ethical responsibility of lawyers in relation to 
making and maintaining a claim of client legal privilege.  
Recommendation 9–4 The study of legal ethics requirement found in state and 
territory rules and Uniform Admission Rules governing admission to practice as a 
lawyer should include the responsibility of lawyers in relation to making and 
maintaining a claim of client legal privilege. 
Recommendation 9–5 Continuing legal education programs (including those 
required for the maintenance of a current practising certificate) should include a regular 
review of the law and responsibilities in relation to the making and maintaining of a 
claim of client legal privilege. 
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Recommendation 9–6 Legal professional associations should issue to their 
members ‘best practice’ notes from time to time, about the law and responsibilities in 
relation to making and maintaining a claim of client legal privilege. 
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Background 
The focus of this Inquiry is on the application of client legal privilege in the context of 
federal investigations and Royal Commissions of inquiry. The ALRC was asked to 
undertake this Inquiry in an environment in which the number of federal bodies with 
coercive information-gathering powers has grown significantly in recent decades. 
These bodies now include traditional law enforcement bodies—such as the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP); bodies concerned with taxation and the administration of public 
funds—such as the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and Centrelink; corporate and 
financial regulators—such as the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC) and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC); and 
regulators with a focus on a specific industry—such as the Australian Fisheries 
Management Authority (AFMA). 
During the course of this Inquiry, the ALRC identified 41 federal bodies with coercive 
investigatory powers, as well as Royal Commissions of inquiry that may be established 
from time to time under the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth).1  
                                                        
1  There have been a number of high profile federal Royal Commissions in recent years, including those 
into the Australian Wheat Board; HIH Insurance; and the building and construction industry: T Cole, 
Report of the Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food Programme 
(2006); N Owen, Report of the HIH Royal Commission (2003); and T Cole, Royal Commission into the 
Building and Construction Industry (2003). 
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The problems 
There are many more than 41 pieces of legislation that address the powers of the 
federal bodies identified in this Inquiry, and some bodies are covered in multiple pieces 
of legislation. Unfortunately, there are few instances in which this legislation 
specifically addresses the application of privilege within the investigatory context; and, 
where privilege is addressed, there is inconsistency in terminology and scope.  
Several recent developments have highlighted the need for clarification of the 
application of privilege in the context of federal investigations. In The Daniels 
Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (Daniels),2 a case concerning the ACCC’s coercive power under s 155 of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), the High Court of Australia held that client 
legal privilege only could be abrogated expressly or by necessary implication.  While 
this decision clarified the principles that apply when considering whether privilege has 
been abrogated, it also created considerable uncertainty in relation to the powers of 
many federal investigatory bodies under their own particular legislation—uncertainty 
that presently only can be resolved through litigation. In this Inquiry, the ALRC heard 
from stakeholders that policies and practices vary considerably amongst federal bodies. 
For example, ASIC’s approach until very recently was based on a view that the 
principles enunciated in Daniels did not apply to some of its coercive powers. 
Within several years of the Daniels decision, the Hon Terence Cole QC was faced with 
extensive claims to privilege during the Royal Commission investigating the conduct 
of the Australian Wheat Board in relation to the United Nations ‘Oil-for-Food’ 
programme (the AWB Royal Commission). Those claims delayed the Commission for 
over a year, causing great frustration to the Royal Commissioner. AWB Ltd also 
challenged Commissioner Cole’s capacity to determine privilege claims. In the result, 
Young J of the Federal Court agreed with Commissioner Cole that a document in 
question was not subject to privilege,3 and also held that the Commissioner had power 
in the circumstances of that case to form an opinion as to whether the document was 
subject to privilege. However, Young J’s decision cast doubt on the ability of a Royal 
Commissioner to inspect a document in respect of which client legal privilege has been 
claimed to determine whether the claim is made out—although he stated that it was 
inappropriate for him to grant declaratory relief on this issue. The Royal Commissions 
Act 1902 (Cth) was amended in consequence, to facilitate the resolution of such claims 
by a Royal Commissioner in a position like Commissioner Cole. (See Chapter 5.)  
Cole’s concerns are also being played out in the slow, ongoing progress of the 
resolution of privilege claims in the ‘Project Wickenby’ investigations, which resulted 
from the taskforce set up in 2004 to investigate internationally promoted tax 
arrangements that allegedly involve tax avoidance or tax evasion, and money 
                                                        
2  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543. 
3  AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382. 
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laundering. This complex investigation has involved a number of federal bodies, 
including the ATO, the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), the AFP, ASIC and the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP). 
When a body has search and seizure powers, the scale of the operation can be 
considerable. The ALRC heard concerns about the impact of timing—the perception of 
‘raids’ requiring an immediate (or quick) response and having to characterise 
potentially many thousands of documents, files and electronic records to advise on 
what should be produced, or claimed as privileged. Any uncertainty about what must 
be produced puts enormous pressure on all concerned—and uncertainty can frustrate 
investigations and end up in protracted and costly litigation to resolve any contested 
issues.  
In approaching this Inquiry, the ALRC has sought to examine the rationale for 
privilege in the modern context; to consider whether there are any common principles 
that should apply regardless of the agency involved; to identify the types of 
circumstances—if any—in which privilege might be modified or abrogated; to identify 
improvements to the processes for making and handling claims of privilege; and to 
increase the accountability of lawyers maintaining such claims on behalf of clients. 
Rationale—a principled approach 
The ALRC put the spotlight squarely upon rationale and considered arguments for and 
against client legal privilege so that the recommendations are founded on a clearly 
principled basis. (See Chapter 2 of the Report.) 
From the outset of this Inquiry, the ALRC signalled that the ‘privilege’ should not be 
viewed as some peculiar entitlement of lawyers, but rather as an important right of 
clients. The ALRC described the doctrine not as ‘legal professional privilege’ but 
‘client legal privilege’,4 reflecting the terminology of the uniform Evidence Acts and 
expressing the privilege as based in the relationship of a client with his or her lawyer.  
In Daniels, the High Court described client legal privilege as ‘not merely a rule of 
substantive law’, but rather ‘an important common law right, or perhaps, more 
                                                        
4  ‘The privilege is commonly described as legal professional privilege, which is unfortunate, because it 
suggests that the privilege is that of the members of the legal profession, which it is not. It is the client’s 
privilege, so that it may be waived by the client, but not by the lawyer’: Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 
CLR 52, 85 (Murphy J). The phrase ‘client legal privilege’ was adopted in the uniform Evidence Acts 
after the ALRC’s 1985 and 1988 Reports on evidence: Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence, 
ALRC 26 (1985); Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence, ALRC 38 (1987). 
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accurately, an important common law immunity’.5 It was even described as a ‘human 
right’.6  
Client legal privilege is a principle that is not just confined to common law 
jurisprudence. A doctrine protecting the confidential communications of clients with 
their lawyers is also accepted today as a basic principle of European Community law. 
(See Chapter 3 of the Report.) The confidentiality of communications between lawyer 
and client is seen as promoting the proper administration of justice and the right to a 
fair trial, regardless of the system of justice that applies. Thus, apart from protecting 
the interests of individual litigants, client legal privilege plays an important role in the 
administration of justice more broadly. 
Focus of the recommendations 
The ALRC’s challenge in this Inquiry was to clarify areas of existing uncertainty and 
to develop procedures for making and resolving client legal privilege claims. The 
challenge also was to balance the competing public interests: namely, the public 
interest in effective and efficient investigations by federal bodies; and the public 
interest in the active compliance that privilege is understood to promote.  
Following the High Court in Daniels, the central premise in the recommendations is 
that client legal privilege is a doctrine of fundamental importance in the common 
law—and only should be abrogated or modified in exceptional circumstances.  
A key theme in submissions and consultations was that, to the extent that there is a 
problem in relation to client legal privilege in the context of federal investigatory 
bodies, it mainly lay in the domain of practice and procedure. Consequently, if there 
were greater transparency, clearer guidelines and procedures, many of the present 
problems could be solved—and a greater framework of cooperation and trust could be 
generated, while still respecting the fundamental principle of client legal privilege. 
Many stakeholders argued that remedying the problems in relation to practice and 
procedure—on both sides, client (lawyer) and federal body—would result in most of 
the other concerns being addressed.  
Complementing the recommendations in relation to procedure are those that focus 
upon the ethical responsibilities of lawyers in the making and maintaining of claims, by 
ensuring thorough consideration of client legal privilege in initial training, admission 
requirements, continuing education and ongoing professional accountability. 
                                                        
5  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543, [11]. 
6  Ibid, [86] (Kirby J). 
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Key recommendations 
The key recommendations in this Inquiry include: (a) the enactment of a statute of 
general application to cover aspects of the law and procedure governing client legal 
privilege claims in federal investigations; (b) the setting out of procedures with respect 
to the making and resolution of client legal privilege claims; and (c) the extension of 
privilege, in defined circumstances, to include tax advice—the tax advice privilege. 
Federal client legal privilege legislation 
In Chapter 5, the ALRC recommends the enactment of federal client legal privilege 
legislation to clarify the existing scattered federal provisions on the application of 
privilege to federal coercive information-gathering powers and to inject greater 
consistency with respect to procedures for privilege claims. The statute also would 
make it clear that the default position in relation to coercive information-gathering 
powers in federal investigations is that client legal privilege applies in the absence of 
express abrogation—reflecting the fundamental importance of the doctrine of privilege 
as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.  
There was strong support in submissions and consultations for clarification of the 
application of client legal privilege to the coercive information-gathering powers of 
federal bodies through the enactment of a single specific federal statute, rather than the 
amendment of each of the federal statutes containing coercive information-gathering 
powers. The ALRC considers that such legislation also would avoid the problem of 
leaving the resolution of uncertainties to the slow and expensive processes of the 
common law.  
The ALRC recommends that any legislative scheme which seeks to abrogate or modify 
client legal privilege must do so by express reference to the particular sections or 
divisions within that scheme that confer coercive information-gathering powers which 
abrogate or modify the privilege. Further, the Attorney-General should lead a process 
through the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General to encourage the states and 
territories to harmonise the law by adopting the proposed model in their respective 
jurisdictions. 
Making and resolving claims—practice and procedure 
Chapter 8 considers the respective obligations of federal bodies exercising coercive 
information-gathering powers, and the persons subject to those powers. The strong 
theme in submissions and consultations was that the key to addressing the problems 
identified in relation to claims of client legal privilege in federal investigations was to 
focus upon practice and procedure.  
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Submissions and consultations made it clear that there are issues and problems 
concerning the making of privilege claims, including:  
• a lack of consistency in the manner in which claims are made; 
• a lack of transparency in claims;  
• the need to address blanket claims of privilege; 
• over-claiming of privilege; 
• over-use of masking of documents;  
• ‘warehousing’—placing prejudicial documents in the hands of third parties and 
beyond the power of a party to litigation;  
• ‘privileging’—placing prejudicial documents in the hands of lawyers under 
cover of spurious requests for legal advice so as to permit a claim for privilege; 
• concerns about inadvertent waiver of privilege in the process of making a claim. 
The ALRC also heard that federal bodies experience difficulties in testing privilege 
claims because the persons the subject of coercive powers sometimes do not alert the 
federal body of the existence of a claim or, when claims are made, insufficient details 
are provided; and that there is an enormous disparity in the approaches taken by 
persons subject to federal coercive powers to justify their claims of privilege.  
To deal with such problems and difficulties, the ALRC recommends that federal client 
legal privilege legislation include a range of requirements with respect to claims, 
concerning: 
• the notification that federal bodies should give about the application of privilege 
to their coercive information-gathering powers; 
• provision of a reasonable opportunity to claim privilege; 
• the details of claims that should be provided, if requested by a federal body; and 
• the certification of the claim by a lawyer, if requested by a federal body. 
The ALRC recommends that there be a model scheme for resolving privilege disputes 
which is to include a number of specified features, one of which is to allow a federal 
body the discretion to offer a claimant an opportunity to agree to an independent 
review process. 
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As the ALRC makes recommendations for significant changes with respect to practice 
and procedure, it is also recommended (Chapter 6) that the federal client legal privilege 
legislation should provide that, five years after it comes into force, a review is to be 
conducted of the effectiveness of its provisions relating to the procedures for making 
and resolving privilege claims in federal investigations. If significant issues related to 
the operation of client legal privilege claims still exist, the ALRC considers that 
thought should be given to whether there is a need for abrogation of the privilege to be 
reconsidered. A complementary proposal in relation to Royal Commissions is that 
where client legal privilege has been abrogated or modified in a Royal Commission, 
the Commissioner must include within the report consideration of the degree to which 
the abrogation or modification has facilitated the effectiveness of the Royal 
Commission. 
Tax advice privilege 
The ALRC recommends the creation of a ‘tax advice privilege’ to protect the 
confidentiality of tax advice given by independent professional accounting advisers 
from the information-gathering powers of the Commissioner of Taxation. The 
recommendation is underpinned by the compliance rationale of privilege—that, in 
order to promote compliance, clients ought to be protected fully in their 
communications in relation to tax law in the same way they are in other areas of the 
law. This does not necessarily mean that privilege is extended to tax advisers, but 
rather that the client’s confidential communications in the nature of tax advice will be 
protected. If a federal body so requests, the claim that the tax advice is privileged must 
be certified by a lawyer. The ALRC noted in particular the comparative precedents—
especially that in New Zealand, which includes a specific ‘client-accountant 
privilege’—and the administrative practice currently adopted by the ATO (‘the 
accountants’ concession’). The ALRC’s recommendations in relation to the tax advice 
privilege are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
Other key recommendations 
The ALRC makes a number of important recommendations complementing the 
clarification of the law and procedure in relation to client legal privilege claims. These 
include recommendations about the circumstances in which it may be appropriate to 
abrogate privilege in federal investigations; the safeguards that should apply when 
privilege is abrogated; and improvements to the ways in which lawyers handle claims 
of client legal privilege through better education and, if necessary, by enforcing 
professional discipline.  
When abrogation may be appropriate 
Client legal privilege may be modified or abrogated by legislation if the Parliament 
chooses to give higher priority to the interests of investigatory agencies in accessing 
information than to the interests served by maintaining privilege—as, for example, in 
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the James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) that abrogated 
client legal privilege in relation to certain material, allowing its use in investigations of 
the James Hardie Group and any related proceedings; and the Royal Commissions Act 
1923 (NSW).  
While a case can be made that client legal privilege claims do frustrate and delay 
investigations—as in the AWB Royal Commission—the ALRC considers that federal 
bodies could achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in relation to claims of client 
legal privilege by addressing the significant issues and problems associated with the 
practices and procedures for making and resolving claims in federal investigations. 
These matters are addressed in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 6 focuses on whether it is desirable to modify or abrogate client legal privilege 
in order to achieve a more effective performance of federal investigatory functions. 
The chapter considers some of the problems that arise from the application of client 
legal privilege to federal investigations and outlines arguments for and against 
modification or abrogation of the privilege as a means of addressing these problems.  
The ALRC’s recommendation is that abrogation only should be considered in 
exceptional circumstances. The ALRC considers that, in the course of ordinary 
enforcement and investigatory activities, the importance of the privilege in 
encouraging compliance overrides the benefits of abrogation to the regulator. As such, 
the ALRC does not support any wholesale abrogation of the privilege in relation to 
federal investigations. 
The ALRC has identified three examples where a higher public interest may warrant 
abrogation of the privilege: major investigations which fit specified criteria; some 
Royal Commissions; and the oversight of public sector agencies. The recommended 
factors to be considered when determining whether to abrogate privilege in relation to 
major investigations and Royal Commissions are: (a) that the subject of the 
investigation or inquiry concerns a matter (or matters) of major public importance that 
has (or have) a significant impact on the community in general or on a section of the 
community, or is a covert investigation; (b) whether the information sought can be 
obtained in a timely and complete way by using alternative means that do not require 
abrogation of client legal privilege; and especially (c) the degree to which a lack of 
access to the privileged information will hamper or frustrate the operation of the 
investigation and, in particular, whether the legal advice itself is central to the issues 
being considered by the investigation. In relation to public sector agencies that focus 
on the accountability of government, the ALRC recommends clarification of the extent 
to which privilege is abrogated. 
Safeguards—limitations on use where privilege is abrogated 
An important issue in relation to client legal privilege is determining, if privilege were 
to be abrogated or modified, what a federal investigatory body can do with otherwise 
privileged information that it obtains through the use of coercive powers. 
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In Chapter 7, the ALRC recommends the introduction of a default safeguard provision 
into federal client legal privilege legislation providing that a federal body, that seeks to 
rely on otherwise privileged information as evidence in any court proceedings, must 
apply to the court for permission to do so. Further, there should be a presumption 
against use of the evidence which is able to be displaced in the court’s discretion, 
having regard only to: (a) the public interest in limiting the effects of the abrogation of 
an important common law right; (b) whether the otherwise privileged information was 
obtained pursuant to the exercise of a covert investigatory power; and (c) the probative 
value of the otherwise privileged evidence, including whether it reveals matters tending 
to constitute serious misconduct or conduct which has a serious adverse impact on the 
community in general or on a section of the community. 
As the recommended provision is a general default position, it can be displaced by 
specific existing and subsequent legislation—but only by express words conveying a 
contrary approach. This ensures that an appropriate degree of flexibility is retained 
with respect to the application of safeguards, recognising the exigencies of different 
investigatory contexts and specific circumstances. 
Lawyers, ethics and accountability 
The recommendations also seek to ensure professional integrity in relation to claims of 
client legal privilege, focusing, in particular, on the role of professional disciplinary 
proceedings and legal ethics education. (See Chapter 9.) It is necessary to complement 
the recommendations for a more transparent and expeditious framework for the making 
and resolving of claims with better education of lawyers in this area in order to 
inculcate a far greater understanding of the nature of, and responsibilities in relation to, 
the making of privilege claims. 
The ALRC acknowledges that identifying when the assertion of a claim of client legal 
privilege amounts to ‘abuse’ may be problematic. As pointed out in submissions and 
consultations, where a lawyer is testing the boundaries of the doctrine of privilege with 
an arguable case, this is different from maintaining a hopeless claim as a tactic in order 
to frustrate or delay an investigation. While there is no clear evidence of chronic abuse 
of claims of client legal privilege, there are some cases that cause concern, and also 
evident distrust on the part of federal investigatory bodies that claims are not being 
made legitimately in every case. 
There is considerable scope for improving the various levels of legal education to 
identify client legal privilege issues more particularly—both prior to and after 
admission to practice—to ensure a better understanding of the obligations of lawyers in 
relation to privilege claims within the context of a lawyer’s overall ethical 
responsibilities to the court. This emphasis should be reflected in criteria for admission, 
practical legal training, continuing legal education and best practice advice notes issued 
by legal professional associations. 
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The ALRC’s view is that the best strategies for addressing alleged instances of misuse 
or abuse of claims of client legal privilege are to clarify and enhance the existing 
disciplinary frameworks that apply to lawyers. The aim should be to ensure that cases 
of actual abuse are detected and punished, rather than introducing specific penalty 
provisions concerning client legal privilege. 
Net effect of the recommendations 
The net effect of the recommendations in this Report is to affirm the importance of 
client legal privilege as a fundamental principle of the common law that only may be 
abrogated in exceptional circumstances, and to provide, through federal client legal 
privilege legislation, a confirmation of the default principles in relation to privilege and 
a framework for making and resolving claims of client legal privilege in federal 
investigations. Complementing these recommendations are others which focus on 
educating lawyers on an ongoing basis with respect to their ethical responsibilities in 
relation to privilege claims. 
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Background to the Inquiry 
1.1 On 29 November 2006, the then Attorney-General of Australia, the Hon Philip 
Ruddock MP, asked the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) to inquire into 
the application of legal professional privilege1 to the coercive information-gathering 
powers of Commonwealth bodies—such as the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the 
Australian Crime Commission (ACC), the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) and federal Royal Commissions of inquiry.  
1.2 Coercive information-gathering powers include the power to compel the 
production of documents, the answering of questions, and the entering of premises 
under warrant to search and seize records. To date, the proliferation of bodies with 
coercive information-gathering powers has presented a challenge to the common law 
doctrine of client legal privilege. Was the doctrine limited to curial proceedings, or did 
it have wider application? If it did have wider application, what was the reason for it? 
In what circumstances should privilege not apply at all? 
1.3 The ALRC has been directed to consider the investigatory functions of 
Commonwealth bodies, and whether it is desirable to modify or abrogate client legal 
                                                        
1  Hereafter called ‘client legal privilege’—see section on ‘Terminology’ below. 
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privilege in order to achieve a more effective performance of those functions in the 
public interest. The ALRC also has been asked to consider whether it is desirable to 
clarify all existing federal provisions that modify or remove client legal privilege, with 
a view to harmonisation. 
1.4 The ALRC considered client legal privilege in the investigatory context in its 
2002 Report, Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties in 
Australia (ALRC 95).2 The ALRC noted the significant inconsistencies in the 
availability of the privilege across regulatory statutes and recommended that a review 
be undertaken of federal investigatory powers that compel the disclosure of 
information and the operation of client legal privilege in that context, with a view to 
providing greater certainty and consistency.  
1.5 More recently, the ALRC, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
(NSWLRC) and the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) considered client 
legal privilege in the evidentiary context in the 2005 Report, Uniform Evidence Law 
(ALRC 102).3 The Commissions considered that ‘a dual system of client legal 
privilege operating in any one jurisdiction is undesirable’ and recommended that: 
The client legal privilege provisions of the uniform Evidence Acts should apply to 
any compulsory process for disclosure, such as pre-trial discovery and the production 
of documents in response to a subpoena and in non-curial contexts including search 
warrants and notices to produce documents, as well as court proceedings.4 
1.6 The application of client legal privilege in the context of Royal Commissions 
arose as an issue of some contention in 2006 in the inquiry undertaken by 
Commissioner Terence Cole QC into the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) and the Oil-
for-Food Programme (the AWB Royal Commission). Extensive claims for privilege 
were asserted by AWB, generating what Commissioner Cole identified as a conflict  
between the public interest in discovery of the truth which is a prime function of a 
Royal Commission, and the fundamental right of persons to obtain legal advice under 
conditions of confidentiality.5 
1.7 Commissioner Cole recommended that consideration be given to amending the 
Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) to permit the Governor-General in Council by 
Letters Patent to determine that, in relation to the whole or a particular aspect of the 
matters the subject of inquiry, client legal privilege should not apply.6 
                                                        
2  Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties 
in Australia, ALRC 95 (2002). 
3  Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 102 (2005). 
4  Ibid, Rec 14–1. 
5  T Cole, Report of the Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme (2006), [7.66]. 
6  Ibid, rec 4. 
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Scope of the Inquiry 
Terms of Reference 
1.8 In relation to the application of client legal privilege to federal bodies with 
coercive information-gathering powers, the Terms of Reference require the ALRC to 
consider whether it would be desirable to:  
• modify or abrogate the privilege in some areas in order to achieve more 
effective performance of Commonwealth investigatory functions;  
• clarify existing provisions for the modification or abrogation of the privilege, 
with a view to harmonising them across the Commonwealth statute book; and  
• introduce or clarify other statutory safeguards where the privilege is modified or 
abrogated, with a view to harmonising them across the Commonwealth statute 
book.  
1.9 The Terms of Reference also direct the ALRC to consider ‘any related matter’. 
This provides an opportunity—to a limited extent—to consider issues of a broader 
nature than those specifically enumerated.  
1.10 While the Inquiry is focused on client legal privilege in the context of federal 
agencies with coercive powers, any modification or abrogation of the doctrine in this 
context will have wider implications because of the potential flow-on effects in the 
domain of legal advice. That is, at the point in time when a person is seeking legal 
advice it will usually not be known whether, at some possible future time, that advice 
may be subject to a coercive investigatory power. Wider implications also stem from 
the fact that many coercive powers are exercisable against persons who are not 
necessarily suspected of any wrongdoing, but are believed to have information that 
may assist an agency in its investigation. 
1.11 The exercise of coercive information-gathering powers can generate complex 
questions in particular investigations. There may be multiple and parallel regulatory or 
investigatory proceedings. The transactions leading to the collapse of the HIH 
Insurance group, for example, were subject to investigation or inquiry by ASIC, the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and eventually a Royal 
Commission.7  
1.12 One particular matter that was raised in the Issues Paper in this Inquiry, Client 
Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies (IP 33), concerned whether client 
legal privilege should arise in the context of advice on taxation law provided by 
                                                        
7  See Ch 4. 
38 Privilege in Perspective  
accountants. This prompted a number of responses—considered in detail in the 
Discussion Paper, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies (DP 73)8—
and a further discussion of the application of privilege to patent attorneys and others, 
which is considered further in this Report.9 
Matters outside the Inquiry 
1.13 In this Inquiry, the ALRC is not conducting an evaluation of the appropriateness 
or otherwise of federal coercive information-gathering powers of themselves.10  
1.14 The Terms of Reference limit the ALRC’s Inquiry to the application of client 
legal privilege in federal investigations and do not extend to client legal privilege in 
court proceedings,11 which was considered in ALRC 102. In July 2007, the Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG) endorsed a Model Uniform Evidence Bill, 
which is based on the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) with 
amendments as recommended in ALRC 102.12 The New South Wales (NSW) 
Parliament passed the relevant amendments to the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) in late 
2007.13 At the time of writing, amendments to the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) had not 
been introduced into Parliament.14 
1.15 Consideration of client legal privilege in the context of federal investigations, 
however, does naturally prompt a consideration of the privilege in its wider 
jurisprudential context. This was evident in a number of submissions, where comments 
were made about the way the doctrine operated more generally—for example the 
extent to which copies of documents are considered to be privileged;15 whether 
privilege should apply to an auditor’s assessment of contingent liabilities under the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth);16 and the application of the Uniform Evidence Act 
provisions to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.17 Where such comments were 
made, they are noted at relevant points in this Report. 
                                                        
8  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), [6.188]–[6.237] and Rec 6–3. 
9  See Ch 6. 
10  At the time of writing, the coercive information-gathering powers of federal bodies was being considered 
by the Administrative Review Council (ARC) and a draft report had been prepared: Administrative 
Review Council, Government Agency Coercive Information-Gathering Powers [Draft Report] (2007). 
11  Although in formulating recommendations relating to the practice of making claims of client legal 
privilege in federal investigations the ALRC draws, by analogy, on the practices of making claims in the 
context of discovery in litigation. 
12  The Uniform Evidence Bill may be viewed at <www.pco.nsw.gov.au/uniform_legislation.htm> at 
30 November 2007. 
13  The Evidence Amendment Bill 2007 was passed on 24 October 2007. At the time of writing, the Act was 
yet to be proclaimed. 
14  See ‘Case Study: Uniform Evidence Law (ALRC102, 2005)’, Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Annual Report 2006–07, for a report on the progress of implementation of the recommendations.  
15  Prompted by the decision in Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance (1997) 188 CLR 501. 
16  Prompted by the decision in Westpac Banking Corporation v 789TEN Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 321. 
17  Prompted by the decision in Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd 
(2006) 67 NSWLR 91. 
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Terminology 
Client legal privilege 
1.16 Although the Terms of Reference use the phrase ‘legal professional privilege’, 
the ALRC has used the term ‘client legal privilege’ throughout the Inquiry. This is the 
manner in which this privilege is described in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)18 and 
reflects the nature of the privilege as one belonging to the client, rather than the lawyer.  
The privilege is commonly described as legal professional privilege, which is 
unfortunate, because it suggests that the privilege is that of the members of the legal 
profession, which it is not. It is the client’s privilege, so that it may be waived by the 
client, but not by the lawyer.19 
1.17 In The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (Daniels),20 Kirby J quoted the words of Advocate-General 
Slynn in the European Court of Justice, which reiterated the concept of the privilege as 
one focusing upon the client:  
Whether it be described as the right of the client or the duty of the lawyer, this 
principle has nothing to do with the protection or privilege of the lawyer.21 
Lawyer 
1.18 When client legal privilege is discussed, both in judgments and in scholarly 
literature, various terms are used in relation to the kind of ‘legal’ relationships that 
invoke the privilege—such as those involving barristers, solicitors, attorneys, legal 
practitioners, and so on. Section 117 of the uniform Evidence Acts uses the expression 
‘lawyer’, which is defined as including a barrister or solicitor.  
1.19 In ALRC 102, the ALRC, NSWLRC and VLRC rejected the holding of a 
practising certificate as a pre-condition to qualify for the privilege,22 consistently with 
the decision in the ACT Court of Appeal in Commonwealth v Vance.23 The term 
‘lawyer’ is used for the purposes of this Inquiry—including, unless specifically stated, 
lawyers with or without current practising certificates. 
                                                        
18  Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) pt 3.10, div 1. The term was also adopted in the uniform Evidence Acts after the 
ALRC’s 1985 and 1988 Reports on evidence: Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence, ALRC 26 
(1985); Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence, ALRC 38 (1987).  
19  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 85 (Murphy J). 
20  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543. 
21  AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1983] 1 QB 878, 913, cited by Kirby J 
in The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543, [87]. 
22  Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 102 (2005), [14.82]–[14.100]. See further Ch 2. 
23  Vance v McCormack (2004) 154 ACTR 12. 
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Law reform processes  
Time frame for the Inquiry 
1.20 The Terms of Reference were given to the ALRC on 29 November 2006 and 
initially stipulated a reporting date of 3 December 2007. In order to ensure that the 
views of key stakeholders could be considered, the ALRC requested and the Attorney-
General granted a short extension until 24 December 2007.24 
1.21 The time frame for the Inquiry—just over 12 months—meant that for each stage 
of the consultative process there were tight deadlines for making submissions. The 
ALRC acknowledges the considerable amount of work undertaken by those who 
contributed to the consultative process throughout this Inquiry.  
Advisory Committee 
1.22 A key aspect of ALRC procedures is the establishment of an expert Advisory 
Committee, or ‘reference group’, to assist with the conduct of ALRC inquiries.  
1.23 Advisory Committees provide advice and assistance to the ALRC, and have 
particular value in helping the ALRC to identify the key issues and determine 
priorities, providing quality assurance in the research, writing and consultation 
processes, and assisting with the development of proposals and recommendations for 
reform. Ultimate responsibility for the Report and recommendations, however, remains 
with the Commissioners of the ALRC. 
1.24 The membership of the Advisory Committee for this Inquiry included judicial 
officers from a number of federal and state courts, corporate counsel, regulators, legal 
practitioners and academics with expertise in the area. The full membership is detailed 
in the List of Participants at the front of this publication.  
1.25 The Advisory Committee met for the first time on 15 March 2007, to consider 
the questions to be included in the Issues Paper. The Advisory Committee met for the 
second time on 26 July 2007, to consider the draft proposals for the Discussion Paper. 
A third (and final) meeting was held on 15 November 2007 to consider the draft 
recommendations for reform. Members of the Advisory Committee also were given 
access to draft chapters of each of the documents produced in this Inquiry for 
comment. 
1.26 The ALRC derived enormous assistance from the Advisory Committee 
throughout this Inquiry and extends its gratitude to the members of the Committee in 
voluntarily providing their time and expertise. 
                                                        
24  Attorney-General Robert McClelland MP, Letter to the ALRC, 6 December 2007. 
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Community consultation  
1.27 One of the most important features of ALRC inquiries is the commitment to 
widespread community consultation.25 The ALRC maintains an active program of 
direct consultation with stakeholders and other interested parties throughout every 
inquiry. The nature and extent of this engagement are normally determined by the 
subject matter of each reference. While some areas may be seen to be narrow and 
technical, and of interest mainly to experts, other ALRC inquiries involve a significant 
level of interest and involvement from the general public and the media. 
1.28 The Terms of Reference for this Inquiry direct that the ALRC ‘will identify and 
consult with relevant stakeholders’. In addition, under the provisions of the Australian 
Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth), the ALRC ‘may inform itself in any way it 
thinks fit’ for the purposes of reviewing or considering anything that is the subject of 
an inquiry.26  
1.29 The ALRC developed a consultation strategy for this Inquiry that encouraged 
participation and input from a wide spectrum of stakeholders. The ALRC conducted 51 
consultation meetings (most of them involving a number of participants) including 
former Royal Commissioners, judges, lawyers, community legal centres, representative 
bodies of lawyers and tax advisers, federal investigatory bodies, and academics. In 
respect of some major stakeholders, consultation meetings took place more than once 
during the course of the Inquiry. A full list of consultations is set out in Appendix 3. 
1.30 The ALRC’s commitment to widespread community consultation also has a 
geographic dimension. Although the ALRC is based in Sydney, in recognition of the 
national character of the Commission, consultations have been conducted in other 
states and territories during the Inquiry.  
Community consultation documents 
1.31 The ALRC’s standard operating procedure is to produce two community 
consultation documents—an Issues Paper and a Discussion Paper—before proceeding 
to a final report with recommendations for reform. Each document invites submissions 
in relation to specific questions—in IP 33; and proposals—in DP 73. 
1.32 To facilitate access to the community consultation documents and to encourage 
participation in the Inquiry both consultation documents are available free of charge in 
hard copy or on CD, and can be downloaded free of charge from the ALRC’s website: 
www.alrc.gov.au. 
                                                        
25 B Opeskin, ‘Engaging the Public: Community Participation in the Genetic Information Inquiry’ (2002) 80 
Reform 53. 
26 Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth) s 38. 
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1.33 For this Inquiry, IP 33 was released on 23 April 2007 to commence the 
community consultation process on an informed basis. It was organised into seven 
chapters and asked 31 questions that the ALRC identified as arising out of the Terms 
of Reference. DP 73 was released on 26 September 2007. It contained nine chapters 
and 42 proposals for reform. 
1.34 IP 33 and DP 73 contained a significant amount of background and historical 
material, including a review of the current state of federal law in relation to coercive 
information-gathering powers of federal investigatory bodies (including Royal 
Commissions) as well as a review of the over 40 investigatory bodies themselves.  
1.35 Five hundred hard copies and 56 CD copies of IP 33, and 600 hard copies and 
35 CD copies of DP 73, were distributed during the course of the Inquiry.  
Written submissions 
1.36 This Inquiry has strongly encouraged interested persons and organisations to 
make written submissions to help advance the process of developing recommendations. 
The ALRC received 116 written submissions—76 in response to IP 33 and an 
additional 40 in response to DP 73. Lists of the submissions are set out in Appendix 2.  
1.37 The submissions addressed the issues and questions raised in IP 33 and the 
proposals in DP 73 and, in the case of federal investigatory bodies, also responded to 
questions specifically put to them by the ALRC concerning their use of their particular 
coercive information-gathering powers and their approach to privilege issues. Only 
three submissions have been designated as confidential, although some agencies 
indicated that parts of their submissions should be treated as confidential.   
1.38 Submissions were received from: federal investigatory bodies; individual 
lawyers; groups of companies or persons affected by the exercise of coercive 
information-gathering powers—for example, QBE Insurance Group and the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors; groups representative of persons affected by the 
exercise of coercive information-gathering powers—such as community legal centres 
and legal aid bodies; bodies representing particular groups of lawyers—such as the 
Australian Corporate Lawyers Association and the Insolvency Practitioners 
Association; bodies representative of professional groups of lawyers and accountants—
such as the Law Council of Australia, the NSW Bar Association, NSW Young 
Lawyers, the Law Society of NSW, the Taxation Institute of Australia and the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants; academics and law students.  
1.39 In response to DP 73, submissions also were received from bodies representing 
non-lawyers which had occasion to encounter privilege issues: two union groups—the 
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) and the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU)—in relation to industrial advocates; the Intellectual 
Property Research Institute of Australia (IPRIA)—in relation to patent attorneys; and 
the Australasian Compliance Institute—in relation to compliance reports. 
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1.40 The nature of submissions varied considerably, from short contributions singling 
out specific areas of the law or practice for comment, to long expository submissions 
prepared on behalf of representative bodies—for example those of the Law Council of 
Australia, the Institute of Chartered Accountants and the NSW Bar Association. Three 
submissions were from teams of pairs of law students who were selected as the 2007 
finalists for the Kirby Cup Law Reform competition, which this year focused on the 
topic of client legal privilege.27 A number of individuals, groups and federal bodies 
also made submissions both to IP 33 and DP 73. 
Implementation 
1.41 Once tabled in the Australian Parliament, this Report becomes a public 
document.28  
1.42 ALRC Reports are not self-executing documents. The ALRC is an advisory 
body and provides recommendations about the best way to proceed—but 
implementation is a matter for others.29  
1.43 As in other recent reports, the ALRC’s approach to law reform has involved a 
mix of strategies, including legislation and subordinate regulations; official standards 
and codes of practice; industry and professional guidelines; education and training 
programs; and so on. Although the final Report is presented to the Attorney-General, 
some of its recommendations are directed to other government agencies, professional 
associations and institutions, for action or consideration. 
1.44 Finally, it should be noted that, in the past, the ALRC often drafted legislation as 
the focus of its law reform effort. The ALRC’s practice has since changed, and it does 
not produce draft legislation unless specifically asked to do so in the Terms of 
Reference for a particular inquiry. This is partly because drafting is a specialised 
function better left to the parliamentary experts and partly because the ALRC’s time 
and resources are better directed towards determining the policy that will shape any 
resulting legislation. The ALRC has not been asked to produce draft legislation in this 
Inquiry, but its final recommendations specify the nature of any desired legislative 
change. 
                                                        
27  Information on the Kirby Cup is found at http://www.alrc.gov.au/events/events/kirbycup/guidelines.htm. 
28 The Attorney-General must table the Report within 15 sitting days of receiving it: Australian Law Reform 
Commission Act 1996 (Cth) s 23. 
29 However, the ALRC has a strong record of having its advice followed. About 59% of the Commission’s 
previous reports have been fully or substantially implemented, about 29% of reports have been partially 
implemented, 4% of reports are under consideration and 8% have had no implementation to date: 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Annual Report 2005–06, 38. 
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Overview of this Report 
1.45 This Report reflects the law and the policies of federal bodies as at 1 December 
2007. However, just before the completion of the Report, the ALRC learned that, from 
3 December 2007, ASIC’s policy is that people who are subject to its compulsory 
powers will be explicitly notified that they are not required to provide documents or 
information that are subject to a valid claim for client legal privilege. People who make 
such a claim are requested to provide specific details of the material over which the 
claim is made and the basis of the claim.30 
1.46 This Report is organised into nine chapters. Recommendations for reform are 
not spread evenly throughout. Some chapters provide mainly contextual or background 
material. Other chapters are focused more on the technical aspects of the law and 
practice and procedure—it is in these chapters that the reform recommendations are 
mainly found. 
1.47 Chapter 2 considers the two limbs of client legal privilege—the advice limb and 
the litigation limb—in light of the rationales that have been advanced for them. The 
chapter concludes that both limbs have an overarching rationale in the administration 
of justice and that the right to confidentiality in legal communications may be seen as 
part of the broader right of access to justice, and a protection of citizens against the 
state. The chapter also affirms that the doctrine of client legal privilege remains a 
fundamental principle of the common law and that insofar as problems have occurred 
in relation to claims of client legal privilege, the problem lies broadly in the area of 
practice and procedure—and not rationale. 
1.48 Chapter 3 describes the historical origins of the doctrine of client legal privilege 
and provides an overview of the current doctrine under the common law and the 
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)—when it can be claimed; when it cannot; and when it may be 
waived or abrogated. The chapter also includes a consideration of similar doctrines in a 
comparative and international context. The chapter then considers the operation of the 
common law fraud and crime exception to the privilege and the application of the 
privilege to corporations. 
1.49 Chapter 4 provides an overview of the investigatory and associated functions of 
many federal bodies that have coercive information-gathering or related powers, and 
the nature of those powers. The bodies discussed include those nominated in the Terms 
of Reference as well as a number of other federal agencies and departments.31 Where 
the information is available, the chapter addresses the frequency with which federal 
bodies use coercive powers and their policies in this regard. 
                                                        
30  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Correspondence, 11 December 2007; Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, Correspondence, 12 December 2007. 
31  The name of departments and agencies used in this Report were current as at 1 December 2007 prior to 
the issue of the Administrative Arrangements Order on 3 December 2007. 
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1.50 Chapter 5 considers the law on client legal privilege in the specific context of 
federal investigations. Legislative provisions that abrogate, modify or preserve the 
privilege, and significant cases dealing with the application of the privilege in federal 
investigations, are discussed. This chapter contains recommendations aimed at 
achieving greater clarity in the law on the application of privilege to federal coercive 
information-gathering powers. It also considers the issue of whether there needs to be 
greater consistency in the law on the application of privilege to those powers. A key 
recommendation in this chapter is that a statute of general application be enacted to 
cover various aspects of the law and procedure governing client legal privilege claims 
in federal investigations.  
1.51 Chapter 6 focuses on whether it is desirable to modify or abrogate client legal 
privilege in order to achieve a more effective performance of federal investigatory 
functions. The chapter considers some of the problems that arise from the application 
of client legal privilege to federal investigations and outlines arguments for and against 
modification or abrogation of the privilege as a means of addressing these problems. 
The chapter recommends a limited set of exceptional circumstances in which 
abrogation of the privilege is appropriate, these being Royal Commissions and 
investigations where there is a greater public interest in having all material available, 
and especially where legal advice is central to the issues under consideration. Chapter 6 
also considers the availability of otherwise privileged material to government 
‘watchdog’ bodies. Finally, the chapter considers whether privilege should be extended 
to non-lawyers who provide legal advice to clients and recommends the creation of a 
tax advice privilege which would protect the confidentially of tax advice given by 
independent professional accounting advisers, in a limited set of circumstances. 
1.52 Chapter 7 discusses the safeguards that ought to be put in place if client legal 
privilege is abrogated or modified. It considers restrictions on the use of otherwise 
privileged information obtained by compulsion, including use immunity and derivative 
use immunity provisions. A key recommendation in Chapter 7 is that there should be a 
default provision in federal client legal privilege legislation regulating the use of 
otherwise privileged information, which is to apply where a statute abrogating 
privilege is silent on the use of privileged information. The provision should contain a 
presumption against use which can be displaced in the court’s discretion having regard 
to specified factors. Chapter 7 also contains recommendations concerning the 
preservation of privilege against third parties, and the establishment of appropriate 
document management systems to handle documents subject to a privilege claim. 
1.53 Chapter 8 discusses the practice and procedure for making and resolving client 
legal privilege claims in federal investigations, including consideration of particular 
issues pertaining to electronic material and the execution of search warrants. The 
chapter considers the respective obligations of federal bodies exercising coercive 
information-gathering powers, and the persons subject to those powers. The ALRC 
recommends that federal bodies should notify persons about whether or not client legal 
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privilege applies to the exercise of a particular power. A key recommendation is for the 
establishment of a procedure for the making of privilege claims. This would give 
federal bodies legislative authority to seek particulars of privileged communications 
withheld from production. Other recommendations also seek to achieve transparency, 
clarity and uniformity in procedures, as well as reducing delay. In particular, the ALRC 
recommends that there be a model scheme for resolving privilege disputes which is to 
include a number of specified features; one of which is to allow a federal body the 
discretion to offer a claimant an opportunity to agree to an independent review process. 
1.54 Finally, Chapter 9 raises issues concerning ensuring professional integrity in 
relation to claims of client legal privilege focusing, in particular, on the role of 
professional disciplinary proceedings, legal ethics and education. The chapter 
concludes that alleged abuses of claims of client legal privilege are best considered 
within existing disciplinary frameworks—rather than a specific penalty regime—and 
recommends that professional conduct rules provide specific guidance about making 
and maintaining claims of client legal privilege. The chapter also recommends 
enhancing the legal ethics requirements in rules for admission to practise as a lawyer 
and legal continuing education programs to provide specific consideration of the 
lawyer’s responsibility in relation to claims of client legal privilege.  
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The need to identify rationale 
2.1 As the Inquiry considers the application of client legal privilege in the context of 
federal bodies—and questions of abrogation and modification—it necessarily touches 
on the underlying justifications of the doctrine itself. The ALRC agrees with Dr Sue 
McNicol that, in this Inquiry, ‘the rationale should provide the foundation, the 
justification and the explanation for the privilege’.1 This should result in ‘a happy 
marriage between the privilege and its rationale’, 
so that when the privilege is looking to be delimited or extended by the courts, the 
rationale can be resorted to as a solid foundation against which to test the proposed 
delimitation or extension. If consistency cannot be achieved between the proposed 
delimitation or extension of the privilege on the one hand and the enshrined rationale 
on the other, then a strong case should be made out before the scope of the privilege is 
altered.2 
2.2 The challenge of connecting underlying rationale to contemporary doctrine is a 
significant one, as the consequences of a successful claim of client legal privilege can 
be profound. To quote McNicol again:  
The effect of a successful claim to privilege is often that information which may be 
vital and relevant to the proper administration of justice is suppressed. Hence it is 
                                                        
1  S McNicol, ‘Implications of the Human Right Rationale for Legal Professional Privilege—The Demise of 
Implied Statutory Abrogation?’ in P Mirfield and R Smith (eds), Essays for Colin Tapper (2003) 48, 65. 
2  Ibid, 65. 
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important to ascertain whether there are worthwhile rationales behind each head of 
privilege such that each privilege can be defended against the valid competing claims 
of the proper administration of justice. It may be that an exploration of the rationales 
behind each of the existing privileges leads to the conclusion that the law has gone too 
far in protecting certain interests against interference from the legal process. On the 
other hand, it may be decided that the law has not gone far enough in that there are 
other legitimate interests which the law has failed to protect under the head of 
privilege. Many of the conclusions reached will depend upon where one strikes the 
balance between the utilitarian philosophy that all relevant information should be 
available to legal officials in order to achieve justice properly and fairly and the 
libertarian philosophy that individual rights and interests should be protected against 
undue interference from the law.3 
2.3 Identifying the relevant rationale for privilege in each particular set of 
circumstances may assist in meeting the complementary concerns that, on the one 
hand, client legal privilege is ‘travelling beyond the underlying rationale to which it is 
intended to give expression’;4 and, on the other, that ‘the underlying rationale is 
travelling beyond the necessary application of the privilege’.5 
2.4 Questioning rationale also assists the consideration of any reform and the shape 
it might take. As Professor Andrew Paizes commented: 
How do you apply a legal concept that is the product of an outmoded rationale and a 
flawed philosophy to situations which are the product of new socio-political realities? 
Do you adapt the concept to meet the demands of a changing world by adding patches 
to its worn and faded fabric, stretching and stitching it in ways unimagined by its 
original designer? Or do you fashion the material anew, tailoring it precisely to fit the 
exigencies of fresh demands?6  
A range of rationales 
2.5 A range of rationales has been offered for client legal privilege, all within an 
overarching justification of ‘public interest’, variously expressed. Interwoven in the 
‘public interest’ arguments is the element of the private interest of clients in being 
assured of the confidentiality of their communications with legal advisers. The threads 
of rationale often intertwine and interlock; different aspects of rationale may be seen to 
support claims of client legal privilege in relation to the particular materials and 
communications under consideration at any given time.7  
2.6 Chapter 1 of the Issues Paper, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory 
Bodies (IP 33), considered arguments for and against client legal privilege within the 
                                                        
3  S McNicol, Law of Privilege (1992), 1. 
4  Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674, 688. 
5  S McNicol, ‘Implications of the Human Right Rationale for Legal Professional Privilege—The Demise of 
Implied Statutory Abrogation?’ in P Mirfield and R Smith (eds), Essays for Colin Tapper (2003) 48, 64. 
6  A Paizes, ‘Towards a Broader Balancing of Interests: Exploring the Theoretical Foundations of the Legal 
Professional Privilege’ (1989) 106 South African Law Journal 109, 128. 
7  Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence, ALRC 26 (1985), [877]. 
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broad context of public interest.8 As the majority of submissions and consultations—
considered further below—strongly endorsed the retention of the doctrine in the 
context of federal investigations, this section explores the arguments in favour of the 
doctrine in more detail. 
2.7 Client legal privilege has two distinct limbs: ‘advice privilege’ and ‘litigation 
privilege’. These are considered in detail in Chapter 3. While the limbs have different 
origins, the arguments in support have drawn increasingly together. Arguments in 
favour of client legal privilege can be grouped broadly under two separate headings—
‘instrumental rationales’ and ‘rights-based rationales’. 
Instrumental rationales 
2.8 Instrumental rationales focus upon the outcome served by the particular doctrine 
in question. In the context of client legal privilege, the broadest instrumental argument 
is that client legal privilege is a necessary aspect of the administration of justice.9 The 
High Court in Grant v Downs expressed it as follows: 
The rationale of this head of privilege, according to traditional doctrine, is that it 
promotes the public interest because it assists and enhances the administration of 
justice by facilitating the representation of clients by legal advisers, the law being a 
complex and complicated discipline. This it does by keeping secret their 
communications, thereby inducing the client to retain the solicitor and seek his advice, 
and encouraging the client to make a full and frank disclosure of the relevant 
circumstances to the solicitor. The existence of the privilege reflects, to the extent to 
which it is accorded, the paramountcy of this public interest over a more general 
public interest, that which requires that in the interests of a fair trial litigation should 
be conducted on the footing that all relevant documentary evidence is available.10 
2.9 The instrumental rationale of the administration of justice is reflected in a 
number of sub-themes, principally: 
• encouraging full and frank disclosure; 
• encouraging compliance; 
• discouraging litigation and encouraging settlement; and 
• promoting the efficient operation of the adversarial system. 
                                                        
8  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007). 
9  J Auburn, Legal Professional Privilege: Law and Theory (2000), 1; S McNicol, ‘Implications of the 
Human Right Rationale for Legal Professional Privilege—The Demise of Implied Statutory Abrogation?’ 
in P Mirfield and R Smith (eds), Essays for Colin Tapper (2003) 48, 48.  
10  Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674, 685. 
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Encouraging full and frank disclosure 
2.10 The protection of the communications between a client and his or her lawyer is 
said to foster a candid relationship. Hence a client would be discouraged from making 
full and frank disclosure of all relevant facts unless the confidential nature of the 
communication were assured. This was expressed in 1833 by Lord Brougham in 
Greenough v Gaskell in this way: 
It is out of regard to the interests of justice, which cannot go on without the aid of 
men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the courts, and in those matters 
affecting rights and obligations which form the subject of all judicial proceedings. If a 
privilege did not exist at all, everyone would be thrown on his own legal resources. 
Deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not venture to consult any skilful 
person, or would only dare to tell his counsellor half his case.11 
2.11 In the High Court of Australia case of Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice, Mason 
and Brennan JJ commented similarly that: 
The raison d’être of legal professional privilege is the furtherance of the 
administration of justice through the fostering of trust and candour in the relationship 
between lawyer and client.12 
2.12 This rationale suggests, therefore, that by protecting lawyer-client 
communications, the value and integrity of those communications is ensured. This is a 
predominant theme in discussions of the instrumental rationale of client legal 
privilege.13 
Encouraging compliance 
2.13 As clients can obtain the fullest legal advice only where the lawyer is in 
possession of all relevant facts, the protection of communications is said to encourage 
greater compliance with the law, as the client is in the best position to be informed as 
to what amounts to complying conduct. In Baker v Campbell, Wilson J stated that: 
It is not only a matter of protection of the client. The freedom to consult one’s legal 
adviser in the knowledge that confidential communications will be safeguarded will 
often make its own contribution to the general level of respect for and observance of 
the law within the community.14 
2.14 The argument is that where clients feel secure that their communications with 
their lawyers will be kept confidential, it is likely to promote the disclosure of all 
relevant information and thus permit lawyers to provide legal advice that encourages 
                                                        
11  Greenough v Gaskell (1833) 39 ER 618, 621. 
12  Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475, 487. 
13  S McNicol, ‘Implications of the Human Right Rationale for Legal Professional Privilege—The Demise of 
Implied Statutory Abrogation?’ in P Mirfield and R Smith (eds), Essays for Colin Tapper (2003) 48, 48; J 
Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law (3rd ed, 
1940), 542–545. 
14  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 95. See also Carter v Northmore Hale Davey & Leake (1995) 183 
CLR 121, 127–128. 
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the greatest compliance with the law. Dr Jonathan Auburn notes the broader social 
impact of the doctrine in stating that: 
The rationale is concerned with many benefits beyond those accruing to the client. 
Society benefits through, for example, increased compliance with the law, greater 
efficiency for attorneys in the adversary system, an easing of the burden on courts 
and, arguably, greater accuracy of fact-finding.15 
Discouraging litigation or encouraging settlement 
2.15 It is sometimes suggested that litigation is avoided if all facts are placed before 
the legal adviser. Conversely, litigation is increased if the client ‘cautiously avoids any 
statement except that which he thinks will support his cause’.16  
2.16 In suggesting that the object of fostering the administration of justice was a 
wider notion than the demands of the adversarial system in judicial and quasi-judicial 
proceedings, Wilson J in Baker v Campbell, stated that: 
The perfect administration of justice is not confined to legal proceedings. The object 
and indeed the result of consulting a solicitor will often be the settlement of a dispute 
which otherwise may have had to be fought out in court. The fostering of a 
professional relationship which obviates recourse to litigation is very much in the 
public interest.17 
2.17 The settlement of disputes is dependent on successful negotiations, requiring ‘a 
fully briefed lawyer who can give the client a frank assessment of his or her prospects 
in court’.18 
Promoting the efficient operation of the adversarial system 
2.18 While the first limb of client legal privilege—the advice limb—has emphasised 
the ‘trust and candour’ argument, the litigation limb has emphasised the ‘protection of 
the brief’, ensuring the confidentiality of the information (brief) of each party from 
disclosure to the other side.19 This is considered fundamental to the effective operation 
                                                        
15  J Auburn, Legal Professional Privilege: Law and Theory (2000), 13–14 (notes omitted). Reinforcing 
responsible corporate practice through a culture of compliance has also been identified by Professor 
R Baxt in the context of an assessment of penalties for breach of continuous disclosure obligations: R 
Baxt, ‘Compliance Will Reduce Penalties for Non-Disclosure’ (2006) 2(5) Baxt Report 6; and see 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission; Re Chemeq Ltd v Chemeq Ltd (2006) 234 ALR 511. 
16  M Radin, ‘The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client’ (1927–1928) 16 
California Law Review 487, 491. Radin maintains that this is Wigmore’s view. 
17  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 94. 
18  J Hunter, C Cameron and T Henning, Litigation I—Civil Procedure (7th ed, 2005), [8.10]. 
19  McNicol links client legal privilege with the privilege against self-incrimination and without prejudice 
privilege as fundamentally connected with the accusatorial system itself, hence being described at times 
as ‘litigation-based’ privileges: S McNicol, Law of Privilege (1992), 2, also citing M Aronson, J Hunter 
and M Weinberg, Litigation: Evidence and Procedure (4th ed, 1988), 281. See Australian Law Reform 
Commission, Evidence, ALRC 26 (1985), 495–6. 
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of the accusatorial or adversarial system itself.20 As Roskill LJ explained in Causton v 
Mann Egerton (Johnsons) Ltd: 
So long as there is an adversary system, a party is entitled not to produce documents 
which are properly protected by privilege if it is not to his advantage to produce them, 
and even though their production might assist his adversary if his adversary or his 
solicitor were aware of their contents, or might lead the court to a different conclusion 
from that to which the court would come in ignorance of their existence.21 
2.19 This logic is also reflected in the ‘work-product’ aspect of the privilege doctrine 
in the United States. This was referred to by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in 
Woods (t/as Turner Freeman) v Hanoldt:  
During the hearing Handley JA referred to a passage in an article on ‘Discovery of 
Documents’ … [where it was said that] ‘If a party’s solicitor can secure useful 
material, not by his own efforts, but simply by raiding that secured by the solicitor for 
the opposing party, then neither will have much incentive to individual diligence in 
gathering together such material, at least before the trial. As Maguire once said ‘…we 
must not let the drones sponge upon the busy bees. Otherwise it would not be long 
before all lawyers became drones.’: JM McGuire Evidence: Common Sense and 
Common Law Chicago, Foundation Press, 1947 at 91.’ 
That is entirely apt and while it expresses no principle of law it is good sense. 
Solicitors should not, as a general rule, be permitted to secure by subpoena the fruits 
of the labour of other solicitors, thereby avoiding the necessity to undertake for 
themselves the burden of securing evidence for presentation at trial, particularly 
where there is a readily available source which involves the invasion of no-one’s 
rights.22 
2.20 The privilege has been extended beyond the communications between the 
lawyer and the client to cover third party communications obtained as ‘part of the 
brief’,23 or ‘the brief in action’,24 and connected to litigation. It was considered 
‘necessary’ to prepare the brief properly; were it otherwise, ‘it would be impossible to 
employ a solicitor to obtain the evidence and information necessary to support a 
case’.25 
An overarching rationale 
2.21 While there are particular arguments for each of the two limbs of privilege, there 
are common elements of justification that may be seen to comprise one overarching 
rationale. In Carter v The Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davy and Leake 
                                                        
20  S McNicol, Law of Privilege (1992), 1. 
21  Causton v Mann Egerton (Johnsons) Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 453, 460. See also S McNicol, Law of Privilege 
(1992), 2. 
22  Woods (t/as Turner Freeman) v Hanoldt (1995) 11 NSW CCR 161, 171–172. 
23  N Williams, ‘Discovery of Civil Litigation Trial Preparation in Canada’ (1980) 58(1) The Canadian Bar 
Review 1, 44; J Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common 
Law (3rd ed, 1940), [2294]. 
24  Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675, 685. 
25  Re Thomas Holloway (1887) 12 PD 167, 170. 
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(Carter), for example, Brennan CJ expressed the ‘the basic justification for allowing 
the privilege’, as ‘the public interest in facilitating the application of the rule of law’.26 
2.22 As McNicol notes, the arguments in support of each limb have been increasingly 
conflated, with the result that 
one is left with a broad rationale which furthers and promotes both the administration 
of justice and an effective adversary system of litigation. Legal professional privilege 
is said to achieve both these objectives by, first fostering candour and trust in the 
lawyer-client relationship, and secondly, protecting the information of each party 
from disclosure to the other side.27 
2.23 This conflation or blurring of the distinction between the limbs is evident in 
Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Pratt) where Stone J indicated 
that the advice limb of privilege could extend to third party communications. 
If … the policy implicit in the rationale for legal professional privilege is not to be 
subverted, the dominant purpose criterion must be applied recognising that the 
situations in which people need legal advice are increasingly complex and that the 
client may need the assistance of third party experts if he or she is to be able to 
instruct the legal adviser appropriately.28 
Distinguishing the limbs 
2.24 Notwithstanding this blurring of the rationales for each limb under a broad 
instrumental justification, arguments still arise that express the limbs in distinct 
terms—particularly in the consideration of third party communications. As Pincus J 
explained in Dingle v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia—decided before 
Pratt—if the rationale of client legal privilege is the preservation of confidentiality of 
communications between clients and their lawyers, then there are difficulties in 
justifying the protection of third party communications: 
The difficulty about this body of doctrine, in so far as it protects communications 
other than between solicitor and client, is simply that it is not defensible as preserving 
the confidentiality of communications between solicitor and client. For that reason, 
the relevant rules may, in the end, be held to be more soundly based on a separate and 
narrower principle, namely that a party is not in general bound to reveal to the court 
statements taken from witnesses and the like for the purposes of litigation. … That 
principle was expressed by James LJ in Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) 
2 Ch D 644 at 656: ‘… that as you have no right to see your adversary’s brief, you 
have no right to see that which comes into existence merely as the materials for the 
brief’.29 
                                                        
26  Carter v Northmore Hale Davey & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121, 129. 
27  S McNicol, Law of Privilege (1992), 48–49; and S McNicol, ‘Implications of the Human Right Rationale 
for Legal Professional Privilege—The Demise of Implied Statutory Abrogation?’ in P Mirfield and R 
Smith (eds), Essays for Colin Tapper (2003) 48. 
28  Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 207 ALR 217, [87]. See Ch 3. 
29  Dingle v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia (1989) 91 ALR 239, 242. 
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2.25 Statements such as these suggest separate rationales for the two limbs of the 
doctrine, rather than one blended rationale and that client legal privilege ‘properly so 
called’ should be distinguished from the question of protecting communications that 
have come into existence for the purpose of litigation.30 
2.26 In Public Transport Authority of Western Australia v Leighton Contractors Pty 
Ltd,31 the Court of Appeal of Western Australia considered whether the two limbs of 
privilege expressed different rationales. 
2.27 The issue arose in the context of litigation over a contract for the construction of 
a railway by Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd. The Public Transport Authority (PTA) 
engaged the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) to produce a table that was relevant 
to a ‘rise and fall’ provision. The PTA’s solicitors obtained witness statements from 
ABS employees. The relevant documents sought through discovery concerned 
communications between the PTA’s solicitors and the ABS or its solicitors and internal 
communications between ABS employees for the purpose of preparing witness 
statements for the proceedings. The claim for privilege related to draft statements of 
witnesses and communications concerning them. 
2.28 A central issue was whether such documents lay outside the scope of client legal 
privilege. The PTA submitted that the rationale for the two categories of privilege was 
different and, in consequence, that confidentiality was not a necessary condition of 
litigation privilege.  
2.29 In considering this submission, the Court of Appeal noted that ‘the High Court 
has yet to make clear whether litigation privilege has an existence and rationale distinct 
from advice privilege’.32 
2.30 While there was prior authority in Western Australia that suggested that 
litigation privilege did not require that communications between an independent 
witness and the lawyer be confidential,33 the Court of Appeal referred to the ‘numerous 
general statements’ which were ‘to the effect that the privilege only attached to 
confidential communications’.34 
2.31 In reviewing the arguments in the case, the Court of Appeal commented on the 
question of rationale, saying that ‘litigation privilege is recognised in this jurisdiction 
                                                        
30  Ibid, 242. 
31  Public Transport Authority of Western Australia v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 151. 
32  Ibid, [20]. 
33  Southern Equities Corporation Ltd v West Australian Government Holdings Ltd (1993) 10 WAR 1. 
34  Ibid, [22].  
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as a separate category of legal professional privilege with a different rationale to that of 
advice privilege’.35 
2.32 The Court referred to two Canadian cases that had quoted with approval 
comments from a lecture by RJ Sharpe on claiming privilege in the discovery process, 
distinguishing the two limbs of privilege: 
… the rationale for solicitor-client privilege is very different from that which 
underlies litigation privilege … 
Litigation privilege aims to facilitate a process (namely, the adversary process), while 
solicitor-client privilege aims to protect a relationship (namely, the confidential 
relationship between a lawyer and a client).36 
2.33 In support of the width of litigation privilege, the Court of Appeal referred to the 
‘lawyer’s brief’ rule, protecting the lawyer’s preparation of a client’s case, linking the 
‘reason for the rule’ to the adversarial proceeding. This ‘reason’ was described as the 
‘rationale’.37 
2.34 Considering each limb of client legal privilege as against its particular 
background may provide a useful basis for comparison of the doctrine in its common 
law form with similar or analogous doctrines in the civil law. This is considered further 
in Chapter 3. 
Rights-based rationales 
2.35 The language of ‘rights’ has appeared increasingly in discussions, both judicial 
and academic, concerning client legal privilege. This arises both in terms of privacy 
rights and rights of access to justice. 
Protecting privacy 
2.36 One thread in discussions of rationale places emphasis on the privacy of the 
client against intrusion by, for example, the state. This can be seen in the judgment of 
Murphy J in Baker v Campbell: 
The client’s legal privilege is essential for the orderly and dignified conduct of 
individual affairs in a social atmosphere which is being poisoned by official and 
unofficial eavesdropping and other invasions of privacy. The individual should be 
                                                        
35  Public Transport Authority of Western Australia v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 151, 
[13], referring to Southern Equities Corporation Ltd v West Australian Government Holdings Ltd (1993) 
10 WAR 1. 
36  In particular, Solosky v The Queen (1979) 105 DLR (3d) 745; Descôteaux v Mierzwinski (1982) 141 DLR 
(3d) 590: Public Transport Authority of Western Australia v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd [2007] 
WASCA 151, [16]; and citing R Sharpe, ‘Claiming Privilege in the Discovery Process’ in Law in 
Transition: Evidence, LSUC Special Lectures (1984), 164–165. 
37  Public Transport Authority of Western Australia v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 151, 
[13]. 
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able to seek and obtain legal advice and legal assistance for innocent purposes, 
without the fear that what has been prepared solely for that advice or assistance may 
be searched or seized under warrant. Denying the privilege against a search warrant 
would have a minimal effect in securing convictions but a major damaging effect on 
the relationship between the legal profession and its clients. It would engender an 
atmosphere in which citizens feel that their private papers are insecure and that 
relationships they previously thought confidential are no longer safe from police 
intrusion. As Douglas J stated in Couch v United States, ‘The constitutional fences of 
law are being broken down by an ever-increasingly powerful Government that seeks 
to reduce every person to a digit’.38 
2.37 A focus on the importance of client legal privilege in protecting the privacy of 
the individual is similarly reflected in the comment of Wilson J in Baker v Campbell, 
that ‘the adequate protection according to law of the privacy and liberty of the 
individual is an essential mark of a free society’.39 
2.38 The concern for privacy goes beyond the protection of the confidential 
relationship of lawyer and client to protecting the individual from intrusion from state 
agencies. As Deane J commented in Baker v Campbell: 
[The principle of client legal privilege] represents some protection of the citizen—
particularly the weak, the unintelligent and the ill-informed citizen—against the 
leviathan of the modern state. Without it, there can be no assurance that those in need 
of independent legal advice to cope with the demands and intricacies of modern law 
will be able to obtain it without the risk of prejudice and damage by subsequent 
compulsory disclosure on the demand of any administrative officer with some general 
statutory authority to obtain information or seize documents.40 
2.39 The protection of the privacy of the lawyer also was identified in Woods (t/as 
Turner Freeman) v Hanoldt, where the New South Wales Court of Appeal cited a 
passage from the United States case of Hickman v Taylor,41 that: 
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the 
advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. 
In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a 
certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and 
their counsel. Proper preparation of a client’s case demands that he assemble 
information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare 
his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. That 
is the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of 
our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients’ interests.42  
                                                        
38  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 89. 
39  Ibid, 95. See Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence, ALRC 26 (1985), [877] and Australian Law 
Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 102 (2005), [14.44]. 
40  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 120. 
41  Hickman v Taylor (1946) 329 US 495, 510. The decision was described as ‘the seminal decision’ of the 
Supreme Court in its development of the work product doctrine: C Tapper, ‘Discovery of Documents’ 
(1991) 107 Law Quarterly Review 370, 372. 
42  Woods (t/as Turner Freeman) v Hanoldt (1995) 11 NSW CCR 161, 172. 
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Protecting access to justice 
2.40 The decision in Baker v Campbell43 clearly signalled that the doctrine of client 
legal privilege in Australia was not confined to judicial and quasi-judicial 
proceedings—and hence was more than ‘a mere rule of evidence’.44 Since then, the 
trend in Australian cases has been to include the language of ‘rights’ in speaking of the 
rationale of client legal privilege. 
2.41 In Baker v Campbell, for example, Deane J commented that:  
the general and substantive principle underlying legal professional privilege is of 
fundamental importance to the protection and preservation of the rights, dignity and 
equality of the ordinary citizen under the law in that it is a precondition of full and 
unreserved communication with his lawyer.45 
2.42 In Carter, Deane J echoed this in describing client legal privilege as ‘not a mere 
rule of evidence but … a substantive and fundamental common law principle’.46  
2.43 The common thread in such judgments is that client legal privilege plays a role 
in enforcing rights, rather than being a right in itself. In this way it is facilitative of 
rights, or as Toohey J commented in the Carter case, ‘of fundamental importance to 
the protection and preservation of the right, dignity and equality of the ordinary citizen 
under the law’.47 Such statements are also echoed in comments of Commissioner Cole 
in the AWB Royal Commission, in describing ‘the fundamental right of persons to 
obtain legal advice under conditions of confidentiality’.48  
2.44 The statement in the European Court of Justice case, AM & S Europe Ltd v 
Commission of the European Communities (AM & S Europe), that privilege may be 
seen as ‘a practical guarantee of fundamental, constitutional or human rights’,49 is often 
cited in discussions of rationale.50 The manner in which privilege acts as such a 
guarantee is explained in the judgment of Toulson J in General Mediterranean 
Holdings v Patel: 
                                                        
43  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. 
44  Carter v Northmore Hale Davey & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121, 132. Auburn criticises the use of 
‘evidence’ here, saying that the rule is a rule of evidence, ‘albeit a strong one with a broad reach beyond 
the doors of the courtroom’: J Auburn, Legal Professional Privilege: Law and Theory (2000), 31–32. 
45  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 118. 
46  Carter v Northmore Hale Davey & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121, 132. 
47  Ibid, 145. 
48  T Cole, Report of the Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme (2006), [7.66]. 
49  AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1983] 1 QB 878, 941. 
50  For example, Carter v Northmore Hale Davey & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121, 161 (McHugh J); Goldberg 
v Ng (1995) 185 CLR 83, 121 (Gummow J); The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543, [84] (Kirby J). 
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In summary, the common law (1) recognises the right to legal confidentiality which 
arises as between a person and his legal adviser (save where the client is trying to use 
the relationship for an unlawful purpose) as a matter of substantive law, and (2) 
regards it as a right of great constitutional importance, because it is seen as a 
necessary bulwark of the citizen’s right of access to justice whether as a claimant or 
defendant. Legal professional privilege is an attribute or manifestation of that right. It 
is also, as Lord Taylor CJ said in R v Derby Magistrates’ Court, ex p B [1995] 4 All 
ER 526, [1996] AC 487 much more than an ordinary rule of evidence, being 
considered a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice rests.51 
2.45 The analysis of client legal privilege in terms of a right of access to justice de-
emphasises the distinction between the advice and litigation limbs of the common law 
doctrine. For example, in Carter, in searching for a rationale that linked both limbs of 
the doctrine, McHugh J commented that: 
By protecting the confidentiality of communications between lawyer and client, the 
doctrine protects the rights and privacy of persons including corporations by ensuring 
unreserved freedom of communication with professional lawyers who can advise 
them of their rights under the law and, where necessary, take action on their behalf to 
defend or enforce those rights. The doctrine is a natural, if not necessary, corollary of 
the rule of law and a potent force for ensuring that the equal protection of the law is a 
reality.52 
2.46 In Daniels, the High Court used the term ‘right’ but explained it in the sense of 
an ‘immunity’, as evident in the joint judgment of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ: 
Legal professional privilege is not merely a rule of substantive law. It is an important 
common law right or, perhaps, more accurately, an important common law immunity. 
It is now well settled that statutory provisions are not to be construed as abrogating 
important common law rights, privileges and immunities in the absence of clear 
words or a necessary implication to that effect.53 
2.47 Similarly, McHugh J noted that: 
Legal professional privilege describes a person’s immunity from compulsion to 
produce documents that evidence confidential communications about legal matters 
made between a lawyer and client or between a lawyer and a third party for the 
benefit of the client. The immunity also protects the disclosure of documents that 
record legal work carried out by the lawyer for the benefit of a client, such as research 
memoranda. The immunity embodies a substantive legal right.54 
                                                        
51  General Mediterranean Holdings v Patel [1999] 3 All ER 673, 688. 
52  Carter v Northmore Hale Davey & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121, 161. McHugh J drew upon, inter alia, 
Canadian cases such as Solosky v The Queen (1979) 105 DLR (3d) 745 and Descôteaux v Mierzwinski 
(1982) 141 DLR (3d) 590. Auburn argues that Solosky has been misread and that it does not support a 
rights-based rationale, rather merely shifting the time at which the privilege can be asserted: J Auburn, 
Legal Professional Privilege: Law and Theory (2000), 20. 
53  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543, [11] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
54  Ibid, [44]. 
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A right in itself 
2.48 In Daniels, Kirby J progressed from speaking of client legal privilege as a 
doctrine that was protective of rights (as in AM & S Europe)55 to describing it in terms 
of a right in and of itself: 
In so far as this Court has dealt with the topic of legal professional privilege, save for 
Yuill, it has consistently emphasised the importance of the privilege as a basic 
doctrine of the law and a ‘practical guarantee of fundamental rights’, not simply a rule 
of evidence law applicable to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. It has been 
increasingly accepted that legal professional privilege is an important civil right to be 
safeguarded by the law. Of course, derogations appropriate to the needs of a 
democratic society may be contemplated. However, vigilance is required against 
accidental and unintended erosions of the right. 
Legal professional privilege is also an important human right deserving of special 
protection for that reason.56  
2.49 Similarly, in R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income 
Tax (Morgan Grenfell) Lord Hoffman spoke in terms of ‘human rights’, describing 
client legal privilege as ‘a fundamental human right long established in the common 
law’.57 
2.50 International law may provide an avenue for analysis in terms of human rights. 
Article 14 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for basic 
minimum rights to an accused; and articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provide for the right to a fair 
trial and the right to respect for private and family life.58 
2.51 Some common law jurisdictions also have superimposed Bills or Charters of 
Rights upon the common law. These may provide an avenue for rights-based analyses 
of client legal privilege, directly or indirectly. So, for example, s10(b) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms grants the right ‘on arrest or detention … to retain and 
instruct counsel’.59 Similarly, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides the 
right of access to a lawyer and the right to representation; and in Hong Kong, client 
legal privilege is protected as a constitutional right under the Basic Law.60 In Victoria, 
                                                        
55  AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1983] 1 QB 878; see above, [2.44]. 
56  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543, [85]–[86] (Kirby J). 
57  R (Morgan Grenfell) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2003] 1 AC 563, [7]. 
58  See the discussion of these articles in, eg, J Auburn, Legal Professional Privilege: Law and Theory 
(2000), ch 3, ‘Privilege under the European Convention on Human Rights’. 
59  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 7, 8, 10(b), 11(c) and 11(d) protect the right to full answer 
and defence, the right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence and 
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the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 provides that a person has the 
right not to have his or her privacy or correspondence unlawfully or arbitrarily 
interfered with;61 and a right to a fair hearing and to communicate with his or her 
lawyer in criminal proceedings.62 
Consequences of rights analysis 
2.52 Characterising client legal privilege as a doctrine fundamental to the common 
law, using the language of ‘rights’, has two consequences: first, its application is not 
restricted to court proceedings; and, second, it cannot be overridden except by the clear 
language of parliament to that effect. This was the essence of the Australian decisions 
in Baker v Campbell63 and then in Daniels,64—but it has the potential to go much 
further.65 
2.53 Where client legal privilege is seen as a principle or tenet of the common law, it 
is, as such, amenable to re-interpretation, modification and abrogation by statute. 
Where it is seen as a civil or human right, there is, as McNicol argues, potentially a 
radical shift in thinking towards a ‘rights-based’ rationale.66  
2.54 The rights analysis may have particularly significant consequences in relation to 
questions of abrogation.67 Once Lord Hoffmann in Morgan Grenfell described client 
legal privilege as a human right, McNicol considered that he had ‘locked himself in’ to 
the view that client legal privilege is ‘virtually immutable or untouchable’.68 When a 
court has to consider the issue of abrogation, it therefore has ‘a stark choice’: 
It could start with a concentration on the common law human right that is now said to 
be the basis of legal professional privilege or it could start with a focus on the words 
of the statute and the overall purpose of the legislation. … [However] this latter task 
… is both redundant and artificial if the court has started with the proposition that 
legal professional privilege is a fundamental human right.69 
2.55 A human rights approach also raises the issue of the application of the doctrine 
to corporations. As McNicol argues, 
if the instrumental rationale of encouraging candour and trust in the lawyer-client 
relationship is the favoured rationale, then … clearly corporations should be entitled 
to the benefit of legal professional privilege … If, however, the human right rationale 
                                                        
61  Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 13(a). 
62  Ibid ss 24, 25(2)(b). 
63  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. 
64  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543. 
65  S McNicol, ‘Implications of the Human Right Rationale for Legal Professional Privilege—The Demise of 
Implied Statutory Abrogation?’ in P Mirfield and R Smith (eds), Essays for Colin Tapper (2003) 48. 
66  See Ibid. 
67  See Ch 6. 
68  S McNicol, ‘Implications of the Human Right Rationale for Legal Professional Privilege—The Demise of 
Implied Statutory Abrogation?’ in P Mirfield and R Smith (eds), Essays for Colin Tapper (2003) 48, 61. 
69  Ibid, 62. 
 2. Rationale of Client Legal Privilege 61 
 
for privilege is treated as the predominant rationale, it is less clear that corporations 
should be entitled to the benefit of the privilege.70 
2.56 The introduction of ‘rights’ language into the discussion of the rationale for 
client legal privilege has not gone uncriticised. For example, in Carter, Brennan CJ 
expressly rejected aspects of the use of rights terminology, saying ‘I do not subscribe 
to the view that legal professional privilege is a fundamental human right which 
sterilises the operation of any law which infringes it’.71  
2.57 In his study of the law and theory of client legal privilege, Auburn distinguishes 
between situations where client legal privilege has been entrenched through an 
instrument; and where it is a matter of common law doctrine. Of the former, he states: 
Where a human rights instrument expressly provides for, or has been interpreted as 
providing for, a right to legal professional privilege, or some other form of 
professional secrecy which is capable of overriding compulsion by a court or agency 
of the executive, then the privilege may rest on a constitutional or statutorily 
entrenched right, and the scope of this constitutional or statutory protection may be 
determined largely by reference to the provision establishing the right and its 
associated jurisprudence.72 
2.58 In contrast, where there is no constitutional or statutory basis for the protection 
of confidential communications between a client and his or her lawyer, the nature, 
scope and rationale of the privilege are found in the common law. 
2.59 Auburn argues that the use of a rights analysis in the common law cases is not 
particularly convincing:  
The stated approach in cases which decided the extra-curial applicability of the 
privilege was to look first to the privilege’s underlying rationale, and then apply the 
rationale to the novel fact situation. However in reality the exercise was conducted the 
other way round. Courts decided that the privilege should apply to search warrants, 
and then fashioned a new rationale to justify this extension. The implicit logic 
advanced is that once the privilege applied beyond the threat of disclosure in court, 
then it must be a common law right.73 
2.60 Further, Auburn maintains that rights-based reasoning is unnecessary to achieve 
the expansion of the doctrine and that simply emphasising the importance of the rule as 
a common law doctrine is enough.74 This is supported by statements to the effect that, 
                                                        
70  Ibid, 63. The application of client legal privilege to corporations is considered in Ch 3. 
71  Carter v Northmore Hale Davey & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121, 129. 
72  J Auburn, Legal Professional Privilege: Law and Theory (2000), 16. 
73  Ibid, 29. 
74  Ibid, 18. 
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irrespective of statutory human rights provisions, the common law privilege has, in any 
event, developed into a substantive common law right.75   
2.61 Auburn suggests that the relationship between human rights legislation and the 
common law privilege is far from clear and ‘the way in which the common law 
privilege doctrine fits within [the] new rights framework has never been adequately 
settled’.76 The elevation of common law doctrine into the constitutional, or rights, 
arena, arguably makes issues of abrogation more complex and difficult.77  
Submissions and consultations 
Questions posed 
2.62 In IP 33, the ALRC posed a number of questions in relation to the rationale for 
client legal privilege in Australia today. It sought comment on the following: 
• What are the best contemporary rationales for the doctrine of client legal 
privilege? 
• Does client legal privilege serve broad ‘public interests’? What is/are they? 
Does client legal privilege essentially amount to a private right? 
• Do the underlying rationales accord with actual current practice? 
• Is there a different rationale for particular contexts such as the context of 
Commonwealth investigatory bodies, including Royal Commissions?78 
2.63 Following submissions and consultations in relation to these questions, the 
ALRC expressed the view in DP 73 that the doctrine of client legal privilege is a 
fundamental principle of the common law providing an essential protection to clients, 
enabling them to communicate fully and frankly with their lawyers and those who may 
lawfully provide ‘legal advice’. The protection of the confidentiality of such 
communications facilitates compliance with the law and access to a fair hearing in 
curial and non-curial contexts, thereby serving the broad public interest in the effective 
administration of justice.79 
2.64 The comments in submissions and consultations clustered around the following 
broad areas: support for the continuation of the doctrine as serving the administration 
                                                        
75  General Mediterranean Holdings v Patel [1999] 3 All ER 673. 
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77  S McNicol, ‘Implications of the Human Right Rationale for Legal Professional Privilege—The Demise of 
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of justice; a rights analysis of the doctrine; the question of abolition; and identifying 
where the real problems lie. 
Support for continuation 
2.65 The overwhelming thrust of submissions and consultations was in favour of the 
continuation of client legal privilege on the basis that it provides an essential plank in 
the administration of justice—protecting the confidentiality of particular 
communications with lawyers and others, thereby facilitating full and frank disclosure, 
driving compliance with the law and encouraging settlement of disputes.80  
2.66 Support for retention of the doctrine came from many different groups, 
representing a wide range of those involved in matters that may give rise to issues of 
client legal privilege. 
Protecting the citizen 
2.67 Strong support for the retention of client legal privilege was presented in 
submissions from community legal centres and legal aid groups. A key aspect of such 
support was the role of the doctrine in protecting the citizen against the state. 
2.68 In its submission, Victoria Legal Aid presented a range of arguments in support 
of the doctrine: 
Access to justice 
(a) Enabling people to seek legal help 
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[Client legal privilege] serves the public interest in access to justice by enabling 
people to seek legal advice or representation. The High Court has acknowledged that 
the relationship between lawyer and client has special significance because it is part 
of the functioning of the law itself.  If [client legal privilege] did not exist, people 
might litigate without the benefit of legal advice or representation. It is generally 
acknowledged that it is more difficult for an unrepresented person to access justice. In 
some circumstances, the law acknowledges that an unrepresented litigant is unable to 
get a fair hearing.   
(b) Fostering a candid lawyer client relationship 
[Client legal privilege] facilitates access to justice by fostering a candid relationship 
between lawyer and client.  If [client legal privilege] did not exist, clients may not 
make full and frank disclosure of all relevant facts to their lawyers. Alternatively, 
lawyers may refrain from asking relevant questions, taking proper file notes or 
providing written legal advice. As a result, clients may not receive appropriate legal 
advice or adequate representation.   
The Victorian Legal Aid Act recognises the fundamental importance of fostering a 
candid lawyer client relationship—by preserving [client legal privilege] even where 
information is disclosed for the purposes of getting a grant of assistance. 
(c) Supporting the adversarial system 
[Client legal privilege] facilitates access to justice by supporting the adversarial 
system. The system is based on a series of interlocking checks and balances that 
ensure all litigants receive a fair hearing. [Client legal privilege] helps to redress any 
power imbalance between the litigants (eg. between the state and an individual) by 
allowing the ‘weaker’ party to get help from a lawyer without damaging their legal 
position. 
Administration of justice 
(a) Facilitating compliance with the law  
[Client legal privilege] serves the public interest in the efficient administration of 
justice by enabling people to obtain legal advice before proceedings are issued. 
Lawyers have an ethical obligation to encourage compliance with the law. Facilitating 
compliance with the law may reduce the likelihood of future litigation. 
(b) Facilitating early settlement 
[Client legal privilege] also assists the administration of justice by facilitating early 
settlement. Cases are more likely to settle when the client is represented by a fully 
briefed lawyer. This allows the lawyer to give the client a frank assessment of their 
prospects and advise them about negotiating an appropriate resolution. 
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(c) Minimising unrepresented litigants 
[Client legal privilege] facilitates the administration of justice by enabling people to 
obtain legal representation for court hearings.  This generally results in hearings that 
are fairer and are conducted more efficiently.81 
2.69 Such arguments were also supported in the submission from National Legal Aid, 
which warned that ‘any change to current protections would undermine our ability to 
assure clients that their information will be protected’.82 
2.70 Submissions from community legal centres were also strongly in support of 
client legal privilege, particularly in relation to the kinds of clients served by such 
centres. The Federation of Community Legal Centres (Vic) Inc, for example, stated 
that: 
The Federation believes that the client-legal privilege is absolutely essential to clients 
obtaining and receiving accurate legal advice … Client legal privilege is particularly 
important given the client base of Federation members. Community Legal Centres 
have expertise in working with excluded and disadvantaged communities and people 
from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds. We provide a bridge between 
disadvantaged and marginalised communities and the justice system. We work with 
the communities of which we are a part. We listen, we learn, and we provide the 
infrastructure necessary for our communities’ knowledge and experiences to be heard. 
In this framework, it is essential that our clients are prepared to seek advice from a 
lawyer and to speak openly and honestly to their lawyer. If clients feel that what is 
discussed may not remain confidential (unless of course disclosure is authorised by 
the client) this may reduce a client’s willingness to speak openly. In turn, this will 
affect the quality and accuracy of legal advice that lawyers can provide.83 
2.71 Similarly, Sussex Street Community Law Service commented that: 
As a nation with very limited constitutional rights it is important for us to respect the 
rights we do have, which provide protection to the Australian public. 
Client legal privilege has a preventative and curative effect. It allows for more 
effective legal advice which would prevent clients from straying beyond the limits of 
the law, creating a more law-abiding society. It also allows for legal advisers to 
provide a competent defence in the case of legal proceedings, the right to a defence 
being an essential aspect of our legal system.84 
2.72 Others also commented on the important role of client legal privilege in 
protecting the citizen and the impact that further erosion of the doctrine might have in 
the federal regulatory context. The New South Wales (NSW) Bar Association, for 
example, submitted that:  
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One of the rationales for the privilege is to maintain some parity between the 
individual qua citizen and the state qua prosecutor. The proposal to qualify the 
privilege only in respect of the coercive information-gathering powers of 
Commonwealth investigatory bodies directly undercuts this rationale. We submit that 
so direct a challenge to an established basis of the privilege must discharge a 
substantial justificatory onus; in particular in respect of the issue of why 
Commonwealth investigatory bodies should be the sole beneficiaries of the loosening 
of the immunity when they typically enjoy uniquely broad enforcement resources and 
machinery.85 
2.73 Dr Keith Thompson also argued that the ‘interests of justice’ are best served by 
regarding client legal privilege as ‘premised at its most fundamental level in concepts 
of fairness and equality’ which protect the individual citizen.86 
2.74 In supporting the ALRC’s ‘broad view on client legal privilege’ in DP 73, the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) observed that the ALRC’s conclusion had 
‘consonance with Murphy J’s views in Baker’ and submitted that the ACTU and the 
ALRC ‘are fundamentally ad idem’.87  
2.75 The Law Council of Australia (Law Council) regards client legal privilege as ‘a 
fundamental protection and pillar of the Australian legal system’: 
Client legal privilege ensures full and frank discussions between legal advisers and 
their clients, which promotes the administration of justice and encourages compliance 
with the law. Client legal privilege also protects the rights of individuals, corporations 
and other entities against oppression by the State in legal proceedings and 
investigations.88 
2.76 In consequence, the Law Council submitted, client legal privilege ‘must not be 
abrogated in any circumstance’: 
Incursions against privilege have a deleterious impact on the lawyer-client 
relationship, by impairing the trust and confidence a client would otherwise have that 
their legal adviser will not be forced to disclose the information they provide to enable 
a full understanding of their rights and responsibilities under Australia’s complex and 
ever-changing system of laws.89  
Corporate compliance 
2.77 The key role of client legal privilege in facilitating compliance with the law was 
a particular aspect of the doctrine emphasised in relation to corporate clients. The Law 
Council highlighted 
the important role lawyers play in encouraging compliance with the law. Since 
lawyers owe a paramount duty to the court and the administration of justice, they are 
                                                        
85  New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. 
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required to encourage their clients to obey the law. One aspect of this work, within the 
corporate sphere, is assisting the client to comply with relevant legal regulatory 
regimes, by ensuring that the client understands the legal constraints within which it 
operates. Most corporations genuinely attempt to fulfil their legal obligations. 
Lawyers play an important role in enabling them to do this by advising on relevant 
obligations, and helping to detect and address potential and actual breaches.90 
2.78 The QBE Insurance Group emphasised the role that client legal privilege plays 
in relation to ‘the smooth functioning of the business community’: 
Corporations must have confidence that they can engage with their legal advisers in 
an ethical, but also candid and informed, manner to assess their legal rights and 
obligations … 
We acknowledge that some corporations have been found to have misused Privilege. 
However it is important to recognise that the vast majority of corporations are 
responsible citizens of the business community and should not be penalised for the 
actions of a small minority.91 
2.79 The submission of National Australia Bank Limited and others also stressed the 
importance of the doctrine, in saying that ‘the retention of [client legal privilege], in 
principle, is absolutely essential for the effective operation of Australian law’.92 
2.80 The Australian Corporate Lawyers Association (ACLA) argued for the 
particular role of in-house lawyers in fostering corporate compliance: 
In-house lawyers, by dint of their role as providers of legal services to their own 
organisation on a dedicated basis, carry out a particular and important role in 
promoting corporate compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. They are in a 
position, as integrated members of a management team, to keep themselves informed 
and to influence corporate behaviour on a continuing basis.93  
2.81 The Australian Institute of Company Directors suggested that the wrong 
question was posed in IP 33 about finding contemporary rationales for the doctrine: 
The issue is whether the doctrine is sound in principle. There are a number of 
fundamental legal principles which remain sound and incontrovertible, no matter what 
the circumstances. These include the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, 
the right to a fair trial and client legal privilege.94 
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Expanding regulatory context 
2.82 The protection provided by client legal privilege was seen to be all the more 
important in the context of the expanding powers of investigatory bodies. As Sussex 
Street Community Law Service commented: 
Client legal privilege strengthens the adversarial system under which all 
Commonwealth investigatory bodies operate. For our clients, the adversarial system 
has the consequence of setting powerful government bodies against weaker 
individuals and it is the legal rights such as client legal privilege that prevent these 
individuals from being mistreated. Client legal privilege has the effect of balancing 
the advantages between parties of contrasting power, and providing a fairer judicial 
system.95 
2.83 To similar effect is the submission of the Fitzroy Legal Service that 
the doctrine of client legal privilege is vital to the administration of justice in the 
sense of introducing some measure of equality into the relationship between the state 
and individuals through the free dissemination of information and confidential support 
of the individual by the legal practitioner. 
The excessive use of power by investigating and prosecuting authorities where such 
protections are absent in our view runs contrary to the rule of law and administration 
of justice and should not be abrogated in relation to individuals.96  
2.84 The argument that the expansion of regulation increases the need to retain client 
legal privilege to foster compliance with the law was also evident in the submissions of 
bodies representing different groups of lawyers. For example, the NSW Bar 
Association commented that: 
If anything, there is a stronger case for retaining the privilege in the current legal 
environment. There is such a proliferation of statutes and laws that a citizen (whether 
corporate or natural person) more than ever needs to be able to get advice in 
confidence as to his, her or its legal rights, whether before committing to some course 
of action or after an issue has arisen. The community also has an interest in the citizen 
being able to get that advice: a citizen fully informed of legal rights is more likely to 
obey the law or to understand where he, she or it may have breached the law, reducing 
the need for enquiries by investigative agencies and ultimately reducing the number, 
length and cost of cases required to be decided before Courts.97 
2.85 The Corporate Tax Association drew attention to the particular complexity of 
taxation law in relation to the need to obtain proper advice to ensure compliance with 
the law.98 
2.86 The Law Council also commented that: 
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It is obviously important that a corporate client’s officers feel no constraints about 
raising compliance issues with the corporation’s lawyers. Abrogation of [client legal 
privilege] would have a chilling effect on officer/lawyer communications and so 
render much more difficult the corporation’s task of compliance with the huge amount 
of regulation now governing corporate behaviour. This result would not, of course, be 
in the interests of either good corporate governance, or the administration of justice.99 
Perspective of federal bodies 
2.87 A number of the federal investigatory bodies themselves endorsed the retention 
of client legal privilege. For example, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security (IGIS) commented that: 
There are cogent reasons for generally maintaining client legal privilege. While some 
of the rationales for privilege given in the first chapter of Issues Paper 33 are 
debatable, it is difficult to put aside the rationales of full and frank disclosure, 
encouraging compliance and protecting the fairness of the adversarial system.100 
2.88 The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), while 
submitting that there may be particular contexts in which client legal privilege may be 
overreached, nonetheless acknowledged the importance of the doctrine: 
Although client legal privilege embodies a private ‘right’, its principal rationale is that 
it serves the public interest by promoting the effective administration of justice by 
encouraging clients to seek legal advice and communicate fully and frankly with their 
lawyers. Doing so promotes compliance with the law, reduces the incidence of and 
encourages earlier and more effective resolution of legal disputes.101 
2.89 The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) strongly 
endorsed the doctrine as an aspect of the right to a fair trial as set out in article 14(1) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
HREOC submits that LPP is fundamental to a client’s right to a fair trial. Removing 
this protection is likely to undermine the confidential nature of the communication 
between lawyers and their clients and, accordingly, may impact upon the information 
provided by a client and the quality of advice and/or representation they receive.102 
2.90 The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) noted that 
‘compliance with the law, the facilitation of the administration of justice and the right 
to a fair trial (which is part of the administration of justice)’ were ‘important public 
interests’ and accordingly was supportive of laws ‘that best achieve these public 
interests’. The submission therefore asked ‘to what extent client legal privilege serves 
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these public interests’. Questions of modification or abrogation were also to be 
considered through a similar lens.103   
2.91 The CDPP considered that, using this approach, the two limbs of privilege 
warranted separate consideration. In relation to the argument that the availability of 
privilege to legal advice drives compliance with the law, the CDPP commented that: 
This rationale assumes that the client wishes to comply with the law, and is limited to 
that extent. Further, to the extent that client legal privilege puts what would otherwise 
be evidence out of the reach of investigators and courts, avoiding the deterrent effect 
that flows from punishment, client legal privilege is often problematic in successfully 
countering breaches of the law. Therefore it works for and against compliance.   
2.92 Rather than litigation privilege facilitating the administration of justice through 
full disclosure, sound advice and greater settlement of disputes, the CDPP submitted 
that client legal privilege can undermine the administration of justice by concealing 
evidence that would reveal the truth.104 Such comments reflect concerns that go to the 
question of when it is appropriate to abrogate or modify the application of client legal 
privilege in relation to federal investigations. This is considered in Chapter 6.  
Rights analysis 
2.93 There were mixed responses to the use of rights terminology with respect to 
client legal privilege. For example, the Law Council considered that:  
the difference between defining [client legal privilege] as a fundamental human, ie 
civil, right (applicable to corporations) and defining [client legal privilege] as a 
fundamental common law right is largely a semantic one, and is evidence of the 
convergence of common law and international law concepts and terminology. The 
Law Council considers that there is a strong line of authority for [client legal 
privilege] as a fundamental common law right and it is to this authority that the 
ALRC should have regard.105 
2.94 However, the Law Council also commented that: 
to view [client legal privilege] as a ‘private right’ is to mistake the nature and purpose 
of the privilege. The chief purpose of [client legal privilege] is not to confer a right for 
the benefit of the client, but to facilitate the administration of justice.106 
2.95 NSW Young Lawyers submitted that ‘while it is accepted that client legal 
privilege is a common law and statutory right, the extent to which it is a basic human 
right would appear to be taking it much further than required’.107 
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2.96 The NSW Bar Association commented that the ‘orthodoxy in the jurisprudence 
of the High Court’ was that client legal privilege is ‘a fundamental citizen’s right 
vested in the client’:  
As such, it is a crucial predicate of openness and honesty in the practitioner-client 
relationship; and hence throughout the entire legal system.108 
2.97 HREOC endorsed a ‘human rights’ approach to client legal privilege, arguing 
that:  
Recognition of [client legal privilege] is important for the protection of the following 
human rights: 
• the right to a fair hearing; and 
• the right to defend oneself through legal assistance of one’s own choosing 
in the determination of criminal charges. 
In protecting these rights, it is also relevant to refer to the following principles: 
• the need to protect confidentiality in all communications between a lawyer 
and their client; and 
• the need to ensure effective access to legal services.109 
2.98 The Office of the Privacy Commissioner emphasised the privacy aspect of the 
privilege: 
The doctrine of legal professional privilege serves a broad public interest in protecting 
the privacy of the client against intrusion and should only be modified or abrogated in 
exceptional circumstances.110 
2.99 Dr Keith Thompson made a connection between a rights analysis and 
perceptions of fairness: 
My sense is that Lord Brougham [in Greenough v Gaskell (1833) 39 ER 618] was … 
prefiguring a modern human rights rationale for [client legal privilege] when he said 
[it] was necessary in the interests of justice. Human rights are of course premised in 
the notion that all human beings are or ought to be equal before the law. It has always 
been considered difficult for an impecunious or unknown litigant to succeed before a 
judicial tribunal. That was true in the days of the ordeal; in trial by battle; under the 
alternative medieval compurgation system; and under the jury trial system both before 
and after jurors became independent. … 
Courts ever since have necessarily kept an eye on their own credibility. The law has 
no majesty if it is not credible. The public perception of the fairness of a judicial 
system makes a marked contribution to its success. Thus where Lord Brougham spoke 
                                                        
108  New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. 
109  Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Submission LPP 28, 4 June 2007. 
110  Australian Government Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Submission LPP 71, 29 June 2007. 
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of ‘the interests of justice’, he was pointing at a generalised need for a public 
perception of fairness from the judicial system. … 
In essence the most important question is—will the legal system be perceived as less 
fair if [client legal privilege] is abrogated completely or adjusted in certain proposed 
ways?111 
2.100 Civil Liberties Australia (ACT) Inc (Civil Liberties Australia) commented in 
relation to ‘the status of the privilege as a fundamental human right’.112 It agreed with 
the analysis of the ALRC in DP 73113 and considered that ‘Australian law should now 
reflect the status of legal professional privilege as an important human right’, offering a 
number of grounds in support. 
2.101 In the first place, the submission emphasised the importance of international 
conventions: 
Australia has signed and ratified the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1980, and in so doing 
has agreed to be bound by the terms of those instruments. Australia, therefore, has a 
moral and ethical duty, and a legal duty at international law, to ensure that its 
domestic laws are consistent with the terms of the two instruments.114 
2.102 Relying on such international conventions, the submission referred to the 
European jurisprudence that had arisen in relation to client legal privilege. One 
example cited was R v Derby Magistrates Court ex parte B, in which Lord Taylor CJ, 
after analysing the development of the doctrine of privilege, commented: 
It is a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice as a whole rests 
… Nobody doubts that legal professional privilege could be modified, or even 
abrogated, by statute, subject always to the objection that legal professional privilege 
is a fundamental human right protected by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) ...115 
2.103 The submission also pointed to the strength of the privilege in the context of a 
right to a fair trial: 
CLA submits that the European case law shows legal professional privilege to be an 
important right and integral to the right to a fair trial, and the right to privacy. 
Moreover, the fact that any abrogation of the privilege is ordinarily a violation of 
Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides strong 
authority for the proposition that any abrogation would similarly entail a violation of 
Articles 10 and 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As such, CLA 
argues that any abrogation of the privilege in Australian law would amount to a 
                                                        
111  K Thompson, Submission LPP 76, 7 September 2007. 
112  Civil Liberties Australia (ACT) Inc, Submission LPP 86, 1 November 2007. 
113  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), [2.99]. 
114  Civil Liberties Australia (ACT) Inc, Submission LPP 86, 1 November 2007. 
115  R v Derby Magistrates Court ex parte B [1996] AC 487, 507. 
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breach of Australia’s human rights obligations under the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and hence its obligations under international law.116 
2.104 The connection between the doctrine of privilege and the right to a fair trial 
under international conventions also was emphasised in the submission from 
HREOC.117 
Abolition 
2.105 Two submissions recommended the abolition of advice privilege. I Turnbull and 
A Evans argued that the rationale of privilege was the proper functioning of the 
adversarial system, which did not, therefore, require the advice limb in addition to the 
litigation limb of privilege.118 
2.106 Another submission suggested that, while the concept ‘remains important to the 
criminal law arena’, ‘its use-by-date has been reached in respect of its wholesale 
application to commercial transactions’.119 
The ethical legitimacy of the concept, allied as it is to confidence is too important to 
the privacy of communication. Nevertheless, it seems to me that one reform 
possibility involves separation of the concept: privilege could be retained for the 
purpose of advice and for ‘general’ criminal, quasi-criminal, family and 
administrative law representation, but this might be balanced by its prima facie 
abrogation for commercial litigation and for prosecutions by nominated Federal 
agencies, subject to a right of ‘re-instatement’ upon application to a judge. 
The onus could shift to the corporation seeking to justify privilege rather than the 
Federal agency seeking to dislodge it. If such a change were affected, it would affirm 
a communal view of justice over liberal rights-based ethics, that is, of some 
responsibilities to disclose over every conceivable right to keep secret.120 
2.107 A lone submission advocated ‘the removal of the concept of client legal 
privilege entirely from all Australian law and related practice’ on the grounds that: 
It appears to be the only logical way of providing more certainty and information for 
everybody faced with an otherwise opaque, fragmented, conflicted, increasingly 
complex and therefore increasingly ignorant, slow and costly legal environment.121 
2.108 Some federal agencies argued for abolition of privilege in relation to their 
activities. This is considered in Chapter 6. 
                                                        
116  Civil Liberties Australia (ACT) Inc, Submission LPP 86, 1 November 2007. 
117  Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Submission LPP 28, 4 June 2007. 
118  I Turnbull, Submission LPP 18, 3 June 2007; M Wyles, Submission LPP 27, 4 June 2007. 
119  A Evans, Submission LPP 4, 27 March 2007. 
120  Ibid. 
121  C O’Donnell, Submission LPP 80, 26 October 2007. See also C O’Donnell, Submission LPP 10, 16 May 
2007. 
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2.109 Many submissions also acknowledged that Royal Commissions may require 
different considerations from the everyday operation of coercive information-gathering 
powers in other federal investigatory bodies. This is considered in Chapter 6. 
2.110 While not arguing directly for the abolition of privilege, Civil Liberties 
Australia submitted that there was a difference in considering privilege when raised by 
agencies compared with raising privilege against agencies. It argued that privilege 
issues should be considered subject to the ‘general democratic principle’ that 
‘government should always act in an open and transparent manner’. 
The notion that privilege is necessary to promote the confidential disclosure of 
damaging material to a solicitor is not applicable to government because if they were 
genuinely committed to acting in an open transparent manner, as they should be, they 
would not be disposed to hiding or concealing information that may cause 
embarrassment in the first place. … 
It follows that, if government agencies should not ordinarily have confidential private 
interests, then one of the principal rationales for the privilege, being the protection of 
private interests through the confidential nature of the privilege, ceases to apply. The 
justification for extending the privilege to government departments and agencies 
therefore becomes far more tenuous.122 
2.111 Also raising concerns about the application of client legal privilege in relation to 
federal investigatory bodies was the Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union 
(Construction and General Division): 
It should not simply be assumed that the rationale for client legal privilege applies 
with equal force to these agencies as it does to private citizens or even that the 
interests or actions of such agencies will at all times be consonant with the public 
interest. It may well serve the interests of justice and the administration of justice that 
the investigative process itself be more open and that federal agencies not be given a 
wide opportunity to withhold material gathered in that process which does not assist 
their case, by use of a claim for client legal privilege. Such agencies are not always 
above the kind of obstructionist or self-serving tactics identified in the Discussion 
Paper.123 
2.112 Comments to similar effect also were made by Whistleblowers Australia: 
CLP in public administration does not embrace the human rights issues that normally 
underpin the principles of CLP. CLP in public administration serves a different 
function which has little to do with any effect on human rights or private interests. 
Legal advice in matters of public administration seldom has anything to do with the 
bureaucrats who are seeking advice. In public administration, the purpose of CLP is to 
ensure that matters are dealt with according to law and to ensure that information 
which may harm good government is not made public. … 
[We recommend that] CLP in public administration must be confined within a narrow 
and well defined framework of matters, and applied only for the sole purpose of 
                                                        
122  Civil Liberties Australia (ACT) Inc, Submission LPP 86, 1 November 2007. 
123  Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (Construction and General Division), Submission LPP 
90, 1 November 2007. 
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ensuring the maintenance of good government and the safety and well-being of the 
community.124  
2.113 Concerns such as these may be better considered in the context of the role of 
watchdog bodies such as the IGIS. This is considered in Chapter 6. The issues of 
abrogation and modification more generally are also considered in this chapter. 
Identifying the real problem 
2.114 A common thread in many submissions and consultations was that the problem 
does not lie directly with the doctrine itself, but rather in the arena of practice and 
procedure—that problems of delay, lack of transparency, lack of information are not 
intrinsically about privilege, but how claims are raised and managed. This is 
considered further in Chapter 8.  
2.115 It was also suggested that the ‘high profile’ cases, like the AWB Royal 
Commission, are not typical of the overall workings of the doctrine. For instance, the 
National Australia Bank Limited and others submitted that examples like the AWB 
Royal Commission and the James Hardie matter, where specific legislation concerning 
client legal privilege was enacted,125 are 
extreme cases and do not justify the view that the public interest in the due 
enforcement of federal laws is being detrimentally affected in a material manner by 
the misuse of [client legal privilege]. Whilst they do raise matters that cannot be 
easily discounted, they are extreme cases. [We] suggest that the more appropriate 
approach is to find a mechanism to deal with what are in essence unwarranted, 
unprincipled and mischievous uses of claims of [client legal privilege].126 
2.116 The NSW Bar Association commented similarly that: 
The concerns identified by Commissioner Cole [in the AWB Royal Commission] do 
not reflect either a problem conceptually intrinsic to the privilege per se or a pervasive 
practical misuse of the privilege sufficient to justify its substantial curtailment or 
abolition. Rather, the issues arise from isolated overambitious claims, which are more 
effectively addressed through education and procedural amendment to the manner in 
which claims are made.127 
                                                        
124  Whistleblowers Australia, Submission LPP 77, 7 October 2007. 
125  James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth). 
126  National Australia Bank Limited and others, Submission LPP 30, 4 June 2007. See also Australian 
Institute of Company Directors, Submission LPP 43, 8 June 2007—the James Hardie (Investigations and 
Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) ‘was a response to a unique set of circumstances and should be considered 
atypical’. 
127  New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. 
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2.117 ACLA agreed, focusing upon the position of in-house lawyers. 
Many of the issues raised by the ALRC are isolated instances of individual behaviour 
and do not indicate a systemic problem in relation to in-house lawyers.128 
ALRC’s views 
2.118 It is the ALRC’s view that the doctrine of client legal privilege is a fundamental 
principle of the common law providing an essential protection to clients—both 
individual and corporate,129 enabling them to communicate fully and frankly with their 
lawyers and those who may lawfully provide legal advice. The protection of the 
confidentiality of such communications facilitates compliance with the law and access 
to a fair hearing in curial and non-curial contexts, thereby serving the broad public 
interest in the effective administration of justice.   
2.119 The ALRC considers that, rather than characterising client legal privilege as a 
right in and of itself, it is better seen as part of the right of access to a fair hearing. Its 
‘rights’ character may be considered, therefore, as a right more generally described—
of access to a fair hearing or trial and, as a corollary, access to legal advice. In this 
character, the doctrine serves the administration of justice in a broad sense and protects 
the rights of citizens against the state. Client legal privilege then may be seen to be 
facilitative of rights—and an aspect of the protection of rights recognised as human 
rights under international conventions. 
2.120 The two limbs of the privilege doctrine have different origins, which have led to 
different expressions of the requisite elements. In the ALRC’s view, however, the two 
limbs can be seen to share a broad rationale in common. While the two limbs have 
particular rationales, both can be seen today as sub-sets of the broader, overarching 
rationale—the administration of justice. 
2.121 Insofar as issues of competing public interests (the pursuit of truth and the 
protection of client confidences) may be seen to arise, client legal privilege may be 
considered—to a large extent—as already encompassing a balancing of public 
interests, although occasions may arise where client legal privilege may be abrogated 
on the basis of some higher public interest. The ALRC considers in later chapters when 
such abrogation may be justified. 
2.122 The ALRC agrees with submissions that where perceived problems have 
occurred in relation to claims of client legal privilege, the problem is not with the 
rationale of the doctrine, but lies broadly in the arena of practice and procedure. The 
ALRC puts forward specific recommendations in relation to such matters in later 
chapters of this Report. 
                                                        
128  Australian Corporate Lawyers Association, Submission LPP 83, 31 October 2007. 
129  The application of privilege to corporations is considered in Chapter 3. 
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Introduction 
3.1 A legal ‘privilege’ is essentially a right to resist disclosing information that 
would otherwise be required to be disclosed.1 There are several privileges available at 
common law and under evidence legislation in Australia, including:  
• client legal privilege;  
• the privilege against self-incrimination;  
• public interest immunity; and  
• privileges protecting other confidential relationships.2  
                                                        
1  J Gans and A Palmer, Australian Principles of Evidence (2nd ed, 2004), 91. 
2  Parliamentary privilege, which grants parliamentarians immunity from any civil or criminal action arising 
from what they say in Parliament, also exists under state, territory and Commonwealth law. 
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3.2 Privileges are not only available as part of the rules of evidence, but also can 
apply outside court proceedings as a substantive doctrine wherever disclosure of 
information may be compelled, including by administrative agencies.3 Therefore, 
privilege may be claimed in the production of documents before a trial (including with 
respect to an application for discovery or the issue of a subpoena), the answering of 
interrogatories, the giving of testimony or in the course of an administrative 
investigation.  
3.3 Client legal privilege is perhaps the most frequently discussed and claimed 
privilege. As outlined below, it developed as a common law protection and also has 
been recognised under the uniform Evidence Acts.4 Key modifications to the doctrine 
over time have included the extension of privilege from curial proceedings to 
investigative and administrative proceedings,5 and the shift from a ‘sole purpose’ test6 
to a ‘dominant purpose’ test in relation to the purpose for which the document was 
created.7  
3.4 The operation of the privilege under both the common law and the uniform 
Evidence Acts is substantially the same.8 In 2005, the ALRC, the New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission and the Victorian Law Reform Commission conducted a 
review of the uniform Evidence Acts, which included a discussion of client legal 
privilege, and noted some developments in which the common law doctrine had moved 
away from the legislative provisions. The final report, Uniform Evidence Law 
(ALRC 102), made a number of recommendations designed to bring the Acts into line 
with the common law.9 In July 2007, the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 
(SCAG) endorsed a Model Uniform Evidence Bill, which is based on the Evidence Act 
1995 (NSW) and the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) with amendments as recommended in 
ALRC 102.10 The New South Wales Parliament passed the relevant amendments to the 
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) in late 2007.11 At the time of writing, amendments to the 
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) had not been introduced into Parliament. 
                                                        
3  Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328; Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 
152 CLR 281; Comptroller General of Customs v Disciplinary Appeal Committee (1992) 35 FCR 466. 
4  At the time of writing the uniform Evidence Acts are the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Evidence Act 1995 
(NSW); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); Evidence Act 2004 (NI). 
5  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52.  
6  Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674.  
7  Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49. 
8  Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Evidence Act 1995, IP 28, [11.23]. 
9  Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 102 (2005), Recs 14–2, 14–3, 14–4. 
10  The Uniform Evidence Bill may be viewed at <www.pco.nsw.gov.au/uniform_legislation.htm> at 30 
November 2007. 
11  The Evidence Amendment Bill 2007 (NSW) was passed on 24 October 2007. At the time of writing, the 
Act was yet to be proclaimed. 
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3.5 The privilege provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) apply only to the 
adducing of evidence at trial.12 In all other situations the common law rules persist, 
unless a statute abrogates the privilege in a particular context.  
3.6 This Inquiry is concerned with the interaction between client legal privilege and 
the investigatory functions of federal bodies that have coercive information-gathering 
powers.13 As the common law presently governs the matters being considered in this 
Inquiry, this chapter will focus on the common law doctrine, with more limited 
mention made of the Evidence Act provisions.   
3.7 In ALRC 102, the three Commissions recommended that the privilege 
provisions of the Evidence Act be extended to apply to any compulsory process for 
disclosure, such as pre-trial discovery and the production of documents in response to a 
subpoena; and in non-curial contexts including search warrants and notices to produce 
documents, as well as court proceedings.14 This recommendation does not form part of 
the Uniform Model Evidence Bill, but the ALRC understands it will be considered by 
the SCAG Officers Working Group in the future. 
3.8 Although this present Inquiry must consider the law as it currently stands, if the 
recommendations in ALRC 102 are adopted, then the Evidence Act provisions will 
cover some of the types of investigations under consideration. As noted above, there 
are not many substantive differences between the Act and the common law, and the 
Commissions’ recommendations in ALRC 102 will further harmonise these regimes.  
3.9 As such, recommendations made by the ALRC in this Inquiry that are based on 
the operation of the common law will apply equally to the Evidence Act should it be 
extended to operate in federal investigations in the future. The recommendations in 
ALRC 102 would not apply the Evidence Act provisions to Royal Commissions, which 
are not bound by the rules of evidence and procedure.15 
                                                        
12  It should be noted that in New South Wales, the Supreme Court and the District Court have amended 
their rules to provide specifically that the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) applies pre-trial. Since the enactment 
of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), privileged 
documents are defined in the Dictionary of the Rules as information that could not be adduced under 
Part 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). The rules apply Part 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) to 
discovery, interrogatories, subpoenas, notices to produce and oral examinations. These rules apply the 
Act only to civil proceedings and not, for example, to subpoenas in criminal matters.  
13  The nature of those functions is discussed in Ch 4.  
14  Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 102 (2005), Rec 14–1. 
15  See Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 4. ALRC 102 did not recommend that 
the Evidence Act provisions should be extended to apply to Royal Commissions. 
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The development of client legal privilege 
What is client legal privilege? 
3.10 Client legal privilege in Australia today is both a doctrine of the common law 
and a matter of statute. Deane J in Baker v Campbell described it as ‘a fundamental and 
general principle of the common law’.16 As noted above, it also has been given effect 
in statutory form in the uniform Evidence Acts. 
3.11 A concise statement of the contemporary doctrine is provided by Dr Sue 
McNicol: 
It provides that, in civil and criminal cases, confidential communications passing 
between a lawyer and her or his client, which have been made for the dominant 
purpose of seeking or being furnished with legal advice or for the dominant purpose 
of preparing for actual or contemplated litigation, need not be disclosed in evidence or 
otherwise revealed. This rule also extends to communications passing between a 
lawyer or client and third parties if made for the purpose of actual or contemplated 
litigation.17 
3.12 Before further consideration of the contemporary doctrine, a brief review of the 
historical background is given. 
Historical background 
3.13 While it has been said that ‘it will never be possible to come to a conclusive 
answer to the origin of and early rationale for the privilege’,18 it was described by the 
leading American evidence scholar, Professor John Henry Wigmore, as ‘the oldest of 
the privileges for confidential communications’.19  
3.14 Dr Jonathan Auburn described privilege as ‘one of many rules in the large mass 
of law relating to testimonial compulsion’ that developed in the 16th century.20 There 
are several threads that can be identified in the history of the emergence of today’s 
privilege doctrine.21  
Chancery 
3.15 The rule as to non-disclosure of evidence and the concept of ‘discovery’ have 
their source in chancery. Before the middle of the 19th century in England, discovery 
                                                        
16  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 116–117. 
17  S McNicol, ‘Implications of the Human Right Rationale for Legal Professional Privilege—The Demise of 
Implied Statutory Abrogation?’ in P Mirfield and R Smith (eds), Essays for Colin Tapper (2003) 48, 48. 
18  Auburn states that ‘the decisive pieces of information, the reasoning underlying the first reported cases 
and precise knowledge of pre-Elizabethan Chancery procedure, are simply not available’: J Auburn, 
Legal Professional Privilege: Law and Theory (2000), 7.  
19  J Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law (3rd ed, 
1940), 547, [2290]. 
20  J Auburn, Legal Professional Privilege: Law and Theory (2000), 7. 
21  The outline of the historical development of the doctrine is drawn principally from N Williams, 
‘Discovery of Civil Litigation Trial Preparation in Canada’ (1980) 58(1) The Canadian Bar Review 1. 
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was a process that was mainly limited to the Chancery Courts. Hence it was in the 
chancery context that an evidentiary rule restricting access to certain evidence was 
seen. 
The premature disclosure of evidence was not a problem which confronted the 
common law courts since witnesses at law gave their evidence for the first time at 
trial. Also, at common law the parties could not have discovery of each other. 
Discovery for a common law action could be obtained by a bill of discovery in 
chancery but it was the procedure of that court which determined what information 
had to be given. The pre-hearing discovery of the parties and examination of 
witnesses was a peculiar characteristic of equity procedure which had been inherited 
from the Romano-Canonical system, and so only the Court of Chancery needed to 
regulate the extent and timing of disclosure of the evidence. In addressing the problem 
the Chancellors were moved by the same fear of perjury that had shaped the civil law 
practice. Like the civil law, equity made a distinction between the party’s own 
testimony and the testimony which the party’s witnesses could give. The adversary 
was allowed to find out the personal knowledge of the party but because of the danger 
of perjury, could not use discovery to compel the party to disclose the names of 
witnesses or his belief as to what their evidence would be.22 
3.16 The fear of tampering with witnesses that might follow the premature disclosure 
of evidence also informed the approach to the discovery of documents.23 The 
production of documents that were part of a party’s evidence was considered as 
‘opening a wide door to perjury’.24  
Trial at law 
3.17 The trial at common law utilised oral examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses in the presence of parties, rather than the chancery process of secret 
depositions. While this was considered superior to the deposition method of chancery,25 
the trial at law was hampered by the prohibition of hearing the testimony of the parties 
themselves. As the parties were ‘interested’ in the outcome of the trial, they were not 
considered competent—‘they could not be trusted to tell the truth’.26 Chancery in its 
auxiliary jurisdiction could be enlisted to assist to some extent, but it was ‘time-
consuming, cumbersome and expensive’.27 
3.18 The reform of common law procedures in the mid-19th century gave common 
law courts power to order discovery, overtaking the former chancery jurisdiction in this 
                                                        
22  Ibid, 7. 
23  Ibid, 10. 
24  Bligh v Benson (1819) 146 ER 948, 949. 
25  N Williams, ‘Discovery of Civil Litigation Trial Preparation in Canada’ (1980) 58(1) The Canadian Bar 
Review 1, 12. 
26  Ibid, 13. The position in chancery was different. As Williams noted, ‘The practice of requiring a party to 
produce evidence against himself that was in his possession, established originally in the ecclesiastical 
courts, rested on the notion that it would be against conscience to allow him to withhold it’: 11. 
27  Ibid, 13. 
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area. The reforms also made the parties ‘generally competent and compellable to 
testify for and against each other in all courts of justice’.28 
Privilege for documents relating to the case 
3.19 As Victorian barrister Neil J Williams QC recorded, ‘the privilege [to withhold 
documents] that relate exclusively to the case of the party giving discovery was 
brought into existence to shield title deeds from disclosure to strangers’.29 The reason 
behind this privilege was a concern for security of tenure in days before any system for 
registration of land titles. 
The rule helped maintain security of tenure by concealing any defects in the formal 
chain of descent from persons opposed in claim or from blackmailers prepared to 
exploit the defects. Since a plaintiff in ejectment had to succeed on the strength of his 
own title rather than upon any defects in the defendant’s, documents that impeached 
the defendant’s title but which did not support the plaintiff’s were not discoverable.30 
3.20 By the middle of the 19th century this privilege in relation to title deeds had 
expanded to include any documents that formed the evidence for the party making 
discovery,31 evolving as ‘the common law equivalent of the protection that had 
originated in chancery for documents which formed the party’s evidence’.32 This 
developed into the ‘litigation privilege’ limb of client legal privilege of today. 
3.21 The commitment of the common law to litigation as adversarial proceedings—
of which the litigation privilege limb is an aspect—was said by Professor Wigmore to 
reflect its origin ‘in a community of sports and games’ and, therefore, to have been 
permeated by the ‘instincts of sportsmanship’. 
This has had both its higher aspect and its lower aspect. On the one hand, it has 
contributed a sense of fairness, of chivalrous behaviour to a worthy adversary, or 
carrying out a contest on equal and honorable terms. The presumption of innocence, 
the character rule, the privilege against self-crimination, and other specific rules (to 
name those of Evidence alone), show the effect of this instinct against taking undue 
advantage of an adversary. The minor rules of professional etiquette … illustrate the 
same tendency even more clearly. On the other hand, it has contributed to lower the 
system of administering justice, and in particular of ascertaining truth in litigation, to 
the level of a mere game of skill or chance. The right to use a rule of procedure or 
evidence as one plays a trump card, or draws to three aces, or holds back a good horse 
till the home stretch, is a distinctive result of the common-law moral attitude towards 
parties in litigation.33 
                                                        
28  Ibid, 13. 
29  Ibid, 16. 
30  Ibid, 16 (footnotes omitted). 
31  Ibid, 16. 
32  Ibid, 17. 
33  J Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law (3rd ed, 
1940), 374–375, [1845]. 
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3.22 The ‘sportsmanlike’ simile is one found also in the earlier work of the great 
19th century English legal historians, Sir Frederick Pollock and Professor Frederick W 
Maitland.34 In describing the behaviour expected of judges, ‘in different ages and by 
different systems of law’, they said that it fluctuated ‘between two poles’. 
At one of these the model is the conduct of the man of science who is making 
researches in his laboratory and will use all appropriate methods for the solution of 
problems and the discovery of truth. At the other stands the umpire of our English 
games, who is there, not in order that he may invent tests for the powers of the two 
sides, but merely to see that the rules of the game are observed. It is towards the 
second of these ideals that our English medieval procedure is strongly inclined. We 
are often reminded of the cricket-match. The judges sit in court, not in order that they 
may discover the truth, but in order that they may answer the question, ‘How’s 
that?’35 
3.23 Williams summarised this approach as follows: 
Litigation was conducted in the spirit of a game. It was governed by rules that were 
known to the parties in advance, and that the rules were observed was no less 
important than the actual outcome of the contest. And just as players in a game were 
allowed to decide when to show their hand so was the litigant to be free to select the 
most propitious moment to present his evidence. Also the system stressed the virtue of 
industry and self-reliance, qualities that reflected the prevailing laissez-faire economic 
and social philosophy of the nineteenth century. … In this climate it would hardly be 
expected that the system would aid a party in getting the evidence in the case from the 
other side. Evidence was something that was to be obtained through the exercise of 
individual initiative and endeavour.36 
3.24 The evidence rule in equity, that discovery could not be had of the evidence of 
the adversary’s case, was mirrored at law in the privilege which developed to protect 
the materials prepared for the brief. As Williams commented, the chancery evidence 
rule ‘matched the litigation philosophy of the common law’.37 By 1876 it was ‘well 
established both at law and in equity’ 
that documents obtained by a party or his solicitor with a view to and in 
contemplation of litigation, either pending or anticipated, are protected even though 
received from persons unconnected with the litigation.38  
                                                        
34  F Pollock and F Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I (2nd ed, 1899). 
35  Ibid, vol 2, 670–671. 
36  N Williams, ‘Discovery of Civil Litigation Trial Preparation in Canada’ (1980) 58(1) The Canadian Bar 
Review 1, 27. 
37  Ibid. 
38  M’Corquodale v Bell (1876) 1 CPD, 481; N Williams, ‘Discovery of Civil Litigation Trial Preparation in 
Canada’ (1980) 58(1) The Canadian Bar Review 1, 42. In equity the evidence rule was that discovery did 
not extend to the evidence in support of the adversary’s case. The concern was to avoid perjury and 
witness interference. The common law privilege developed independently: N Williams, ‘Discovery of 
Civil Litigation Trial Preparation in Canada’ (1980) 58(1) The Canadian Bar Review 1, 42–43. 
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3.25 The basis of this protection and the connection with the adversarial system was 
explained by Williams: 
From [the perspective of the adversarial model] the privilege [protecting a party’s 
brief] was but a logical consequence of the principal characteristics of the system—
party responsibility for the collection of evidence and party autonomy in presenting 
the evidence that would best advance the party’s case or destroy that of the adversary. 
What rendered the privilege ‘necessary’ were these characteristics, and the assertion 
that the material deserved protection as belonging to the party’s brief reflected the 
same idea. The brief represented more than just the actual documents that constituted 
or set forth the party’s evidence. It also symbolized the party’s investment of time, 
expense and effort in searching out the facts. Under an adversary system, how the 
yield from that investment was to be dealt with, whether it was to be withheld or 
disclosed, was the prerogative of the party to decide.39 
Emergence of the present doctrine 
3.26 Dr Ronald Desiatnik provides a useful summary of how the content of client 
legal privilege has changed over time: 
Initially the privilege could only attach to ‘communications received since the 
beginning of the litigation at bar and for its purposes only’. The privilege was then 
extended to apply to communications between lawyer and client ‘for the purpose of 
any litigation whatsoever’, be it actual or prospective. Subsequently the privilege was 
applied to ‘cover communications relating to advice unrelated to legal proceedings’.40  
3.27 Common law privilege emerged in the context of trials and extended to the pre-
trial period of discovery. However, since Baker v Campbell,41 it now also extends to 
non-curial contexts such as the exercise of coercive powers of investigatory or 
regulatory authorities. To quote Desiatnik further,  
[The doctrine] has risen from the ranks of other evidentiary laws to achieve post-
graduate status while retaining its under-graduate evidentiary qualifications.42 
Client legal privilege today 
The common law limbs of privilege 
3.28 The common law doctrine of client legal privilege has two distinct limbs: 
‘advice privilege’ and ‘litigation privilege’, although there has been a blurring of the 
distinction in recent case law.  
                                                        
39  N Williams, ‘Discovery of Civil Litigation Trial Preparation in Canada’ (1980) 58(1) The Canadian Bar 
Review 1, 47. 
40  R Desiatnik, Legal Professional Privilege in Australia (2nd ed, 2005), 12 (footnotes omitted). The 
developments are considered more fully in, eg, J Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law (3rd ed, 1940), [2294]. 
41  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. 
42  R Desiatnik, Submission LPP 24, 1 June 2007. 
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Advice privilege 
3.29 This limb of the common law doctrine protects confidential communications 
made between a lawyer and a client from compulsory production in the context of 
court and other proceedings where such communications were made for the dominant 
purpose of the lawyer providing (or the client receiving) legal advice.  
3.30 In AWB Ltd v Cole, after considering a number of authorities as to what amounts 
to ‘legal advice’,43 Young J concluded that legal advice is not confined to telling the 
client ‘the law’ but also includes advice about what action should be taken in that legal 
context. In the context of Royal Commissions, Young J accepted that legal advice 
‘includes professional advice given by lawyers to a client as to what evidence and 
submissions should be placed before a commission of inquiry’.44 
Litigation privilege 
3.31 This limb of the common law doctrine protects confidential communications 
made between: 
(a) a lawyer and a client, for the dominant purpose of use in, or in relation to, 
existing or anticipated legal proceedings; or 
(b) a lawyer, client and a third party, for the dominant purpose of use in, or in 
relation to, existing or anticipated legal proceedings.45 
3.32 Litigation privilege also will cover other documents brought into existence for 
the dominant purpose of use in legal proceedings—for example, drafts of pleadings 
and physical evidence, such as surveillance tapes or expert reports.46 
A blurring of the distinction 
3.33 At one time, communications with third parties were not covered by advice 
privilege unless the third party was found to be acting as an ‘agent’ of the client in 
making the communication. However, in 2004, in Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v 
Commissioner of Taxation (Pratt) the Full Federal Court held that a third party’s 
communication with a client, even where there was no litigation pending, potentially 
could be protected by client legal privilege.47 Otherwise, it was held, it may be difficult 
for a person seeking legal advice to communicate the problem in respect of which 
                                                        
43  This included the decision of the House of Lords in Three Rivers District Council v Governor and 
Company of Bank of England [2005] 1 AC 610. 
44  AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382, 410. 
45  E Kyrou, ‘Under Attack: Legal Professional Privilege’ (2007) 81(3) Law Institute Journal 33, 33. 
46  R Desiatnik, Legal Professional Privilege in Australia (2nd ed, 2005), 24. 
47  Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 207 ALR 217, [39]. 
86 Privilege in Perspective  
advice is sought without input from a third party.48 This was expressed in terms of the 
underlying rationale for client legal privilege: 
If … the policy implicit in [the rationale] is not to be subverted, the dominant purpose 
criterion must be applied recognising that the situations in which people need legal 
advice are increasingly complex and that the client may need the assistance of third 
party experts if he or she is to be able to instruct the legal adviser appropriately.49 
3.34 It has been suggested that the decision in Pratt is indicative of a blurring of the 
distinction between the two limbs of client legal privilege:  
Arguably, the Full Court’s approach represents a significant extension of the advice 
privilege, to a point where there is now little theoretical distinction between the advice 
privilege and the litigation privilege.50 
3.35 The High Court’s description of client legal privilege in The Daniels 
Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (Daniels) provides support for this position. 
It is now settled that legal professional privilege is a rule of substantive law which 
may be availed of by a person to resist the giving of information or the production of 
documents which would reveal communication between a client and his or her lawyer 
made for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice or the provision of 
legal services, including representation in legal proceedings.51 
3.36 By determining that the case could be decided under the head of legal advice 
privilege, the Full Court did not have to resolve this issue. However, in Pratt, Stone J 
indicated that the High Court’s exposition of the rationale for client legal privilege in 
Daniels was consistent with the appellant’s submission that there was a single rationale 
in Australia for client legal privilege. Her Honour found that the rationale applies both 
to litigation privilege and legal advice privilege, although she did not accept that 
adopting a single rationale should lead to a refusal to distinguish between the 
categories.52 
3.37 The ‘blurring’ discussed in the Pratt decision is consistent with—and indicative 
of—the conflation of instrumental rationales into one broad ‘administration of justice’ 
                                                        
48  Ibid, [42], [104]; see V Morfuni, ‘Legal Professional Privilege and the Government’s Right to Access 
Information and Documents’ (2004) 33 Australian Taxation Review 89, 108. 
49  Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 207 ALR 217, [87]. 
50  J O’Neill, ‘Loosening the Shackles on Advice Privilege’ (2004) 42(8) Law Society Journal 60, 60. 
51  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543, 552. 
52  Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 207 ALR 217, [86]. In ALRC 102, the 
commissions recommended that the uniform Evidence Acts be amended to follow the reasoning in Pratt 
and allow communications with third parties to be included under the advice privilege: Australian Law 
Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 102 (2005), Rec 14–4. The importance of the decision in 
Pratt was most recently noted in Visy Industries Holdings Pty Limited v Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission [2007] FCAFC 147. 
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rationale, underpinning both limbs of the doctrine of client legal privilege, as discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
Statute 
3.38 The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) also distinguishes between legal advice and 
litigation privilege. Section 118 provides that evidence is not to be adduced if, on 
objection by the client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in 
disclosure of: 
(a) a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer; or 
(b) a confidential communication made between two or more lawyers acting for the 
client; or 
(c) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) prepared by 
the client or the lawyer; 
for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, providing legal 
advice to the client. 
3.39 Section 119 establishes a ‘litigation privilege’, protecting confidential 
communications between a client and another person, or a lawyer acting for a client 
and another person, or the contents of a confidential document that was prepared for 
the dominant purpose of a client being provided with legal services related to an 
Australian or overseas proceeding, or anticipated proceeding, in which the client is or 
may be a party.  
3.40 It should be noted that under s 118, advice privilege does not presently extend to 
third party communications, in contrast with the common law following the decision in 
Pratt. Under this section a third party must be an agent of the client for privilege to 
apply.  
3.41 In Westpac Banking Corporation v 789TEN Pty Ltd (Westpac), the Court of 
Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (NSW) found that privilege could 
not be claimed over letters that were sent to PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), regarding 
an audit being conducted of Westpac.53 In order for auditors to discharge their 
obligations under ss 297 and 305 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), companies are 
required to advise the auditors of the likely amount of their contingent liabilities. This 
is generally done through a letter to an auditor by a company’s lawyer setting out the 
directors’ estimate of any potential financial settlement, and the lawyer’s opinion of 
that estimate.  
3.42 In the Westpac case, the court found that client legal privilege did not attach to 
the letter to the auditor under either s 118 or s 119 of the Evidence Act. As regards 
                                                        
53  Westpac Banking Corporation v 789TEN Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 321. 
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s 118, the court found the dominant purpose of the preparation of the letters was not to 
provide ‘legal advice’ to Westpac, but to enable PWC as the bank’s auditor to use the 
information in the audit. There was also no evidence in the case to suggest that PWC 
was acting as an ‘agent’ of the bank.54 The court also considered whether the letters 
were prepared for the dominant purpose of Westpac being provided with professional 
legal services in relation to a proceeding, and thus captured by s 119. Again, the court 
found that the letters were not created for the dominant purpose of Westpac being 
provided with advice in relation to legal proceedings, but for the dominant purpose of 
the auditors being provided with the lawyer’s opinion in the course of meeting their 
obligations under the Corporations Act.55 
3.43 In ALRC 102, the three Commissions recommended that s 118 of the Evidence 
Act be amended to replace the words ‘client or lawyer’ with the words ‘client, a lawyer 
or another person’ to extend advice privilege to information provided by a third party 
to the client or lawyer for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice.56 This 
proposal has been adopted under the Model Uniform Evidence Bill.57 This amendment 
could rectify problems arising from the requirement that a third party be an agent in 
order to fall within the scope of s 118, but will not deal with situations where such 
advice is not prepared for the dominant purpose of advising the client. 
3.44 There is considerable concern amongst the legal community that the decision in 
Westpac means that companies that fully comply with their obligations under the 
Corporations Act may be required to disclose both the company’s own view of its 
prospects in pending litigation and the view of its lawyers, if an opponent files a notice 
of discovery.58 The NSW Attorney General’s Department submitted early to this 
Inquiry that the decision may have implications for federal and state government 
departments that provide letters of representation to their Auditors-General.59 
3.45 In Westpac, Tobias J stated: 
There is obviously a problem which may require legislative intervention. However, 
any such intervention (for instance, by amendment to the Evidence Act or the 
Corporations Act) should only be made in a manner which would not unduly extend 
the rationale which underpins the privilege in question and which, essentially, is no 
different to that which applies under the general law with respect to litigation 
privilege where the relevant confidential information is directly related to assisting the 
prosecution, defence or compromise of pending or contemplated proceedings.60 
                                                        
54  Ibid, [29]. 
55  Ibid, [58]. 
56  Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 102 (2005), Rec 14–4. 
57  Model Uniform Evidence Bill, s 118: <www.pco.nsw.gov.au/uniform_legislation.htm> at 30 November 
2007. 
58  Law Council of Australia, Correspondence, 12 July 2007. 
59  Attorney General’s Department of New South Wales, Submission LPP 14, 9 May 2007. 
60  Westpac Banking Corporation v 789TEN Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 321, [65]. 
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3.46 The ALRC notes the concerns raised in response to the Westpac case, however, 
as noted in the Discussion Paper in this Inquiry, Client Legal Privilege and Federal 
Investigatory Bodies (DP 73),61 the issues are outside the terms of reference established 
for this Inquiry. Sections 297 and 305 of the Corporations Act are not examples of the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s (ASIC) coercive information-
gathering powers; rather, they require annual reports to include a true and fair view of 
the financial position and performance of the disclosing entity. It is not ASIC that is 
seeking the information; it is a requirement of the auditor to fulfil the auditor’s function 
under the Act. 
3.47 The reasoning in Westpac appears to be correct—the letters to the auditors are 
not prepared for the dominant purpose of providing the client with legal advice; they 
are prepared for the purpose of providing information for an audit. The ALRC would 
have some concerns if the doctrine of client legal privilege were extended to include 
this type of advice, as this would be a distortion of the dominant purpose test, and 
could lead to an undesirable broadening of the privilege. However, it appears 
uncontroversial that this specific information should remain confidential (as noted by 
Tobias J above), and that compliance with a requirement under the Corporations Act 
should not lead to a risk that an opponent in litigation could discover that information. 
3.48 The ALRC’s view is that the confidentiality of the information should be 
maintained through amendment to the Corporations Act and associated amendments to 
state and territory legislation dealing with unincorporated entities and government 
bodies. Such amendments could stipulate that an auditor has a duty of confidentiality 
or secrecy in relation to the information.62 
When client legal privilege can be claimed 
Types of proceeding 
3.49 At common law, client legal privilege can be claimed in civil proceedings at the 
interlocutory stage, during the course of a civil or criminal trial, and in non-judicial 
proceedings.63 Baker v Campbell established that the doctrine applies ‘in the absence 
of some legislative provision restricting its application … to all forms of compulsory 
disclosure of evidence’.64 
                                                        
61  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), 68. 
62  The ALRC received two submissions endorsing this approach (whilst noting the ALRC’s view that the 
issue was outside the terms of reference of this Inquiry): Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, 
Submission LPP 89, 1 November 2007; Grant Thornton Association Inc, Submission LPP 97, 
2 November 2007. 
63  S McNicol, Law of Privilege (1992), 52. 
64  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 132. 
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3.50 As noted above, the privileges under the Evidence Act (with the exception of 
s 127, concerning religious confessions) are confined to the adducing of evidence in 
relevant proceedings.65  
3.51 The privilege is not automatic, either at common law or under statute, but must 
be claimed in order to be applied. As noted in Chapter 1, the privilege is that of the 
client, not the lawyer—although in practice a represented client will normally assert 
the claim through his or her lawyer.66 A party making a claim of privilege must provide 
the party seeking disclosure with sufficient facts on which he or she could make a 
decision about whether the claim for privilege could be supported.67 Where there is a 
dispute about whether the document or communication is privileged, the court may test 
the evidence of the purpose of the document. 
A person may succeed by pointing to the nature of the documents or by evidence 
describing the circumstances in which they were brought into existence. But it should 
not be thought that the privilege is necessarily or conclusively established by resort to 
any verbal formula or ritual. The court has power to examine the documents for itself, 
a power which has perhaps been exercised too sparingly in the past, springing 
possibly from a misplaced reluctance to go behind the formal claim of privilege. It 
should not be forgotten that in many instances the character of the documents that are 
the subject of the claim will illuminate the purpose for which they were brought into 
existence.68 
3.52 Two recent cases have considered what constitutes ‘litigation’ for the purpose of 
claiming litigation privilege under both s 119 of the Evidence Act and the common law. 
3.53 Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd69 
(Ingot) concerned a claim for privilege over communications between a firm of 
solicitors and an expert the firm had retained to provide advice in a matter that was the 
subject of review by the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The 
issue in Ingot was not the substance of the AAT appeal, but was an application by one 
of the defendants to the proceedings for access to the advice held by the respondent, for 
the purpose of use by the defendants in the private litigation. 
3.54 The respondents claimed that litigation privilege applied to the documents, 
either under the Evidence Act or the common law, because the communications had 
been made for the purpose of providing legal advice in relation to an AAT proceeding. 
                                                        
65  Since the commencement of the Commonwealth and New South Wales legislation in 1995, a number of 
appellate cases have applied the privilege provisions to discovery and inspection of documents on the 
basis that the uniform Evidence Acts have a derivative application to the common law. However, in 
Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 and Esso v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49, the High 
Court rejected this approach. The wording of the religious confessions privilege is not limited to apply 
only to a witness in a proceeding. 
66  Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475, 487. 
67  National Crime Authority v S (1991) 29 FCR 203, 211. The issue of sufficient disclosure is addressed 
further in Chapter 8. 
68  Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674, 689. 
69  Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2006) 67 NSWLR 91. 
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3.55 Bergin J held that litigation privilege under s 119 did not apply to proceedings 
before the AAT. Under s 33 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) 
(AAT Act), the AAT is not bound by the rules of evidence, but may inform itself in 
any matter in such manner as it thinks appropriate. It is therefore not a ‘federal court’ 
under the definition in s 4 of the Evidence Act, and hence the Act does not apply to its 
proceedings.70  
3.56 Bergin J then considered whether common law litigation privilege applied to 
AAT proceedings. Her Honour based her decision on whether AAT proceedings were 
inquisitorial or adversarial in nature. In concluding that the proceedings were 
inquisitorial, Bergin J cited Brennan J in Bushell v Repatriation Commission where he 
stated that while AAT proceedings may appear adversarial, the onus of proof ‘which 
plays so important a part in fact-finding in adversarial proceedings before judicial 
tribunals, has no part to play in administrative proceedings’.71  
3.57 Other matters that Bergin J found indicative of the non-adversarial nature of 
AAT proceedings were: the statutory obligation of the decision maker to assist the 
Tribunal in making its decision;72 the administrative functions of the Tribunal; and the 
fact that the AAT is not a court and a decision on its review does not involve an 
exercise of judicial power.73 The fact that AAT proceedings contemplate legal 
representation was not on its own considered sufficient to attract litigation privilege.74 
In conclusion, her Honour found that the dictates of fairness, which are served by the 
availability of common law advice and litigation privilege, did not apply to the 
processes of, and proceedings in, the AAT.75  
3.58 Ingot followed the reasoning of Young J in AWB v Cole,76 in which Young J 
found that litigation privilege did not apply to commissions of inquiry (although advice 
privilege did). Young J stated that: 
the reason why the litigation privilege has been recognised as a substantive rule of law 
and as a fundamental right, is that it operates to secure a fair civil or criminal trial 
within our adversarial system.77  
                                                        
70  Ibid, [10]. 
71  Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408, 424. 
72  Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 33(1AA). 
73  Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2006) 67 NSWLR 91, [54]. 
74  Ibid, [39]. 
75  Ibid, [55]. The issue of whether the material could have been covered by advice privilege, on the basis 
that the decision in Pratt may allow some third party communications to be covered, was not raised in 
this case. 
76  AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382. 
77  Ibid, [37]. 
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3.59 Following the release of the Issues Paper in this Inquiry, Client Legal Privilege 
and Federal Investigatory Bodies (IP 33),78 it was suggested to the ALRC that it 
should consider whether it is appropriate to amend the Evidence Act or the AAT Act to 
rectify the decision in Ingot, so that both limbs of the privilege apply to AAT 
proceedings.79 
3.60 In DP 73, the ALRC argued that there does appear to be an anomaly in the 
situation that if a party sought review of an administrative decision in the Federal 
Court, then the material that his or her lawyer prepared for the case would be covered 
by client legal privilege, but if the review was sought in the AAT, the lawyer’s ‘brief’ 
would not be covered by privilege and the material could be sought by other parties. 
However (as the case concerned whether litigation privilege could protect advice given 
for the purpose of assisting a client in connection with an AAT proceeding), the issue 
is clearly not within the scope of the ALRC’s Terms of Reference. It does not concern 
the particular issues of the exercise of a coercive information-gathering power by a 
federal body.80 
3.61 Nevertheless, the ALRC has some concerns with the limited view of litigation 
privilege outlined by Bergin J in Ingot. As noted in Chapter 2, while the two limbs of 
advice and litigation privilege have particular rationales, both can be seen as sub-sets 
of a broader, overarching rationale expressive of the administration of justice. The 
administration of justice rationale relates not only to fairness in the adversarial context 
of protecting the lawyer’s brief, but also facilitates access to a fair hearing in a non-
curial context. 
3.62 In the ALRC’s view, material gathered for the dominant purpose of providing 
legal advice or legal services (to use the words of the Evidence Act) in an 
administrative tribunal should be covered by both advice and litigation privilege. 
3.63 The ALRC’s recommendation in ALRC 102 to extend the privilege provisions 
of the Evidence Act to non-curial contexts,81 if adopted, would extend the operation of 
those sections of the Evidence Act to AAT proceedings. This extension would require 
making AAT proceedings a relevant proceeding for the purpose of s 119.82 
3.64 In its submission the AAT supported the view that client legal privilege rather 
than ‘common law legal professional privilege’ should apply to proceedings before the 
AAT, and that the rules relating to the application of the privilege should be the same 
                                                        
78  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007). 
79  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
80  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), [3.59]–[3.61]. 
81  Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 102 (2005), Rec 14–1. 
82  It should be noted, however, that the ALRC did not recommend that the Evidence Act apply to AAT 
proceedings more generally. 
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in the federal courts and the AAT, in the absence of any compelling reasons to the 
contrary.83 
3.65 In the recent case of Re Farnaby and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Commission,84 the Tribunal declined to follow Ingot and held that litigation privilege 
does apply to the Tribunal, unless abrogated in clear terms by a statute. In its decision, 
the Tribunal argued that the analysis of whether privilege applied should not depend on 
whether or not the proceedings were adversarial, but rather 
We think it is more useful to look at the proceedings themselves and enquire whether 
they carry features that warrant the recognition of privilege, rather than to strive for a 
label and attribute consequences to that label.85 
3.66 In the view of the Tribunal, the fact that the AAT has the ability to make 
decisions which affect people’s rights (as opposed to a commission of inquiry), renders 
its proceedings closer to that of a court.86 It argued that the rationale for the privilege 
concerns wider considerations than just protecting parties to litigation, such as the 
public interest in the administration of justice and protecting freedom of 
communication. As such the Tribunal saw ‘no basis upon which that rationale could 
sustain privilege in court proceedings and not in proceedings in the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal’.87 
Types of communications 
Confidential 
3.67 A key feature of the doctrine of client legal privilege is that, to be protected, the 
communications must be confidential.88 It has been noted that this characteristic serves 
as a limitation on the application of the privilege.89 However, the entirety of a lawyer’s 
file is not protected, with documents like trust account ledgers, timesheets, records of 
objectively observable facts or notes of public proceedings falling outside the 
doctrine.90 In addition, privilege does not attach to evidence of transactions such as 
                                                        
83  Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Submission LPP 111, 6 November 2007. 
84  Re Farnaby and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2007] AATA 1792. 
85  Ibid, [16]. 
86  Ibid, [20]. 
87  Ibid, [34]–[35]. 
88  J Hunter, C Cameron and T Henning, Litigation I—Civil Procedure (7th ed, 2005), [8.35]. This was most 
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Government Holdings Ltd (1993) 10 WAR 1, [22]. 
89  R Desiatnik, Legal Professional Privilege in Australia (2nd ed, 2005), 28. 
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contracts or conveyances, even where they are provided to a lawyer for advice or for 
use in litigation.91 
3.68 Communications made privately between a lawyer and a client are assumed to 
be confidential.92 As a general rule, the privilege is lost where the communication is 
made in the presence of a third party (who is not an employee or agent of the lawyer), 
although there is some authority for the proposition that this may depend on whether it 
was unavoidable that the third party was present.93 Whether or not the client intended 
the communication to be confidential will also be an important consideration.94 
Purpose of communication 
3.69 A key development in the Australian common law was the shift from a ‘sole 
purpose’ test to a ‘dominant purpose’ test. Until 1999, for a communication to be 
protected it had to be made for the sole purpose of contemplated or pending litigation, 
or for obtaining or giving legal advice, as enunciated in Grant v Downs.95 In 1999, in 
Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation, the High Court overruled 
Grant v Downs, holding that the common law test for client legal privilege was the 
dominant purpose test—in line with the test under the Evidence Act that has been in 
place since 1995.96 
3.70 The scope of what may be covered by client legal privilege at common law is 
potentially expansive. The dominant purpose test serves as the primary limitation on its 
application. The purpose of the creation of the document or communication is therefore 
the vital question in a claim for client legal privilege.97 The ‘purpose’ of the document 
has been defined as ‘the reason why the document was brought into existence’.98 In 
determining the purpose of a communication, courts have looked at the circumstances 
in which it was made, including the intention of the person making it, the nature of any 
previous dealings between the parties, and whether it was made in accordance with an 
internal procedure or practice.99 
3.71 Under the dominant purpose test, there may be more than one reason for the 
communication. The High Court has stated that the ‘dominant purpose’ should be 
given its ordinary meaning, being that the purpose was ‘the ruling, prevailing or most 
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influential purpose’.100 This followed the approach of the United Kingdom courts to 
the issue.101 Dr Ronald Desiatnik notes that the change from the sole purpose to the 
dominant purpose test creates the potential for greater pre-trial disputes and appeals by 
requiring the court to ‘rank’ the (potentially) multiple purposes for which a document 
may have been created.102  
Copies  
3.72 At common law, the extent to which copies of documents are covered by the 
doctrine of client legal privilege has been a matter of some contention.103 It is clear that 
when a copy is made of an original that attracts privilege (ie, for the purpose of record 
keeping or administration) the copy is also privileged. The position is more difficult 
where the original is not privileged but a copy of that document—which is 
communicated for the purpose of seeking or giving advice or in preparation for 
litigation—may be.104 
3.73 The majority of the High Court in Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance 
(Propend) found that privilege could exist in copies of documents made for the 
purpose of seeking legal advice or pending litigation.105 Where a copy is made in such 
circumstances the copy becomes a separate communication in its own right to which 
the dominant purpose test is applied.106 This rule therefore protects copies of 
unprivileged documents that become part of the lawyer’s brief for litigation.107  
3.74 The decision in Propend was based on the idea of protecting the lawyer’s file or 
brief. Where a copy is produced for a ‘privileged purpose’—for the purpose of 
providing legal advice or for litigation—then it should be accorded the protection of 
confidentiality, even if the original is unprivileged and could be obtained elsewhere.  
If privilege were denied to a copy of an unprivileged document when the copy is 
produced solely for the purpose of seeking advice from a solicitor or counsel or for 
the purpose of use in pending, intended or reasonably apprehended litigation there 
would be a risk that the confidentiality of solicitor-client communications would be 
breached. The way would be open for the execution of search warrants by the 
emptying out of, and sifting through, solicitors’ files and counsels’ briefs. That would 
undermine the adversary system under which most litigation is conducted.108 
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3.75 It is easier to understand the basis of the Propend decision in the context of 
litigation privilege and the adversarial process rather than ordinary advice privilege. 
However, if copies of documents contained in the lawyer’s file were not protected, it is 
possible to imagine a situation where disclosure of a group of documents not otherwise 
privileged would disclose a legal strategy being adopted, recommended or considered 
by a party’s lawyers. 
3.76 Where the original document is destroyed, the privileged copy loses its 
privilege. In Propend, Brennan J argued that if client legal privilege were accorded 
without qualification to a copy of an unprivileged document where the copy is brought 
into existence for a privileged purpose, the privilege might frustrate the power to 
search and seize, and thereby undermine the administration of justice. A person could 
make a copy for the purpose of litigation, and then destroy the unprivileged original.109 
3.77 Similar authorities to Propend have been criticised in the United Kingdom. In 
Ventouris v Mountain, Bingham LJ suggested that the rule was ‘ripe for authoritative 
reconsideration’,110 on the basis that it was hard to justify why copies of documents 
should be treated any differently from the original. In a South Australian case prior to 
Propend, Debelle J stated that ‘generally speaking, it would be absurd for the copy to 
be privileged while the original was not’.111 
3.78 In the recent case of Barnes v Commissioner of Taxation, the Full Federal Court 
applied the principles in Propend and noted that the relevant point in time for 
consideration of whether privilege attached to a document (ie, when determining the 
purpose for which the copy is made) is when the document was created, not when it is 
communicated.112  
3.79 The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has submitted to this Inquiry that the 
Propend decision has a potentially significant effect on its operations. As documents 
that are not privileged may become privileged if they are copied and meet the dominant 
purpose test, the ATO could be ‘prevented from obtaining even basic and antecedent 
documents’.113 The ATO also pointed to difficulties of the application of Propend 
where the response to a notice was that the original of the document could not be 
found, as distinct from being destroyed, hence arguably the copy was still within the 
protection of privilege.114 
We consider that the law should be clarified so that [client legal privilege] does not 
apply to a copy of a document where privilege would not have attached to the original 
document. In our view, this may help prevent warehousing of documents, will provide 
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certainty about whether [client legal privilege] applies to copies, and will provide the 
Tax Office with greater access to transactional and antecedent documents.115  
3.80 It has been suggested that the rule in Propend should be narrowed to 
circumstances where it can be established that the copied documents indicated the 
direction of the legal advice being given.116 The ALRC is not in a position in this 
Inquiry to recommend substantive changes to the doctrine of client legal privilege. 
However, the Commission notes the comments of Dawson J (in the minority) in 
Propend:  
legal professional privilege … exists in order to preserve the confidential relationship 
between client and legal adviser, a relationship which is to be fostered and preserved 
for the better working of the legal system. However, that relationship is not impaired 
and the interests of justice are best served if the client or his legal adviser on his 
behalf is compelled to disclose a copy of the document when the original might be 
compelled without any ground for objection.117 
3.81 In keeping with the approach to the rationale for client legal privilege in 
Chapter 2, the ALRC is of the view that any protection of copies of otherwise 
unprivileged documents should be limited to situations where the copies would 
disclose or lead to discovery of confidential advice. 
The lawyer 
Professional capacity 
3.82 Client legal privilege does not protect all communications between a lawyer and 
a client; rather, it protects only those communications where the lawyer is acting in his 
or her professional capacity. Under the common law, part of the test of whether a 
lawyer is acting in a professional capacity is the lawyer’s ‘independence’ from the 
client. In Waterford v Commonwealth, Brennan J argued that the law required that a 
lawyer be independent from a client 
in order that the personal loyalties, duties or interests of the adviser should not 
influence the legal advice which he gives or the fairness of his conduct of litigation on 
behalf of his client.118 
In-house counsel 
3.83 The fact that a lawyer is employed as ‘in-house’ counsel does not in itself 
preclude a claim to client legal privilege in relation to communications between the 
lawyer and the employer.119 However, such claims may be more closely scrutinised by 
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the court to ensure that the lawyer was acting in the role of independent legal adviser 
and not with a focus on other commercial aspects of the business.120 As noted above, 
the communication must be made for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice. 
In determining whether the communication was made for that purpose, the courts have 
focused on the role of the lawyer in giving that advice.  
3.84 In Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd, Tamberlin J noted that the fact that in-house 
counsel also may advise on other matters does not rule them out from claiming 
privilege on behalf of their employers. 
Commercial reality requires recognition by the courts of the fact that employed legal 
advisers not practising on their own account may often be involved to some extent in 
giving advice of a commercial nature related to the giving of legal advice. Such 
involvement does not necessarily disqualify the documents relating to that role from 
privilege. The matter is necessarily one of fact and degree and involves a weighing of 
the relative importance of the identified purposes.121   
3.85 It has been suggested that where an in-house lawyer is actually ‘a player in the 
transaction’, his or her legal advice will not be privileged.122 However, where an in-
house lawyer provides independent advice and is not an active participant in the 
transaction, then the in-house lawyer’s advice may clearly be privileged.  
3.86 In Telstra Corporation Ltd v Minister for Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts (No 2), the Court considered ‘dominant purpose’ in terms of 
the independence of in-house counsel. In that case, Telstra indicated that the basis for 
its privilege claim was that the documents were prepared by internal legal advisers for 
the dominant purpose of providing legal advice. The judgment focused on two key 
issues: first, the circumstances in which in-house lawyers can make a valid claim of 
client legal privilege, and second, the need to provide evidence of the independence of 
in-house lawyers. Graham J set out a test for what is an appropriate degree of 
independence to apply to the work of an in-house lawyer, stating: 
In my opinion an in-house lawyer will lack the requisite measure of independence if 
his or her advice is at risk of being compromised by virtue of the nature of his 
employment relationship with his employer. On the other hand, if the personal 
loyalties, duties and interests of the in-house lawyer do not influence the professional 
legal advice which he gives, the requirement for independence will be satisfied.123 
3.87 His Honour stated that the court should not start from the premise that the 
communications of in-house lawyers are by their very nature communications which 
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attract privilege in the same way that it might for documents which are ‘opinions 
expressed by identified Senior Counsel’.124 
3.88 Graham J held that Telstra had merely asserted that the relevant documents were 
privileged and not provided sufficient information to satisfy the Court of the 
independence of its internal legal advisers. Telstra had therefore not satisfied the Court 
that the documents were in fact privileged, and discovery was ordered.125 In-house 
lawyers are discussed further in Chapters 8 and 9. 
Practising certificate 
3.89 Related to the issue of independence is whether a lawyer must hold a current  
practising certificate for the purpose of the privilege.126 In the Australian Capital 
Territory Supreme Court case of Vance v McCormack, Crispin J found that privilege 
only attached where the lawyer concerned held a current practising certificate or had a 
statutory right to practise.127 Crispin J based this finding on what he considered to be 
the rationale for client legal privilege,128 being the public interest in proper 
representation of clients. Where a legal adviser has no right to represent a client, no 
privilege should attach.129 His Honour noted that, in Australian jurisdictions, the 
statutory right to practise law generally depends on the holding of a current practising 
certificate.130 In August 2005, the ACT Court of Appeal overturned this decision, 
finding that Crispin J had erred by applying the common law rather than the Evidence 
Act test when considering if the documents were covered by client legal privilege.131  
3.90 In considering the definition of a lawyer under s 117 of the Evidence Act, the 
Court of Appeal found that, while holding a practising certificate is an important 
indicator, it is not conclusive on the issue of whether the legal advice was sufficiently 
independent to constitute legal advice. 
Admission to practice of itself carries with it an obligation to conform to the powers 
of the Court to remove or suspend a legal practitioner for conduct that the Court 
considers justifies such a determination. … The person remains bound to uphold the 
standards of conduct and to observe the duties undertaken upon admission to the roll 
of practitioners. The holding of a practising certificate reinforces that regime and 
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makes it more immediately applicable but the underlying obligations subsist even if a 
current practising certificate is not held.132 
3.91 The Court of Appeal cited Australian Hospital Care v Duggan (No 2) in support 
of this finding.133 That case concerned advice given by an in-house company lawyer 
who had been admitted to practice and held a practising certificate in the past, but did 
not hold a current Victorian practising certificate. In that case, Gillard J extensively 
outlined the case law establishing independence as a crucial element of the features 
that must be present for client legal privilege to apply in respect of a confidential 
communication between a private sector employer and its own employee lawyer.134 
In my opinion there [are] sufficient dicta to support the proposition that the employee 
legal adviser when performing his role in a communication concerning a legal matter 
must act independently of any pressure from his employer and if it is established that 
he was not acting independently at the particular time then the privilege would not 
apply or if there was any doubt the court should in those circumstances look at the 
documents.135 
The client 
Application to corporations 
3.92 Unlike the privilege against self-incrimination, client legal privilege is available 
for corporations as well as natural persons. This was most recently confirmed by the 
decision of the High Court in Daniels.136  
3.93 However, there has been debate regarding the correctness of this proposition in 
view of the move by some members of the High Court to describe client legal privilege 
in human rights terms.137 If such a rationale were accepted as a key basis for 
continuation of the privilege, then it becomes an important question whether 
corporations should remain able to claim it.138 McNicol has argued that:  
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If ‘human’ in the phrase ‘human right’ is defined literally as something that is enjoyed 
by human beings, then the privilege rule will have to be narrowed so that only human 
clients of lawyers can enjoy the benefits of it.139 
3.94 In the case of the privilege against self-incrimination, the inherent strengths of a 
corporate entity as opposed to an individual were seen as part of the reasoning behind 
limiting the availability of the privilege.140 In Environment Protection Authority v 
Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd, Mason CJ and Toohey J took the view that: 
In general, a corporation is usually in a stronger position vis-à-vis the state than is an 
individual; the resources which companies possess and the advantages which they 
tend to enjoy, many stemming from incorporation, are much greater than those 
possessed and enjoyed by natural persons. The doctrine of the corporation as a 
separate legal entity and the complexity of many corporate structures and 
arrangements have made corporate crime and complex fraud one of the most difficult 
areas for the state to regulate effectively.141 
3.95 This position was applied to client legal privilege by Wilcox J, in the Full 
Federal Court decision in Daniels. 
The policy considerations that influenced the High Court in Pyneboard, in relation to 
self-incrimination, are equally apposite to legal professional privilege. Conduct that 
involves a contravention of the Trade Practices Act often comprises many separate 
acts, some of which may be effected through lawyers. Without information about 
contacts between the person under investigation and that person’s lawyer it may be 
impossible for the ACCC [Australian Competition and Consumer Commission] to see 
the whole picture.142 
3.96 Alex Bruce has summarised the arguments against corporations having the right 
to assert the privilege, including that: 
• Corporate activity is complex, carried on through layers of management and 
principally in documentary form. 
• Often the best and the only evidence about the conduct of a corporation can be 
obtained from that corporation. This is especially so where any ‘victim’ of 
corporate misconduct is an ‘amorphous entity such as a market’. 
• Corporations are often large and powerful and better placed to initiate and 
defend investigation and litigation. They can do this by being better able to 
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conceal evidence of wrongdoing and to deploy resources to frustrate 
investigation and litigation. 
• If corporations can employ common law privileges to resist the production of 
documents concerning the truth of alleged misconduct, the public interest in 
detecting and punishing crime, as expressed in statutes like the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), is likely to be diminished.143 
3.97 In Daniels, Kirby J noted the argument that the right to the privilege as a 
‘fundamental human right’ should only apply to humans—and that the interests of the 
public may be well served in some cases by allowing these documents to be in the 
public realm. However, his Honour ultimately drew a distinction between the privilege 
against self-incrimination and client legal privilege, based on their very different 
historical origins. 
Occasionally, in any case, a fundamental human right is an expression of an even 
larger concept, namely a fundamental civil right belonging also to artificial persons 
such as corporations. Protection from self-incrimination rests upon different 
historical, legal and policy considerations almost all related to individual human 
beings. The entitlement to sound legal advice, immune from compulsory disclosure to 
investigating or prosecuting public authorities, is arguably necessary both for natural 
and artificial persons.144 
3.98 Kirby J cited the comments of Advocate-General Sir Gordon Slynn in AM & S 
Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, explaining the principle as 
applicable to both natural and legal persons. 
Whether it is described as the right of the client or the duty of the lawyer, this 
principle has nothing to do with the protection or privilege of the lawyer. It springs 
essentially from the basic need of a man in a civilised society to be able to turn to his 
lawyer for advice and help, and if proceedings begin, for representation; it springs no 
less from the advantages to a society which evolves complex law reaching into all the 
business affairs of persons, real and legal, that they should be able to know what they 
can do under the law, what is forbidden, where they must tread circumspectly, where 
they run risks.145 
3.99 McNicol argues that the issue of whether corporations should be entitled to the 
benefit of client legal privilege highlights the importance of clarifying the rationale for 
the privilege.146 If client legal privilege is based on the need for full and frank 
communications in order to obtain proper legal advice, then there is no reason that it 
should not apply to corporations as strongly as individuals. If corporations were denied 
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the shield of privilege it may deter candid, detailed, written advice being given by 
lawyers and hamper the development of internal corporate compliance programs.  
Submissions and consultations 
3.100 In IP 33, the ALRC asked whether client legal privilege should apply to only 
natural persons and not corporations.147 
3.101 No submissions supported this distinction. The NSW Bar Association argued 
that the privilege  
helps to protect and foster a fiduciary and confidential relationship which is integral to 
the rule of law. Citizens, whether corporate or natural, are entitled to the benefit of 
that relationship.148  
3.102 This was also the view taken by ASIC;149 and the Law Council of Australia 
(Law Council). The Law Council submitted that the rationale for the privilege applied 
equally whether the client was an individual or a corporation and noted that it was 
incorrect to view all corporate entities as large and well resourced.150  
3.103 The Law Society of NSW submitted that the complexity of laws governing 
corporations meant that they may have an even greater need for confidential legal 
advice. 
In general terms, corporations rather than private citizens have a greater need for 
obtaining advice from lawyers as to their legal, general and ongoing obligations. It 
would be a strange and inconsistent result if privilege was not available to 
corporations in circumstances where it is recognised that the primary rationale for the 
existence of privilege is to enable compliance with legal obligations to be more 
efficiently undertaken and for the administration of justice to be better and more 
efficiently carried out.151 
3.104 The Australian Government Solicitor (AGS) noted that the case for protection 
against self-incrimination has been seen as not as compelling for corporations as it is 
for natural persons, as corporations can only suffer financial detriment, rather than 
penal sanction. By contrast, client legal privilege is just as necessary to protect a 
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corporation’s effective access to legal advice and (more generally) its legal interests, as 
is the case with a natural person.152 
3.105 Civil Liberties Australia (ACT) submitted that, while the compliance rationale 
applied equally to individuals and corporations, the injustices that may be occasioned 
to corporations when the privilege is abrogated will rarely be comparable to that 
occasioned to individuals. Therefore, when consideration is being given to the question 
of when it is in the public interest to abrogate the privilege, the standard applied to 
individuals should always be far more rigorous than that applied to corporations.153 
ALRC’s views 
3.106 As outlined in Chapter 2, client legal privilege enables full and frank 
communication with lawyers and facilitates compliance with the law. Any 
characterisation of the doctrine as a right should be viewed more in terms of a right to 
access to a fair hearing or trial or access to legal advice, rather than a right that only 
can be ascribed to humans. No change to the current law in this regard is 
recommended. 
When client legal privilege can be lost 
3.107 Client legal privilege can be lost in a number of circumstances such as:  
• when a party has died;  
• through waiver;  
• where the communication may be adduced by a criminal defendant (where there 
are joint clients); and  
• where the communication is made in furtherance of the commission of an 
offence or fraud.154  
3.108 The two major examples where client legal privilege may be lost are discussed 
here—namely, waiver and the fraud or crime exception. 
Waiver 
3.109 Under common law, waiver was traditionally imputed where the circumstances 
were such that it was unfair for the client to say that the privilege had not been 
waived.155 What is ‘unfair in the circumstances’ was determined by the conduct of the 
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client. In 1999, the High Court in Mann v Carnell focused the common law test on 
inconsistency, rather than on fairness alone. 
What brings about the waiver is the inconsistency, which the courts, where necessary 
informed by the consideration of fairness, perceive between the conduct of the client 
and the maintenance of confidentiality; not some overriding principle of fairness 
operating at large.156 
3.110 In DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Interan Inc, Allsop J noted that by subordinating 
the notion of fairness to possible relevance in the assessment of the inconsistency 
between the act and the confidentiality of the communication, Mann v Carnell had 
produced an important change to the existing law.157 
3.111 The approach in Mann v Carnell was restated by the Federal Court in SQMB v 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs,158 where it was found 
that waiver occurs ‘when a party does something inconsistent with the confidentiality 
otherwise contained in the communication’.159  
3.112 One of the most common examples of implied waiver is where a party raises an 
issue as to his or her belief or state of mind (usually in a pleading or court document or 
to a third party) that indicates the substance of the communication.160 One of the ways 
in which waiver can be implied is where the person claiming the privilege has made his 
or her ‘state of mind’ an issue in the proceedings, and the legal advice in question is 
likely to have contributed to that state of mind.161 It is not sufficient to constitute 
waiver merely to show that the legal advice might be relevant—it must be shown that:  
The legal advice in question was relevant to the formation of that state of mind or 
belief or that the advice itself in some way becomes an issue in the action.162 
3.113 This issue has particular implications for government decision makers who may 
be relying on legal advice in making determinations.163 For instance, in Commissioner 
of Taxation v Rio Tinto, Rio Tinto alleged that the Commissioner could not have had a 
proper basis on which to make his decision that a transaction was a dividend stripping 
transaction.164 The Commissioner stated that the matters taken into consideration were 
found in documents over which he had claimed privilege in the matter. In considering 
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the question of when privilege would be waived, the Full Federal Court found that 
issue waiver occurs where  
the privilege holder’s conduct is inconsistent with the continued confidentiality of 
communication because he or she has put into issue the character or contents of the 
communication in pursuing a right or claim, or has created a situation where another 
party must reasonably do so by way of a defence.165 
3.114 In such circumstances, the Full Federal Court found that the Commissioner had 
gone further than merely saying that the legal advice was relevant, he had made 
reference to specifically relying on the contents of the advice, and thus put the advice 
in issue, thereby waiving the privilege.166 
3.115 In the recent case of Secretary Department of Justice v Osland, the Court of 
Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria affirmed the test as one of inconsistency and 
found that the circumstance and purpose of the disclosure were relevant. The court 
specifically rejected the idea that there was a general rule that disclosure of the 
conclusions of legal advice waived privilege. Maxwell P noted that the test of 
inconsistency 
is well capable of accommodating the notion that, in appropriate circumstances, the 
privilege-holder should be able to disclose publicly that it is acting on advice and 
what the substance of that advice is, without being at risk of having to disclose the 
confidential content of the advice.167 
3.116 Maxwell P stated that the purpose for which the privilege-holder made the 
disclosure is highly relevant to determine inconsistency. The relevant question in 
Osland was whether the purpose for which the conclusion of the legal advice was 
disclosed was inconsistent with the maintenance of confidentiality in respect of the 
content of the advice.168 
Fraud or crime exception 
3.117 Client legal privilege does not extend to communications made in furtherance of 
a crime or fraud, as the law of client legal privilege should not be able to be used as a 
shield to cover advice that may assist in the commission of a crime.169 
Communications made for an illegal purpose, such as an abuse of statutory power, are 
also not covered by the privilege.170 The fraud need not be known to the lawyer or the 
client, and may be that of a third party.171  
                                                        
165  Ibid, [54]. Cited in E Kyrou, ‘Under Attack: Legal Professional Privilege’ (2007) 81(3) Law Institute 
Journal 33, 35. 
166  Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto (2006) 151 FCR 341, [72]–[74]. 
167  Secretary Department of Justice v Osland [2007] VSCA 96, [50]. 
168  Ibid, [63]. 
169  E Kyrou, ‘Under Attack: Legal Professional Privilege’ (2007) 81(3) Law Institute Journal 33, 104. 
170  Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500. 
171  Capar v Police Commissioner (1994) 34 NSWLR 715. 
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3.118 Over time, the fraud or crime exception has expanded to include other improper 
purposes. In AWB v Cole (No 5), Young J stated that the term ‘fraud exception’ does 
not capture the full reach of this principle. 
The principle encompasses a wide species of fraud, criminal activity or actions taken 
for illegal or improper purposes and extends to ‘trickery’ and ‘shams’. As the fraud 
exception is based on public policy grounds, it is sufficiently flexible to capture a 
range of situations where the protection of confidential communications between 
lawyer and client would be contrary to the public interest.172 
3.119 Young J defined a ‘sham’ as ‘steps which take the form of a legally effective 
transaction but which the parties intend should not have the apparent, or any legal 
consequences’.173  
3.120 In order to prove that the exception applies, the party alleging that the 
communication is in furtherance of an offence must present a prima facie case to 
support their allegations.174 In Propend, Brennan CJ held that the test was one of there 
being ‘reasonable grounds for believing that the relevant communication was for an 
improper purpose’.175 In AWB v Cole (No 5), Young J found that it was not necessary 
to prove an improper purpose on the balance of probabilities; rather, the test was a 
prima facie one, in keeping with the fact that issues of client legal privilege were 
usually dealt with at the interlocutory stage of proceedings.176 
3.121 There has been some question about what evidence can be used to establish a 
prima facie case in this regard. A key issue in Propend was whether evidence, that 
would otherwise be considered hearsay and inadmissible, could be used to show that 
client legal privilege should be lost on the basis of the fraud exception. The High Court 
was split on this issue. Whilst a majority of the court found that hearsay could be used 
to displace the privilege,177 Gaudron and Kirby JJ placed different caveats on the use of 
hearsay evidence. Gaudron J found that it ordinarily could not be used, although if it 
were admissible on some other issue it could be relied on if the witness were available 
for cross-examination.178 Kirby J found that hearsay evidence could be relied on, but it 
was insufficient on its own to displace the privilege.179 
3.122 Desiatnik highlights the sensitivity for the judge when dealing with cases in 
which this exception is raised. When a court has to decide whether the fraud exception 
                                                        
172  AWB v Cole (No 5) [2006] FCA 1234, [210]. 
173  Ibid, [211]. 
174  O’Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581. 
175  Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance (1997) 188 CLR 501, 514. 
176  AWB v Cole (No 5) [2006] FCA 1234, [218]. 
177  Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, and Kirby JJ. McHugh J and Brennan J were in dissent. Gummow J did not 
deal with this question: R Desiatnik, Legal Professional Privilege in Australia (2nd ed, 2005), 116. 
178  Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance (1997) 188 CLR 501, 547. 
179  Ibid, 593. 
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applies, it is often the case that the fraud allegedly contained in the documents is 
central to the entire proceedings. This means that if the trial judge expresses the view 
that the communication was for an improper purpose, there is a real risk that the party 
against whom the privilege ruling is made could seek to have that judge removed from 
the case on the ground of apprehended bias.180 
3.123 In defence of the preservation of client legal privilege, it is often argued that the 
fraud exception prevents the privilege being used for an improper purpose. However, 
there are questions about how effectively the fraud exception operates in practice. 
Dawson J noted in Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales v Yuill (Yuill) 
that in some cases it will be very hard to determine whether a person has been 
fraudulent or negligent without access to the legal advice they have received.181  
Submissions and consultations 
3.124 In response to IP 33,182 a number of submissions expressed the view that the 
fraud exception was not effective in stopping improper claims of client legal privilege, 
and that there were a number of practical difficulties for federal bodies in proving that 
a communication is not privileged on this basis.  
3.125 For example, ASIC submitted that this exception is of limited utility and 
application for two reasons. First, for the exception to apply, it is not enough for the 
privileged communication to provide evidence of the fraud or illegality. The 
communication itself must be made in furtherance of the fraud or illegality. In ASIC’s 
view the exception would be more effective if it were sufficient that the privileged 
communication relate to, rather than be made in furtherance of, a fraud or offence.  
3.126 ASIC also argued that it is difficult to obtain the requisite prima facie evidence 
to support an allegation that the exception applies.183 The Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) stated that it remains ‘difficult, if not impossible’ to 
detect and prove an improper purpose.  
In most cases, the material that is the subject of the claim is likely to be the best 
material available to decide this issue, which creates a vicious cycle.184 
3.127 However, a number of submissions argued that the current test of establishing a 
prima facie case was appropriate. Desiatnik disagreed with the proposition that a prima 
                                                        
180  R Desiatnik, Legal Professional Privilege in Australia (2nd ed, 2005), 11. 
181  Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319, 333. 
182  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), Question 2–1. 
183  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. 
184  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. For other 
submissions, see Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory 
Bodies, DP 73 (2007), [3.112]. 
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facie case would be hard to establish.185 The Law Society of NSW argued that, in the 
absence of prima facie evidence, the efficacy of the claim should be accepted.186  
3.128 The Law Council considered that the problems of identifying whether a 
document is subject to a valid claim for privilege are overstated.  
The Law Council notes that if fraud cannot be discerned without reference to 
privileged documents, then it may be that there has been no fraud. The argument also 
assumes that the legal advice would display the client’s fraudulent purpose, and that 
may not be the case.187 
ALRC’s views 
3.129 The fraud exception poses a significant hurdle for agencies because of the 
evidentiary problems of establishing even a prima facie case over a document that the 
agency has not seen. The ALRC was told in a number of consultations that ‘you don’t 
know what you don’t know’.188  
3.130 However, many of the difficulties expressed by federal agencies in establishing 
the fraud exception relate to the lack of information available when a claim of privilege 
is made, or to the delay in resolving contested claims. The ALRC is of the view that 
the procedural changes recommended in Chapter 8, which require a person claiming 
client legal privilege to give an investigatory body greater detail as to the nature of the 
claim, will assist bodies to determine whether a claim is properly made. The 
recommendations for a uniform process to resolve contested privilege claims should 
also assist in this regard.  
When client legal privilege is abrogated 
3.131 In Principled Regulation (ALRC 95), the ALRC noted that few federal statutes 
expressly remove the operation of client legal privilege.189 Most federal statutes are 
silent on the availability of the privilege. Some statutes expressly state that the 
privilege does apply, for example, one statute states that privilege applies in the same 
way as it does to a witness in a High Court proceeding.190 This issue is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 5. 
3.132 In 2002, the Daniels case clarified when client legal privilege could be 
abrogated by necessary implication. In Yuill, the first case to remove the privilege by 
                                                        
185  R Desiatnik, Submission LPP 24, 1 June 2007. 
186  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
187  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
188  For example, Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Consultation LPP 24, 
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implication, the High Court held that privilege was not a ‘reasonable excuse’ for a 
failure to comply with the investigatory powers under the Companies (NSW) Code.191  
3.133 In Daniels, the High Court considered whether client legal privilege was 
abrogated by implication under s 155 of the TPA. The High Court found that client 
legal privilege was ‘not merely a rule of substantive law. It is an important common 
law right or, perhaps more accurately an important common law immunity’.192 As 
such, express words or necessary implication were required to abrogate the privilege: 
It is now well established that statutory provisions are not to be construed as 
abrogating important common law rights, privileges and immunities in the absence of 
clear words or a necessary implication to that effect.193 
3.134 The decisions of the High Court in Yuill and Daniels are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5. 
The comparative dimension 
The law of the professional secret in civil law 
3.135 While the doctrine of client legal privilege in its litigation arm is historically 
connected to the nature of adversarial court processes of the common law, a doctrine 
protecting the confidential communications of clients with their lawyers is not confined 
to the common law. 
3.136 In AM & S Europe v Commission of the European Communities (1983) (AM & S 
Europe), the European Court of Justice had to consider whether the protection of legal 
confidence was a principle of European Community law. It found that, while there 
were differences between the applicable principles in the common law as distinct from 
the civil law countries, all member states afforded some protection to confidential 
relations between lawyer and client.194  
3.137 The Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union (CCBE)—
which participated in the AM & S Europe litigation—has had occasion to survey and 
report upon the relevant doctrines several times since the 1970s.195 In 1976, DAO 
                                                        
191  Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319. 
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(2002) 213 CLR 543, 553. 
193  Ibid, 553.  
194  AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1983] 1 QB 878, 941. 
195  D Edward, The Professional Secret, Confidentiality and Legal Professional Privilege in the Nine Member 
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on the Report by DAO Edward, QC (2003); Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European 
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Edward QC, then Treasurer of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland and Rapporteur-
Général of the CCBE,196 prepared a report on The Professional Secret, Confidentiality 
and Legal Professional Privilege in the Nine Member States of the European 
Community (the Edward Report).197 The CCBE published an update in 2003, entitled 
The Professional Secret, Confidentiality and Legal Professional Privilege in Europe.198 
In February 2004, a further report was released, written by John Fish, Former President 
of the CCBE and Solicitor, Dublin, entitled Regulated Legal Professionals and 
Professional Privilege within the European Union, the European Economic Area and 
Switzerland, and Certain Other European Jurisdictions (the Fish Report).199 These 
reports reveal the widespread applicability of a protection of information 
communicated in confidence by clients to their lawyers. 
3.138 In the European Union (EU) the rule is broadly known as one of ‘professional 
secrecy’ or ‘the law of the professional secret’. In the 1970s, the source of the 
protection amongst those states was the relevant Penal Code, providing that it was an 
offence to reveal another person’s ‘secret’.  
This provision of the Penal Code is the source of the lawyer’s duty and, since breach 
of that duty is a criminal offence, the duty is not simply a professional or contractual 
duty, but a matter of public order. 
The duty of the lawyer carries with it corresponding rights, in particular (i) the right to 
refuse to give evidence on matters covered by the professional secret, and (ii) the right 
to withhold from seizure by the police and judicial authorities any document which 
contains information covered by the professional secret. These rights are in some 
cases expressly conferred by the Codes of Criminal and/or Civil Procedure. 
The secret thus enjoys both positive and negative protection: positive protection, in 
that the lawyer is bound to keep the secret and not to divulge it; negative protection, 
in that the courts and other authorities cannot force him to divulge it.200  
3.139 In the EU the obligation of professional secrecy was not confined to lawyers, 
but extended, for example, to doctors and priests as well.201 In some European 
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jurisdictions, such as Germany, obligations relating to professional secrecy are also 
included in the law regulating the legal profession.202 
3.140 The law of the professional secret concerns the duties and corresponding rights 
of the person to whom a secret has been communicated. It applies to information 
communicated by the client to the lawyer; not advice or information communicated by 
the lawyer to the client.203 Communications by the lawyer may be protected through 
different rules and to different extents in each particular country. For example, in AM 
& S Europe, Advocate-General Slynn referred to the position in Belgium. 
In Belgium it seems that confidential communications between lawyer and client are 
protected and cannot be seized or used as evidence. Although the basis of the rule 
may have been that information confided to the lawyer must be protected, it seems … 
that it also covers confidential advice given to the client.204 
3.141 In relation to France, the Advocate-General summarised the different threads in 
the relevant doctrine: 
In France breach of the rule of professional secrecy is a criminal offence and, 
although it seems that documents may be seized in some circumstances even in the 
hands of the lawyer, the importance of the rule is stressed in Lemaire Les règles de la 
profession de l’avocat which has been provided for the court. This rule appears to be 
closely linked with the right to a fair trial (les droits de la défense). 
The principle of the ‘droits de la défense’ appears to cover confidential documents 
passing in both directions between lawyer and client … and includes protection from 
seizure of legal advice given to the client before commencement of proceedings and 
found in his possession or in the possession of a person associated with him … There 
is also a wider protection for confidential letters than exists under the common law 
systems.205 
The position of in-house lawyers 
3.142 One key difference between the civil and common law systems is the protection 
of advice provided by in-house counsel. In AM & S Europe, the Court of Justice 
limited the availability of privilege to ‘independent’ lawyers, which did not include 
lawyers employed by their clients.206 
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3.143 In Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission of European Communities, lawyers 
groups sought to push the bounds of the AM & S Europe decision by arguing that 
‘independence’ could be established notwithstanding that a lawyer was an employee of 
the client—ie, that the question was not just employment alone. However, this 
argument was rejected by the European Court of First Instance, which found that the 
requirement of independence meant that the protection could not apply where a lawyer 
was ‘bound to his client by a relationship of employment’, regardless of whether he or 
she was a member of a professional association or subject to professional discipline or 
ethics.207  
3.144 This may be contrasted with the Australian cases noted above where the 
privilege may apply to in-house counsel where the requisite degree of independence 
can be established. 
Similarities of civil law and common law 
3.145 The common law doctrine of client legal privilege developed from the law of 
evidence and protects communications not only by the client to the lawyer, but 
communications in both directions—catching advice given by the lawyer as well as 
information communicated by the client. The nearest common law equivalent to the 
civilian law of the professional secret is the law of official secrets.208 
3.146 In AM & S Europe, Advocate-General Slynn focused upon ‘the overall picture’: 
Thus the question is not whether ‘legal professional privilege’ (a misnomer and the 
right of the client) is identical with ‘le secret professionnel’ (the duty, inter alia, of the 
lawyer), which plainly it is not, but whether from various sources a concept of the 
protection of legal confidence emerges, eg in England from the ‘privilege’ and any 
rules as to the protection of confidentiality in France from an amalgam of ‘le secret 
professionnel’, ‘les droits de la défense’ and rules applicable to ‘le secret des lettres 
confidentielles’.209 
3.147 While there are technical differences between the civil and common law 
doctrines,210 the Edward Report identified their overall similarity of purpose: 
In all the member states of the European Community, the law protects from disclosure 
information communicated in confidence to a lawyer by his client. The member states 
differ in the methods by which this protection is achieved. In some states legal duties 
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are expressly imposed upon the lawyer and corresponding rights are expressly 
conferred. In other states, protection is achieved by the creation of ‘privileges’ or 
exemptions from the ordinary rules of law. The nature and extent of these rights, 
duties, privileges and exemptions, vary from state to state. By whatever means 
protection is achieved, and whatever its nature and extent, its purpose is the same in 
all states.211 
3.148 ‘The purpose of the law’, he stated, was ‘not to protect the individual lawyer or 
his individual client’: 
The purpose is, first, to protect every person who requires the advice and assistance of 
a lawyer in order to vindicate his rights and liberty and, second, to ensure the fair and 
proper administration of justice.212 
3.149 The Edward Report was written in 1976, at the behest of the CCBE, at a time 
when the protection of client confidences was considered to be under threat: 
Terrorism, tax evasion and the abuse of monopoly power have added a new 
dimension to the age-old problem of preserving a proper balance between the interests 
of the state and the liberty of the individual. Moreover, the conduct of some lawyers 
has led (rightly or wrongly) to the suspicion that they are abusing their legal privileges 
and acting as accomplices, rather than advocates or advisers, of their clients.213 
3.150 The update to the Edward Report in 2003 noted the continuation of these trends: 
It seems generally admitted in most of the jurisdictions consulted that over the last 
25 years there has been a trend towards the greater limitations in the protection of 
professional secrecy. This trend is mainly caused by tougher statutory developments 
in order to overcome corruption, drugs and terrorism. 
In particular, there has been a development of legislation increasing the means of 
coercion or the investigation methods mainly in economic, tax and financial matters 
such as money laundering or revenue enquiries, investigations by the competition 
authorities. This statutory intrusion is motivated by the search of a total transparency 
in the economic and financial transactions and the suspicion that lawyers may be 
involved in illegal matters or permit themselves to be used for illegal purposes. 
The most clear and significant example of this statutory development would be the 
European Directive on money laundering … Under the Directive, lawyers may have 
the obligation to breach confidentiality in an attempt to make investigations more 
efficient. This is clearly done at the cost of confidentiality.214 
3.151 The circumstances attracting such comments bear a striking similarity to those 
that have led to this Inquiry. 
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3.152  By drawing attention to the functional similarity of the civilian and common 
law doctrines protecting the lawyer-client relationship, and making suggestions as to 
what should be done about perceived abuses, the CCBE, through the Edward Report, in 
many ways may be seen as anticipating some of the very questions posed in IP 33: 
The Community and national authorities should recognise that the rights, duties and 
privileges of lawyers are not simply a peculiarity of the law relating to lawyers but are 
specifically designed to protect the liberty and privacy of the individual, the proper 
administration of justice and the right to a fair trial. The Bars of the member states 
have a right and duty to protest against any infringement or curtailment of that 
protection. They stand, in this respect, between the citizen and the state. Abuse of 
privilege by individual lawyers acting as accomplices of their clients should be 
punished by professional and, if appropriate, by penal sanctions directed against them 
as individuals, rather than by withdrawing protection from the innocent. If abuse 
cannot be proved against individuals, it is not to be presumed to exist.215  
3.153 The concerns of the CCBE were expressed in 2001, and affirmed in 
December 2004, as A Statement of Position on Lawyers’ Secrecy and Confidentiality 
and their Importance for a Democratic Society that follows the System of Justice.216  
3.154 The view is commonly expressed that the civil or inquisitorial system is more 
directly concerned with discovery of the truth—unlike the adversarial system, which 
uses the rules of evidence to prevent the court from considering what would be 
otherwise relevant material.217 It is therefore interesting to note the direct similarities 
between the rules protecting client-lawyer confidentiality in both systems. This 
similarity supports the argument that confidentiality between lawyer and client 
promotes the proper administration of justice and the right to a fair trial, regardless of 
the system of justice employed. 
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Introduction  
4.1 This chapter considers the investigatory and associated functions of federal 
bodies that have coercive information-gathering or related powers, as well as the nature 
of those powers. The bodies discussed include those nominated in the Terms of 
Reference as well as a number of other federal agencies and departments. Where the 
information is available, the chapter will also address the frequency with which federal 
bodies use coercive powers,1 and their policies in this regard. Some bodies, for 
example, have a policy of using their coercive powers only as a measure of last resort. 
                                                        
1  To supplement the limited information available in annual reports of federal bodies, the ALRC wrote 
directly to federal bodies with investigatory functions to ask for further input on the use of their coercive 
powers. Where non-confidential information was provided to the ALRC, this has been included in 
relevant chapters of this Report. The information taken from annual reports that was set out in the 
Discussion Paper in this Inquiry, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies (DP 73) has 
been updated to include 2006–07 annual reports, where available. 
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4.2 Investigatory functions may involve ascertaining factual circumstances or 
whether there has been a breach of the law, or gathering evidence of breaches of the 
law. Associated functions vary, but include functions flowing from the outcome of 
investigations, such as: conducting prosecutions; taking civil or administrative 
enforcement action; seizing the proceeds of crime; and making recommendations for 
reform. There are also functions that are not dependent on the outcome of 
investigations such as: gathering intelligence; conducting audits; and monitoring 
compliance with Commonwealth regulatory laws.  
4.3 There are, of course, important differences in the aims and functions of federal 
bodies, and the subject matters with which they deal. Varying coercive powers support 
the different functions of federal bodies in a vast array of areas, including: criminal law 
enforcement; border control and immigration; competition regulation and 
consumer protection; financial and prudential regulation; revenue; social security; 
communications; health and aged care; human rights and public administration.2 
4.4 For the purpose of performing their investigative and associated functions, 
federal bodies may obtain information and documents on a voluntary basis. However, 
they also have the ability to obtain information by using a range of coercive powers, 
which are found in various statutes. Appendix 1 sets out a list of the statutes containing 
coercive information-gathering powers exercisable by particular federal bodies. These 
powers include: the power to compel the production of documents, things or 
information; the power to compel the answering of questions; the interception of 
communications; and the entering of premises to search and seize records. Some 
federal bodies have the power to apply for an order that a witness deliver his or her 
passport in order to secure compliance with their coercive powers where there is reason 
to suspect that the witness intends to leave the country.  
4.5 There are different statutory prerequisites to the exercise of coercive powers and 
different ranks of persons delegated to exercise those powers. Failure to comply with 
the requirements is often an offence, attracting punishment in the form of fines or 
imprisonment. Failure to comply also may trigger an agency’s powers to make other 
orders or may lead to a court order to comply.  
4.6 Many information-gathering powers can be exercised against persons who are 
not the target of an investigation but happen to have information or documents that 
may be relevant to an investigation concerning the conduct of other persons.  
4.7 Not all coercive powers can be categorised as information gathering—for 
example, powers of arrest on their own are not ‘information gathering’, although arrest 
can be a precursor to the exercise of coercive information-gathering powers. Further, 
the application of client legal privilege will not typically arise in relation to certain 
                                                        
2  For the purposes of this chapter, the ALRC has adopted broad categories of federal responsibility, under 
which it describes the functions of federal bodies. The functions performed by some federal bodies may 
be broader than the boundaries of a particular categorisation—or even fall within more than one category. 
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coercive information-gathering powers—such as powers to search for and record 
fingerprints, or to take samples of a person’s handwriting or DNA—although the 
exercise of such powers may involve a consideration of the application of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
Criminal law enforcement  
Australian Crime Commission  
4.8 The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) is a federal statutory body established 
under the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (ACC Act) to reduce the 
incidence and impact of serious and organised crime.3 It commenced operations on 1 
January 2003, replacing the National Crime Authority, the Australian Bureau of 
Criminal Intelligence and the Office of Strategic Crime Assessments. The ACC works 
in collaboration with other law enforcement agencies, federal and state. 
ACC’s functions 
4.9 The ACC has a number of intelligence and investigatory functions, including: 
collecting and analysing criminal intelligence; undertaking intelligence operations; 
investigating matters relating to ‘federally relevant criminal activity’ when authorised 
by the ACC Board; and providing reports to the ACC Board on the outcomes of 
intelligence and investigations, as well as advice on national criminal intelligence 
priorities.4 The ACC Board comprises members from a number of federal bodies 
including: the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police; the Secretary of the 
Attorney-General’s Department; the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Australian 
Customs Service; the Chairperson of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC); the Director-General of the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO); and the head of the police force of each state and territory.5 
ACC’s powers 
4.10 The ACC has a range of coercive powers, which are used where ordinary law 
enforcement methods are considered unlikely to be effective. The ACC Board 
determines the use of these powers.6 The powers are exercisable by ACC examiners, 
who are independent statutory officers, appointed by the Governor-General, and 
support the ACC’s special intelligence operations and special investigations. A special 
investigation is designed to disrupt and deter identified criminal groups by gathering 
evidence of criminal activity that may result in criminal proceedings and the seizure of 
                                                        
3  See Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) s 4 for definition of ‘serious and organised crime’.  
4  Ibid s 7A. See s 4 for definition of ‘federally relevant criminal activity’. 
5  Ibid s 7B. 
6  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2005–06, 10; Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 
(Cth) ss 4, 7C. 
 4. Overview of Federal Bodies with Coercive Powers 121 
illegally obtained assets.7 From 18 August 2007, a special investigation may also 
include an investigation into Indigenous violence or child abuse.8 
4.11 The coercive powers include the ability to summon a person to attend an 
examination to give evidence under oath or affirmation and the power to require a 
person to produce documents or things specified in a notice.9 Failure to comply is an 
indictable offence punishable with a maximum fine of $22,000 and five years’ 
imprisonment.10 These powers are complemented by the ACC’s powers to obtain 
information from certain federal, state and territory agencies,11 and to apply for 
warrants for the interception of communications in respect of a telecommunications 
service, and for surveillance device warrants for the investigation of certain federal or 
territory offences and certain state offences with a federal aspect.12 The ACC also has 
the power to apply for the issue of a warrant, including by telephone in circumstances 
of urgency, and to apply for a court order requiring a person to deliver his or her 
passport to the ACC.13  
4.12 During 2005–06, the ACC conducted 605 examinations and used its powers to 
demand documents under s 29 of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) 
(ACC Act) on 480 occasions.14 In that period, the ACC reported the successful 
disruption of 22 criminal syndicates and 26 organised crime identities.15 The ACC 
Board has approved the National Indigenous Violence and Child Abuse Intelligence 
Task Force and the Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs National Intelligence Task Force, a 
number of special intelligence operations, and the following special investigations: 
• High Risk Crime Groups—Investigates high risk crime groups involved in 
significant serious and organised crime. These groups have a willingness 
and capacity to corrupt public officials, intimidate witnesses and use 
knowledge of law enforcement methods to defeat investigations. 
• Money Laundering and Tax Fraud—Investigates serious financial crime 
such as large-scale money laundering, tax fraud and associated crimes, with 
                                                        
7  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2005–06, 38. 
8  Amendments to the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) were made by the Families, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Other Legislation Amendment (Northern Territory 
National Emergency Response and Other Measures) Act 2007 (Cth) sch 2. 
9  Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) ss 28–29. 
10  Ibid ss 29(3A), 30(6). 
11  Ibid ss 19A, 20. The power to obtain information from a ‘State agency’—which includes an agency of the 
Northern Territory or ACT—was inserted by the Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 
and Other Legislation Amendment (Northern Territory National Emergency Response and Other 
Measures) Act 2007 (Cth). This power only operates in relation to state and territory agencies where an 
arrangement between the federal minister and the appropriate state or territory minister is in force under 
the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) s 20A. 
12  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2005–06, 10, 139. The application of the ACC’s powers to 
territory offences was inserted by the Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Other 
Legislation Amendment (Northern Territory National Emergency Response and Other Measures) Act 
2007 (Cth) sch 2. 
13  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2005–06, 139. See also Australian Crime Commission Act 
2002 (Cth) ss 22–24; Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) s 39. 
14  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2005–06, 41, app B.  
15  Ibid, 8, 39. 
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the aim of detecting and dismantling underlying organised criminal 
enterprises. 
• Wickenby Matters—Progresses criminal investigations under Operation 
Wickenby into nationally significant organised tax fraud and associated 
money laundering activities. The ACC also provides partner agencies with 
assistance through the use of its coercive powers to gather strategic 
intelligence and support additional criminal investigations resulting from the 
wider Project Wickenby. 
• Established Criminal Networks (Victoria)—investigates state offences 
committed by members of established criminal networks active and based in 
Victoria, including murder, illicit drugs, firearms and corruption.16  
Australian Federal Police  
4.13 The Australian Federal Police (AFP) is a statutory authority established under 
the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) (AFP Act). The AFP is the primary law 
enforcement agency responsible for enforcing federal law.17 It also takes a lead role in 
the maintenance of national security.  
AFP’s functions 
4.14 The AFP has a number of functions set out in the AFP Act including the 
provision of police services for the purposes of assisting Australian and foreign law 
enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies and government regulatory agencies, and 
the provision of police services in relation to: the laws of the Commonwealth, the 
Australian Capital Territory and the Jervis Bay Territory; the property of the 
Commonwealth; and the safeguarding of Commonwealth interests. It also performs 
functions conferred by the Witness Protection Act 1994 (Cth) and the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 (Cth)18 and provides protection to Australian High Office Holders, 
visiting Heads of State and selected national establishments and infrastructure.19 
4.15 The AFP investigates federal crime, including: terrorism; illegal drug 
importation; tax and social security fraud; people smuggling; and the domestic and 
international exploitation of women and children.20 It also investigates state crime that 
has a federal aspect.21 
4.16 The Minister for Justice and Customs can direct the AFP as to the general policy 
to be pursued by it in performing its functions.22 The Ministerial direction, signed on 
                                                        
16  Australian Crime Commission, Australian Crime Commission Profile ‘Dismantling Serious and 
Organised Criminal Activity’ (2007) <www.crimecommission.gov.au> at 20 August 2007. 
17  Of 551 indictable matters referred to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions in 2006–07, 225 
of these were referred by the AFP, representing the most indictable matters referred by any agency: 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Annual Report 2006–07, 72. 
18  Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s 8. 
19  Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2006–07, 8. 
20  Ibid, 9. 
21  Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s 8(1)(baa). 
22  Ibid s 37(2). 
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31 August 2004, directs the AFP to give special emphasis to a number of strategies, 
including: 
• preventing, countering and investigating terrorism under Commonwealth 
legislation; 
• preventing, countering and investigating transnational and multi-jurisdictional 
crime, illicit drug trafficking, organised people smuggling, serious fraud, ‘high 
tech’ crime involving information technology and communications, and money 
laundering; and 
• identifying and confiscating assets involved in or derived from the above 
criminal activities.23 
4.17 In 2006–07, the AFP reported that it had undertaken: major drug investigations 
involving attempted importations of amphetamine type substances and precursor 
chemicals; investigations into people smuggling, human trafficking and child-sex 
tourism; high profile counter-terrorism investigations and airport security; and 
provided key policing assistance to Pacific nations and established the Technology 
Enabled Crime Working Group.24 
4.18 Agencies may request the AFP to undertake or assist them with investigations. 
For example, the AFP can provide operational assistance in the course of agencies’ 
criminal investigations, including execution of search warrants pursuant to s 3E of the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth),25 international liaison and Interpol requests.26 In 2006–07, the 
AFP provided assistance with the execution of search warrants to a number of agencies 
including the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), Centrelink and the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC).27 
AFP’s powers 
4.19 AFP officers have a wide range of coercive powers, including powers to: arrest 
persons without warrant28 or pursuant to a warrant;29 conduct ordinary frisk and strip 
                                                        
23  Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2006–07, 9. 
24  Ibid, 2–7. 
25  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3F sets out what a search warrant authorises. For example, it authorises the 
executing officer, or a constable assisting, to search for and record fingerprints and to take samples of 
things found at the premises for forensic purposes. 
26  See Australian Federal Police, Australian Federal Police Investigation Services <www.afp.gov.au/ 
services/investigation> at 20 August 2007. 
27  Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2006–07, 37. 
28  See, eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 3W, 3X, 3Y; Environment Protections (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 (Cth) 
s 32; Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth) s 33A. 
29 See, eg, Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) s 31; Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 
(Cth) s 82. 
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searches of persons;30 and search conveyances and premises under warrant,31 or 
without warrant in certain circumstances, including in emergency situations.32 AFP 
members of varying ranks of seniority also have powers to: 
• apply to a magistrate for permission to carry out prescribed procedures on a 
suspect in order to determine his or her age;33 
• stop, question and search persons in relation to terrorist acts, and to seize 
terrorism related items found on a person;34  
• obtain information or documents, for example, about terrorist acts from 
operators of aircraft or ships;35 or documents from any person that are relevant 
to the investigation of a serious terrorism offence or a serious offence;36  
• request specified information and documents from financial institutions under 
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth);37 
• apply to a magistrate for an order requiring a person to produce ‘property-
tracking’ documents;38  
• use, without warrant, optical surveillance devices and surveillance devices for 
listening to or recording words;39  
• apply for warrants authorising the use of surveillance devices on specified 
premises, in or on a specified object or class of object, or in respect of the 
conversations, activities or location of a specified person or a person whose 
identity is unknown;40 
                                                        
30  See, eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 3ZE, 3ZF, 3ZH (search of arrested persons); s 3F (ordinary or frisk 
search where authorised by search warrant). See also Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth) 
s 33(3A); Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) ss 199, 200. 
31  See, eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) pt IAA div 2; Radiocommunications Act 1992 (Cth) pt 5.5, div 2; 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 272; Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) s 4; 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 36; Environment Protections (Sea 
Dumping) Act 1981 (Cth) s 30; Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) ss 49–50. 
32  See, eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) pt IAA div 3; Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) s 251.  
33  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3ZQB. 
34  Ibid pt IAA, div 3A. 
35  Ibid s 3ZQM. 
36  Ibid ss 3ZQN, 3ZQO. 
37  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) s 213. During 2005–06, 1,028 notices to financial institutions were 
served. See Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2005–06, 43. 
38  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) s 202. 
39  See Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) ss 37, 38. 
40  Ibid s 14. See also pt 3 in relation to emergency authorisations. 
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• intercept communications, without warrant, in certain circumstances,41 and to 
apply for warrants to intercept communications;42 
• take identification material from a person in lawful custody or cause such 
material to be taken, including prints of the person’s hands, fingers, feet or toes, 
recordings of the person’s voice, samples of the person’s handwriting or 
photographs and video recordings of the person;43 and 
• order a person to carry out a non-intimate forensic procedure on a suspect.44 
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity  
4.20 The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI), 
established by the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth), (LEIC 
Act) began operating on 30 December 2006.45 The function of ACLEI is to assist the 
Integrity Commissioner in performing his or her functions.46 ACLEI staff provide 
investigative, intelligence and administrative support to the Integrity Commissioner.47 
Integrity Commissioner’s functions 
4.21 The core function of the Integrity Commissioner is to detect, investigate and 
prevent corruption within the AFP and the ACC, as well as any other Australian 
Government agency that has a law enforcement function and is prescribed in the 
regulations.48 Other functions of the Integrity Commissioner include: referring 
corruption issues, where appropriate, to a law enforcement agency for investigation; 
managing or overseeing the investigation of corruption issues by law enforcement 
agencies; conducting public inquiries into corruption issues, at the request of the 
Minister; and collecting, analysing and disseminating intelligence in relation to 
corruption in law enforcement agencies.49 The Integrity Commissioner is required to 
give priority to serious or systemic corruption in carrying out his or her functions.50  
4.22 The known incidence of corruption in the AFP and the ACC is infrequent.51 
However, the (then) Attorney-General expressed the view that it is important that 
                                                        
41  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) s 7(4)–(10). 
42  Ibid s 39. 
43  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3ZJ. 
44  Ibid pt ID, div 4, esp s 23WM. 
45  Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Acting Integrity Commissioner Appointed’ 
(Press Release, 22 December 2006). 
46  Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) s 196.  
47  Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006 (Cth), 2. 
48  No other agencies have been prescribed in the regulations to date. 
49  Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) s 15. 
50  Ibid s 16. 
51  Parliament of Australia—Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Provisions of: Law 
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006; Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner 
(Consequential Amendments) Bill 2006; Law Enforcement (AFP Professional Standards and Related 
Measures) Bill 2006 (2006), [3.2]; P Ruddock (Attorney-General) and C Ellison (Minister for Justice and 
Customs), ‘Commonwealth to Set Up Independent National Anti-Corruption Body’ (Press Release, 
16 June 2004). 
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safeguards are in place to preserve integrity in law enforcement52 and to establish a 
body that would detect and investigate corruption in the AFP or ACC ‘should it 
arise’.53 In its first six months of operation, ACLEI investigated 18 corruption 
allegations against the AFP and ACC.54  
Integrity Commissioner’s powers 
4.23 The Integrity Commissioner may initiate his or her own investigations, or have 
information about a corruption issue referred by the Minister, the head of an agency or 
any other person. The Integrity Commissioner has powers similar to those of Royal 
Commissions concerning the conduct of investigations.55 Many of the provisions in the 
LEIC Act mirror the provisions of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) and the ACC 
Act. For the purposes of investigating a corruption issue the Commissioner has the 
power to: 
• request a staff member of a law enforcement agency or a person other than a 
staff member, to give specified information or to produce documents or things;56  
• summon a person to attend a hearing to give sworn evidence or to produce 
documents or things, overriding the privilege against self-incrimination;57 and  
• enter places occupied by law enforcement agencies without a search warrant and 
inspect and copy any documents relevant to the investigation, and in certain 
circumstances, seize those documents.58 
4.24 The Integrity Commissioner also can apply for a court order that a person 
deliver up his or her passport if there is reason to suspect that the person—having 
received a summons to attend a hearing or having appeared at a hearing—intends to 
leave Australia and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person may be able 
to give evidence or produce documents or things relevant to an investigation.59 
                                                        
52  Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Acting Integrity Commissioner Appointed’ 
(Press Release, 22 December 2006). In Australian Law Reform Commission, Integrity: But Not By Trust 
Alone—AFP & NCA Complaints and Disciplinary Systems, ALRC 82 (1996), Rec 6, the ALRC 
recommended that a new agency to be known as the National Integrity and Investigations Commission 
should be established to investigate, or supervise the investigation of, complaints against the AFP and the 
(then) National Crime Authority. 
53  Parliament of Australia—Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Provisions of: Law 
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006; Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner 
(Consequential Amendments) Bill 2006; Law Enforcement (AFP Professional Standards and Related 
Measures) Bill 2006 (2006), [3.2]; P Ruddock (Attorney-General) and C Ellison (Minister for Justice and 
Customs), ‘Commonwealth to Set Up Independent National Anti-Corruption Body’ (Press Release, 
16 June 2004). 
54  C Stewart, ‘More Bite for Police Watchdog’, The Australian (online), 13 July 2007, <www.theaustralian. 
com.au>. 
55  Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006 (Cth), 2. 
56  Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) ss 75, 76. 
57  Ibid ss 83, 84.  
58  Ibid s 105. 
59  Ibid s 97. 
 4. Overview of Federal Bodies with Coercive Powers 127 
4.25 Authorised officers of ACLEI, including the Integrity Commissioner, also have 
the same powers of arrest as a police constable60 and are able to apply for and execute 
warrants to search premises and persons for the purposes of investigating a corruption 
issue.61 The LEIC Act sets out the scope of the powers to search.62 For example, the 
power to search premises includes the power to take fingerprints and samples of things 
found at the premises for forensic purposes, as well as the power to take photographs 
or video recordings of things on the premises.63 The power to search persons extends to 
searching any aircraft, vehicle or vessel that the person had operated or occupied 
within 24 hours before the search began, for things specified in the warrant.64 
Authorised officers also have the power to apply for telephone intercept warrants and 
warrants authorising the use of surveillance devices.65  
4.26 The Acting Integrity Commissioner advised the ALRC that during the first six 
months of operation he only once used the coercive information-gathering powers 
conferred by the LEIC Act, and summonses were issued to a number of persons to 
provide information in connection with an investigation.66 Powers in relation to 
telephone intercept warrants and surveillance devices were not used. The 
Commissioner expressed the opinion that the various coercive information-gathering 
powers are an ‘indispensable investigative tool available to ACLEI’.67 The Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Committee supported the use of coercive powers to detect 
corruption, 
particularly in light of the fact that ACLEI will be required to investigate officers in 
law enforcement agencies who are experienced in investigative practices and, by 
implication, the ways to avoid detection.68 
4.27 The LEIC Act contains a number of offence provisions relating to the failure to 
comply with a request by the Integrity Commissioner, or a failure to comply with a 
confidentiality direction, and conduct in the nature of contempt.69 
4.28 The Integrity Commissioner is required to report his or her findings at the 
conclusion of an investigation, subject to provisions in the LEIC Act, which ensure the 
                                                        
60  Ibid s 139. 
61  Ibid ss 108, 109, 111 (warrants by telephone, fax, email). 
62  See, eg, Ibid ss 112, 113, 121. 
63  Ibid ss 112(b), 121(1). 
64  Ibid s 113.  
65  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) s 39; Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) 
ss 6, 14. For discussion of these powers, see Parliament of Australia—Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Legislation Committee, Provisions of: Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006; Law 
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2006; Law Enforcement (AFP 
Professional Standards and Related Measures) Bill 2006 (2006), [3.54]. 
66  Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, Submission LPP 69, 20 July 2007. 
67  Ibid. 
68  Parliament of Australia—Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Provisions of: Law 
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006; Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner 
(Consequential Amendments) Bill 2006; Law Enforcement (AFP Professional Standards and Related 
Measures) Bill 2006 (2006), [3.60]. 
69  See, eg, Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) ss 78, 90, 94. 
128 Privilege in Perspective 
confidentiality of protected information. Where there is a corruption issue within 
ACLEI, the Minister may authorise a special investigator to conduct an external special 
investigation into that issue.70 
Prosecutions 
Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
4.29 The Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) is an 
independent prosecuting agency established under the Director of Public Prosecutions 
Act 1983 (Cth) (DPP Act), which operates under the control of the Director. The DPP 
Act ensures the separation of the investigative and prosecutorial functions in the 
federal criminal justice system. The CDPP does not have investigatory functions or 
powers—its main functions are to prosecute offences against federal law and to initiate 
court proceedings in order to confiscate the proceeds of federal crime.71 It relies on 
other investigatory agencies to refer briefs of evidence for consideration of prosecution 
action.72 
4.30 The CDPP regularly provides advice and assistance to federal investigators and 
works closely with them, often during the investigatory stage.73 The decision whether 
to investigate a particular matter and refer that matter to the CDPP is a matter for each 
investigative agency.74 The CDPP considers briefs of evidence referred by a wide 
range of investigative agencies and departments and decides whether to pursue 
criminal charges, and, if so, which charges should be laid in light of the available 
evidence.  
4.31 During 2006–07, the CDPP received referrals from 32 Australian Government 
agencies—including the Australian Fisheries Management Authority, the AFP, ASIC, 
the ACC, the Australian Taxation Office and Centrelink—as well as a number of state 
and territory agencies.75 Of any agency, Centrelink refers the largest number of briefs 
to the CDPP.76 
4.32 The main offences prosecuted by the CDPP involve drug importation and 
money laundering, corporations law offences, fraud on the Commonwealth—including 
tax and social security fraud—people smuggling, people trafficking—including sexual 
servitude and sexual slavery—terrorism, and a range of regulatory offences.77 
                                                        
70  See Ibid pt 12, div 4. 
71  However, under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) ch 3, the CDPP is able to ask questions during an 
examination undertaken by an approved examiner. There were 50 compulsory examinations under the 
Act during 2006–07: Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Annual Report 2006–07, 79. 
72  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 61, 12 June 2007. 
73  Ibid; Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Annual Report 2006–07, 2. 
74  See Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, The Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions <www.cdpp.gov.au/AboutUs/TheOffice/> at 20 August 2007. 
75  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Annual Report 2006–07, 72, Table 11. 
76  Ibid, 13. 
77  Ibid, 71. 
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4.33 Decisions to prosecute are made in accordance with the Prosecution Policy of 
the Commonwealth, which sets out a two-stage test that must be satisfied. This test is 
that: 
• there must be sufficient evidence to prosecute the case, which requires not just 
that there be a prima facie case but that there also be reasonable prospects of 
conviction; and 
• it must be evident from the facts of the case, and all the surrounding 
circumstances, that the prosecution would be in the public interest.78 
4.34 Other functions of the CDPP include: 
• to conduct committal proceedings and summary prosecutions for offences 
against state law where a Commonwealth officer is the informant; 
• to assist a coroner in inquests and inquiries conducted under the laws of the 
Commonwealth; 
• to appear in proceedings under the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and the Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth); and 
• in respect of relevant matters, to take civil remedies on behalf and in the name 
of the Commonwealth in connection with the recovery of tax.79 
Competition laws and consumer protection  
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
4.35 The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is an 
independent statutory authority, established in 1995 to administer the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) and other Acts.80 Its primary responsibility is to ensure that 
individuals and businesses comply with Commonwealth fair trading, competition and 
consumer protection laws.81 The ACCC promotes effective competition and informed 
markets—for example, by preventing price fixing; encouraging fair trading; protecting 
consumers; and regulating infrastructure service markets and other markets where 
                                                        
78  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth <www.cdpp. 
gov.au/Prosecutions/Policy/> at 20 August 2007. 
79  See Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) s 6 for a full list of functions. See also 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, The Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions <www.cdpp.gov.au/AboutUs/TheOffice/> at 20 August 2007. 
80  The predecessors of the ACCC were the Trade Practices Commission and the Prices Surveillance 
Authority. 
81  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Annual Report 2005–06, 14.  
130 Privilege in Perspective 
competition is restricted, including the electricity, gas, telecommunications and 
transport sectors.82  
4.36 The ACCC’s role in relation to fair trading and consumer protection is 
complemented by that of the state and territory consumer affairs agencies which 
administer the mirror legislation of their jurisdictions, and the Competition and 
Consumer Policy Division of the Commonwealth Treasury.83 
ACCC’s functions 
4.37 The scope and nature of the ACCC’s functions vary significantly across the 
various parts of the TPA.84 However, undertaking enforcement action has been 
described as the ‘cornerstone’ of the agency.85 The ACCC is responsible for enforcing 
certain prohibitions in the TPA, such as: certain anti-competitive conduct; 
unconscionable conduct; unfair consumer practices and price exploitation conduct. The 
ACCC detects possible contraventions of the TPA through a variety of means 
including: complaints; observation of marketplace conduct; information from 
governments; and proactive market inquiries.86 To enforce the provisions of the TPA, 
the ACCC can seek a number of remedies, including: declarations of contraventions; 
injunctions; probation orders; damages; enforceable undertakings; adverse publicity 
orders; and pecuniary penalties.87  
4.38 The ACCC has identified the detection and prosecution of cartels as a major 
priority,88 stating that: 
Significant, difficult or complex matters such as cartels, require a recognition that 
enforcement activities will involve complex investigations and the most effective 
application of our investigative and legal resources.89 
ACCC’s powers 
4.39 The ACCC has a number of coercive information-gathering powers available.90 
Some of these powers have not been used or have been used infrequently.91 The ACCC 
                                                        
82  Ibid, 14–16, 19. 
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generally prefers to obtain its information through cooperation,92 because this is ‘more 
efficient, less time-consuming and more flexible than the alternative practice of 
obtaining information by using its coercive powers’.93 However, there are various 
reasons why the ACCC will choose to use its coercive powers, including where 
voluntary disclosure is not forthcoming, or because the use of powers will allow 
sanctions to be imposed for non-compliance.94 
4.40 Section 155 of the TPA is the ACCC’s most widely used coercive information-
gathering power,95 although the decision to issue a s 155 notice is not taken lightly.96  
The main focus in using s 155 notices is upon corporations. Where a notice is issued 
to a corporation, commonly notices are also issued to one or more employees of the 
corporation who are considered to be directly involved in the conduct in question. 
Issuing notices to a corporation’s advisers and related parties is less frequent.97  
4.41 Prior to issuing a notice, the ACCC will consider whether the information is 
otherwise available, including whether it would be provided voluntarily.98 A s 155 
notice can be issued in certain specified circumstances, including where the ACCC has 
reason to believe that a person is capable of furnishing information, giving evidence or 
producing documents relevant to a contravention of the TPA.99 A s 155 notice gives 
the ACCC power to require a person to provide information, produce documents, 
answer questions, and in some circumstances, to enter premises and inspect or copy 
documents. 
4.42 In 2005–06, the ACCC reported that it had issued 347 notices under its powers 
in s 155 to compulsorily acquire information. These consisted of 124 notices to provide 
information in writing; 135 notices to provide documents; and 88 notices to appear in 
person. No authorities were issued to enter premises and inspect documents.100 The 
ACCC has also reported that its compulsory evidence-gathering powers are being used 
more widely than just for enforcement purposes, including in mergers investigations 
and adjudication processes.101  
                                                                                                                                             
LPP 53, 13 June 2007; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 2, 14 March 
2007. 
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94  Ibid, 6. 
95  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Section 155 of the Trade Practices Act: Information-
Gathering Powers of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission in Relation to its 
Enforcement Function, 1 October 2000, 1. 
96  Ibid, 6. 
97  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 2, 14 March 2007. 
98  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Section 155 of the Trade Practices Act: Information-
Gathering Powers of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission in Relation to its 
Enforcement Function, 1 October 2000, 6. 
99  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 155(1). 
100  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Annual Report 2005–06, 43. 
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4.43 In January 2007, the power to enter premises and inspect documents was 
repealed from s 155(2) of the TPA, and enacted in a new form in Part XID. The Part 
enables authorised ACCC officers to enter premises in particular circumstances, either 
with consent of the occupier or in accordance with a search warrant. The search 
warrant powers in Part XID have not as yet been used.102 
Financial markets 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission  
4.44 ASIC is an independent federal body that regulates companies and financial 
services and promotes investor, creditor and consumer protection under the Australian 
Securities and Investments Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act), the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth), and various other statutes, including those relating to superannuation and 
insurance.103 
ASIC’s functions 
4.45 The ASIC Act sets out the objectives and functions of the agency. Its objectives 
include: maintaining and improving the performance of the financial system; 
promoting the confident and informed participation of investors and consumers in the 
financial sector; and taking action to enforce and give effect to the laws that confer it 
with functions and powers.104 Its functions include investigatory functions conferred on 
it by the legislation that it administers, as well as monitoring and promoting market 
integrity in relation to the financial and payments systems.105 
4.46 ASIC may commence an investigation where it suspects that there may have 
been a contravention of the corporations law. It can also commence an investigation 
where it suspects a contravention of a law that concerns the management or affairs of a 
body corporate or managed investment scheme; or involves fraud or dishonesty and 
relates to a body corporate, managed investment scheme or financial products.106 In 
addition, the Minister may direct ASIC to investigate a matter, where he or she is of the 
opinion that an investigation is in the public interest.107 
4.47 In 2005–06, ASIC reported that it had concluded enforcement proceedings 
against a record 352 people or companies and managed a number of high profile and 
challenging investigations. These included investigations relating to HIH Insurance, 
                                                        
102  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. 
103  See Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth); Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth); Life 
Insurance Act 1995 (Cth); Retirement Savings Account Act 1997 (Cth); Superannuation Industry 
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105  Ibid ss 11, 12A. 
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107  Ibid s 14. 
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the Westpoint group, the National Australia Bank foreign currency traders, James 
Hardie, and the cross-agency tax-related investigation, ‘Project Wickenby’.108 In 2006–
07, the CDPP reported that, on referral from ASIC, it dealt with 34 defendants on 
summary charges and 37 defendants on indictable charges.109 
ASIC’s powers 
4.48 ASIC has a number of coercive information-gathering powers. These include the 
power to:  
• require a person to attend an examination to answer questions on oath or 
affirmation and to give all reasonable assistance in connection with an 
investigation;110  
• inspect books;111  
• require the production of books, records or information;112  
• enter premises and inspect, take extracts from, and copy, records;113 and 
• require a person to give all reasonable assistance in connection with a 
prosecution—which may involve answering questions, explaining documents 
and diligently searching for and producing documents.114 
4.49 Some of ASIC’s information-gathering powers that require the production of 
books and documents can be exercised as part of a general monitoring of a company’s 
affairs. ASIC can issue such notices ‘for the purposes of ensuring compliance with the 
corporations legislation’ as well as in the course of an investigation with a view to 
taking enforcement action.115  
4.50 A notice to produce documents under s 33 of the ASIC Act requires a person to 
produce books in that person’s possession. The Corporations Act defines ‘possession’ 
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assistance concerning a declaration of contravention, pecuniary penalty order or criminal proceedings). 
115  Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 28. 
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to include what is in a person’s custody or control.116 Documents held by a person’s 
solicitor are within that person’s control because the person has a legal entitlement to 
require them to be produced.117 Therefore, a notice issued under this provision can 
require production of documents held by a person’s solicitor on behalf of that 
person.118 
4.51 A failure to comply with a notice requiring attendance at an examination or the 
production of books under the ASIC Act carries a maximum penalty of $11,000 or 
imprisonment for two years or both.119 In certain circumstances, ASIC officers can 
apply for a warrant to seize books not produced pursuant to a notice.120 Further, where 
ASIC is of the view that information about the affairs of a body corporate or financial 
products needs to be found for the purposes of the exercise of ASIC’s powers, but that 
information cannot be found because a person has failed to comply with a coercive 
information-gathering power, ASIC may make orders in relation to the securities of a 
body corporate or financial products generally. For example, ASIC may make orders 
restraining a specific person from disposing of, or acquiring, any interest in specified 
financial products or specified securities of a body corporate.121 
4.52 ASIC has the ability to obtain documents voluntarily—but sometimes 
organisations and persons prefer to have compulsory powers exercised against them. 
One reason for this is that the ASIC Act specifically provides that a person who 
produces documents in response to a notice issued under Part 3 Division 3 of the ASIC 
Act is protected against liability for breach of the duty of confidentiality.122 Also, 
where a person is a friend, associate, employer or work colleague of a person suspected 
to be under investigation, he or she may not wish to be seen to be volunteering 
information relevant to that investigation to ASIC. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority  
4.53 The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is the prudential 
regulator of the financial services industry. It oversees credit unions, banks, building 
societies, life and general insurance companies, friendly societies and most members of 
the superannuation industry.123 APRA was established in 1998 under the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth) (APRA Act) following 
recommendations from the Wallis Inquiry that a single prudential regulator be set up 
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for the financial services sector.124 It brought together the prudential supervisory 
responsibilities of 11 separate agencies.125 
APRA’s functions 
4.54 The APRA Act provides that the purpose of APRA is to 
regulate bodies in accordance with other laws of the Commonwealth that provide for 
prudential regulation or for retirement income standards, and for developing the 
administrative practices and procedures to be applied in performing that regulatory 
role.126 
4.55 APRA’s stated mission is 
to establish and enforce prudential standards and practices designed to ensure that, 
under all reasonable circumstances, financial promises made by institutions [it] 
supervise[s] are met within a stable, efficient and competitive financial system.127 
4.56 APRA’s functions are those conferred under the APRA Act, and various other 
laws such as the Banking Act 1959 (Cth) and the Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) that relate to specific industry sectors.128 Those functions 
include supervising, monitoring and investigating certain participants in the financial 
services industry. In performing its functions and exercising its powers, APRA is 
directed to ‘balance the objectives of financial safety and efficiency, competition, 
contestability and competitive neutrality’.129  
4.57 APRA has a number of investigatory functions. For example, it can: 
• investigate, in certain circumstances, the affairs of an authorised deposit 
institution;130  
• appoint a person to investigate and report on prudential matters in relation to 
certain body corporates if it is satisfied that such a report is necessary; 131  
• investigate designated security trust funds132 and, in certain circumstances, a 
body corporate that is a general insurer or an authorised non-operating holding 
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company, including where it suspects that the body corporate has contravened a 
provision of the Insurance Act.1973 (Cth);133  
• investigate the life insurance business of a life company or an associated 
company;134 
• investigate the affairs of a retirement savings account provider if it appears that 
there may have been a contravention of the Retirement Savings Account Act 
1997 (Cth);135 and 
• investigate the affairs of a superannuation entity if it appears that there may have 
been a contravention of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 
(Cth) in relation to the superannuation entity or the financial position of the 
entity may be unsatisfactory.136 
4.58 In 2006–07, APRA reported that eight investigations were in progress, including 
some carrying on from previous years.137 Investigations conducted by APRA in 2006–
07 included the conclusion of the investigation into the marketing and promotion of 
complex financial reinsurance products by General Reinsurance Australia Limited.138  
Approach to enforcement 
4.59 APRA takes enforcement action, when required, to protect the interests of 
depositors, policyholders and superannuation fund members. However, such action is 
the exception, rather than the rule, with APRA having expressed a preference to ‘work 
cooperatively to resolve issues that are likely to impinge on the ability of an institution 
to meet its financial promises’.139 About 7% of APRA’s staffing resources are devoted 
to enforcement activity.140 
APRA’s powers 
4.60 APRA has a number of coercive information-gathering powers that it can use 
for its investigatory or monitoring functions. These powers enable it to: require the 
production of information, books, accounts and documents; enter premises to inspect, 
copy and take books; and require persons to provide assistance or answer questions.141 
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Sometimes the powers can be exercised ‘for the purposes’ of the relevant Act—which 
means that they can be exercised for monitoring purposes in the absence of an 
investigation.142 APRA uses these powers as part of its general supervisory processes, 
and does not record the frequency of use of such powers.143 
4.61 In other cases, the powers can be exercised only for the purposes of an 
investigation.144 In some instances, a power can be exercised by APRA either for the 
purposes of an investigation or for monitoring purposes.145 APRA has indicated that it 
utilises its coercive powers ‘fairly infrequently’.146 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre  
4.62 The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) is 
Australia’s anti-money laundering regulator and specialist financial intelligence unit. 
Counter-terrorism financing is also now included in the scope of AUSTRAC’s work. 
AUSTRAC was established under the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth) 
(FTR Act) and continues in existence under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-
Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act).147  
AUSTRAC’s functions 
4.63 AUSTRAC’s mission is to ‘make a valued contribution towards a financial 
environment hostile to money laundering, major crime and tax evasion’.148 In its 
regulatory role, AUSTRAC oversees compliance with the reporting requirements under 
the FTR Act by a wide range of cash dealers, financial service providers, and the 
gambling industry. Under the FTR Act, cash dealers are required to report ‘suspect 
transactions’ and ‘significant cash transactions’ to AUSTRAC.149 In its intelligence 
role, AUSTRAC collects, analyses and disseminates financial intelligence to a range of 
Australian law enforcement, revenue, national security, and social justice agencies, as 
well as a number of overseas financial intelligence units.150 AUSTRAC’s functions, 
although not investigatory, assist its partner agencies in the investigation and 
prosecution of criminal and terrorist enterprises.151 The data contained in financial 
transaction reports may indicate illegal activity, assisting partner agencies to combat 
major crimes, including financing of terrorism and tax evasion.152 
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4.64 The function of AUSTRAC is to assist its CEO in the performance of his or her 
functions,153 including to: 
• retain, compile, analyse and disseminate eligible collected information, 
including FTR information; 
• provide advice and assistance, in relation to AUSTRAC information, to the 
persons and agencies entitled to access; and 
• advise and assist reporting entities in relation to their obligations under the 
AML/CTF Act, and to promote compliance with that Act.154 
AUSTRAC’s powers 
4.65 Under the FTR Act, authorised officers of AUSTRAC have powers to access the 
premises of cash dealers and solicitors; and to inspect, copy and take extracts of certain 
records and systems kept at those premises.155 Those powers are used to address 
systemic non-compliance.156 Failure to comply with a notice under s 27E(3) of the Act 
is an offence, carrying a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.157 Under the 
AML/CTF Act, authorised officers of AUSTRAC have powers to apply for a 
monitoring warrant158 and to enter premises by consent or under a monitoring 
warrant;159 as well as a range of monitoring powers, including to: 
• search premises for relevant things or compliance records;  
• inspect, copy and take extracts of relevant documents;160 and 
• ask questions of the occupier of the premises or of any person on the premises, 
and require those persons to produce documents.161  
4.66 Where an authorised officer is on premises under a monitoring warrant a person 
who breaches a requirement to answer any questions or produce any documents 
relating to the operation of the Act commits an offence, punishable on conviction by 
six months’ imprisonment or a fine of $3,300 or both.162 Authorised officers of 
AUSTRAC also have general powers to obtain information and documents163 and to 
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issue notices to reporting entities to produce documents.164 Failure to comply with 
these requirements is an offence.165 The AUSTRAC CEO may require a reporting 
entity to provide further information or produce documents, and civil penalties may 
apply to a failure to comply with the request.166 
4.67 AUSTRAC indicated to this Inquiry that it has enhanced its regulatory capacity 
and supervision of the industry in recent years.167 Between 1 January 2000 and 31 
December 2004, AUSTRAC completed 225 inspection audits and 25 joint studies 
visits,168 with written notices to access business premises usually issued under s 27E of 
the FTR Act on these occasions. From 1 October 2005 to 1 June 2007, AUSTRAC 
exercised its coercive information-gathering powers under the FTR Act to undertake 
92 audit/inspection visits, and a further 20 visits were planned for June 2007. As at 
1 June 2007, the new monitoring and information-gathering powers set out in the 
AML/CTF Act had not yet been exercised by AUSTRAC. AUSTRAC noted, however, 
its enhanced role as Australia’s AML/CTF regulator and gave some indication of how 
its coercive information-gathering powers may be used in the future. 
AUSTRAC’s regulatory philosophy of fostering co-operation and voluntary 
compliance will continue under the new AML/CTF regime. However, where 
necessary AUSTRAC will exercise its monitoring and information-gathering powers 
under the AML/CTF Act, and seek other available remedies (such as enforceable 
undertakings) for non-compliance with breaches of the AML/CTF Act. AUSTRAC’s 
enhanced supervisory role of reporting entities under the new regime may lead to 
increased use of its coercive powers.169 
Revenue  
Australian Taxation Office 
4.68 The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) is the Australian Government’s principal 
revenue collection agency and administers Australia’s tax, superannuation and excise 
laws. The ATO’s responsibilities include managing and shaping the administrative 
systems supporting the tax system, collecting revenue (excluding customs duty) and 
administering regulatory and expenditure programs.170 
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4.69 The ATO notes that the Australian tax system is based on self assessment, 
requiring the ATO to make judgments as to likely risks to the revenue and to allocate 
scarce resources to address those risks. 
One way the Tax Office addresses these risks is by engaging in active compliance 
work to ensure that taxpayers are paying the correct amount of tax. Our active 
compliance work includes activities to secure certain lodgments, pre-issue activities to 
prevent incorrect refunds or payments being issued, as well as post-issue activities 
such as reviews and audits.171 
4.70 Most of the Acts administered by the ATO give the Commissioner or delegated 
officers rights of access to information and documents, which assist in undertaking the 
compliance work. The ATO’s Access and Information Gathering Manual lists 22 Acts 
that contain powers to enter and remain on premises and access documents.172 The 
most well known powers to access documents and obtain evidence are under ss 263 
and 264 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth).  
4.71 Section 263 gives the Commissioner or an authorised officer power to have ‘full 
and free’ access to all buildings, places, books, documents and other papers for the 
purposes of administering the Act. Section 264 is the provision regarding notices. 
Under that section, the Commissioner may give a notice requiring a person: 
 (a) to furnish him with such information as he may require; and 
 (b) to attend and give evidence before him or before any officer 
authorised by him in that behalf concerning his or any other person’s 
income or assessment, and may require him to produce all books, 
documents and other papers whatever in his custody or under his 
control relating thereto. 
 (2) The Commissioner may require the information or evidence to be 
given on oath or affirmation and either verbally or in writing, and for 
that purpose he or the officers so authorized by him may administer an 
oath or affirmation. 
4.72 The Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) contains penalty provisions, 
including an offence of refusing a request to provide information or answer questions 
pursuant to a taxation law.173 
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4.73 The scope of s 263 is not confined to investigations where there is a suspicion of 
wrongdoing. As the section allows access for ‘any of the purposes under this Act’, it 
also covers audits to check compliance with the legislation or general investigations 
into certain industries where there is no suggestion of a particular breach.174 Similarly, 
although s 264 is confined to obtaining information or evidence concerning the income 
or assessment of any person, it may apply equally to innocent situations where the 
ATO is reconciling information provided by a person with information obtained from 
another source.175 Richard Travers notes that s 264 notices are often simply used as a 
formal mechanism of communication between the Commissioner and a taxpayer.176 
The ATO’s Access and Information Gathering Manual contains guidelines on the 
contents of notices and covering letters, and the circumstances in which the various 
types of notices should be used. 
4.74 The ATO has significant discretion in relation to the use of its information-
gathering powers. The Taxpayers’ Charter177 sets out the ATO’s approach to when it 
will use its powers, providing that: 
• ATO officers will approach taxpayers and seek information cooperatively before 
formal requests are made; 
• access and information-gathering powers will be used only by authorised 
officers, and it will be made clear when information is being sought 
cooperatively and when a formal power is being used; 
• when asking for information under a formal power, taxpayers will be told of 
their rights and obligations under the law; 
• prior notice and a reasonable time to comply with the notice will be given; 
• where information is sought from a third party, the taxpayer will be told, unless 
special circumstances apply; and 
• explanations will be given to the taxpayer as to decisions made about the use of 
access and information-gathering powers.178 
4.75 The obligation under ss 263 and 264 is expressed in general terms, and not 
expressly subject to any qualification.179 However, as discussed in Chapter 5, this does 
not mean that the provisions are not subject to common law rights. 
                                                        
174  R Travers, ‘Confidentiality of Legal Advice after Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v 
Daniels Corporation’ (2002) 9 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 289, 302. 
175  Ibid, 302. 
176  Ibid, 305. 
177  Australian Taxation Office, Taxpayers’ Charter: Fair Use of Our Access and Information Gathering 
Powers (2007) <www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/N2559book9web.pdf> at 23 August 2007. 
178  Ibid. 
179  R Travers, ‘Confidentiality of Legal Advice after Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v 
Daniels Corporation’ (2002) 9 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 289, 302. 
142 Privilege in Perspective 
Inspector-General of Taxation 
4.76 The Office of the Inspector-General of Taxation was established in 2003, and is 
an independent statutory office that reviews systemic tax administration issues and 
makes recommendations to the Australian Government for improving tax 
administration. The Inspector-General does not deal with individual taxpayer matters 
but can, in conducting reviews, invite submissions from, or consult with, the public or 
particular groups of taxpayers or tax professionals.180 Any information obtained from 
the private sector or government agencies other than the ATO is given voluntarily.181 
4.77 The Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003 (Cth) grants the Inspector-General 
a power to require the Commissioner of Taxation and tax officials to provide 
information or answer questions relevant to a review.182 It is an offence for a tax officer 
to fail to comply with a notice from the Inspector-General.183 To date, the Inspector-
General has not used this coercive power, and all information provided by the ATO has 
been given voluntarily in response to requests for information made under s 14 of the 
Inspector-General of Taxation Act.184 
Intelligence and security  
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation  
4.78 The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) is Australia’s national 
security service. Its main role is to gather information and produce intelligence that 
will enable it to warn the government about matters or activities that might pose a risk 
to Australia’s national security. ASIO focuses on terrorists, persons who may act 
violently for political reasons, and those who may harm Australia’s interests, including 
spies, in order to further their own causes or the interests of foreign governments.185   
ASIO’s functions 
4.79 ASIO’s functions are set out in the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (ASIO Act) and include: obtaining and evaluating 
intelligence relevant to security; communicating such intelligence for security 
purposes; providing security assessments and protective security advice; and collecting 
foreign intelligence in Australia—but only on the request of the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs or the Minister for Defence.186 ASIO is not a law enforcement agency. It does 
not undertake criminal investigations and ASIO officers have no power of arrest.187 
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ASIO’s powers 
4.80 ASIO gathers information in a number of ways, including from publicly 
available sources, members of the public, intelligence services in other countries and 
through interviews.188 ASIO has powers to require information or documents from 
operators of aircraft or vessels.189 ASIO has special powers to use intrusive methods of 
investigation when authorised to do so under a warrant signed by the Attorney-General 
of Australia. These powers are to:  
• use listening devices190 and tracking devices relating to persons and to 
objects;191  
• intercept communications;192  
• access computers;193  
• enter and search premises;194 and 
• examine postal articles and delivery service articles.195  
4.81 Proposals to use special powers are subject to ‘rigorous internal consideration 
and approvals at a senior level’.196 The use of special powers under the ASIO Act197 or 
telecommunications interception legislation198 requires that ‘the subject’s activities are, 
or are reasonably suspected to be, or are likely to be, prejudicial to security’.199 In the 
majority of cases, investigations are resolved through less intrusive means.200 
4.82 ASIO also can seek warrants for the questioning of persons for the purpose of 
investigating terrorism.201 In limited circumstances, the warrants may authorise the 
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detention of a person.202 ASIO is required to obtain the consent of the Attorney-
General before seeking these warrants from a federal magistrate or judge. Any 
questioning pursuant to a warrant must be conducted in the presence of a prescribed 
authority—such as a former or serving senior judge—on the conditions determined by 
that authority.203 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security may be present 
during any questioning or detention under a warrant. It is an offence to disclose 
information without authorisation about the existence of a questioning or questioning 
and detention warrant, questioning conducted under the warrant, or any operational 
information.204 No questioning warrants were executed during 2006–07.205  
Guidelines on performance of functions 
4.83 The Attorney-General has issued guidelines under the ASIO Act on how ASIO 
should perform its functions relating to politically motivated violence and to obtaining 
intelligence relevant to security.206 In relation to politically motivated violence, the 
guidelines provide that in deciding whether or not to conduct an investigation, and the 
investigatory methods to be used, the Director-General shall consider all of the 
circumstances, including: 
(a) the magnitude of the threatened or perceived violence or harm; 
(b) the likelihood that it will occur; 
(c) the immediacy of the threat; and 
(d) the privacy implications of any proposed investigation.207 
4.84 The guidelines also provide that: 
The immediate purpose of an ASIO investigation should generally be to obtain 
information concerning the nature of any activities of a person or group which may be 
relevant to security. The need for information is not confined to information about 
particular offences that may be committed but extends to information about persons 
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who may be prepared to engage in or promote activities of security concern, including 
their plans and capabilities.208 
4.85 In relation to ASIO’s function of obtaining intelligence relevant to security, the 
Guidelines provide that ASIO’s investigations shall be of two types: 
(a) ‘preliminary investigations’ to assess whether there is sufficient evidence of 
activities relevant to security to justify a more detailed investigation of a subject; or 
(b) ‘general investigations’ to assess whether the activities of a subject are prejudicial 
to security, or to monitor whether there is any change in the significance of the 
activities of a subject whose activities have previously been assessed to be prejudicial 
to security.209 
4.86 The Guidelines contain provisions regarding the bases for, and authorisation, 
conduct and review of, investigations. 
4.87 ASIO has stated that subjects of investigations have become more skilled at 
hiding their activities and intentions from security and law enforcement agencies, and 
from other members of the community.210 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security  
4.88 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) is an independent 
statutory office holder who assists the Prime Minister, the Attorney-General, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Defence, to oversee the following six 
agencies which formally constitute the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC): 
• ASIO; 
• Australian Security Intelligence Service; 
• Defence Signals Directorate (DSD); 
• Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation; 
• Defence Intelligence Organisation; and 
• Office of National Assessments.211 
4.89 The office was established by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 
Act 1986 (Cth) (IGIS Act) following recommendations, made by Justice Robert Hope 
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in the Royal Commission on Australia’s Security and Intelligence Agencies (RCASIA) 
General Report and the RCASIA Report on the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation, that such an office be created.212  
4.90 The IGIS’s role fulfils an important public interest in ensuring that the AIC is 
kept accountable. The functions of the IGIS are set out in the IGIS Act.213 The IGIS 
can undertake an inquiry into the activities of an AIC agency on request from the 
responsible Minister, in response to a complaint, on the IGIS’s own motion,214 or on 
request from the Prime Minister.215 The IGIS also has inspection and monitoring 
powers in relation to the activities of the AIC agencies. Inspection activities are the 
‘centrepiece’ of IGIS, taking up a majority of the office’s time.216  
4.91 IGIS has powers to inquire into the following matters concerning AIC agencies: 
• compliance with the law or with ministerial directions and guidelines; 
• the propriety of their particular activities; and 
• whether any of their acts or practices are inconsistent with human rights.217 
4.92 Examples of inquiries that have been conducted under the IGIS Act include: 
• whether the AIC had prior intelligence warning of the Bali bombings;218 
• investigating allegations about DSD’s conduct in respect of the Tampa affair;219 
and 
• inquiring into ASIO’s issue of an adverse security assessment against a United 
States citizen, which led to his removal from Australia.220 
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4.93 Approximately 30–40% of IGIS’s resources are dedicated to inquiry work.221 
The IGIS must conduct inquiries in private.222 This is because these inquiries often 
concern matters that involve highly classified or sensitive information and the methods 
by which it is collected, the public airing of which could be injurious to the national 
interest.223 
4.94 The IGIS has, and uses, Royal Commission type powers when conducting a full 
inquiry.224 The IGIS can compel witnesses to appear and answer questions on oath or 
affirmation where the IGIS has reason to believe that the person is able to give 
information relevant to a matter the subject of inquiry.225 The IGIS can compel a 
person to give him or her information in writing, and to produce documents relevant to 
an inquiry.226 It is an offence not to comply with these requirements.227 The IGIS also 
has the capacity to enter agencies’ premises for the purposes of an inquiry.228 
4.95 Since March 2004, the IGIS has used coercive powers under s 18 of the IGIS 
Act in relation to three inquiries, consisting of 19 notices to appear and answer 
questions and one notice to produce information in writing. The current IGIS, Mr Ian 
Carnell, submitted to the ALRC that: 
Section 18 powers have not been used in all inquiries because, in my view, it has not 
been necessary or appropriate to use them. In most instances inquiries have proceeded 
by way of examination of records (access to which has been freely provided by the 
relevant agencies), interviews with relevant staff which have not involved compulsion 
and the administration of an oath or affirmation, and obtaining statutory declarations 
from staff addressing questions pertinent to the inquiry. 
… 
In the three inquiries where I have issued notices under section 18, this was done 
either because I formed a belief based on reasonable grounds that certain persons may 
not have been forthcoming or truthful, or because I took the view that as it was a 
matter of significant public interest, key witnesses should give their evidence on oath 
or affirmation.229 
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Public administration  
Commonwealth Ombudsman 
Commonwealth Ombudsman’s functions 
4.96 The office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman exists to ‘safeguard the 
community in its dealings with government agencies, and to ensure that administrative 
action taken by Australian Government agencies is fair and accountable’.230 The 
Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) provides that the functions of the Ombudsman are to 
investigate complaints made under the Act and to perform other functions conferred by 
the Act and other legislation.231 The Ombudsman Act confers on the Ombudsman the 
specialist roles of Defence Force Ombudsman, Immigration Ombudsman, Postal 
Industry Ombudsman, and Taxation Ombudsman.232 The three major statutory roles of 
the Ombudsman are to: 
• investigate and review the administrative action of Australian Government 
officials and agencies, upon receipt of complaints;233 
• investigate, on the initiative or ‘own motion’ of the Ombudsman, the 
administrative actions of Australian Government agencies;234 and 
• inspect the records of agencies such as the AFP and the ACC to ensure 
compliance with legislative provisions applying to selected law enforcement and 
regulatory activities.235 
4.97 In conducting investigations, the Ombudsman seeks to determine whether: 
the administrative action under investigation is unlawful, unreasonable, unjust, 
oppressive, improperly discriminatory, factually deficient or otherwise wrong. At the 
conclusion of the investigation, the Ombudsman can recommend that corrective 
action be taken by an agency.236 
4.98 The Ombudsman Act sets out a number of matters in respect of which the 
Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction to investigate, including action taken by a 
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minister or by a justice or judge.237 The Act also gives the Ombudsman discretion not 
to investigate certain complaints, for example, where an investigation is not warranted 
having regard to all the circumstances.238 Prior to commencing an investigation into the 
action of a Department or prescribed authority, the Ombudsman is required to inform 
the principal officer of the Department or authority that the action is to be investigated. 
Investigations under the Act are to be conducted in private.239 
4.99 The bulk of the work of the Ombudsman is conducting complaint based and 
own motion investigations.240 During 2006–07, the Ombudsman investigated 
complaints made about 104 Australian Government departments and agencies.241 In 
that time, the Ombudsman received 33,234 approaches and complaints.242 The 
Ombudsman also completed 13 own motion and major investigations.243 
Commonwealth Ombudsman’s powers 
4.100 The Ombudsman has coercive information-gathering powers under the Act. He 
or she may compel the production of information and documents, and compel a person 
to answer questions relevant to an investigation.244 The Ombudsman also may examine 
a person on oath or affirmation.245 Where a person refuses or fails, without reasonable 
excuse, to comply with a notice to furnish information or produce documents, or to 
attend before the Ombudsman to answer questions, or to be sworn or affirmed, the 
person commits an offence and may be liable to a maximum penalty of $1,000 or 
imprisonment for three months.246 In addition, the Ombudsman may apply to the 
Federal Court for an order directing the person to comply.247 The Ombudsman, Deputy 
Ombudsman and persons authorised by the Ombudsman also have the power to enter 
certain premises, including the premises of departments and prescribed authorities, and 
to inspect documents relevant to an investigation at those premises.248 
4.101 The Ombudsman submitted to this Inquiry that the available coercive powers are 
used sparingly, not routinely, and the office relied instead on voluntary cooperation of 
agencies.249 There are some practical constraints on the use of coercive powers under 
s 9 of the Ombudsman Act, including that most investigative officers do not have the 
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appropriate delegation to exercise s 9 powers, and that the Minister must be informed 
of an investigation prior to use of a s 9 power, an action that is not necessary or 
practical in relation to every investigation, given the number of investigations 
undertaken each year. On the other hand, the Ombudsman indicated that the voluntary 
cooperation of agencies occurs in substantial part because of the existence of coercive 
powers. The Ombudsman also noted that the existence of coercive powers can also be 
useful in less cooperative investigations, or where an agency wishes to be protected by 
a clear distinction between its actions and the decisions of the Ombudsman.250 
Building and construction 
Office of the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner  
4.102 The Office of the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (ABCC) 
was established by the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 
(Cth) (BCII Act) and commenced operations on 1 October 2005. It absorbed the 
Building Industry Taskforce which operated from 1 October 2002.251 The ABCC’s 
purpose is to reform conduct in the building and construction industry,252 and it has 
coercive information-gathering powers in order to assist it to achieve that purpose. 253 
4.103 The BCII Act sets out the functions of the Commissioner, which include: 
• monitoring and promoting appropriate standards of conduct by building industry 
participants; 
• investigating suspected contraventions, by building industry participants of: the 
BCII Act; the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth); the Building Code; a federal 
certified collective agreement or award, or an order of the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission; and 
• instituting, or intervening in, proceedings in accordance with the BCII Act.254 
4.104 The ABCC’s coercive information-gathering powers are similar to those of 
other regulatory agencies, and include the ability to require a person to provide 
information and documents, and to give evidence by way of affirmation or oath.255 The 
ABCC has published guidelines in relation to the exercise of its powers, stating that the 
decision to exercise its powers ‘will not be taken lightly’.256 The ABCC has also stated 
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that it only uses these powers as a last resort.257 The powers can only be used for 
investigation into a contravention by a building industry participant of a designated 
building law.258 The Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner can issue a notice where 
he or she believes on reasonable grounds that a person issued with a notice has 
information or documents relevant to an investigation, or is capable of giving evidence 
relevant to an investigation.259 
4.105 The ABCC has stated: 
The enforcement of workplace relations law throughout the industry remains a 
challenge. The ABCC receives numerous complaints about unlawful conduct from all 
sectors of the industry. The complaints are investigated and if the public interest is 
served, proceedings against contraveners are commenced.  
It remains of concern that some industry participants are reluctant to cooperate with 
our investigations.260 
4.106 In 2006–07, the ABCC reported that it had pursued 216 investigations into 
suspected contraventions of workplace laws. Trade unions were the subject of the 
majority of its investigations, and the major breaches investigated were industrial 
action, coercion and agreement/dispute resolution.261 During 2006–07, 20 notices to 
attend and answer questions were issued.262 Since the commencement of the ABCC, 
the majority of notices to attend and answer questions have been served on individual 
workers.263 The power under s 52(c) of the BCII Act to require the giving of 
information has not as yet been used, with the preference being to require a person to 
attend an examination. The power in s 52(d) to require production of documents has 
also not been used to date, with a preference to issue notices for production under s 59, 
with the option of using s 52(d) where production is refused.264 The ABCC has stated 
that ‘the compliance powers have proven to be a particularly effective method of 
obtaining information from reluctant witnesses’.265  
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Social security  
Centrelink 
4.107 Centrelink is a government statutory agency, responsible for delivering a range 
of social services and income support to the Australian community. Its stated purpose 
is to serve Australia ‘by assisting people to become self-sufficient and supporting those 
in need’.266 Centrelink is a service provider to 6.5 million customers in respect of 9.89 
million individual entitlements.267 Its clients include those looking for work, families, 
retired persons, sole parents, students, and young people. 
4.108 Centrelink operates under the Department of Human Services (DHS). Centrelink 
was established under the Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency Act 1997 (Cth), 
(CSDA Act) which provides that its function is to assist the CEO in the performance of 
his or her functions.268 The CEO’s functions include providing Commonwealth 
services in accordance with service arrangements, and doing anything included in the 
arrangements that is incidental or related to the provision of those services.269 Such 
arrangements may include: 
• undertaking education, compliance, investigation and enforcement activities 
related to the provision of services; or 
• recovering overpayments and other amounts due to the Commonwealth in 
connection with the provision of services; or 
• conducting litigation or proceedings related to the provision of services.270 
4.109 In the period 2006–07, Centrelink completed 42,000 fraud investigations271 
reportedly identifying $127 million in savings and debts.272 During the same period the 
CDPP prosecuted 3,400 Centrelink cases with a conviction rate of 98.7%.273 
4.110 Centrelink has a number of coercive information-gathering powers, which are 
conferred on it by various federal statutes. These include the power to require a person 
to provide information or produce documents.274 For example, under s 194 of the 
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) the Secretary can require a person to 
produce information if it is relevant to the financial situation of a person who owes a 
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debt to the Commonwealth or may assist to locate a debtor to the Commonwealth. 
Other powers require persons to attend an office of the DHS or another place for a 
particular purpose, or to attend for a medical, psychiatric or psychological 
examination.275 
4.111 Centrelink has indicated that it uses its coercive information-gathering powers in 
the majority of its fraud investigations to collect information from other government 
agencies and third parties.276 
Health and aged care  
Medicare Australia  
4.112 Medicare Australia (Medicare) is an Australian government agency within the 
DHS. Its objective is to assist in improving health outcomes in Australia.277 Medicare 
works in collaboration with the Department of Health and Ageing to achieve the health 
policy objectives of the Australian Government.278 Medicare is a service organisation 
that administers a range of health and payment programs, including: Medicare; the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme; the Family Assistance Office; the Australian Organ 
Donor Register; the Australian Childhood Immunisation Register; and Special 
Assistance Schemes, including Bali 2005 Special Assistance.279 
Medicare’s functions 
4.113 The function of Medicare is to assist the CEO in the performance of his or her 
functions.280 The CEO’s service delivery functions, set out in the Medicare Australia 
Act 1973 (Cth), are to provide Commonwealth services in accordance with service 
arrangements.281 The Act specifies that arrangements for the provision of 
Commonwealth services may include making arrangements for: 
• undertaking education, compliance, investigation and enforcement activities 
related to the provision of services; or 
• recovering overpayments and other amounts due to the Commonwealth in 
connection with the provision of services; or 
• conducting litigation or proceedings related to the provision of the 
services.282 
4.114 The CEO’s functions also include investigating compliance with the Health 
Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) and with Part VII of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth).283 
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4.115 Medicare’s program review function is to detect and investigate fraud and 
inappropriate claiming.284 Medicare has stated that: 
Criminal investigation, and subsequent prosecution by the Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions is one of the most powerful tools that Medicare Australia has in 
its effort to reduce fraud in the programs that it administers.285 
4.116 In the period 2006–07, Medicare reported that it had 550 new investigation 
cases; and that it had referred 79 cases to the CDPP.286 Medicare may undertake 
investigations in collaboration with other agencies. In 2005–06 it reported that a multi-
jurisdictional taskforce, including Medicare and Centrelink, was investigating a case of 
a family involved in identity fraud.287 
4.117 Depending on the nature and significance of any non-compliance detected by 
Medicare, it may opt to recover benefits paid incorrectly.288 In 2006–07, it identified 
499 cases for potential recovery action totalling $3.37 million.289 
Medicare’s powers 
4.118 The CEO of Medicare may authorise an employee to exercise investigative 
powers conferred under the Medicare Australia Act. The powers can be exercised in 
connection with an investigation that the CEO is conducting in the performance of his 
or her functions.290 The powers include the ability to require a person to give 
information or to produce documents in the person’s custody or control, if the 
authorised officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a relevant offence has been or 
is being committed, and the information or documents are relevant to the offence.291 
This is the coercive power most frequently used by Medicare, with 56 notices of this 
kind issued in 2005–06.292 Failure to comply with such a notice without reasonable 
excuse attracts a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment.293  
4.119 Authorised officers may also conduct searches for the purposes of monitoring 
compliance either without warrant where the occupier of the premises has consented,294 
or pursuant to a search warrant.295 Medicare has indicated that the extensive powers to 
conduct searches without a warrant under s 8V of the Medicare Australia Act are 
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infrequently used as most evidential material is obtained using either voluntary 
cooperation, s 8P notices to produce information, or by obtaining a search warrant.296 
Department of Health and Ageing 
Therapeutic Goods Administration  
4.120 The Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) is a unit of the Australian 
Government Department of Health and Ageing. It is responsible for administering the 
Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) (TG Act), which provides a national framework for 
the regulation of therapeutic goods to ensure the quality, safety and efficacy of 
medicines; and the quality, safety and performance of medical devices.297 The TG Act 
requires therapeutic goods to be entered on the Australian Register of Therapeutic 
Goods before they can be supplied in Australia, and it stipulates various requirements 
for the inclusion of goods on the register, including advertising, labelling, and product 
appearance guidelines. The TGA undertakes various assessment and monitoring 
activities to ensure that therapeutic goods available in Australia are of an acceptable 
standard.298  
4.121 During 2006–07, the TGA completed 463 investigations concerning breaches of 
the TG Act and the TGA Surveillance Unit issued 234 formal warnings to persons and 
companies, and charged 20 persons and companies with 104 criminal offences.299 
4.122 The Secretary of the Department has a number of coercive information-
gathering powers under the TG Act. For example, the Secretary may require a person 
who has imported therapeutic goods or supplied them in Australia to provide 
information concerning the composition, indications, directions for use or labelling of 
the goods, or concerning advertising material relating to the goods.300 Failure to 
comply with such a notice carries a maximum penalty of $6,600.301 The Secretary may 
also seek information or documents relating to compliance by medical devices with 
certain requirements;302 and relating to medical devices covered by exemptions.303 
Failure to comply with these requirements carries a maximum penalty of $55,000304 
and $44,000 respectively.305  
4.123 The Secretary also may require a person—other than the wrongdoer—to provide 
information in relation to an application for a civil penalty order, where the Secretary 
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suspects that a person may have breached a civil penalty provision of the TG Act.306 If 
the person fails to give assistance, the Federal Court may, on the application of the 
Secretary, order the person to comply with the requirement. Failure to comply carries a 
maximum penalty of $3,300.307 
Aged care  
4.124 The Department of Health and Ageing has wide-ranging responsibilities, 
including health and safety matters such as food and therapeutic goods regulation—as 
discussed above—and the provision of aged care services. The Minister for Health and 
Ageing is responsible for administering 69 statutes,308 including the Aged Care Act 
1997 (Cth).  
4.125 The Aged Care Act confers a number of information-gathering powers—or 
‘monitoring powers’ as they are referred to in the Act—on authorised officers to assist 
the Department in its function of monitoring compliance by approved providers of 
aged care with their responsibilities under the Act. Monitoring powers in relation to 
premises include searching premises; inspecting and taking samples of substances or 
things found at premises; inspecting documents on the premises and taking extracts of 
those documents or copying them.309 Some of these powers can only be exercised with 
the consent of an occupier;310 while others can be exercised without an occupier’s 
consent.311 The Secretary also has powers to require aged care providers to provide 
information in relation to specific matters,312 and require a person to attend before an 
authorised officer to answer questions and/or produce documents.313 Failure to comply 
with certain requests is considered a breach of responsibility under the Aged Care Act, 
but in a number of cases failure to comply is a criminal offence.314 
4.126 An authorised officer can apply to a magistrate for a monitoring warrant, which 
may be granted if it is reasonably necessary to assess whether an approved provider of 
aged care is complying with its responsibilities.315 Where a monitoring warrant is 
issued to an authorised officer, in addition to powers of search and seizure, the officer 
can require persons to answer questions, produce documents and to give reasonable 
assistance. 
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4.127 The Department of Health and Ageing has indicated that the extent to which the 
powers conferred by the Aged Care Act are used depends on the extent of compliance 
within the aged care industry from time to time. The Department notes, however, that 
the powers are ‘an important tool to assist in enforcing the Aged Care Act where other 
less coercive measures have not been successful’.316 
Gene Technology Regulator  
4.128 The Gene Technology Regulator (GTR) was established by the Gene 
Technology Act 2000 (Cth), and the Office of the GTR (OGTR) has been established 
within the Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing to provide 
administrative support to the GTR in the performance of his or her functions. The Gene 
Technology Act introduces a national scheme for the regulation of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) in Australia in order to protect the health and safety of individuals 
and the environment.  
4.129  The functions of the OGTR include to: provide information to other regulatory 
agencies about GMOs and genetically modified (GM) products; promote the 
harmonisation of risk assessments for GMOs and GM products by regulatory agencies; 
and monitor and enforce the legislation.317 
4.130 The Gene Technology Act provides inspectors appointed under the Act with a 
variety of monitoring powers—many of which are information-gathering in their 
nature. An inspector is able to enter premises and exercise certain powers for the 
purpose of finding out whether the Act or the regulations have been complied with if: 
the occupier of the premises has consented; the entry is made under warrant; or the 
occupier is a licence holder and the entry is at a reasonable time.318 Monitoring powers 
include: 
• conducting tests on samples found at the premises;  
• taking photographs or making audio or video recordings;  
• inspecting records on the premises; and  
• where the entry is under warrant, requiring any person on the premises to 
answer questions and produce any records.319  
                                                        
316  Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing, Submission LPP 51, 17 July 2007. 
317  Gene Technology Act 2000 (Cth) s 27. 
318  Ibid s 152. The Office of the Gene Technology Regulator, Operations of the Gene Technology Regulator 
Annual Report 2005–06, 41–48 provides statistical information about the number and breakdown of 
inspections carried out. For example, the OGTR reported that it had conducted 74 inspections during 
2005–06 of containment facilities—including laboratories and animal and plant containments. 
319  See Gene Technology Act 2000 (Cth) s 153. 
158 Privilege in Perspective 
4.131 Inspectors also have powers to search and seize goods, and to search baggage 
containing goods that are to be, or have been, taken off a ship or aircraft.320 Further, to 
deal with situations which present an imminent risk of damage, serious illness or 
injury, or serious damage to the environment, inspectors have the power to search 
premises and secure things until a warrant for seizure is obtained, and to require a 
person to take steps to comply with the legislation.321 
4.132 The OGTR has adopted an operational philosophy that emphasises assisting 
accredited organisations and licence holders to comply with their legislative 
obligations.322 The OGTR has published a compliance and enforcement strategy, which 
states: 
The OGTR investigates all reported or detected contraventions of legislation it 
administers … The OGTR investigates serious contraventions to the point where 
enough information is available to determine whether a criminal prosecution should 
be pursued, alternatively options not involving criminal sanctions may also be 
considered depending on the facts and circumstances of the breach. In serious 
instances the Regulator may refer and assist the Australian Federal Police or other 
enforcement agencies.323 
4.133 The OGTR reported that, during 2006–07, it investigated all suspected breaches 
of the Act that were detected through OGTR routine monitoring activities or were self-
reported. In all instances, risks to human health and safety were assessed as negligible 
and commensurate action was taken, including increased monitoring and education.324 
4.134 The OGTR also reported that it completed two investigations during 2006–07. 
The investigations centred on the conduct of alleged unauthorised GMO dealings, and 
compliance with protocols in a clinical trial.325  
Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority  
4.135 The Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority (APVMA) is an 
independent Australian Government statutory authority within the portfolio of the 
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Management. It was originally known as the 
National Registration Authority for Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals.  
4.136 A number of the functions of the APVMA are set out in the Agricultural and 
Veterinary Chemicals (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth). These include to:  
• assess the suitability for sale in Australia of active constituents for proposed or 
existing chemical products;  
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• evaluate the effects of the use of chemical products in the states and 
participating territories; and  
• collect, interpret, disseminate and publish information relating to chemical 
products and their use.326  
4.137 The list of functions does not specifically refer to any investigative function, 
although the Act provides that the APVMA has any functions or powers conferred on it 
by relevant legislation,327 and power to do anything incidental to any of its powers.328  
4.138 The APVMA is responsible for the registration of pesticides329 and veterinary 
medicines330 prior to sale and their regulation up to and including the time of retail 
sale.331 The consequences of using unregistered chemical products may include: threats 
to personal and public health; occupational health and safety hazards; crop and herd 
damage; economic loss; environmental damage; and international trading losses.332 
4.139 The Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals Code Act 1994 (Cth) provides the 
APVMA with its full range of powers including: the evaluation, registration and 
review of agricultural and veterinary chemical products; the issuing of permits; the 
control of the manufacture of chemical products; controls regulating the supply of 
chemical products; and provisions ensuring compliance with, and for the enforcement 
of, the Code.333 
4.140 An important part of the APVMA’s role is to ensure that pesticides and 
veterinary medicines supplied to the marketplace comply with the APVMA’s 
legislation. The APVMA has stated that it applies three compliance strategies to ensure 
that the standards of registration are met, one of which is surveillance and enforcement. 
It has also stated that it actively investigates alleged breaches and implements risk 
based enforcement strategies, which can include prosecution, recall or negotiated 
compliance.334 
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4.141 The APVMA’s investigations may relate to unregistered products, unapproved 
labels, or the supply of restricted products to unauthorised users.335 The APVMA may 
appoint members of its staff—as well as other appropriate persons—to be inspectors 
for the purpose of a relevant law. Inspectors have coercive information-gathering 
powers, including the ability to conduct searches of premises to monitor compliance 
with legislation.336 The power to search premises includes the power to take and keep 
samples of things kept at the premises and to inspect documents kept at the premises. 
An inspector who has entered premises also has power to require a person to give 
information and produce documents. Failure to comply with such a requirement carries 
a maximum penalty of $3,300. 337  
Human rights  
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission  
4.142 The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) is an 
independent statutory body that was established in 1986 by the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (HREOC Act). Human rights are 
strictly defined, and relate only to the seven international instruments scheduled to, or 
declared under, the Act.338 In addition to the HREOC Act, HREOC administers a suite 
of anti-discrimination legislation, namely: the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth), the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and 
the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). HREOC’s inquiry functions include:  
• to inquire into, and attempt to conciliate, complaints of unlawful discrimination; 
• to inquire into any act or practice, including any systemic practice that may 
constitute discrimination, or may be inconsistent with, or contrary to, any human 
right.339  
4.143 In respect of the latter type of inquiry, HREOC is required, where appropriate, 
to endeavour to settle the matters that gave rise to the inquiry by way of conciliation, or 
to report to the Minister in relation to the inquiry where conciliation is either 
inappropriate or unsuccessful.340 The inquiry functions of HREOC do not include 
inquiring into any act or practice of an intelligence agency that may constitute 
discrimination or a breach of human rights. Complaints in relation to these matters are 
to be referred to the IGIS.341 
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4.144 HREOC has a number of non-inquiry functions including: promoting an 
understanding and acceptance of human rights and equality of opportunity and 
treatment in employment in Australia; reporting to the Minister as to laws that should 
be made by the Commonwealth on matters relating to human rights and equality of 
opportunity and treatment in employment; and where it considers appropriate to do so, 
intervening in court proceedings that involve human rights and discrimination 
issues.342 
4.145 For the purpose of performing its functions, HREOC can hold an examination or 
inquiry in such manner as it thinks fit.343 It has powers under the HREOC Act to 
require a person or body corporate to give information in writing or to produce 
documents;344 and to examine persons on oath or affirmation.345 Failure to comply with 
these requirements carries a maximum penalty of $1,000 for natural persons, and 
$5,000 for bodies corporate.346  
4.146 The President of HREOC also has specific powers to obtain information and 
documents and to require persons to attend a compulsory conference in relation to 
inquiries concerning unlawful discrimination.347 Failure to comply with these 
requirements carries a maximum penalty of $1,100.348 
4.147  HREOC reported that during the period 2005–06, it finalised: 
• 196 complaints under the Racial Discrimination Act; 
• 314 complaints under the Sex Discrimination Act; 
• 512 complaints under the Disability Discrimination Act; and 
• 80 complaints under the Age Discrimination Act.349 
4.148 HREOC has indicated that it uses its coercive powers infrequently.350 For 
example, the power under s 21 of the HREOC Act to require that information be given 
in writing, or that documents be produced, was used four times in 2006. HREOC does, 
however, make mention of the existence of its coercive powers in written 
communications about a delay in responding to a request for voluntary production of 
information, thus encouraging voluntary compliance without recourse to formally 
exercising the coercive powers. HREOC also notes that it must sometimes use coercive 
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powers to obtain information, which it would not be able to obtain through voluntary 
production, such as where there are privacy or patient confidentiality issues.351 
Privacy 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
4.149 The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) is an independent statutory 
organisation that reports to the Attorney-General of Australia.352 Its purpose is to 
promote an Australian culture that respects privacy.353 This is done by supporting 
individuals with privacy concerns, and working with organisations and agencies to 
improve their practices in the handling of personal information.354 
4.150 The OPC, and more particularly the Privacy Commissioner, has legislative 
responsibilities under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), the Data-matching Program 
(Assistance and Tax) Act 1990 (Cth), the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)355 and the National Health Act 1953 (Cth). 
4.151 When the Privacy Act was enacted, it was mainly limited to public sector 
agencies. Its scope was extended to cover private sector organisations with effect from 
21 December 2001. The Privacy Act provides protection to individuals by establishing 
Information Privacy Principles and National Privacy Principles which set out strict 
safeguards for the collection, use and retention of personal information. The Act also 
provides protection for individuals’ tax file numbers and consumer credit information 
held by credit reporting agencies and credit providers.  
4.152 Under the Data-matching Program (Assistance and Tax) Act, the Privacy 
Commissioner regulates the comparison of personal information held by the ATO and 
welfare assistance agencies and issues guidelines for the conduct of data-matching. The 
Telecommunications Act sets out rules for telecommunications carriers, carriage 
service providers and others in their use and disclosure of personal information. The 
OPC has the role of monitoring compliance with those provisions. The National Health 
Act requires the Privacy Commissioner to issue guidelines relating to the management 
of personal information collected from claims on the Medicare and Pharmaceutical 
Benefits programs. The Commonwealth ‘Spent Conviction Scheme’, under Part VIIC 
of the Crimes Act, gives individuals the right not to disclose spent, quashed or 
pardoned Federal or territory convictions. The OPC deals with complaints under this 
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scheme and also assesses applications from organisations seeking to be excluded from 
the operation of this law.356 
4.153 The OPC provides information and advice to the public, and works with 
organisations and agencies that have obligations to protect privacy. It handles 
complaints and conducts audits of the procedures for handling personal information, 
provides policy advice and training on the Privacy Act and works to inform and 
educate the community about privacy issues.357 
4.154 Most complaints received by the OPC regarding alleged contraventions of the 
Privacy Act are resolved through negotiation and conciliation. In most cases, where the 
Privacy Commissioner has formed the view that the respondent has contravened the 
Privacy Act, the respondent agrees to take appropriate action. This may include a 
written apology, retraining of staff, changing procedures or amending or deleting 
personal information. The Privacy Commissioner only has powers to negotiate or order 
compensation for an individual for damages directly arising from an interference with 
privacy, but monetary compensation cannot be used as a fine to punish the 
respondent.358 
4.155 While the Privacy Commissioner has formal complaint determination powers 
under the Privacy Act, these are rarely used.359 If the Commissioner finds a complaint 
substantiated, he or she may make a declaration that: the conduct should not be 
repeated or continued; the respondent should redress any loss or damage suffered by 
the complainant; the complainant be entitled to compensation; or it is inappropriate for 
any further action to be taken.360 
4.156 The Privacy Act provides for investigations to be conducted by the 
Commissioner. An investigation may be undertaken because a person has complained 
that his or her privacy rights under the Privacy Act have been infringed. In that case, 
before commencing an investigation, the Commissioner has power to conduct 
preliminary inquiries.361 The power is limited by its purpose, which is to determine 
whether the Commissioner has power to investigate the matter to which the complaint 
relates or whether the Commissioner may, in his or her discretion, decide not to 
investigate the matter.362 
                                                        
356  Office of the Privacy Commissioner, The Operation of the Privacy Act: Annual Report 2005–06. 
357  Office of the Privacy Commissioner, About the Office of the Privacy Commissioner <www.privacy.gov. 
au/about/index.html> at 27 August 2007. 
358  Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Privacy Complaints <www.privacy.gov.au/privacy 
_rights/complaints/index.html> at 27 August 2007. 
359  Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Complaint Case Notes, Summaries and Determinations 
<www.privacy.gov.au/act/casenotes/index.html> at 27 August 2007. 
360  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 52. 
361  Ibid s 42. 
362  Ibid s 42. 
164 Privilege in Perspective 
4.157 As a general rule, an investigation is to be ‘conducted in private but otherwise in 
such manner as the Commissioner thinks fit’.363 The Commissioner has power to 
obtain information and documents from persons, and make inquiries of persons or 
examine witnesses on oath or affirmation.364 The Commissioner also has the power to 
enter premises with consent or a search warrant and may inspect any documents that 
are kept at those premises, with some exceptions.365 
4.158 In 2006–07, the OPC received a total of 1,094 complaints across all areas of its 
jurisdiction.366 Twelve per cent of matters were closed following a formal investigation 
and, where appropriate, a conciliated response. Around 36% of cases were closed 
following preliminary inquiries. In other cases the Privacy Commissioner declined to 
investigate the matter—for example, because of a lack of jurisdiction or where the 
matter involved a body not covered by the Privacy Act. 367 
4.159 The OPC has indicated that it does not routinely exercise its coercive powers, 
but does use them from time to time.368 Examples of when coercive powers are likely 
to be used include where protected personal information is required from third parties, 
or where a person has failed to respond to the OPC’s routine requests to provide 
information. The OPC has not to date obtained a warrant to enter premises.369 
Border control and immigration 
Australian Customs Service 
4.160 The principal roles of the Australian Customs Service (ACS) are to facilitate 
trade and the movement of people into Australia while maintaining compliance with 
Australian law, collecting customs revenue, and administering specific industry 
schemes and trade measures. The ACS also has a role in border control and safety. 
4.161 The ACS administers the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), the Customs Tariff Act 1995 
(Cth) and related legislation. It also administers legislation on behalf of other 
government agencies, principally in relation to the movement of goods and people 
across the Australian border.370 The ACS provides air- and sea-based surveillance and 
response services to a number of government agencies.371 
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4.162 The ACS prioritises protecting the Australian community by intercepting illegal 
goods and weapons, and employs surveillance techniques to identify and intercept 
vessels and persons to detect border incursions. The ACS also has inspection powers 
under a range of anti-terrorism provisions. 372 
4.163 Much of the work of the ACS operates in a self-assessment environment. It can 
conduct audits and impose sanctions such as: warning letters; removal of ACS agents 
from the self-assessment scheme; revocation of deferred duty arrangements or the 
imposition of additional conditions; refusal of permission for movements under bond 
or imposition of conditions on the permission holder; imposition of administrative 
penalties of up to twice the customs duty; cancellation, suspension or imposition of a 
conditional licence for warehouse licence holders; and prosecution action.373 
4.164 The ACS makes use of a number of ‘monitoring’ powers, including entry to 
premises and obtaining information.374 The monitoring powers can be exercised under 
consent or under a warrant. The ACS has noted, however, that there has been no 
requirement to seek a warrant to enter premises for the purposes of exercising 
monitoring powers since the commencement of the monitoring powers in 2002.375 Any 
matters arising that suggest an offence has been committed are referred to the 
Investigations Branch of the ACS. 
4.165 ACS officers play a role, alongside the AFP, in the investigation and 
prosecution of breaches of border control laws. To fulfil this function, ACS officers 
have wide powers to execute search and seizure warrants and seize evidentiary 
material.376 The Customs Act includes a wide range of coercive powers including 
powers to: 
• board and search ships, collect documents and question passengers;377 
• make copies of, and take extracts from, documents in certain circumstances;378 
• question passengers of aircraft;379 
• question persons claiming packages;380  
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• apply for search warrants in respect of things believed to be evidential 
material;381 
• detain and search persons for purposes of law enforcement cooperation;382 and 
• require production of commercial documents and records verifying the content 
of communications made to the ACS.383 
4.166 In 2006–07, the ACS reported that it had implemented measures improving 
industry compliance, implemented new export air cargo security measures; and 
enhanced investigatory capability through improvements in policy, procedures and 
legislation.384 In that period 16 revenue fraud cases and 138 other fraud cases were 
adopted for prosecution.385 The ACS has indicated that its Regional Investigations 
Branch officers seek the issue and execution of search warrants under s 198 and seizure 
warrants under s 203 of the Customs Act on a weekly basis.386 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship  
4.167 The core activities of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) 
are the managed entry of people into Australia, the settlement of migrants and 
refugees, and the promotion of citizenship and cultural diversity. DIAC implements the 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which regulates the entry of non-citizens into Australia. The 
Act contains powers of detention and removal of unlawful non-citizens, as well as a 
number of character-related powers, which include criminal deportation and visa 
cancellation on character grounds.  
4.168 Following the Palmer Report into the detention of Cornelia Rau,387 DIAC 
committed to making a number of improvements to the operational culture of the 
department based around the three themes of making the department more open and 
accountable, ensuring fair and reasonable dealings with clients, and providing the 
organisation with well-trained and supported staff.388 
4.169 The Migration Act contains a number of coercive information-gathering powers 
used frequently by DIAC. These include:389 
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• A general power to obtain information and documents about unlawful non-
citizens.390 This power is used many times each working day. Prior to 
establishment of electronic links to the ATO, up to 5,000 notices were issued 
each year to the ATO alone. 
• Powers that enable authorised officers to issue a production notice or attendance 
notice in relation to a visa monitoring purpose.391 In 2005–06, some 27 
production notices were issued to education providers in the course of 
investigations into student non-compliance, compared with 60 notices issued in 
2004–05. Authorised officers also have powers to enter premises under a 
monitoring warrant, and require a person to answer questions relevant to visa 
monitoring purposes.392 
• Powers of entry and search pursuant to a search warrant.393 DIAC notes that the 
purpose of s 251 warrants is generally to locate individuals rather than 
documents, although documents can be searched pursuant to the warrant.394 
Section 251 warrants are issued across Australia on every working day. At 
present, somewhere below 500 are issued each year, although up to 1,500 a year 
have been issued in the past. 
• Persons in immigration detention under the Act may be required to answer such 
questions as an officer considers necessary to determine their status.395 
4.170 A number of other coercive powers provided by the Migration Act are generally 
exercised by ACS officers or the Australian Navy, including powers to board and 
search ships, examine documents and goods on board, and require those on board to 
answer questions,396 and powers to muster crews and require production of identity 
documents.397 
Australian Quarantine Inspection Service  
4.171 The Australian Quarantine Inspection Service (AQIS) operates within the 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. AQIS provides quarantine 
inspection services for the arrival of international passengers, cargo, mail, animals and 
plants or their products into Australia, and inspection and certification for a range of 
animal and plant products exported from Australia.  
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4.172 AQIS is responsible for the administration of the Quarantine Act 1908 (Cth) and 
its related legislation. AQIS provides screening services for goods and passengers at 
airports, seaports and mail centres.398 AQIS also administers the Imported Food 
Control Act 1992 (Cth) and related legislation, which ensures that imported food 
complies with public health and food standards; and the Export Control Act 1982 
(Cth), which controls the process of government certification, which is a prerequisite to 
gaining entry to most overseas markets for most food and agricultural products. AQIS 
also administers the Australian Meat and Livestock Industry Act 1997 (Cth), which 
provides for the licensing of meat and livestock exporters. 
4.173 AQIS embraces co-regulation as a basic regulatory strategy whereby 
requirements are set in consultation with industry. AQIS administers the requirements 
set out in law, while industry implements management systems to achieve compliance. 
The AQIS website states that AQIS systems verify compliance and, where there is non-
compliance, AQIS takes action by prosecution or by administrative actions.399 
4.174 AQIS has submitted that its coercive information-gathering powers fall into two 
broad categories.400 The first relates to the collection of information that enables AQIS 
to decide whether regulatory standards under the legislation AQIS administers have 
been met, for example, requirements to provide notices of proposed importation goods 
or give a report and information about arrivals and departures.401 
4.175 The second category of information-gathering powers relates to the collection of 
information that enables AQIS to decide whether an offence has been committed under 
the legislation it administers. Quarantine officers have, or have delegated to them, wide 
powers to search, seize and treat goods suspected of being a quarantine risk, and a 
number of information-gathering powers requiring the provision of information, 
production of documents, and answering of questions.402 Some powers can only be 
exercised with consent or pursuant to a warrant.403 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority  
4.176 The Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) is a statutory body 
that administers the day-to-day management of fisheries.404 AFMA is responsible for 
enforcing the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) and the Torres Strait Fisheries Act 
1984 (Cth) through the detection and investigation of illegal activities by both domestic 
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and foreign fishing boats in the Australian fishing zone and Commonwealth-managed 
fisheries.  
4.177 AFMA undertakes these functions in conjunction with other relevant federal 
agencies, with specific compliance functions being undertaken by state fisheries 
authorities on an agency basis. While state agencies provide the personnel and 
expertise, AFMA provides overall co-ordination, policy direction, technical advice and 
funding.405 AFMA also has responsibilities in relation to protection of the marine 
environment by maintaining sustainable fishery levels. 
4.178 AFMA has surveillance and enforcement powers under Part 6 of the Fisheries 
Management Act. Under this part, AFMA officers have a number of powers including 
to: 
• board and search a boat for equipment that has been used, is being used, is 
intended to be used or is capable of being used for fishing or for any document 
or record relating to the fishing operations of the boat;406 
• search the land or premises for, inspect, take extracts from, and make copies of, 
any documents relating to the receiving of fish;407 and 
• require a person found on any land or premises entered to produce any 
documents in the person’s possession or under the person’s control relating to 
any fish found on the land or in the premises, vehicle or aircraft.408  
4.179 AFMA achieves compliance through a combination of measures, including 
continued education and stakeholder participation in the development of management 
rules, law enforcement deterrents such as targeted operations and inspections, 
intelligence gathering, risk assessments and mitigation measures.409 
Migration Agents Registration Authority 
4.180 The Migration Agents Registration Authority (MARA) is a statutory industry 
self-regulation authority for migration agents in Australia, established under the 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth). MARA is a division of the Migration Institute of Australia 
Limited, the professional association of migration agents in Australia.410  
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4.181 The function of MARA is to assist consumers of migration assistance411 and 
maintain standards of ethics and professionalism in the delivery of migration advice. 
MARA maintains a Register of Migration Agents,412 monitors the conduct of registered 
agents, and investigates consumer complaints about potential breaches of the Migration 
Agents Code of Conduct.413 
4.182 When investigating a registered migration agent’s continued registration, 
MARA may require agents to make a statutory declaration in answer to questions in 
writing,414 appear before individuals specified by MARA to answer questions415 or 
provide MARA with specified documents or records.416 MARA exercises its powers 
under s 308 regularly.417 
4.183 In circumstances where MARA is considering refusing a registration application 
or making a decision to cancel or suspend an agent’s registration or caution a registered 
agent, it has power to serve notice on an agent requiring him or her to provide specified 
information or documents.418 Failure to respond to the notice is a strict liability 
offence.419 MARA also has information-gathering powers in circumstances where it is 
considering barring a former registered migration agent from being a registered 
migration agent for a period of time.420 The powers under ss 305C and 311EA are 
rarely used.421 
Communications 
Australian Communications and Media Authority 
4.184 The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) is responsible 
for the regulation of broadcasting, the internet, radiocommunications and 
telecommunications. ACMA was formed in 2005 following the merging of the 
Australian Communications Authority and the Australian Broadcasting Authority. 
ACMA’s responsibilities include: promoting self-regulation and competition in the 
communications industry, while protecting consumers and other users; fostering an 
environment in which electronic media respect community standards and respond to 
audience and user needs; managing access to the radiofrequency spectrum; and 
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representing Australia’s communications interests internationally.422 ACMA also 
administers the Do Not Call Register, which commenced operation in May 2007.423 
4.185 ACMA has powers under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth), the 
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), the Telecommunications (Consumer Protection 
and Service Standards) Act 1999 (Cth), the Radiocommunications Act 1992 (Cth) and 
the Interactive Gambling Act 2001 (Cth). ACMA works primarily under a self-
regulatory approach with the broadcasting and communications industries, while also 
undertaking investigations and enforcement action to ensure compliance with licence 
conditions, codes and standards.424 
4.186 Under the Broadcasting Services Act, ACMA’s role in complaints is to establish 
whether the code of practice has been implemented or whether there has been 
compliance with licence conditions. ACMA has a range of information-gathering 
powers under the Act, including powers to conduct investigations, undertake 
examinations and hearings and seek the production of documents.425  
4.187 ACMA also has powers to obtain information and make inquiries under the 
Interactive Gambling Act in investigating complaints under the Act, or on its own 
initiative.426 These powers are subject to ACMA’s information-gathering powers set 
out in the Broadcasting Act. 
4.188 ACMA also has extensive information-gathering powers under Part 27 of the 
Telecommunications Act. Under this part, ACMA may, by written notice, obtain 
information and documents from carriers and service providers or from other 
persons.427 ACMA also has a number of search powers in relation to technical offences 
under Part 21 of the Act or for breaches of the Spam Act 2003 (Cth).428 ACMA 
inspectors may exercise these powers under the authority of a search warrant, with 
consent or in an emergency.429 An inspector may require the giving of certain 
information, and the production of certain documents, relevant to compliance with the 
Spam Act or Part 21 of the Telecommunications Act.430 
4.189 Under the Radiocommunications Act, ACMA has powers to search and seize, 
and require production of relevant documents, in undertaking an investigation into an 
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offence against the Act.431 The powers can be exercised with consent, pursuant to a 
warrant, or in an emergency. In 2006–07, ACMA reported that it conducted 483 
radiocommunications investigations, resulting in 61 advice notices and 142 warning 
notices being issued.432 
4.190 The Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 
includes a power for the responsible minister to require a carrier or provider, by written 
notice, to provide information relevant to the minister’s functions under the Universal 
Service Regime established by the Act.433 ACMA has noted that this power is 
exercised by the responsible minister, not by ACMA.434 A written notice issued under 
this section is a disallowable instrument. 
Environment 
Department of the Environment and Water Resources 
4.191 The Department of the Environment and Water Resources advises on and 
implements policies and programs for the protection and conservation of the 
environment. The Department administers the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act).435 The EPBC Act regulates 
actions that will, or are likely to, have a significant impact on any matter of national 
environmental significance.436 
4.192 The EPBC Act contains several compliance and enforcement mechanisms, 
including injunctions, environmental audits, civil and criminal penalties, orders to 
remedy environmental damage, personal liability of executive officers, and publicising 
of contraventions. In 2006–07, the Department dealt with 580 reports of incidents or 
activities potentially in breach of the provisions relating to activities that may have a 
significant impact on matters of national environmental significance.437 
4.193 The Department states that, in order to ensure that the referral, assessment and 
approval regulatory system established under the EPBC Act is applied rigorously and 
is enforceable, it has adopted a structured, compliance-based approach. The 
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Department has established a compliance auditing programme to monitor adherence to 
approval conditions.438  
4.194 The Department operates in a tri-agency model of environmental investigations 
in conjunction with the AFP and ACS, and hosts outposted officers from these 
agencies.439 In 2006–07, the Department investigated 44 cases related to matters of 
national environmental significance, incursions into protected areas, threatened species 
and ecological communities, and wildlife matters.440 
4.195 Division 7 of the EPBC Act provides for the Minister to appoint commissions to 
carry out inquiries into the impacts of actions. Under this division, Commissioners 
have powers to call witnesses, obtain documents and inspect places for the purposes of 
their inquiries.441 Failure to comply with such a requirement carries a maximum 
penalty of $3,300.442 Commissioners may also inspect premises either by consent or 
with a warrant.443 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 
4.196 The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority provides for the protection, use, 
understanding and enjoyment of the Great Barrier Reef in perpetuity through the care 
and development of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park.444 
4.197 The Authority manages the Marine Park and makes any recommendations to the 
Minister as to its care and development. As part of the management of the Marine 
Park, the Authority may set charges for its use by visitors. Under Division 6 of the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 (Cth), inspectors have the authority to search 
aircraft, vessels or premises and inspect documents that are relevant to ascertaining a 
person’s liability to charge or to pay a collected amount due to the Authority under the 
Act.445 While Authority inspectors regularly exercise powers to search and enter 
premises under ss 39S and 39T, the Authority does not generally obtain or execute 
warrants under s 39U. Where a warrant is necessary, this is generally obtained under 
the Crimes Act and executed by police officers.446 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority 
4.198 Commonwealth legislation has been enacted to protect the marine environment 
and to adopt international conventions governing marine pollution. A package of 
‘protection of the sea’ legislation was enacted in 1981 to implement international 
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conventions and provide funding for a national plan to deal with oil and chemical spills 
by imposing levies. This legislation is enforced by the Australian Maritime Safety 
Authority (AMSA). AMSA also has regulatory functions in relation to transport, and is 
discussed below. 
Defence 
Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force 
4.199 The Department of Defence is responsible for Australia’s international defence 
relations and defence cooperation, defence scientific research and development, 
defence procurement and purchasing, and defence industry development and co-
operation. 
4.200 Section 51SO of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) provides that a member of the 
Australian Defence Force, as directed by the Chief of the Defence Force,447 may 
require a person to answer a question or to produce a particular document. This power 
is only available if the member of the Defence Force believes on reasonable grounds 
that it is necessary for the purpose of preserving the life or safety of other persons or to 
protect Commonwealth interests. Failure to comply with such a direction is a criminal 
offence. 
4.201 Under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth), there is a uniform system 
of military justice for the three armed services in Australia. There are three types of 
service tribunals that may hear defence force disciplinary matters: summary 
authorities, court martial and defence force magistrates.448 Section 138 of the Act 
grants powers to appropriate authorities to require defence personnel to give evidence 
or to provide documents as required by the rules of procedure of the service 
tribunals.449 
Energy 
Australian Energy Regulator 
4.202 Since July 1995, the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) has had responsibility 
for compliance monitoring, reporting and enforcement in the National Electricity 
Market. The AER is part of the ACCC, although it operates as a separate legal entity. 
In addition to its economic regulation powers, the AER has a range of compliance 
monitoring and enforcement functions under s 15 of the National Electricity Law.450 
The AER is required to monitor compliance with the National Electricity Law, the 
National Electricity Regulations and the National Electricity Rules. The AER may 
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investigate breaches or possible breaches, and may enforce the law, the regulations and 
the rules.451 
4.203 The National Electricity (South Australia) Act 1996 (SA) establishes the laws of 
the National Electricity Market. Under Part 3 Division 2 of that Act, the AER is 
granted a broad series of investigation powers to obtain search warrants to enter 
premises and inspect documents and equipment where the AER has a reasonable belief 
that there has been a breach of a provision of the Act.452 Under s 28 of the Act, the 
AER may serve a notice requiring a person to furnish to the AER any information the 
AER requires for the performance or exercise of a function or power conferred on it 
under the Act. To date, these powers have not been used by the AER, although it was 
submitted that they are an important part of the economic regulatory and enforcement 
framework.453 Rather than using its coercive powers, the AER relies on routine 
information that must be provided to it by regulated businesses in accordance with the 
National Electricity Rules. 
Transport 
Office of the Inspector of Transport Security 
4.204 The Office of the Inspector of Transport Security (ITS) was established in 
December 2005 within the Department of Transport and Regional Services. The ITS 
undertakes independent inquiries, as required by the Minister for Transport and 
Regional Services, into major transport security incidents or incidents that suggest 
systemic weaknesses in aviation or maritime security regulatory regimes. The ITS also 
inquires into surface transport security matters, subject to the agreement of the relevant 
state or territory government.  
4.205 The functions of the ITS were incorporated into legislation in the Inspector of 
Transport Security Act 2006 (Cth), which commenced operation on 7 June 2007. 
Under Part 5 of the Inspector of Transport Security Act, the Inspector has powers to 
request information that he or she believes is relevant to an inquiry from other 
government agencies or any person.454 Special procedures apply for requests for on-
board recording information.455  
4.206 The ITS may also enter and search premises and board and search transport 
vehicles, with the consent of the controller of the premises or vehicle.456 The Inspector 
may also exercise his or her powers to ask questions while conducting the search.457 
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4.207 None of the powers of the ITS are ‘coercive’ in nature as they can only be 
exercised with consent from the relevant person or government agency, and that 
consent can be revoked at any time.458 
Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
4.208 The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is an independent statutory 
authority established under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth). CASA is responsible for 
the regulation of aviation safety in Australia and the safety of Australian aircraft 
overseas, and falls within the portfolio of the Department of Transport and Regional 
Services.  
4.209 CASA administers the Civil Aviation Act, which prescribes the drafting of Civil 
Aviation Regulations, safety education, surveillance and enforcement processes. 
CASA is also governed by the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (Cth) and the Civil 
Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth). The Civil Aviation Act and Regulations give 
effect to the Chicago Convention, an international convention that regulates 
international civil aviation.459 
4.210 To undertake its functions, CASA aims to develop effective enforcement 
strategies to secure compliance with aviation safety standards.460 CASA takes 
enforcement action when it detects non-compliance with obligations imposed by the 
Act, the Regulations and other instruments made under the Act and Regulations. Non-
compliance in this context may involve contravention of the Act or the Regulations, 
but it also may involve a breach of a condition attaching to a licence or certificate, or 
acts or omissions that indicate that a person no longer meets the standards required by 
the legislation for the holding of a licence or certificate.461  
4.211 The penalties under the Civil Aviation Act and Regulations are directed at 
aircraft manufacturers, aircraft owners, aircraft hirers, pilots, maintenance personnel, 
handlers of dangerous goods, and any person who interferes with crew or aircraft. 
4.212 CASA has a range of enforcement tools available which are set out in detail in 
its enforcement manual.462 These include a demerits point scheme, enforceable 
undertakings, and protection for self-reporting of inadvertent mistakes. CASA states 
that its system of enforcement is based on protecting those who make innocent 
mistakes and encouraging them to report, measured responses to minor breaches and 
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concentration of enforcement action on cases where there are serious safety 
breaches.463 
4.213 There are 23 provisions under the Act and the Regulations that allow CASA 
access to aircraft, aerodromes, premises or documents. For example, under s 53 of the 
Act, CASA is empowered to require the production of documents and other things 
required in the investigation of defects. Regulation 305 is a general access provision 
authorising access to premises and documents for regulatory purposes. Access powers 
are only available to authorised inspectors under the Regulations.464 Under 
reg 305(1A), it is an offence for a person to prevent or hinder access by an inspector to 
any place. 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority  
4.214 AMSA is a regulatory safety agency established under the Australian Maritime 
Safety Authority Act 1990 (Cth) (AMSA Act). It is largely self-funded through levies 
on the commercial shipping industry. AMSA reports to the Minister for Transport and 
Regional Services. 
4.215 AMSA’s goal, as set out in the AMSA Act, is to achieve world’s best practice in 
providing services to Australia in maritime safety, aviation and marine search and 
rescue, and protection of the marine environment from ship-sourced pollution. As 
discussed above, AMSA is also responsible for enforcing federal legislation that has 
been enacted to protect the marine environment and to adopt international conventions 
governing marine pollution. 
4.216 The Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) is the main piece of federal legislation that 
regulates matters such as ship safety, coastal trade, employment of seafarers and 
shipboard aspects of the protection of the marine environment, and provides a national 
search and rescue service. 
4.217 Under the Navigation Act, a person authorised by the Minister or by AMSA may 
search a ship in a port where the person has reasonable grounds for believing the 
search to be necessary for the purposes of the Act. An authorised person also may enter 
and inspect any premises; summon persons before him or her and require them to 
answer questions; and require and enforce the production of documents by any 
person.465 Refusal to comply with such a direction is an offence under the Act, with a 
maximum penalty of $1,000.466 
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4.218 AMSA also provides inspectorate services under the Occupational Health and 
Safety (Maritime Industry) Act 1993 (Cth).467 Under the Act, inspectors appointed by 
AMSA have powers to enter, search and inspect ships, and require persons to answer 
questions or produce documents in relation to an investigation into health and safety on 
the ship.468 It is an offence to not comply with such requests made by inspectors. 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
4.219 The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is an operationally independent 
body within the Department of Transport and Regional Services and is Australia’s 
prime agency for transport safety investigations.469 
4.220 The ATSB’s stated objective is safe transport. Its mission is to maintain and 
improve transport safety and public confidence through excellence in: independent 
investigation of transport accidents and other safety occurrences; safety data recording, 
analysis and research; and raising safety awareness and knowledge.470  
4.221 The ATSB’s functions and powers are governed by the Transport Safety 
Investigation Act 2003 (Cth). The object of the Act is to improve transport safety 
through, among other things, independent investigations of transport accidents and 
incidents and the making of safety action statements and recommendations that draw 
on the results of those investigations.471 ATSB investigations avoid apportioning blame 
or determining liability.472 In 2006–07, the ATSB released 80 final investigation 
reports.473 
4.222 The ATSB has powers to investigate under Part 5 of the Transport Safety 
Investigation Act. Those powers are only able to be exercised in the context of an 
investigation.474 Under s 32 of the Act, the Executive Director of ATSB has powers to 
require a person to answer questions or produce documents relevant to an 
investigation. A person who refuses to attend or answer questions when required is 
guilty of an offence. 
4.223 In a submission to this Inquiry, the ATSB indicated that it generally uses its 
powers under s 32 to require production of documents or appear to answer questions in 
most investigations, with multiple notices likely to be issued in major investigations.475 
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As certain protections attach to documents produced under s 32, the ATSB regularly 
considers it ‘necessary’ to use the power to facilitate the appropriate confidentiality 
requirements. The ATSB considers this fits with the objectives of the Act in not 
apportioning blame or determining liability as part of its investigations.476 
4.224 Other coercive information-gathering powers under the Act include powers to: 
enter premises with consent, under a warrant or in emergencies; search, photograph 
and take evidence from premises; and seize material that is the subject of an 
investigation warrant.477 The ATSB indicated that it has not had cause to use the 
powers with respect to warrants, as parties generally comply with notices issued under 
s 32 to produce evidential material.478 
4.225 The ATSB website contains a number of publications regarding its investigation 
powers, outlining what steps are taken when a major transport accident occurs, and 
detailing the rights and obligations of parties who participate in investigations.479 
Other  
Workplace Ombudsman 
4.226 The Workplace Ombudsman was established under recent amendments to the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (WRA), commencing operation on 1 July 2007.480 
The role of the Workplace Ombudsman is to: 
• educate employers and workers to understand their rights and obligations under 
the WRA; 
• promote and monitor compliance with the WRA, including inquiring into any 
potentially non-compliant practices and investigating suspected contraventions 
of the WRA; 
• institute proceedings to enforce the WRA; 
• represent employees who are or might become a party to proceedings under the 
WRA; and 
• appoint and direct workplace inspectors.481  
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4.227 Under s 169 of the WRA, workplace inspectors have coercive information-
gathering powers to determine whether an employer’s obligations under the Act are 
being met. Inspectors under the Act may enter premises, interview any person, require 
documents to be produced for inspection and inspect, and make copies from or extract 
any document provided.482 Inspectors may also, by notice in writing, require a person 
to produce a document.483 It is an offence to contravene a requirement of an inspector 
to produce a document.484 
4.228 Building on the previous work of the Office of Workplace Services, which 
conducted similar functions to the Workplace Ombudsman between March 2006 and 
June 2006, the Workplace Ombudsman has been involved in a number of successful 
prosecutions and recovery of unpaid worker entitlements.485 At the end of November 
2007, 37 court cases have been finalised, and a further 45 cases were before the 
courts.486 The Workplace Ombudsman has produced a fact sheet providing information 
on the powers of workplace inspectors, including their coercive information-gathering 
powers.487 
Comcare 
4.229 Comcare is a federal statutory authority established under the Safety, 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (SRC Act). Comcare administers the 
Commonwealth’s workers’ compensation scheme under the SRC Act and also the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 (Cth) (OHS Act).488 Comcare also 
administers the Asbestos-Related Claims (Management of Commonwealth Liabilities) 
Act 2005 (Cth) (ARC Act). 
4.230 Comcare states that its priorities are: to promote safe and healthy workplaces; 
provide accessible and affordable compensation services; and encourage and support 
the early and safe return to work of injured employees.489 
4.231 Comcare conducts investigations to determine compliance with the OHS Act 
and may do so on its own initiative, or in response to a direction from the Safety, 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission.490 Investigations may be reactive 
(undertaken in response to an incident) or proactive, where an investigation is 
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generally scheduled in advance as part of a targeted compliance program. During 
2005–06, Comcare commenced a total of 189 investigations, made up of 76 reactive 
investigations, 64 proactive investigations and 49 review investigations.491 
4.232 Under the OHS Act, investigators have powers to enter and inspect premises and 
require persons: to give to the investigator reasonable assistance; to answer any 
questions put by the investigator; and to give to the investigator any documents 
requested by the investigator or copies of such documents.492 Failure to comply with an 
investigator’s request is an offence.493 After receiving an investigation report, the 
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission also has the power to obtain 
information and documents relevant to the matters of the investigation.494 The 
Commission may conduct public or private inquiries under s 55 of the Act, and has the 
power to summon witnesses and require the production of documents for that 
purpose.495 
4.233 Comcare has indicated that it frequently uses its coercive information-gathering 
powers under the OHS Act, in particular ss 42 and 43. Comcare also notes that it is 
currently moving away from the practice of informally obtaining documents and 
information from employers by consent, and is instead issuing statutory notices 
whenever possible.496 
4.234 To assist the functions of assessing claims, Comcare has powers under the SRC 
Act and the ARC Act to request information in relation to compensation claims.497 It is 
not an offence to fail to comply with such requests, but Comcare can refuse to deal 
further with the claim if the request is not met. Comcare has indicated that it uses the 
powers of request under the SRC Act on a regular basis, but generally obtains 
information in relation to asbestos claims through a simple written request rather than 
using s 11 of the ARC Act.498 
Child Support Agency 
4.235 The Child Support Agency (CSA) was established under the Child Support 
(Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) to administer the Commonwealth 
Government’s Child Support Scheme. Since 2004, the CSA has been part of the 
Australian Government Department of Human Services. The function of the CSA is to 
ensure separated parents share in the cost of supporting their children. The CSA has a 
Child Support Registrar,499 who maintains a register of child support payments500 and 
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manages their collection and regular and timely distribution to families. Under the 
Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth), the Child Support Registrar can make 
administrative determinations of the level of child support required to be paid by 
individuals.   
4.236 Under both Acts, the Child Support Registrar has the power to serve notice on a 
person requiring them to provide the Registrar with relevant information or 
documents.501 The Registrar also has the power to require a person to attend for 
questioning by the Registrar.502 Refusal or failure to comply with requests issued under 
the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act is an offence punishable by a fine 
not exceeding $2,000.503 Refusal or failure to comply with notices issued under the 
Child Support (Assessment) Act is an offence punishable by imprisonment not 
exceeding 6 months.504 
4.237 Similar powers are available to the Registrar under the Child Support 
(Registration and Collection) Act for obtaining information from a person who is, or 
was, a resident of an overseas jurisdiction prescribed under the regulations as 
reciprocating on child support matters. Failure to comply is not, however, an offence 
under the Act.505 
4.238 The CSA has comprehensive compliance strategies in place to ensure that the 
right amount of child support is paid on time.506 In 2006–07, the CSA referred over 
101,000 customers to the ATO for lodgement-enforcement action.507 As a last resort, 
the CSA takes legal action for enforcement, with 786 cases finalised in 2006–07.508 
Proactive investigation of avoiders and income-minimisers significantly increased 
between 2005–06 and 2006–07.509 
Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia  
4.239 The Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (ITSA) is responsible for the 
administration and regulation of the personal insolvency system in Australia. ITSA’s 
purpose is to ‘provide a personal insolvency system that produces equitable outcomes 
for debtors and creditors, enjoys public confidence and minimises the impact of 
financial failure on the community’.510 
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4.240 The coercive information-gathering powers relevant to ITSA can be grouped in 
three categories: 
• Powers available to an official receiver to assist a trustee in the administration of 
a particular matter, or to assist in the administration of the Act itself. Official 
receivers are appointed in each bankruptcy district, and provide Australia’s 
bankruptcy registry service. 
• Powers available to the Official Trustee to obtain information to assist in the 
administration of a particular matter. The Official Trustee is a body corporate 
established under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) which can act as a trustee of 
bankrupt estates and the administrator of other types of arrangements. 
• Powers exercised by the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy in the regulation of 
principally registered trustees and debt agreement administrators and in the 
investigation of offences under the Bankruptcy Act.511 
4.241 Under s 77AA of the Bankruptcy Act, official receivers are able, at all 
reasonable times, to have full and free access to all premises and books for any purpose 
of the Act, and remove from premises any books that the receiver or officer reasonably 
considers may be relevant to the examinable affairs of a debtor or bankrupt under that 
part of the Act. Official receivers also have the power under s 77C to require a person, 
by written notice, to produce information or books, or appear to give evidence.512 It is 
an offence to fail to comply with notices issued under ss 77AA and 77C. In 2005–06, 
official receivers issued 504 notices under ss 77AA and 77C.513 ITSA has recently 
published a best practice statement on the exercise of the powers of official 
receivers.514 
4.242 Under the Bankruptcy Act, trustees have a number of information-gathering 
powers to assist in the administration of a bankruptcy. These can be exercised by the 
Official Trustee or any registered private trustee. The powers include requiring: 
production by a bankrupt of information concerning the statement of his or her 
financial affairs;515 production of books of an ‘associated entity’ of a bankrupt;516 and 
provision of additional information concerning a person’s income.517 Failure to comply 
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with notices issued under these provisions is an offence. Section 130 allows a trustee to 
apply for a warrant to enter premises and seize property or books relevant to a 
bankrupt’s affairs. ITSA does not record the number of warrants obtained, or the 
exercise of coercive information-gathering powers by the Official Trustee or any other 
trustee.518 
4.243 The Inspector-General in Bankruptcy has two broad functions: regulation of 
trustees and administrators, and investigation of offences under the Bankruptcy Act. 
Regulatory work is undertaken by ITSA’s Bankruptcy Regulation branch, and 
investigations are undertaken by the Bankruptcy Fraud Investigation unit. To assist 
with its regulatory activities, the Inspector-General is empowered to make a broad 
range of inquiries or investigations into a range of different matters under the Act.519 
4.244 The Inspector-General also has a number of general investigation powers under 
the Act, including the power to require trustees, administrators and former 
administrators to produce books or answer an inquiry made to him or her, and the 
power to investigate the books of a trustee, administrator or former administrator at any 
time.520 ITSA reported that during 2006–07 the Fraud Investigation unit received and 
assessed 1,104 alleged offence referrals; commenced 825 investigations; completed 
809 investigations; achieved compliance in 299 matters; referred two matters to state 
and federal police agencies for investigation; and forwarded 298 briefs of evidence to 
the CDPP.521 
4.245 Over the same period, ITSA also issued warning letters to 117 first-time alleged 
offenders regarding less serious breaches of the Bankruptcy Act. ITSA states that 
warning letters save investigative time and resources and are issued to those alleged 
offenders it considers to have committed minor infringements of the offence provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Act. Where a warning letter is issued, follow-up interviews are 
conducted to educate alleged offenders about their rights and responsibilities, and the 
potential consequences of any future non-compliance. Where a recipient of a warning 
letter elects not to participate in this interview process, ITSA withdraws the warning 
letter and initiates prosecution actions.522 
National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority 
4.246 The National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA) is a statutory 
authority which administers offshore petroleum safety legislation.523 It commenced 
operations in January 2005. The organisation’s primary objectives include:  
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• improving health and safety outcomes across the offshore petroleum 
industry 
• ensuring health and safety regulation of the offshore petroleum industry is 
provided to standards that are equal to the best in the world 
• reducing the regulatory burden on the offshore petroleum industry, which 
operates across multiple jurisdictions, by delivering a consistent and 
comprehensive health and safety regime.524  
4.247 Schedule 7 of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) establishes an 
occupational health and safety regime for petroleum activities in Commonwealth 
waters. Under the Act, NOPSA’s occupational health and safety inspectors are granted 
powers to enter and search premises of facilities and regulated business premises, 
require a person to answer questions in person or in writing, and produce documents or 
articles.525 Failure to comply with these requirements is an offence. Powers to enter 
and search other premises can be exercised with consent or pursuant to a warrant. 526 
4.248 NOPSA’s Compliance and Enforcement Policy indicates that the agency has a 
graduated enforcement system that allows an inspector to escalate the compliance and 
enforcement action according to the response of the responsible party and the 
significance of the non-compliance.527 The options commence with a verbal warning, 
and progress through written notices, improvement notices and prohibition notices, to 
recommendations for prosecution. In 2006–07, NOPSA undertook 66 inspections of 
facilities, issued 14 improvement notices and one prohibition notice.528 
Royal Commissions of inquiry  
4.249 Royal Commissions of inquiry have been described as ‘unquestionably the most 
ancient and the most dignified’ of the various bodies of inquiry.529 The origins of 
Royal Commissions can be traced back to the 12th century.530  
In spite of the decline of this type of inquiry between the late 17th and the end of the 
18th century, the practice was revived under Queen Victoria. It is naturally of special 
interest to Australia that the quasi-political device of using Royal Commissions of 
inquiry was revived at the time when British settlement created a new society in 
Australia.531  
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4.250 Royal Commissions ‘owe their foundation to an exercise of the royal 
prerogative to appoint appropriate citizens of the realm to perform duties on behalf of 
the Crown’.532 The Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) allows the Governor-General, 
by Letters Patent, to 
issue such commissions, directed to such person or persons, as he thinks fit, requiring 
or authorising [those persons] to make inquiry into and report upon any matter 
specified in the Letters Patent, and which relates to or is connected with the peace, 
order and good government of the Commonwealth, or any public purpose or any 
power of the Commonwealth.533 
4.251 Royal Commissions are normally established only where a matter of public 
interest so requires. Their ad hoc nature distinguishes them from permanent standing 
federal agencies and bodies. Their purpose is usually to ascertain factual circumstances 
and make recommendations.534 The discovery of the truth has been described as a 
prime function of a Royal Commission.535 The findings of a Royal Commission do not 
have any legally binding status, although they may assist in the formulation of 
government policy and the enactment of new legislation.536 
[Royal Commissions] can provide policy advice to governments or they can 
investigate and report on major disasters or events that become a matter of public 
concern as a result for example of some alleged maladministration in the workings of 
government.537 
4.252 Justice Neville Owen, the Royal Commissioner in the HIH inquiry, stated: 
Royal commissions have a particular ability to delve beneath the surface and explore 
and expose matters that otherwise might not readily come to light. They also have the 
capacity to marshal evidence and other material in such a way as to assist those whose 
responsibility it is to consider future action. There is thus a continuing public benefit 
from the work royal commissions do.538 
4.253 Royal Commissions are a common feature of Australian public life.539 There 
have been a number of high profile federal Royal Commissions, including those into 
the Australian Wheat Board; HIH Insurance; the building and construction industry; 
and Aboriginal deaths in custody.540 In addition, since the late 1980s, each Australian 
state has had a high profile commission into crime or corruption.541 
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4.254 In the Second Reading of the Royal Commissions Bill 1902, Senator O’Connor 
stated: 
It is quite evident that the power to appoint Royal commissions is of no value 
whatever unless you can give power to examine witnesses on oath, and to compel the 
attendance of witnesses, and the production of documents.542 
4.255 A federal Royal Commission has the power to summon a person to appear 
before it to give evidence or to produce the documents or things specified in the 
summons;543 and to require a person appearing at the hearing of evidence to take an 
oath or affirmation.544 Legal practitioners appointed or authorised to assist a Royal 
Commission may, so far as the Royal Commission thinks proper, examine or cross-
examine any witness on any matter which the commission deems relevant to the 
inquiry.545 A person who fails to attend a hearing or to produce the requested 
documents or things, without reasonable excuse, commits an offence, punishable by a 
maximum penalty of $1,000 or imprisonment for six months.546 The same maximum 
penalty applies to a person who refuses to be sworn, make an affirmation or to answer 
any relevant question asked by the Royal Commission.547 However, a witness cannot 
be compelled to disclose to a Royal Commission ‘any secret process of 
manufacture’.548 A federal Royal Commission may also authorise a member of the 
commission or a member of the AFP or of the police force of a state or territory to 
apply for search warrants in relation to matters into which it is inquiring.549  
                                                                                                                                             
into the Building and Construction Industry (2003); E Johnstone, Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody (1991). 
541  For example, the Fitzgerald Inquiry in Queensland; the Royal Commission into the New South Wales 
Police Service in New South Wales (the Wood Royal Commission); and the WA Inc Royal Commission 
in Western Australia. 
542  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 August 1902, 15659 (R O’Connor), 15659. 
543   Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) s 2(1). 
544  Ibid s 2(3). 
545  Ibid s 6FA. 
546  Ibid s 3. 
547  Ibid s 6. The Act provides for the separate offence of contempt of a Royal Commission: see s 6O. 
548  Ibid s 6D(1). 
549  Ibid s 4. 
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Introduction 
5.1 This chapter considers the law on client legal privilege in the specific context of 
federal investigations. Legislative provisions and significant cases dealing with the 
application of the privilege are discussed. This chapter contains recommendations 
aimed at achieving greater clarity in the law on the application of privilege to federal 
coercive information-gathering powers. It also considers whether there needs to be 
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greater consistency in the law on the application of client legal privilege to those 
powers. 
Legislative provisions 
5.2 Federal legislative provisions conferring coercive information-gathering powers 
on federal bodies take a number of different approaches in dealing with the issue of the 
application of client legal privilege. In broad terms, legislation variously: 
• is silent on the issue; 
• expressly abrogates the privilege; 
• expressly preserves the privilege; 
• modifies or partially abrogates the privilege;  
• makes specific provision for the application of the privilege to lawyers—
whether or not it otherwise remains silent on the application of the privilege to 
the client; or 
• makes provision for procedural aspects in determining the application of the 
privilege to specific communications, or in protecting privileged 
communications. 
Silence 
5.3 Unfortunately, for the most part, federal laws contain no express provision in 
relation to client legal privilege.1 
5.4 A subset of the provisions that are silent on privilege provide that it is not an 
offence for a person intentionally or recklessly to fail to comply with a coercive 
information-gathering power if there is a reasonable excuse, without specifying 
whether or not a claim of client legal privilege amounts to a reasonable excuse.2  
Abrogation of privilege 
James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) 
5.5 Only a few federal statutes expressly abrogate client legal privilege. One 
example is the James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth), which 
                                                        
1  See, eg, Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth); Gene Technology Act 2000 
(Cth); Social Security Act 1991 (Cth); Medicare Australia Act 1973 (Cth); Insurance Act 1973 (Cth); 
Banking Act 1959 (Cth); Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth). 
2  See, eg, A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 159(3); Social Security 
(Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 74(3); Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) ss 11C(2), 11D(3). 
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abrogates client legal privilege in relation to certain material, allowing its use in 
investigations of the James Hardie Group and any related proceedings.3 The Act also 
makes it clear that a lawyer cannot refuse to produce ‘James Hardie material’ on the 
ground that it would involve disclosing a privileged communication.4  
5.6 In introducing the James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Bill 2004 into 
Parliament, the then Treasurer, the Hon Peter Costello MP, noted that there are 
situations in which the abrogation of the privilege is justified in order to serve a higher 
public policy interest. He identified the ‘effective enforcement of corporate regulation’ 
as one such interest.5 In the Second Reading Speech for the Bill, the Treasurer stated: 
There is considerable community concern about the conduct of James Hardie … and 
particularly in relation to the separation of subsidiary companies with liabilities via a 
group restructure, the transfer of key assets offshore in that restructure and the 
subsequent underfunding of obligations to compensate those victims who have a 
legitimate claim against James Hardie for asbestos-related diseases. 
These obligations have recently been estimated at approximately $1.5 billion. 
However, the figure could be as high as $2 billion as the number of victims identified 
increases. …  
A thorough investigation of the conduct of James Hardie, with proceedings brought 
where misconduct is found, is essential to maintaining community confidence in the 
Australian corporate regulatory regime. …  
The government shares the community’s concern about the difficulties faced by the 
victims of asbestos disease and their families and wishes to ensure that they are 
treated fairly. We also place great store on ethical behaviour by corporations. We do 
not condone or support companies that restructure their affairs to avoid their legal 
liabilities to those people whose suffering is very great and whose lives are shattered 
by horrible disease.6 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 
5.7 Client legal privilege is also abrogated in certain situations under the Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth). A person is not excused from providing documents to: 
• the Australian Federal Police (AFP), pursuant to a notice under s 3ZQN of the 
Crimes Act requiring the production of certain documents relating to the 
investigation of a serious terrorism offence; or 
                                                        
3  See James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s 4. 
4  See Ibid s 4(3). ‘James Hardie material’ is defined in s 3. 
5  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 December 2004, 1 (P Costello—
Treasurer), 2.  
6  Ibid, 1. 
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• to a magistrate, pursuant to a notice under s 3ZQO of the Crimes Act requiring 
the production of certain documents relating to the investigation of a serious 
offence; 
on the ground that production of the documents would disclose material that is 
protected against disclosure by client legal privilege or any other duty of confidence.7  
Other statutory provisions 
5.8 Similarly, a person is not excused from providing: 
• certain property tracking records pursuant to an order made by a magistrate 
under s 202 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth); or 
• information or documents, or answering questions under the Inspector-General 
of Taxation Act 2003 (Cth); 
on the ground that it would disclose information the subject of client legal privilege.8  
Preservation of privilege 
5.9 The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the TPA) expressly preserves the 
application of client legal privilege in the context of the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission’s main coercive information-gathering power under s 155. This 
section provides that the exercise of that power does not require a person to produce a 
document that would disclose information the subject of a privilege claim.9 This 
provision was inserted in the TPA by the Trade Practices Amendment Act (No 1) 2006 
(Cth), implementing a recommendation made by the Trade Practices Act Review 
Committee—following the decision in The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd 
v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (Daniels)—that the TPA should 
provide explicitly that s 155 does not require the production of documents to which 
privilege attaches.10 
5.10 Some federal legislation expressly provides that the law concerning client legal 
privilege is not affected, which also has the effect of preserving the common law 
concerning privilege. Examples of this type of provision can be found in the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (ASIO Act);11 the Law Enforcement 
                                                        
7  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3ZQR. 
8  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) s 206; Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003 (Cth) s 16(1). 
9  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 155(7B). 
10  Australian Government Trade Practices Act Review Committee, Review of the Competition Provisions of 
the Trade Practices Act (2003), rec 13.5. The High Court’s decision in The Daniels Corporation 
International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 relating 
to the application of the privilege to Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 155 is discussed below. 
11  See Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34ZV, which relates to the exercise of 
ASIO’s special powers under div 3 relating to terrorism offences. However, the ASIO Act is silent on 
privilege in so far as it applies to ASIO’s exercise of special powers under div 2 of the Act. 
 5. Client Legal Privilege in Federal Investigations 193 
 
Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth);12 and the Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth).13 Consistent with the approach of the 
High Court in Baker v Campbell,14 the Crimes Act expressly preserves the application 
of privilege in the course of search and seizure.15  
Modification or partial abrogation 
5.11 As discussed in Chapter 3, there are two limbs to client legal privilege—the 
‘advice’ limb and the ‘litigation’ limb. Some federal legislative provisions modify the 
application of the privilege, by narrowing the circumstances in which the privilege can 
be claimed. For example, the Inspector-General of Security and Intelligence Act 1986 
(Cth) does not excuse a person from giving information or producing a document on 
the ground that it would disclose legal advice given to a Minister, an agency, or an 
authority of the Commonwealth.16 However, it seems that a claim for client legal 
privilege would excuse a person from giving information or producing a document if 
doing so would involve disclosing legal advice given to someone other than a Minister, 
an agency, or an authority of the Commonwealth, or if it fell within the litigation limb 
of the privilege and the document did not fall within the category of ‘legal advice’ to 
one of the specified entities. So, for example, draft pleadings and affidavits would be 
excused from production.17  
Provisions relating to lawyers 
5.12 A number of federal statutes give lawyers express statutory protection from 
complying with a coercive power, where to do so would involve disclosing a privileged 
communication unless: 
• the client to whom the privilege belongs consents to the lawyer complying with 
the requirement; or 
• the liquidator consents where the privilege belongs to a body corporate under 
administration. 
                                                        
12  Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) s 138 provides that pt 9 div 4 (concerning 
search warrants) does not affect the law relating to client legal privilege. 
13  Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) s 242. See also Exposure Draft 
Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007 (Cth) cl 155(3). 
14  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. This case is discussed in Ch 3.  
15  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3ZX, provides that pt 1AA of the Crimes Act (concerning powers of search, 
information gathering, arrest and related powers) does not affect the law relating to client legal privilege. 
16  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) s 18(6)(b). See also Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 24(3) (which is in similar terms, although it also applies 
to information or documents that would disclose legal advice given to a person or body that acts on behalf 
of the Commonwealth); Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) s 9(4)(ab) (which applies only to certain types of 
legal advice and communications) and Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) 
s 80(5)(c). 
17  This is considered further in Ch 6. 
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5.13 If a lawyer refuses to comply, he or she must reveal the name and address of the 
relevant client—where they are known—and provide sufficient particulars to identify 
the documents containing the privileged communications.18 Sometimes legislation 
states that such a provision does not affect the law relating to client legal privilege,19 
but more often the legislation is silent on this point.20 
Provisions relating to procedure 
5.14 Given that most federal legislation conferring coercive powers is silent on the 
issue of privilege, it is rare for such legislation to make provision for the procedures to 
be adopted in resolving claims for privilege.21  
5.15 An example of a federal provision that relates to the procedures to be adopted in 
protecting privileged information is s 89 of the Law Enforcement Integrity 
Commissioner Act. It provides that a person must give evidence in private if the 
evidence is likely to disclose specified types of legal advice or communications that 
attract client legal privilege. 
5.16 Another notable exception is the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) as amended 
by the Royal Commission Amendment Act 2006 (Cth). The Royal Commissions Act 
provides that the power of a Royal Commission to require or summon a person to 
produce a document includes the power to require or summon the person to produce a 
document that is subject to client legal privilege.22 It also provides that it is not a 
reasonable excuse to fail to produce a document to a Royal Commission on the basis 
that it is the subject of a claim for privilege unless: 
• a court has found the document to be privileged; or 
• the claim is made to the member of the Commission who required production of 
the document within the time required for production of the document.23 
5.17 Where a claim for privilege is made to a Royal Commission, the Commission 
may serve a notice requiring the production of the document the subject of the claim 
for the purpose of inspecting it to decide whether to accept or reject the claim.24 Where 
the claim is accepted, the Royal Commission must return the document and disregard 
                                                        
18  See, eg, Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) ss 79, 95; Australian Crime 
Commission Act 2002 (Cth) s 30(3); Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 69; Retirement Savings Account Act 1997 (Cth) s 118; Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 
(Cth) s 288. 
19  See, eg, Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) ss 79(5), 95(5); Australian Crime 
Commission Act 2002 (Cth) s 30(9). 
20  See, eg, Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). 
21  Practical and procedural issues associated with resolving claims for privilege are discussed in Ch 8. 
22  Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) s 2(5). However, this section contains a note that under s 6AA client 
legal privilege might still be a reasonable excuse for refusing to produce the document. 
23  Ibid s 6AA(1). 
24  Ibid s 6AA(2), (3). 
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the privileged material for the purposes of any report or decision it makes.25 Where the 
claim is rejected, the Royal Commission may use the document for the purposes of its 
inquiry.26 The Act also sets out offences in relation to the non-production of documents 
the subject of a claim for client legal privilege.27 
5.18 Amendments to the Royal Commissions Act in 2006 were designed to 
put beyond doubt that a Commissioner may require the production of a document in 
respect of which [client legal privilege] is claimed, for the limited purpose of making 
a finding about that claim, that is deciding to accept or reject it, for the purposes of the 
Commission.28 
5.19 The amendments were requested by Commissioner Terence Cole, who headed 
the inquiry into AWB Ltd (AWB) and the Oil-for-Food Programme (the AWB Royal 
Commission),29 following the decision in AWB Ltd v Cole.30  
5.20 During the AWB Royal Commission, AWB Ltd challenged Commissioner 
Cole’s decision to reject a claim of client legal privilege over a particular document 
and his capacity to determine privilege claims. In the Federal Court, Young J held that 
the document in question was not subject to privilege. He also held that Commissioner 
Cole had power in the circumstances of that case—as the document had been 
inadvertently provided to the Royal Commission and without any accompanying claim 
for privilege at that time—to form an opinion as to whether the document was subject 
to privilege.31 However, Young J’s decision cast doubt on the ability of a Royal 
Commissioner to inspect a document in respect of which client legal privilege has been 
claimed to determine whether the claim is made out—although he stated that it was 
inappropriate for him to grant declaratory relief on this issue.32  
5.21 In the Second Reading Speech for the Royal Commissions Amendment Bill 
2006, the Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, the then Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime 
Minister, in referring to the decision of Young J, stated: 
It puts royal commissions in a very difficult practical situation, because it means that, 
if an order or direction is made that a document … be produced and a claim of legal 
                                                        
25  Ibid s 6AA(4). 
26  See Ibid s 6AA(5). 
27  Ibid s 6AB. 
28  Explanatory Memorandum, Royal Commissions Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth), 1. 
29  See T Cole, Report of the Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme (2006). 
30  AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382. See also Explanatory Memorandum, Royal Commissions 
Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth), l. 
31  See AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382, in particular [189]. See also Explanatory Memorandum, Royal 
Commissions Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth), 1. 
32  AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382, [184]–[194]. See also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives, 26 May 2006, 18 (M Turnbull—Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime 
Minister), 20. 
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professional privilege is made, the commission then must either abandon its efforts to 
obtain access to the document or go to a court itself to seek a declaration that legal 
professional privilege does not apply or indeed to seek a mandatory injunction that the 
document be produced. This is, in practical terms, an impossible obligation, because 
the commissioner has not seen the document and does not know how strong the claim 
of privilege is. It would make the conduct of inquiries of this kind open to 
considerable delay and, indeed, possibly tactical claims for legal professional 
privilege.33 
Need for clarification 
5.22 Where statutes conferring coercive information-gathering powers are silent on 
client legal privilege—or address the obligations of lawyers, but not their clients, 
concerning the provision of privileged information in response to a coercive power—
there may be confusion about whether the exercise of a particular power overrides the 
privilege by implication. Confusion may arise because: 
(a) the common law has not considered whether the exercise of a particular power 
abrogates privilege by necessary implication;  
(b) where the common law has decided whether the exercise of a particular power 
abrogates privilege by implication, there may be differing interpretations about 
the extent to which that decision applies to other powers not considered 
specifically by the court; or 
(c) it is not readily apparent whether particular federal bodies take the view that 
their powers abrogate privilege by necessary implication, especially where such 
powers have never been used.34  
5.23 In addition, where privilege is abrogated by express words, or where a federal 
body takes the position that its powers abrogate privilege by necessary implication, 
there may be uncertainty about whether the abrogation extends to advice given in 
relation to an investigation or communications concerning the representation of a client 
in an investigation.35 
5.24 In some instances, clarification about the application of the privilege to 
particular powers has been provided by the common law. For example, in Carmody v 
Mackellar the Federal Court held that the power to listen to and record 
communications under s 45 of the then Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 
(Cth) overrode client legal privilege. The Court stated that the telecommunications 
interception legislation would be unworkable if it were not to be construed as 
                                                        
33  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 May 2006, 18 (M Turnbull—
Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister), 20. 
34  The lack of transparency of approach of particular federal bodies is addressed separately below. 
35  This issue is discussed in Ch 7.  
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authorising the recording or overhearing of privileged communications.36 The decision 
in Carmody v Mackellar is relied upon by federal bodies exercising 
telecommunications interception powers under legislation authorising such 
interception, such as the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) 
and the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth).37 
5.25 Conversely, the cases mentioned below have held that the following powers do 
not abrogate client legal privilege: 
• Commissioner of Taxation v Citibank Ltd in relation to the powers of access of 
the Commissioner of Taxation under s 263 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1936 (Cth);38  
• Joel v Migration Agents Registration Authority in relation to s 308 of the 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth);39  
• Re Steele; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Clayton Utz in relation to 
s 77A of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth);40 and 
• Re Compass Airlines Pty Ltd in relation to the right of a liquidator to obtain 
information under s 597 of the Corporations Law.41 
5.26 The High Court’s decision in Daniels clarified that privilege does apply to the 
coercive information-gathering power under s 155 of the TPA.42 Although the decision 
in Daniels has wider implications for the application of privilege to other coercive 
information-gathering powers, as the discussion below bears out, there remain areas of 
uncertainty. There are significant questions about the interrelationship between Daniels 
and the earlier case, Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales v Yuill (Yuill), 
                                                        
36  Carmody v Mackellar (1997) 76 FCR 115.  
37  Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007. See also Officers from the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Inspector-General of Security and Intelligence, 
Consultation LPP 34, Sydney, 26 June 2007. 
38  Commissioner of Taxation v Citibank Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 403. See also Allen Allen & Hemsley v Deputy 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 20 FCR 576.  
39  Joel v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2000] FCA 1919, [32]. Section 308 empowers the 
Migration Agents Registration Authority to require a registered migration agent to answer questions 
(either by statutory declaration or in person) and to produce specified documents and records. 
40  Re Steele; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Clayton Utz (1994) 119 ALR 716. See also Boensch 
v Pascoe [2007] FCA 532; Lombe v Pollak [2004] FCA 264. 
41  Re Compass Airlines Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 447. 
42  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543. This case is discussed in more detail below. 
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which dealt with the implied abrogation of privilege by the now repealed Companies 
(New South Wales) Code (the Companies Code).43  
5.27 Not all coercive information-gathering powers replicate the wording of s 155 of 
the TPA, nor do they all share the same investigatory contexts. Each federal body with 
coercive information-gathering powers, and the persons and entities subject to those 
powers, may be forced to litigate to resolve conclusively the question of whether the 
privilege is available in response to the exercise of their particular investigatory 
powers.  
5.28 In 2003—prior to the amendments to the Royal Commissions Act—Justice 
Neville Owen, the Royal Commissioner in the HIH Royal Commission, expressed a 
desire for clarity in the law. In the Report of the HIH Royal Commission, Justice Owen 
stated: 
As a consequence of the doubt over whether legal professional privilege is available 
in the context of a royal commission, large amounts of time were devoted to dealing 
with the associated questions that arose. Accordingly, if it is the legislature’s intention 
that legal professional privilege should not be available as a reasonable excuse against 
the production of documents in answer to royal commission processes, it is desirable 
that the Act be amended to make this explicit.44 
Decision in Yuill 
5.29 A majority of the High Court in Yuill held that a claim of client legal privilege 
was not a ‘reasonable excuse’ for refusing to comply with a requirement under s 295(1) 
of the Companies Code.45 Section 295(1) empowered an inspector to require an officer 
of a corporation, the subject of an investigation, to produce such books of the 
corporation that were in his or her custody or control and to appear before the inspector 
for examination.  
5.30 The Companies Code—which was enacted prior to the decision in Baker v 
Campbell46—did not contain a provision abrogating the privilege expressly. The law, 
as understood at that time, and declared in O’Reilly v State Bank of Victoria 
Commissioners,47 was that client legal privilege was limited to judicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings. Brennan J stated that the Companies Code was to be construed in 
light of the law as it stood when it came into force.48 He also stated that even if ss 295 
and 296(2) were to be construed in the light of Baker v Campbell, the Companies Code 
evinced an intention that client legal privilege should not be a reasonable excuse for 
failure to comply with a requirement under s 295(1). 
                                                        
43  Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319. This case is discussed 
below. 
44  N Owen, Report of the HIH Royal Commission (2003), [2.9]. 
45  Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319. 
46  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. 
47  O’Reilly v State Bank of Victoria Commissioners (1983) 153 CLR 1. 
48  Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319, 323. 
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In the absence of language which expressly excludes the privilege, indicia of 
legislative intention can be found in the nature of the statutory power, the prescribed 
manner of its exercise and the purpose which its exercise is designed to achieve.49 
5.31 The High Court relied on a number of reasons for implying that the privilege 
was abrogated. The first was that s 308 of the Companies Code entitled a lawyer to 
refuse to comply with a notice where it would involve a breach of client legal privilege, 
as long as the lawyer provided the client’s name and address. Brennan J stated: 
The enactment of s 308 would be otiose and the specifying of a condition governing 
the solicitor’s excuse for non-compliance would be futile if the observance of legal 
professional privilege were a reasonable excuse for non-compliance, for a solicitor 
who is bound to observe legal professional privilege would be entitled to refuse to 
comply with a notice issued under s 295 without satisfying such a condition … The 
apparent purpose of the statutory condition is to ensure that a client can be located and 
required to disclose communications protected by … privilege although the solicitor 
may be excused from disclosing them.50 
5.32 Secondly, s 299(2)(d) of the Companies Code provided that a statement made in 
an examination which disclosed matter, in respect of which a claim for client legal 
privilege could be made, was not admissible in evidence against the person in any civil 
or criminal proceedings. This was said to imply that an assertion of client legal 
privilege was not a reasonable excuse to refuse to comply with a requirement to answer 
questions and that it would be  
a curious asymmetry to treat an assertion of the privilege as a ‘reasonable excuse’ for 
non-compliance with a requirement to produce books, for the contents of the books 
could be ascertained in any event by compelling oral disclosure by any person who 
has knowledge of them.51 
5.33 Dawson J expressed the view that ‘reasonable excuse’ more aptly referred to 
any ‘physical or practical difficulties’ in complying with a requirement under s 295.52  
To construe it as embracing legal professional privilege would be to render 
ss 299(2)(d) and 308 superfluous and to produce an incongruity with the denial of 
self-incrimination as a reasonable excuse.53 
5.34 Emphasis also was placed on the purpose of instituting a special investigation 
under Part VII of the Companies Code. Part VII provided for investigations into the 
affairs of corporations when investigation was, in the opinion of the relevant Minister, 
                                                        
49  Ibid, 323. 
50  Ibid, 324. See also 334 (Dawson J). 
51  Ibid, 325. See also 335. 
52  Ibid, 336. Gaudron J, in dissent, expressed the view that ‘reasonable excuse’ was wide enough to cover 
any answer, defence, justification or excuse acknowledged by the law at the time of the refusal to comply, 
including client legal privilege: see Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales v Yuill (1991) 172 
CLR 319, 338–339. 
53  Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319, 336. 
200 Privilege in Perspective  
warranted in the public or national interest, or when the Ministerial Council decided 
that an investigation should take place.54 The view was expressed that an inspector’s 
ability to satisfy the public or national interest would be significantly diminished if he 
or she could not compel the disclosure of privileged communications passing between 
persons whose conduct was material to an investigation, and their legal advisers.55 
5.35 The Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC 
Act) does not contain a provision that expressly abrogates client legal privilege. 
However, it contains provisions similar to those in the Companies Code that were the 
subject of the decision in Yuill.56 ASIC relies on Yuill to support its position that the 
ASIC Act impliedly abrogates privilege.57 
Decision in Daniels  
5.36 Prior to 2006, the TPA was silent on the application of client legal privilege to 
the coercive information-gathering powers under s 155 of the TPA. In an important 
decision on whether or not privilege was abrogated by necessary implication, the High 
Court in Daniels overturned the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court58 and 
determined that s 155 does not entitle the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) to obtain or access documents subject to a valid claim for client 
legal privilege.59 
5.37 Fundamental to the High Court’s decision was the finding that client legal 
privilege ‘is not merely a rule of substantive law. It is an important common law right, 
or, perhaps, more accurately, an important common law immunity’.60 The High Court 
stated that statutory provisions were not to be construed as abrogating important 
common law rights in the absence of express unambiguous words or a necessary 
implication to that effect.61 
Courts do not construe legislation as abolishing, suspending or adversely affecting 
rights, freedoms and immunities that the courts have recognised as fundamental 
unless the legislation does so in unambiguous terms. In construing legislation, the 
courts begin with the presumption that the legislature does not interfere with these 
fundamental rights, freedoms and immunities unless it makes its intention to do so 
unmistakably clear.62 
                                                        
54  Ibid, 326, 333. 
55  Ibid, 326. 
56  Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 69, 76(1)(d). 
57  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 5, 29 March 2007. 
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5.38 The High Court rejected the ACCC’s argument that the purpose of investigating 
contraventions of the TPA would be impaired or frustrated if client legal privilege 
could be availed of to resist compliance with a notice under s 155, and stressed that a 
communication that was made to seek assistance to evade the law by illegal conduct 
was not privileged.63 
5.39 McHugh J rejected the argument that the TPA impliedly abrogated the privilege. 
He noted: 
Section 155 would neither become inoperative nor be rendered practically useless if a 
person to whom a s 155 notice was addressed could refuse to produce documents 
because they were protected by legal professional privilege. Documents protected by 
the privilege must be a small percentage of the documents whose production can be 
required by such notices. Only in recent times has the Commission or its predecessor 
claimed that legal professional privilege does not apply to documents that are the 
subject of a s 155 notice. The Commission’s long acceptance of its earlier position 
supports the view that the section’s object would not be frustrated by holding that it 
does not abolish the right to claim immunity for documents protected by … 
privilege.64 
5.40 Where the ACCC has reason to believe that a person has contravened the TPA, 
s 155(2) gives it power to enter premises and to inspect, copy or take extracts of 
documents on those premises. The High Court in Daniels noted that this power was 
similar to the power under the Crimes Act to issue a search warrant to enter premises 
and seize things, including documents, and that the Court’s decisions in Baker v 
Campbell65 and Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance66 held and confirmed 
that the power of search and seizure under the Crimes Act did not authorise the seizure 
of material to which client legal privilege attached.67  
5.41 The ACCC argued that the statutory proviso that a person ‘must not refuse or 
fail to comply with a notice [under s 155] to the extent that the person is capable of 
complying with it’ permitted non-compliance only where the person was physically 
incapable of complying with the notice. The High Court rejected this argument.  
5.42 The High Court distinguished its earlier decisions in Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade 
Practices Commission (Pyneboard)68 and Yuill. Pyneboard was distinguished on the 
basis that it dealt with the privilege against self-exposure to a penalty. The High Court 
stated that the decision in Pyneboard—that s 155(1) of the TPA impliedly abrogated 
the privilege against self-exposure to a penalty—could partly be supported by 
                                                        
63  Ibid, [7], [35]. 
64  Ibid, [45]. 
65  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. 
66  Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance (1997) 188 CLR 501. 
67  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543, [27], [50]–[51]. 
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reference to the ‘absurdity that would result if that privilege could be claimed, and 
pursuant to s 155(7), the privilege against self-incrimination could not’.69 
5.43 Yuill was distinguished on the basis that s 295 of the Companies Code was very 
different in context, history, purpose and wording from s 155 of the TPA. Yuill was 
decided in the context of statutory provisions that were enacted before the decision in 
Baker v Campbell, at a time when it was thought that client legal privilege could only 
apply in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.70 The High Court stated that it may be 
that Yuill would now be decided differently,71 and Kirby J expressed the view that Yuill 
may have been ‘wrongly decided’.72 
Implications of Daniels 
General implications 
5.44 It has been suggested that Daniels is important not merely because it establishes 
authoritatively that the TPA does not abrogate privilege, but because 
it reveals that the Court is applying established principles in a new way. It seems 
likely that a stricter approach will be taken in the future to the implied abrogation of 
… legal professional privilege.73 
5.45 As Kirby J noted, the implications of the decision in Daniels transcend the TPA 
and the circumstances of the parties to that case.74 Similar statutory language to that in 
s 155 of the TPA appears in other federal legislation affecting powers of investigation 
with respect to taxation and the environment, for example.  
5.46 In 2003, the House of Lords in R (Morgan Grenfell) v Special Commissioner of 
Income Tax, reached a similar conclusion to the High Court in Daniels.75 It held that 
s 20(1) of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (UK)—which contained a power for a tax 
inspector to seek the production of documents on compulsion—did not abrogate client 
legal privilege either expressly or by necessary implication. Significantly, the House of 
Lords construed a provision in that Act which protected a lawyer from disclosing 
privileged information without the client’s consent, as consistent with the preservation 
of client legal privilege. 
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Why should Parliament want to preserve [privilege] for documents in the hands of the 
lawyer but not for documents … in the hands of the taxpayer?  …  
[Client legal privilege] is, after all, a single privilege, for the benefit of the client, 
whether the documents are in his hands or that of his lawyer.76 
5.47 While the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) is 
silent on client legal privilege, the Guidelines issued by the Office of the Australian 
Building and Construction Commissioner state that, applying the reasoning in Daniels, 
the Commissioner ‘expects that the … investigative power [under the Act] does not 
abolish the right to claim legal professional privilege when responding to a notice’.77  
5.48 The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) has informed the 
ALRC that, since the High Court’s decision in Daniels, it has not pressed the view that 
its coercive information-gathering powers abrogate privilege. Prior to the decision in 
Daniels, however, APRA did take the view—particularly in the exercise of its 
investigation powers under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 
(Cth)—that client legal privilege was not a reasonable excuse for a person (other than a 
person’s lawyer) not to produce documents or provide information.78 
5.49 However, it emerged in the ALRC’s consultations that persons or entities the 
subject of APRA’s coercive information-gathering powers have, on occasion, been 
requested by APRA to provide privileged information.79 
Implications concerning ASIC 
5.50 Despite the decision in Daniels, a federal body with coercive information-
gathering powers may maintain that its specific investigatory powers abrogate client 
legal privilege. For example, there has been debate about whether specific 
investigatory powers conferred on ASIC by the ASIC Act abrogate client legal 
privilege. One view, taken by ASIC, is that the decision in Yuill is still applicable to 
those powers.80 On that view the construction of ASIC’s powers is not affected by 
Daniels. 
                                                        
76  Ibid, [22], [25].  
77  Australian Government Office of the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner, Building and 
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5.51 However, stakeholders in this Inquiry have questioned ASIC’s position on 
privilege, and its reliance on Yuill. The Law Council of Australia (Law Council) 
submitted that ASIC’s position is ‘unsustainable’,81 and the National Australia Bank, 
together with a number of other banks and corporations, submitted that ASIC’s 
position is, in their view, ‘erroneous’.82  
5.52 The proposition that Yuill applies has also been challenged by commentators. 
Emilios Kyrou and Gillian Wong state: 
Applying the rationale in Daniels to ASIC, it is submitted that ASIC’s powers to issue 
notices to obtain documents under the ASIC Act do not satisfy the abrogation test 
because they do not expressly abrogate legal professional privilege and the retention 
of privilege would not significantly impair ASIC’s functions under the ASIC Act. 
Consequently, contrary to ASIC’s stated position, respondents to ASIC notices may 
resist production of documents on the basis that they are subject to legal professional 
privilege.83 
5.53 Geoff Healy and Andrew Eastwood express the view that: the decision in Yuill 
is problematic; it should no longer be followed; and the better view is that ASIC’s 
investigative powers do not abrogate client legal privilege.84 They argue that: 
• unlike the Companies Code, at the time the ASIC Act was enacted in 2001, it 
was well established that client legal privilege was a fundamental immunity, 
which was not confined to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings;85 
• provisions giving lawyers statutory protection from divulging privileged 
communications in response to a coercive power—such as those under s 308 of 
the Companies Code and s 69 of the ASIC Act—are explicable as preserving the 
duty of confidence owed by a lawyer to a client;86  
• provisions preserving client legal privilege in subsequent litigation in respect of 
a statement made at an examination—such as s 299(2)(d) of the Companies 
Code and s 76(1)(d) of the ASIC Act—should be interpreted to mean that even 
if a person discloses a privileged communication during an examination, this 
does not amount to a waiver of privilege in subsequent litigation;87  
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• the ‘special investigations’ regime considered in Yuill has since been repealed 
and had no equivalent in the ASIC Act;88 and 
• the fact that the Australian Government has considered it necessary to introduce 
a new piece of legislation to abrogate client legal privilege expressly with 
respect to ASIC’s investigation into James Hardie, emphasises the uncertainty 
that exists concerning ASIC’s ability to access privileged material in other 
investigations.89 
5.54 Ashley Black also notes that ASIC’s stance sits oddly with the James Hardie 
(Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004, which expressly abrogates privilege.  
This raises the question why that legislation was necessary, unless ASIC’s view that a 
person (other than a lawyer) does not have reasonable excuse to refuse to produce 
privileged documents under an ASIC notice is incorrect or at least open to serious 
question.90 
5.55 The uncertainty concerning ASIC’s position on privilege was referred to by the 
Treasurer in his Second Reading Speech on the James Hardie (Investigations and 
Proceedings) Bill 2004: 
The bill will confirm a longstanding interpretation of ASIC’s investigative and 
enforcement powers which was cast into doubt by the decision of the High Court in 
2002 in the Daniels case. That case created some uncertainty as to whether the 1991 
decision of the High Court in the Yuill case would be followed today if a request by 
ASIC to produce material subject to legal professional privilege were to be 
challenged.91 
5.56 On the other hand, there are also published views supportive of the continuing 
application of Yuill. For example, Dr Stephen Donaghue expresses the view that Yuill 
was a case in which the statutory text was more amenable to an interpretation that 
preserved client legal privilege than s 155 of the TPA and that, despite its having been 
treated as an aberration in Daniels, Yuill was consistent with a line of authority that 
placed great emphasis on the purpose of an investigatory scheme in deciding whether a 
common law privilege had been abrogated.92 
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5.57 The debate about the application of privilege to ASIC’s powers has been 
substantial and serious, indicating the existence of uncertainty and contention about 
client legal privilege in an important area of commercial regulation. 
5.58 In the absence of statutory clarification, resolution of the question whether or 
not the ASIC Act abrogates client legal privilege is dependent on the initiation of 
litigation that would test ASIC’s position—most likely prompted by a party the subject 
of a coercive information-gathering power refusing to produce privileged information 
in circumstances where ASIC insists that it do so. However, the publicity associated 
with, and the time and resources that would be expended in, such test litigation would 
make many persons and companies subject to ASIC’s powers reluctant to pursue such 
a course.  
5.59 Submissions and consultations revealed that inconsistent legal advice is being 
given to clients about their obligations to produce privileged information to ASIC. 
Some lawyers advise their clients that they are under no obligation to produce 
privileged information to ASIC, in light of the decision in Daniels; while others give 
qualified advice in this regard.93 The Law Council submitted that it 
is informed that advice is provided to clients under investigation by ASIC that they do 
not have to produce privileged material to ASIC. However, such advice is routinely 
qualified by noting that there is some uncertainty in this area due to the Yuill decision 
and the position asserted by ASIC. …  
In short, the uncertainty creates a significant risk to entities under investigation which 
may make them the test case. This uncertainty is undesirable and places those entities 
in a difficult position.94 
5.60 Submissions and consultations also suggested the existence of inconsistent 
practices within ASIC concerning its pressing for production of privileged 
information.95 The Law Council submitted: 
It has been the experience of practitioners that investigators of ASIC have conceded 
that there is a difference of opinion as to whether compliance with [a] notice requires 
privileged material to be produced.96 
5.61 Further, there appears to be some uncertainty about whether ASIC’s position—
that its coercive powers under ss 19 and 30–33 of the ASIC Act abrogate privilege by 
necessary implication—extends to other coercive powers under the ASIC Act. Black 
notes that it is not clear whether the obligation to provide reasonable assistance to 
ASIC under s 49 of the ASIC Act would prevent a person asserting a claim to client 
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legal privilege in relation to a communication.97 Notices issued under s 49(3) of the 
ASIC Act do not include any express reference to client legal privilege unless the 
notice is issued to a lawyer.98 
Approaches to necessary implication 
5.62 Where statutes conferring powers on federal bodies are silent on the application 
of privilege, it is not always possible to ascertain whether they take the stance that their 
particular powers override privilege. This information tends not to be available on the 
websites of federal bodies.  
5.63 An exception to this is the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). Its Access and 
Information Gathering Manual, which is available on its website, proceeds on the basis 
that client legal privilege applies to its access and information-gathering powers, and 
makes express reference to the High Court’s decision in Daniels.99 
5.64 The ALRC wrote to federal bodies with coercive information-gathering powers 
and asked whether they take the view that any of their powers abrogate privilege by 
necessary implication. Many federal bodies are of the opinion that their powers do not 
abrogate privilege.100 For example: 
• APRA, as noted above, stated that since Daniels, it has not pressed its 
previously-held view that certain of its powers abrogate privilege;101 
• the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, following the decision in 
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Hamdan,102 
takes the position that information subject to client legal privilege cannot be 
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required to be given in response to a notice issued under s 18 of the Migration 
Act;103  
• the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) takes the view that a claim for 
client legal privilege falls within the ‘reasonable excuse’ defence for not 
complying with a coercive information-gathering power under the Privacy Act 
1988 (Cth);104 and 
• the Department of Health and Ageing stated that, given that privileged 
information is not likely to be relevant to the information-gathering powers 
under the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth), it would be difficult to argue that any of 
the provisions of that Act abrogate the privilege by necessary implication.105 
5.65 Some federal bodies stated that they have never had to consider the issue of 
whether their powers abrogate privilege by necessary implication;106 or that they would 
be seeking advice in this regard or otherwise taking steps to reassess their position.107  
5.66 The Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (ITSA) stated that it was unaware 
of any authoritative statement on whether the exercise of the express power under 
s 6A(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) abrogates privilege.108 It also expressed the 
view that, while it was not aware of any authoritative statement on whether a trustee’s 
powers under s 77 of the Bankruptcy Act109 would abrogate a claim for client legal 
privilege, it would be difficult to argue that the privilege was not abrogated. In 
expressing this view, ITSA relied, by analogy, on the decision of the Full Federal 
Court in Griffin v Pantzer, which held that s 77 abrogates the privilege against self-
incrimination.110 
Submissions and consultations 
5.67 In response to the Issues Paper in this Inquiry, Client Legal Privilege and 
Federal Investigatory Bodies (IP 33),111 strong support was expressed in submissions 
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and consultations for the need to clarify the application of client legal privilege to the 
coercive information-gathering powers of federal bodies.112 For example, the 
Australian Financial Markets Association submitted: 
We believe the current uncertainty surrounding the coercive information-gathering 
powers of Commonwealth bodies with particular reference to ASIC, and the status of 
client legal privilege within the context of these powers needs to be clarified.113 
5.68 The Law Society of New South Wales (NSW) submitted that ‘the time for 
statutory intervention has probably arrived to clarify the extent of the powers agencies 
have to override client legal privilege’.114 The Federation of Community Legal Centres 
(Vic) Inc expressed particular concern about the lack of clarity on how the Australian 
Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) approaches the issue of client legal 
privilege.115 
5.69 Some submissions expressed the need for clarification of the law of privilege in 
specific contexts. For example, ITSA submitted that there were several uncertainties in 
the application of the privilege in the bankruptcy context, which require clarification, 
including whether a trustee can obtain privileged material that relates to a right of 
action that vests in the trustee, or advice to a bankrupt about whether or not he or she is 
‘the owner of property that would vest’.116 
5.70 A minority of submissions expressed the view that there was no need to clarify 
the application of privilege to the coercive information-gathering powers of one or 
more federal bodies. The OPC submitted that there was no need to clarify the 
application of the privilege to its powers under the Privacy Act, because the OPC does 
not seek or compel the production of legal advice obtained by a party to a complaint 
and, in any event, takes the view that the ‘reasonable excuse’ exception in s 66(1B) of 
the Privacy Act includes a claim for client legal privilege.117  
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5.71 BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance submitted that the decision in Daniels is clear. 
We do not feel that statutory clarification … would be of any benefit. The advantage 
of relying on case law is that it is readily able to evolve to meet particular factual 
situations that were not envisaged by legislators. Introduction of statutory clarification 
would impede this flexibility.118 
5.72 The Law Council also submitted that the common law concerning the 
application of privilege to the coercive powers of federal bodies is clear in light of the 
decisions in Baker v Campbell119 and Daniels. It suggested that most regulatory 
agencies act in a manner consistent with Daniels. However, it submitted that there was 
potential for confusion for unrepresented persons, who would not understand the 
application of the principles in Daniels and, therefore, providing clarification would be 
beneficial.120 
5.73 In response to the Discussion Paper in this Inquiry, Client Legal Privilege and 
Federal Investigatory Bodies (DP 73),121 ITSA submitted that: 
There is a need to provide some clarification on the application of client legal 
privilege (CLP) to information-gathering powers exercised by Commonwealth 
agencies. Particularly in the bankruptcy context, where it is not uncommon for a 
debtor to have had dealings with a range of agencies prior to and during bankruptcy, 
there is a need for some form of guidance on the treatment of CLP claims in federal 
investigations.122 
5.74 The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) also submitted 
that there was a need for clarity concerning the application of client legal privilege in 
federal investigations. 
Given the invasive nature of the powers exercisable by a range of federal agencies it 
is important that the capacity to assert and rely on the doctrine of client legal privilege 
should be set out in the clearest possible terms.123 
5.75 The Hon John Hannaford, formerly NSW Attorney General, and now an 
examiner with the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) submitted: 
With the introduction of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth), following 
a lengthy inquiry, it is apparent to me that there has been uncertainty as to whether 
client legal privilege was modified by the amendments which were inserted into the 
ACC Act and which made changes to s 30 of that Act from that which were present in 
s 30 of the predecessor Act, the National Crime Authority Act. This uncertainty has 
extended to the nature and extent of the modification. This has been a continuing 
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problem for the Australian Crime Commission and for the exercise of powers by 
Examiners within the Commission. This uncertainty has emanated from the 
requirements set out in Daniels … for there to be any abrogation or modification of 
[client legal privilege].124 
ALRC’s views 
5.76 The ALRC considers that there is a need for legislative clarification of the 
application of client legal privilege to the coercive information-gathering powers of 
federal bodies. This need is particularly evident in relation to the application of the 
privilege to ASIC’s powers, but submissions and consultations have suggested that 
there is a similar need for clarification in relation to the powers of other federal bodies, 
including APRA, ASIO and ITSA.  
5.77 To expect the common law to achieve clarity in respect of the application of the 
privilege to the wide range of coercive information-gathering powers is problematic.125 
The common law is dependent on the institution of particular legal proceedings and its 
outcomes may be confined to specific fact situations. Given the nature of the common 
law, there may be a considerable passage of time before clarity is achieved in respect 
of the application of the privilege to the wide range of coercive information-gathering 
powers contained in legislation that is silent on the issue. 
5.78 While the decision in Daniels is arguably clear, confusion may arise where the 
common law has not considered whether the exercise of a particular power abrogates 
privilege by necessary implication. In addition, where the common law has decided 
whether the exercise of a particular power abrogates privilege by necessary 
implication, there may be differing interpretations about the extent to which that 
decision applies to other powers not specifically considered by the court. 
5.79 Whether or not persons produce privileged information in response to the 
exercise of a particular coercive power should not be dependent on whether those 
persons receive legal advice; from whom the advice is sought; or which federal officer 
within a federal body is exercising a power. It is unsatisfactory that the uncertainty 
surrounding ASIC’s position on privilege has led to inconsistent legal advice being 
given to clients about their obligations to produce privileged information to ASIC. 
Moreover, it is undesirable that unrepresented persons may be at a particular 
disadvantage in this regard. 
5.80 As discussed above, it is not readily apparent whether particular federal bodies 
take the view that their powers abrogate client legal privilege by necessary implication, 
especially where such powers have never been used. In some instances, federal bodies 
                                                        
124  J Hannaford, Submission LPP 114, 19 November 2007. 
125  The ALRC has identified 42 different federal bodies with statutory coercive information-gathering 
powers (including Royal Commissions of inquiry): see Ch 4. 
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have never considered whether their powers abrogate privilege. Clarifying the law will 
not only address present uncertainties but will have the advantage of addressing 
potential uncertainties that may arise in the future when there is cause to consider the 
application of privilege to a particular power.  
Achieving clarity 
Options for reform 
5.81 In IP 33, the ALRC identified two methods of achieving statutory 
clarification.126 One way would be to amend each federal Act that contains a coercive 
power to make it clear whether or not the exercise of that power preserves, modifies or 
abrogates client legal privilege.127  
5.82 This approach received some support in other inquiries. The Administrative 
Review Council (ARC), in a draft report on the coercive information-gathering powers 
of federal bodies, recommended that the legislation of each agency should clearly 
indicate whether or not privilege is abrogated.128 The Victorian Parliament Law 
Reform Committee, in considering the need for clarity in the context of state powers 
conferring coercive powers, recommended that, as a general principle, the application 
of client legal privilege—whether it applies or is abrogated—should be clarified in 
statutes containing inspectors’ powers.129 
5.83 Another method would be to enact a specific new federal statute, providing that, 
in the absence of any clear express statutory statement to the contrary, client legal 
privilege is preserved in relation to a coercive information-gathering power of a federal 
body.130 Specific statutory regimes that sought to abrogate or modify the privilege 
would need to be amended individually in order to achieve that purpose.131  
5.84 A further option for reform, identified in the final stages of the ALRC’s 
Inquiry—unfortunately without the opportunity to seek feedback—is that a global 
provision protecting client legal privilege in relation to the exercise of coercive powers 
properly could be made a rule of interpretation of Commonwealth Acts and delegated 
legislation. This could be achieved, for example, by amending the Acts Interpretation 
Act 1901 (Cth) and would operate as an amending provision in respect of existing acts 
which do not contain an express abrogation of privilege, but from which an implication 
                                                        
126  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), [4.60]. 
127  Appendix 1 sets out federal legislation containing coercive information-gathering powers.  
128  Administrative Review Council, Government Agency Coercive Information-Gathering Powers [Draft 
Report] (2007), Principle 16.  
129  See Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee, The Powers of Entry, Search, Seizure and Questioning 
by Authorised Persons (2002), rec 35, 149. 
130  Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties 
in Australia, ALRC 95 (2002), Rec 19–1 recommended the inclusion of a provision to similar effect in 
the proposed Regulatory Contraventions Statute. 
131  This is consistent with Ibid, Rec 19–2. 
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of abrogation would otherwise be drawn. As one parliament cannot bind its successors, 
it would operate as a general interpretive rule in respect of future Acts displaced by 
express provision to the contrary.  
Submissions and consultations 
Enactment of legislation of general application 
5.85 In response to IP 33, strong support was expressed in submissions and 
consultations for clarity to be achieved by the enactment of a single specific federal 
statute.132  
5.86 Dr Ronald Desiatnik submitted that: 
Clarification is best achieved by enacting one piece of legislation which need only 
contain a few provisions and which would have three appendices containing, 
respectively Acts which abrogate, modify or respect the doctrine. This Act could be 
amended from time to time to add or delete existing or future relevant legislation to 
the appendices.133 
5.87 However, some stakeholders expressed concern about the enactment of 
legislation of general application.134 ASIC, for example, submitted that: 
Enacting a single statute to cover all Commonwealth bodies may appear to reduce the 
complexity and extent of the task to be performed. That reduction may not be realised 
because: 
(1) the statute would be required, in relation to each body whose powers 
included an abrogation, to include specific provisions that relate solely to that 
body’s legislation because of its unique requirements; and 
(2) the legislation setting out the powers of those bodies would likely require 
amendment in any event, to ensure that any existing provisions relating to client 
legal privilege would not be inconsistent with any newly enacted provisions.135 
5.88 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that the Australian Parliament should enact 
legislation of general application (referred to as federal client legal privilege 
                                                        
132  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 12 June 2007; Australian Institute of Company Directors, 
Submission LPP 43, 8 June 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007 
Fitzroy Legal Service, Submission LPP 29, 4 June 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 
4 June 2007, R Desiatnik, Submission LPP 24, 1 June 2007. 
133  R Desiatnik, Submission LPP 24, 1 June 2007. Dr Desiatnik expressed similar views in consultation: 
R Desiatnik, Consultation, Sydney, 26 October 2007.  
134  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007; Australian 
Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 50, 13 June 2007. 
135  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. 
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legislation) to cover various aspects of the law and procedure governing client legal 
privilege claims in federal investigations.136 
5.89 This proposal received support in submissions and consultations from members 
of the legal community, representative bodies of entities subject to federal coercive 
information-gathering powers, and federal bodies.137 It was described by the Australian 
Financial Markets Association as a ‘welcome initiative’.138 The Law Council, in 
expressing support for federal client legal privilege legislation, submitted that such 
legislation should not seek to ‘cover the field’ with respect to client legal privilege 
claims, and that it  
should also allow room for the continued development of the common law in this 
area. Case law provides a strong point of reference for legal practitioners and 
government agencies considering the application of client legal privilege. It also 
allows flexibility in the application of the doctrine and rationale associated with client 
legal privilege.139 
5.90 The Law Society of NSW expressed qualified support for the proposal, 
submitting that: 
This support is based only on a recognition that the law will be assisted by legislation 
regulating the procedure by which privilege is claimed and contested. The Law 
Society remains firmly of the view that any abrogation or modification of privilege is 
not justified.140  
5.91 The Australian Government Solicitor (AGS) and the Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions (CDPP) expressed caution concerning the enactment of legislation 
of general application.141 AGS submitted: 
From the standpoint of practical utility, [AGS] would see the enactment of provisions 
in the legislation of each investigatory body that are uniform, to the extent that 
nothing in the body’s functions requires a departure from the standard, as a more 
practicable course. …  
At the Commonwealth level, the effect of client legal privilege upon coercive powers 
of federal agencies is, in our view, too confined a subject to justify legislation 
                                                        
136  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 5–1.  
137  See, eg, National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Insolvency and Trustee Service 
Australia, Submission LPP 105, 5 November 2007; Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission 
LPP 95, 2 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007; Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007; Australasian Compliance Institute, 
Submission LPP 79, 26 October 2007; R Desiatnik, Consultation, Sydney, 26 October 2007. 
138  Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007. 
139  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007. 
140  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. Abrogation or modification of 
client legal privilege is discussed in Ch 6. 
141  Australian Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 113, 5 November 2007; Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 101, 2 November 2007. See also Australian Federal Police, 
Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007. 
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governing it generally in every context in which it can arise. It stands in contrast to 
much broader subject matter which would ordinarily justify such general legislation, 
such as federal criminal law … and the laws of evidence in federal jurisdiction …  
A risk of using general legislation … is that the generality itself of the legislation is 
more likely to see it read down by the more specific provisions that obtain in the 
separate legislation that invests the coercive powers in the investigatory body in 
question and governs their exercise.  
A course that could be followed is to enact legislation which amends each enactment 
governing the exercise of an investigatory body’s coercive powers by introducing the 
standard reforms (ie those resulting from the consideration of the ALRC’s proposals) 
into each such enactment.142  
5.92 The CDPP expressed concern about 
the impact that the proposed federal client legal privilege legislation could have on the 
operation of client legal privilege in relation to federal investigations. If the proposed 
legislation were to be enacted without limitations on its applicability to investigative 
powers Parliament has already legislated in relation to, the effect of the federal client 
legal privilege legislation would be to provide new rules for interpreting pre-existing 
powers which do not necessarily correlate with Parliament’s intention in legislating 
for those powers. …  
Accordingly, it is the view of the CDPP that if the proposed federal client legal 
privilege legislation were to be implemented it should either only apply to legislation 
enacted by Parliament after the commencement of the federal client legal privilege 
legislation or, alternatively, a thorough harmonisation process of all Commonwealth 
legislation providing for coercive information-gathering powers would be 
necessary.143 
Default provision preserving application of privilege 
5.93 In response to IP 33, some stakeholders expressly supported the proposed statute 
of general application to contain a default provision that client legal privilege applies to 
federal coercive powers in the absence of express words to the contrary.144 
5.94 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that federal client legal privilege legislation 
should provide that, in the absence of any clear, express statutory statement to the 
contrary, client legal privilege applies to the coercive information-gathering powers of 
federal bodies.145 
                                                        
142  Australian Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 113, 5 November 2007. 
143  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 101, 2 November 2007. 
144  For example, NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 12 June 2007; Fitzroy Legal Service, 
Submission LPP 29, 4 June 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. See also 
National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 52, 13 June 2007. 
145  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 5–2. 
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5.95 This proposal received strong support.146 For example,  
• ASIC submitted that ‘in the interests of certainty, express abrogation of client 
legal privilege is desirable’;147  
• APRA supported the proposal as a way ‘to resolve the current uncertainty about 
whether client legal privilege has been abrogated in legislation administered by 
APRA’;148  
• Allens Arthur Robinson (AAR) submitted that this proposal (together with 
Proposal 5–3) represented ‘a positive step to clarify an area of particular 
uncertainty (most notably in relation to the operation of the ASIC Act)’;149 and 
• The Australian Financial Markets Association described it as a ‘welcome 
initiative’. 
This would clarify and appropriately protect documents ordinarily the subject of client 
privilege from claims by regulators that they have powers to request documents in the 
absence of legislative direction. 
It is [the Australian Financial Markets Association’s] position that regulators ought 
properly to have clearly sanctioned powers to obtain privileged materials, and in the 
absence of which, individuals’ and entities’ rights will be appropriately protected.150 
5.96 Hannaford submitted: 
I strongly support the need for express statutory statements as to legislative intent 
where there is a proposal to modify client legal privilege. This may be achieved 
without the need for codification of the law relating to client legal privilege.151 
5.97 The CFMEU submitted: 
The Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth), while 
providing similar coercive powers to the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), contains no 
express reference to the right to claim client legal privilege. Reference to that right is 
contained only in [Australian Building and Construction Commissioner] Guidelines. 
… 
                                                        
146  For example, NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 116, 1 November 2007; Allens Arthur Robinson, 
Submission LPP 107, 5 November 2007; National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; 
Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, Submission LPP 105, 5 November 2007; Law Council of 
Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 
31 October 2007; Westpac Banking Corporation, Submission LPP 85, 1 November 2007; Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007; R Desiatnik, 
Consultation, Sydney, 26 October 2007. 
147  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. 
148  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007. As discussed in 
Ch 6, APRA is of the view that abrogation of client legal privilege is necessary for all APRA’s coercive 
information-gathering powers. 
149  Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission LPP 107, 5 November 2007. 
150  Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007. 
151  J Hannaford, Submission LPP 114, 19 November 2007. 
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The Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) should be 
amended to expressly provide for the right to claim client legal privilege in the course 
of s 52 investigations. Alternatively, as proposed in the Discussion Paper, there 
should be Commonwealth legislation of general application that has the same 
effect.152 
5.98 However, the AFP opposed this proposal because of its impact on 
telecommunications interception legislation. It submitted: 
Such a provision would have a significant detrimental impact on federal law 
enforcement. Relevant statutes in place at present, such as the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) and the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) 
do not expressly abrogate … client legal privilege, however, judicial consideration 
has determined that the privilege does not attach in certain circumstances (Carmody v 
Mackellar (1997) 148 ALRC 210). 
The AFP would object to the imposition of such provisions resulting in the 
requirement to reinterpret legislation which has already undergone judicial 
consideration concerning the applicability of [client legal privilege], resulting in an 
effective common law balance. 
Should any such proposal proceed, the AFP would recommend that it be made 
prospective only, so as not to affect the effectiveness of existing legislative 
provisions.153 
5.99 Another view put forward in consultation was that the proposed federal client 
legal privilege legislation could contain a schedule of excluded Acts—essentially those 
containing federal telecommunications interception powers—which do not need to be 
amended to abrogate expressly client legal privilege, thereby allowing the privilege to 
continue to be implied by necessary implication.154  
Any abrogation to be with specific reference to particular powers 
5.100 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that any legislative scheme which seeks to 
abrogate or modify client legal privilege must do so by express reference to the 
particular sections or divisions within that scheme that confer coercive information-
gathering powers which abrogate or modify the privilege.155 
                                                        
152  Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (Construction and General Division), Submission 
LPP 90, 1 November 2007. 
153  Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007. 
154  Australian Federal Police, Consultation LPP 40, Canberra, 23 October 2007. 
155  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 5–3.  
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5.101 This proposal was widely supported, including on the basis that it promoted 
clarity and certainty.156 The Law Council did not support abrogation or modification of 
client legal privilege in any context, but submitted that: 
If abrogation or modification of client legal privilege does occur, the legislative 
instrument abrogating or modifying the privilege should refer to specific sections or 
provisions in the enactment or scheme conferring a coercive information-gathering 
power.157 
5.102 There was limited opposition to the ALRC’s proposal.158 Desiatnik, for 
example, did not support the proposal on the basis that any abrogation of the privilege 
should be opposed.159  
ALRC’s views 
Enactment of statute of general application 
5.103 There is some overlap between the ALRC’s views on achieving clarity and the 
exposition of its views on whether achieving uniformity is desirable—an issue that is 
considered separately below. Accordingly, certain recommendations in this chapter 
serve a dual function insofar as they simultaneously address the issues of clarity and 
uniformity. 
5.104 Having regard to the majority of views expressed in submissions and 
consultations, the ALRC remains of the view that there is a strong case for the 
enactment of a statute of general application to clarify the application of privilege to 
the coercive information-gathering powers of federal bodies—as well as other aspects 
of the law and procedure governing client legal privilege claims in federal 
investigations.160 The enactment of a statute of general application would also achieve 
a degree of harmonisation of approach. 
5.105 Such a statute would serve as the foundation of a scheme designed to inject 
greater certainty and consistency into client legal privilege law and procedure as it 
applies to federal investigations. Its purpose would be to provide a convenient and 
central location for various provisions relating to client legal privilege claims in such 
                                                        
156  Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission LPP 107, 5 November 2007; National Legal Aid, Submission 
LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, Submission LPP 105, 
5 November 2007; Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007; 
Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, 
Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 
1 November 2007; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 
2007.  
157  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007. 
158  Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007; R Desiatnik, Consultation, Sydney, 
26 October 2007. 
159  R Desiatnik, Consultation, Sydney, 26 October 2007. 
160  The case for clarity and harmonisation of other aspects of the law and procedure concerning client legal 
privilege claims is made out in other parts of this Report, including Chs 7 and 8. 
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contexts. This would avoid the need to repeat those provisions in each of the many 
federal statutes containing coercive information-gathering powers. 
5.106 The provisions that would be accommodated in such a statute would be intended 
to clarify the law, establish uniform procedures in relation to the making and resolving 
of client legal privilege claims, or to establish certain fundamental or default provisions 
that would have general application over all federal bodies exercising coercive 
information-gathering powers—including Royal Commissions—in the absence of 
express words to the contrary.161 The establishment of default provisions has a 
precedent in the Commonwealth Criminal Code.162 
5.107 The ALRC does not suggest a name for the proposed statute of general 
application. The ALRC recognises that, on one view, client legal privilege may be too 
limited a subject matter to warrant its own dedicated federal Act. However, the Act 
could be part of a general statute on federal regulation or federal investigations—such 
as the Regulatory Contraventions Statute recommended in ALRC 95163—or it could be 
part of a federal Act that also deals with other privileges in federal investigations, such 
as the privilege against self-incrimination. For the purposes of this Report, the ALRC 
will refer to the proposed legislation, as ‘federal client legal privilege legislation’.  
5.108 The ALRC notes the view expressed by the Law Council that the proposed 
federal client legal privilege legislation should not attempt to ‘cover the field’ in 
relation to client legal privilege, and should allow room for the common law to 
develop. As stated in DP 73, the proposed legislation is not intended to be a 
comprehensive code containing an all-encompassing statement of the law on client 
legal privilege in the context of federal investigations.164 There will be room for 
developments in the common law, including in relation to the rationale for, parameters 
of, and exceptions to, the privilege. 
5.109 The ALRC also notes the concerns expressed by the CDPP about the impact of 
the proposed federal client legal privilege legislation on existing provisions. However, 
that impact will be confined to particular circumstances, as discussed below in the 
section detailing the ALRC’s views on the interaction of the proposed legislation and 
other federal statutes. 
                                                        
161  However, certain provisions in federal client legal privilege legislation should be excluded from operating 
with respect to Royal Commissions. See, eg, Rec 8–11 (alternative dispute resolution). 
162  See, eg, Criminal Code (Cth) ss 3.1, 5.1; M Goode, ‘Constructing Criminal Law Reform and the Model 
Criminal Code’ (2002) 26 Criminal Law Journal 152, 158. 
163  See Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative 
Penalties in Australia, ALRC 95 (2002), Rec 6–7. 
164  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), [5.94].  
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Default provision preserving application of privilege 
5.110 Federal client legal privilege legislation should provide that, in the absence of 
any clear, express statutory statement to the contrary, client legal privilege applies to 
the coercive information-gathering powers of federal bodies.  
5.111 The ALRC has deliberately chosen the words ‘clear’ and ‘express’ in framing its 
recommendation in this regard.165 First, drawing on common law principles 
summarised in Daniels, clear and unambiguous terms must be used to abrogate a 
fundamental common law right.166 The High Court stated: 
As in other countries of like legal tradition, that rule in Australia is, and should be, 
that the privilege is not lost by statutory words of generality. If it is to be taken away, 
this must be done clearly. At least then the attention of the legislature will have been 
addressed to the seriousness of the step. It will not be possible to deprive persons, 
whether natural or legal, of such a fundamental right by general words or by 
ambiguous formulae (such as ‘capable of complying’) that might not be understood 
by readers as working such a consequence.167 
5.112 Second, the reference to ‘express’ is to distinguish it from abrogation by 
necessary implication.168 This default provision dispenses with the uncertainty created 
by attempting to ascertain whether any particular power abrogates privilege by 
necessary implication. It also achieves a degree of harmonisation of approach across 
federal investigatory powers.169 Where legislation is silent on privilege—which is in 
the majority of cases—the default provision will operate in the absence of any express 
amendment to the contrary.  
5.113 Similarly, where legislation addresses the obligations of lawyers—but not their 
clients—in relation to producing privileged information, the default provision will 
make it clear that privilege is not abrogated in respect of the client. However, this will 
not affect any legislative obligations of lawyers to provide the names and contact 
details of their clients when information in their possession is the subject of a claim for 
client legal privilege. The inclusion of a default provision would avoid the need to 
amend a large number of statutes to include a provision preserving the privilege. 
5.114 The enactment of this default provision will render client legal privilege 
available in ASIC investigations, in the absence of an express amendment to the 
contrary in the ASIC Act.170 It will also necessitate amendment of telecommunications 
                                                        
165  See Rec 5–2. 
166  See, eg, The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543, [11], [43], [90], [93], [94], [103]–[105], [111]–[112], [134], and 
discussion on Daniels above. 
167  Ibid, [111]. 
168  See Ibid, [16]. 
169  Harmonisation is discussed separately below. 
170  Whether or not privilege should be abrogated or modified in ASIC investigations is discussed in Ch 6. 
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interception legislation insofar as such legislation has been held to abrogate privilege 
by necessary implication.  
5.115 As mentioned above, a further option for reform, identified in the final stages of 
the ALRC’s Inquiry is that a global provision protecting client legal privilege in 
relation to the exercise of coercive powers properly could be made a rule of 
interpretation of Commonwealth Acts and delegated legislation. This could be 
achieved, for example, by amending the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), and would 
operate as an amending provision in respect of existing acts which do not contain an 
express abrogation of privilege, but from which an implication of abrogation would 
otherwise be drawn. It would also operate as a general interpretive rule in respect of 
future Acts displaced by expressed provision to the contrary. The ALRC considers this 
an attractive feasible option but is unable to make a recommendation in this regard 
because the option was not identified in time to allow for feedback in submissions and 
consultations. 
Impact of default provision on telecommunication interception powers 
5.116 In making the recommendation that federal client legal privilege legislation 
contain a default provision preserving privilege in the absence of clear and express 
words to the contrary, the ALRC is cognisant of the AFP’s concerns about the impact 
of such a provision on telecommunications interception legislation—in particular, the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and the Surveillance Devices 
Act 2004. Neither Act mentions privilege. It is no answer to make the proposed 
legislation prospective in operation because one of its key aims is to clarify the 
application of client legal privilege to existing federal investigatory powers in the vast 
majority of situations where legislation is silent on privilege.  
5.117 Even if the ALRC were to recommend that clarity in the law should be achieved 
by the alternative option for reform—amending each federal Act that contains a 
coercive power to make it clear whether or not the exercise of that power preserves, 
modifies or abrogates client legal privilege—that would still entail amendments to 
telecommunications interception legislation to make it clear precisely which powers in 
such legislation abrogate privilege.  
5.118 Similarly if, as suggested in consultation, federal client legal privilege 
legislation were to exclude from its application, wholly or partly, specific federal 
statutes conferring powers to intercept telecommunications, the particular powers 
intended to be excluded would need to be identified in the interests of clarity.171 In any 
event, Commonwealth legislative drafting tends to suggest that where there is 
                                                        
171  See Rec 5–3 below. Powers ought to be identified by reference to sections or divisions within the relevant 
legislation. 
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legislation of general application, such as the Criminal Code,172 and that general 
legislation is not to apply, in whole or in part, to other federal statutes, the excluding 
provision is to be found in those other federal statutes.173  
5.119 Therefore, under any of the above scenarios, the Australian Parliament would be 
called upon to clarify in legislation the application of privilege to telecommunications 
interception powers. This would be achieved either by expressly providing that 
privilege is abrogated in circumstances where it is now taken to be abrogated by 
necessary implication, or by identifying the specific parts of particular legislation not 
intended to be covered by the default provision in the proposed federal client legal 
privilege legislation. In the latter case, this would, in effect, legislatively sanction 
abrogation by necessary implication in those particular cases. 
5.120 To minimise the numerous specific amendments that would need to be made to 
every federal statute that contains a coercive information-gathering power and that is 
silent on the application of privilege, the ALRC remains of the view that the most 
practical option for reform is to enact a statute of general application containing a 
default provision preserving the application of privilege in the absence of clear and 
express words to the contrary. From a policy perspective, the ALRC considers that 
there is much to be said for clarity and transparency in the application of privilege to 
all federal investigatory powers—including federal telecommunications interception 
powers. The case for transparency and clarity in the application of privilege is arguably 
stronger in light of the fact that interception powers are exercised covertly. In 
promoting legislative clarity in this area, however, the ALRC is not seeking to question 
previous judicial determination that certain telecommunication interception powers 
abrogate privilege by necessary implication.  
Any abrogation to be with specific reference to particular powers 
5.121 Taking into account the strong support expressed by stakeholders, the ALRC 
remains of the view that if a federal statute seeks to abrogate or modify client legal 
privilege it would have to do so by express reference to particular sections or divisions 
within it, which confer coercive information-gathering powers.  
5.122 It should not be assumed that abrogation or modification of the privilege would 
apply to each of the coercive powers of a federal body under a particular piece of 
legislation, unless that is expressly stated to be the case. This approach aims to avoid 
potential uncertainty about the extent of any abrogation. 
                                                        
172  The Criminal Code is a schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
173  For example, each of the following Acts exclude, in part, the operation of the Criminal Code (Cth): Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) s 26(2); Age Discrimination Act 
2004 (Cth) s 48; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 769A; Road Transport Reform (Dangerous Goods) Act 
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Interaction between federal client legal privilege legislation and other statutes 
5.123 As mentioned above, the proposed federal client legal privilege legislation is not 
intended to be a comprehensive code containing an all-encompassing statement of the 
law on client legal privilege in the context of federal investigations. It is intended to 
operate in conjunction with developments in the common law, and with pre-existing 
federal legislation where Parliament has clearly and expressly abrogated or modified 
the privilege, or has expressly provided for the use, if any, to which otherwise 
privileged information can be put in the event of abrogation or modification.174 
However, where either pre-existing or prospective legislation is silent on: 
• the application of client legal privilege to federal investigatory powers; or 
• the use, if any, to which otherwise privileged information can be put in the event 
of abrogation or modification; 
then default provisions in the proposed federal client legal privilege legislation are 
intended to fill those gaps. 
5.124 As mentioned above, there is a limited number of federal statutes that expressly 
abrogate or modify the privilege. The proposed federal client legal privilege legislation 
may need to contain a ‘grandfather’ clause to address pre-existing provisions. 
However, the mere fact that pre-existing federal legislation abrogates or modifies the 
privilege expressly will not be inconsistent with the proposed privilege legislation 
because the default provision envisages abrogation or modification by clear and 
express words. Therefore, the proposed legislation is not intended to repeal, for 
example, existing provisions under the Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002, the Inspector-
General of Taxation Act 2003 and the Inspector-General of Security and Intelligence 
Act 1986 that expressly abrogate or modify the privilege. 
5.125 Ideally, where federal legislation, enacted after the commencement of the 
proposed federal client legal privilege legislation, seeks to depart from it, it should do 
so with express reference to the exclusion of federal client legal privilege legislation. 
That would have the salutary effect, in the ALRC’s view, of making that departure a 
matter of affirmative statement and one that would require legislative expression and, 
therefore, parliamentary scrutiny and debate. 
5.126 Legislative provisions cannot countenance a derogation of the competency of 
Parliament to pass inconsistent legislation after the passage of earlier legislation.175 
Therefore it may be problematic if federal client legal privilege legislation were to 
contain a provision that any later Act inconsistent with it is inoperative unless it 
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expressly excludes federal client legal privilege legislation. However, the ALRC would 
hope that if federal client legal privilege legislation were enacted, future Parliaments 
would heed its underlying principles and only depart from it after a considered decision 
that it was necessary and appropriate in the circumstances to do so. 
Recommendation 5–1 The Australian Parliament should enact 
legislation of general application to cover various aspects of the law and 
procedure governing client legal privilege claims in federal investigations 
(hereafter referred to as federal client legal privilege legislation) in accordance 
with the recommendations in this Report. 
Recommendation 5–2 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide that, in the absence of any clear, express statutory statement to the 
contrary, client legal privilege applies to the coercive information-gathering 
powers of federal bodies. 
Recommendation 5–3 The Australian Government should ensure that 
any legislative scheme which seeks to abrogate or modify client legal privilege 
does so by express reference to the particular sections or divisions within that 
scheme that confer coercive information-gathering powers which abrogate or 
modify the privilege. 
A uniform approach? 
5.127 The Terms of Reference require the ALRC to consider whether it would be 
desirable to clarify existing provisions for the modification or abrogation of privilege, 
with a view to harmonising them across the Commonwealth statute book. A wider and 
related issue that arises is whether it is desirable to harmonise all provisions relating to 
the application of client legal privilege to the coercive information-gathering powers of 
federal bodies.176 
5.128 Federal legislation containing coercive information-gathering powers does not 
reveal a principled, coherent policy towards client legal privilege. As discussed above, 
the majority of federal statutes are silent on the issue; while other statutes adopt 
varying approaches to its application. 
5.129 ALRC 95 recommended that the Attorney-General order a review of federal 
investigatory powers with a view to providing greater consistency among regulators in 
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relation to their ability to compel the disclosure of information and the operation of 
client legal privilege.177 
5.130 Dr Ben Saul has expressed the view that: 
Confusion about the scope of legal professional privilege stems largely from the 
inconsistent approaches to expressly or impliedly removing privilege evident in 
federal statutes. The inconsistent nature of statutory provisions potentially undermines 
the public confidence in equal treatment before the law, makes it difficult for 
individuals to comply with their legal obligations, and ultimately confuses and 
confounds the rule of law.178 
Practical considerations 
5.131 The ARC has stated that consistency on matters relating to privilege—including 
whether or not it is abrogated—in legislation affecting a single industry or sector or a 
single agency would be likely to lead to efficiencies.179 
5.132 On one view, consistency of approach would make it easier for persons subject 
to coercive powers to comply with their obligations, particularly in the context of 
multiple parallel investigations, or cross-agency investigations, where persons may be 
required to produce a privileged document to one federal body but not to another. It is 
not uncommon for more than one federal body with coercive powers to undertake an 
investigation concerning offences arising from the same transactions.  
5.133 An example of a cross-agency investigation is the Project Wickenby taskforce, 
set up in 2004 to investigate internationally promoted tax arrangements that allegedly 
involve tax avoidance or tax evasion, and money laundering. The taskforce comprises 
the ATO, the ACC, the AFP, ASIC and the CDPP.180 
5.134 Examples of separate parallel investigations are those conducted by provisional 
liquidators, ASIC, APRA, and a Royal Commission into the affairs of HIH. The 
categories of documents sought by ASIC and APRA ‘overlapped to a significant 
extent’.181 Justice Neville Owen, the HIH Royal Commissioner, noted that: 
The overlap in these processes and in the documents required led to evidentiary 
difficulties for the agencies and for those who were required to produce documents to 
them. …  
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The difficulties arising from the parallel investigations by the inspector [appointed by 
APRA] and ASIC in turn gave rise to difficulties for the Commission. …  
Several parties expressed concern about ASIC’s production of documents, in answer 
to a Commission summons, before those parties had the opportunity to review 
documents they had earlier produced to ASIC and that were likely to be produced by 
ASIC in answer to the Commission’s summons. The specific concern related to the 
possible production by ASIC of documents over which a party might wish to assert 
legal professional privilege. A similar difficulty arose in respect of the Commission’s 
summons to the inspector appointed by APRA. Resolution of this matter took 
considerable time … The need to manage questions of privilege and confidentiality 
continued throughout the term of the Commission.182 
5.135 From a practical perspective, it is arguable that a consistent approach to 
privilege—embracing a consistent approach to the issue of appropriate safeguards, if 
privilege were to be abrogated or modified183—would alleviate some of the difficulties 
faced by federal bodies where parallel investigations are on foot, or where multi-
agency taskforces work on the same investigation.  
Varying investigatory contexts 
5.136 An assessment of whether complete consistency of approach on client legal 
privilege is desirable or necessary across the range of federal bodies with coercive 
information-gathering powers also must entail a consideration of the investigatory 
contexts in which those bodies operate.  
5.137 As the discussion in Chapter 4 reveals, there is a wide range of relevant federal 
bodies operating in vastly divergent areas including: criminal law enforcement; 
financial and prudential regulation; revenue; border control; health; social security; 
transport; and public administration. There are important differences in the aims, 
functions, operations and powers of these bodies.  
5.138 Investigation is a core function for some federal bodies—such as the AFP and 
the ACC—whereas bodies such as Centrelink and Medicare, despite having 
investigatory powers, are primarily service providers.  
5.139 Different functions performed by federal bodies include: conducting 
prosecutions; gathering intelligence; and conducting audits. While some federal bodies 
with investigatory powers have enforcement functions—such as the ACCC and 
ASIC—others—such as the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre—do 
not. Further, of those bodies possessing enforcement functions, there are significant 
differences in their policies and practices concerning resort to enforcement activity. For 
example, while the ACCC regards taking enforcement action as the ‘cornerstone’ of 
the agency,184 APRA takes enforcement action as the exception rather than the rule, 
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having expressed a preference for ‘working cooperatively’ with institutions to remedy 
weaknesses.185  
5.140 There is potentially more at stake for persons the subject of investigations 
carried out by federal investigatory bodies the core function of which is enforcement, 
compared with persons the subject of investigations carried out by federal bodies the 
core focus of which is monitoring compliance.  
5.141 IP 33 asked whether harmonisation is desirable and, if so, whether there should 
be distinctions drawn in the application of client legal privilege to federal coercive 
information-gathering powers depending on the functions performed by federal bodies, 
or the subject matter with which they deal.186 If distinctions were to be drawn 
depending on the subject matter with which federal bodies deal, a consistent approach 
to privilege could be taken, for example, in respect of all federal bodies concerned with 
financial markets. 
5.142 However, if distinctions were to be drawn according to whether the core 
function or focus of a federal body is investigation or enforcement, there would be 
different approaches to the application of privilege to investigations conducted by the 
ACCC and APRA—despite the fact that both those bodies deal, at least to some extent, 
in areas regulating financial markets. Another possible basis for a distinction raised in 
IP 33 is whether the body’s enforcement focus is primarily criminal, civil or 
administrative. 
Royal Commissions 
5.143 There is also a question whether distinctions should be drawn between the 
approach to be taken to the application of privilege in the context of Royal 
Commissions, and its application to other federal investigatory bodies.187 As discussed 
in Chapter 4, Royal Commissions are established only in special circumstances, where 
a particular public interest has been identified.  
5.144 The discovery of the truth has been described as a prime function of a Royal 
Commission.188 Unlike many other federal investigations, Royal Commissions are 
conducted in public—although evidence can be taken in private in certain situations.189 
Their function is to ascertain factual circumstances, report on matters specified in the 
Letters Patent, and make recommendations. If there are issues of major public interest 
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at stake, then a failed Royal Commission can arguably do enormous damage. 
Conversely, a successful Royal Commission can benefit the public. As stated by 
Justice Owen in the HIH Inquiry: 
[Royal Commissions] … have the capacity to marshal evidence and other material in 
such a way as to assist those whose responsibility it is to consider future action. There 
is thus a continuing public benefit from the work royal commissions do.190 
5.145 The ad hoc nature of Royal Commissions distinguishes them from permanent 
standing federal agencies and bodies. However, some inquiries that historically may 
have been the subject of a Royal Commission, may now fall within the jurisdiction of 
new federal bodies—such as the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement 
Integrity or the ACC. In addition, the subject matter of some inquiries conducted by 
Royal Commissions—such as the HIH Inquiry—also may fall squarely within the 
investigatory jurisdictions of federal regulatory bodies, such as ASIC and APRA. 
Therefore, there is an issue about whether it is appropriate for persons to be treated 
differently in relation to their ability to assert client legal privilege depending solely on 
the basis of whether or not an inquiry is the subject of a Royal Commission.  
5.146 In the AWB Royal Commission, Commissioner Cole recommended that 
consideration be given to amending the Royal Commissions Act 1902 to permit the 
Governor-General in Council by Letters Patent to determine that, in relation to the 
whole or a particular aspect of the matters the subject of inquiry, client legal privilege 
should not apply.191 This approach did not advocate the outright abolition of privilege 
in all Royal Commissions. Rather, it put forward a mechanism through which privilege 
could be abrogated in Royal Commissions, depending on the subject matter of inquiry. 
Submissions and consultations 
Harmonisation across federal investigatory bodies 
5.147 In response to IP 33, submissions and consultations were divided on the issue of 
whether legislative harmonisation of provisions relating to the application of privilege 
to federal powers is desirable—that is, whether there should be a harmonised approach 
to either preserving, abrogating or modifying client legal privilege across the board or 
based on particular categorisations.  
5.148 The Law Council expressed opposition to legislative harmonisation. The more 
pressing need, in its view, is for harmonisation of the approaches taken by federal 
bodies in dealing with privilege claims.192  
5.149 The Commonwealth Ombudsman submitted that: 
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This office would be reluctant to be subject to a uniform approach of a lower 
stringency than our current legislative provisions because of the practical problems 
that this would cause for us in attempting to fulfil our statutory role.193 
5.150 Other stakeholders expressed ‘in principle’ support for legislative harmonisation 
of provisions.194 Reasons included that it would allow for consistency in legal advice 
and, therefore, lead to a reduction in legal costs.195 The Law Society of NSW, for 
example, submitted that there was ‘a strong case for a harmonised approach across all 
agencies, without exception’. However, it noted that a ‘cover the field approach’ might 
be thought too onerous in some cases and insufficiently protective in others.196 
5.151 There were different views about the approach to harmonisation and, in 
particular, whether distinctions should be drawn depending on the functions performed 
by federal bodies or the subject matter with which they deal. In light of the vastly 
diverse purposes and functions of federal bodies, there was support for each federal 
body to be analysed ‘individually’—on a ‘case-by-case’ basis—to ascertain whether its 
particular circumstances warrant an abrogation or modification of the privilege.197 
Consideration of a federal body’s functions and the subject matter with which it deals, 
were generally considered to be relevant to the issue of whether abrogation of the 
privilege on an individual basis is warranted—rather than forming the basis for 
wholesale harmonisation in particular sectors.198  
5.152 Concerns were expressed about drawing distinctions based on whether or not 
the core function of a body is investigation or enforcement.199 BHP Billiton Mitsubishi 
Alliance, for example, submitted that ‘the fact that a particular body does not have 
enforcement powers does not reduce its ability to affect individuals’.200 The difficulties 
of classifying federal investigatory bodies according to the subject matter with which 
they deal and their primary focus was also noted.201 One stakeholder submitted that any 
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attempted classification would suffer from the fact that a federal body’s focus on 
investigation or enforcement could fluctuate over time.202 
5.153 However, others expressed the view that the core focus of a federal body is a 
relevant matter in considering harmonisation.203 In particular, support was expressed 
for distinctions to be made where a federal body’s function is to oversee the activities 
of government agencies, on the basis that accountability of government is vital.204  
5.154 Considerable support was expressed for legislative harmonisation to the extent 
of adopting a default provision that client legal privilege applies to the information-
gathering powers of federal investigatory bodies.205 For example, NSW Young 
Lawyers submitted: 
Establishing a uniform default provision that client legal privilege should apply in the 
context of regulatory investigations by Commonwealth agencies promotes clarity and 
consistency across regulation and places due weight on the policy rationales for 
recognition of client legal privilege.206 
Distinguishing Royal Commissions 
5.155 In response to IP 33, submissions and consultations were divided on the issue of 
whether distinctions should be drawn between federal investigatory bodies and Royal 
Commissions. Some stakeholders expressed ‘in principle’ opposition to a distinction 
being drawn based on the particular form of a federal body, or the forum in which a 
federal investigation takes place.207 
5.156 Other stakeholders expressed the view that such a distinction is valid, and that 
the case for abrogation of the privilege in the context of Royal Commissions—
particularly those that are inquisitorial rather than policy-focused—is stronger.208 
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ALRC’s views 
5.157 There is a less compelling case to strive for uniformity in the application of 
client legal privilege to federal investigatory powers than there is to achieve clarity 
about whether or not the privilege applies to particular powers. 
5.158 There are difficulties in prescribing a ‘one-size fits all’ rule to be applied 
inflexibly to all federal bodies (including all Royal Commissions)—regardless of their 
particular exigencies or indeed the exigencies of particular inquiries or investigations. 
5.159 Equally, attempting to establish a taxonomy of federal investigatory bodies 
according to their objectives, functions, approach to enforcement, and subject matter of 
regulation—as a basis for creating harmonisation of approach to client legal privilege 
within certain spheres or sectors—is fraught with difficulty. The ALRC does not, 
therefore, recommend harmonisation according to particular classifications of federal 
bodies. Nothing was expressed in submissions and consultations in response to DP 73, 
that would cause the ALRC to change its views in this regard. 
5.160  However, factors such as a federal body’s functions and subject matter of 
regulation are relevant considerations to be taken into account in assessing whether or 
not abrogation or modification of the privilege is warranted in particular cases. Further, 
such an assessment should be made with reference to consistent criteria, regardless of 
whether the investigation or inquiry is being undertaken by a federal investigatory 
body or a Royal Commission.209  
5.161 As foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, there is some overlap in the ALRC’s 
views on the issues of harmonisation and clarity. The ALRC’s recommendation to 
enact legislation of general application, containing a default provision that client legal 
privilege applies to the coercive powers of federal bodies—including Royal 
Commissions—in the absence of clear and express words to the contrary,210 achieves, 
in the ALRC’s view, not only clarity, but an appropriate and desirable degree of 
legislative harmonisation, without impeding flexibility of approach where warranted.  
5.162 Moreover, recommendations in Chapter 8 aim to address the need—identified in 
submissions and consultations—for uniformity of approach to making and resolving 
claims for client legal privilege. Arguably, many efficiencies to be gained from 
uniformity will arise from model uniform procedures as distinct from uniform 
legislative provisions concerning the application of privilege.  
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Achieving harmonisation 
5.163 If it were desirable to aim for harmonisation, one way would be by creating a 
specific new federal statute, containing provisions on privilege, consistent with the 
approach taken in ALRC 95.211 
5.164 Another way of achieving harmonisation would be to amend each federal statute 
that contains a coercive information-gathering power. As shown in Appendix 1, there 
are many federal Acts that contain such powers, so if harmonisation were to be 
achieved via this method, it would entail numerous separate amendments. 
Submissions and consultations 
Achieving federal harmonisation  
5.165 In response to IP 33 , there was strong support in submissions and consultations 
for harmonisation to be achieved by the enactment of a new federal statute, rather than 
through the amendment of each federal statute containing coercive information-
gathering powers.212 Such an approach was said to be more practical. As noted above, 
in response to DP 73, there was also strong support expressed in submissions and 
consultations for the enactment of federal legislation of general application.213 
However, some stakeholders expressed concern about the complexity of enacting a 
statute of general application if that statute were to attempt to accommodate different 
qualifications and exceptions.214  
Achieving national harmonisation 
5.166 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that, to promote national harmonisation, the 
Attorney-General of Australia should lead a process through the Standing Committee 
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of Attorneys-General (SCAG) to encourage the states and territories to adopt the 
Commonwealth model set out in Proposals 5–1 to 5–3.215  
5.167 This proposal received both unqualified216 and qualified support.217 The Law 
Council expressed support for national harmonisation with respect to client legal 
privilege, provided a suitable model could be developed to which all parties could 
agree.218 The Law Society of NSW submitted that it supported the proposal but noted: 
Whilst generally speaking uniformity of federal and state laws is desirable, the Law 
Society would not support New South Wales adopting a federal model which was 
thought to be flawed and, in any event, would wish to review whether there is a State-
based requirement for a change other than merely to achieve uniformity.219 
5.168 National Legal Aid expressed the view that ‘harmonisation across states and 
territories is a matter for respective Attorneys-General’.220 The AFP opposed this 
proposal.221 
ALRC’s views 
5.169 As mentioned above, the ALRC’s view is that there is a strong case for the 
enactment of legislation of general application, containing various provisions relating 
to client legal privilege claims in federal investigations. This would avoid the need to 
enact those provisions in each federal statute containing coercive information-
gathering powers. Such a statute would serve as the foundation of a scheme—to be 
supplemented by policies and guidelines—designed to inject greater consistency into 
client legal privilege law and procedure as it applies to federal investigations.222 
5.170 It is recommended that the statute contain a limited number of default provisions 
that would have general application over all federal bodies exercising coercive 
information-gathering powers—including Royal Commissions—in the absence of 
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express words to the contrary. As discussed above, this includes a default provision 
preserving privilege in federal investigations.223 
5.171 Given that the ALRC is not recommending harmonisation of approach based on 
particular classifications of federal bodies, the proposed legislation need not broach the 
complex task of attempting to accommodate the unique or special circumstances of 
certain federal bodies. In circumstances where Parliament sees fit to depart from the 
default provisions, express amendment to particular federal legislation containing 
coercive information-gathering powers will be necessary.  
5.172 If the proposed scheme favoured by the ALRC as a means of achieving clarity 
and a degree of harmonisation is considered desirable, it may follow that national 
harmonisation is an equally desirable option. If that were so, the Australian 
Government should lead a process through SCAG to encourage the states and 
territories to adopt the Commonwealth model. 
Recommendation 5–4 To promote national harmonisation, the Attorney-
General of Australia should lead a process through the Standing Committee of 
Attorneys-General to encourage the states and territories to adopt the 
Commonwealth model proposed in Recommendations 5–1 to 5–3 above. 
                                                        
223  See Rec 5–2. 
 6. Modification or Abrogation of Privilege? 
 
Contents 
Introduction 235 
Should client legal privilege be abrogated? 236 
Arguments for abrogation 237 
Arguments against abrogation 247 
Client legal privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination 250 
Trends in the United States 252 
Is abrogation or modification necessary or desirable? 255 
Submissions and consultations 262 
ALRC’s views 267 
Government accountability 276 
Review 278 
Other possible models of modification 279 
Documents not related to representation 279 
Submissions and consultations 280 
ALRC’s views 281 
Qualified privilege 282 
Submissions and consultations 284 
ALRC’s views 285 
Extension to other professionals 285 
‘Legal’ privilege 286 
Comparative examples 288 
Submissions and consultations 294 
Protecting tax advice 296 
Submissions and consultations 297 
ALRC’s views 302 
 
 
Introduction 
6.1 In Chapter 2, the ALRC considers, and supports, the underlying rationale for 
client legal privilege—that the protection of the confidentiality of communications 
between a lawyer and a client facilitates compliance with the law and access to a fair 
hearing in curial and non-curial contexts, thereby serving the broad public interest in 
the effective administration of justice.   
6.2 However, client legal privilege clearly conflicts with other important public 
interests, including that all relevant material should be available to a court—and, 
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presumably, investigations conducted by government agencies.1 Claims of client legal 
privilege undoubtedly present some difficulties for investigators, since they would 
prefer access to all of the evidence concerning the role played by parties to an alleged 
contravention of the law. Litigating claims of client legal privilege is also time-
consuming and expensive, and may delay and frustrate investigations. 
6.3 The New Zealand Law Commission has noted that: 
The judicial response to the tension between the competing public policy interests has 
been to uphold the absolute nature of the privilege, while at the same time expanding 
its qualifications and exceptions and the doctrine of waiver, whereby privilege is lost.2 
6.4 The chapter considers whether modification or abrogation of the privilege is 
necessary or desirable and discusses some of the problems that arise from the 
application of client legal privilege, both in a general sense and in its application to 
federal investigations. 
6.5 As an underlying rationale of the privilege is to encourage clients to seek 
professional advice on their legal rights and responsibilities—this chapter also looks at 
whether the doctrine should be extended to other professionals who, while not lawyers, 
provide what amounts essentially to legal advice. 
Should client legal privilege be abrogated? 
6.6 Client legal privilege may be modified or abrogated by legislation.3 Despite the 
importance given to common law rights by the courts, it is clear that privileges can be 
abrogated by statute if the legislature chooses to give higher priority to the interests of 
investigatory agencies in accessing information than to the interests served by 
maintaining privilege.4 In relation to the privilege against self-incrimination it has been 
said that: 
If the legislature thinks that … the public interest overcomes some of the common 
law’s traditional consideration for the individual, then effect must be given to the 
statute which embodies this policy.5 
6.7 As outlined in Chapter 5, modification or abrogation of privilege must be 
express, as common law rights cannot be overridden in the absence of express 
                                                        
1  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. See also New Zealand Law Commission, Search and Surveillance 
Powers, Report 97 (2007), 355. 
2  New Zealand Law Commission, Search and Surveillance Powers, Report 97 (2007), 355. 
3  Chapter 5 outlines the examples where privilege has been expressly abrogated in federal statutes that 
contain coercive information-gathering powers. 
4  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543. 
5  Rees v Kratzman (1965) 114 CLR 63, 80 (Windeyer J). 
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unambiguous words or a necessary implication to that effect.6 There are various ways 
that client legal privilege could be abrogated or modified in relation to federal 
investigatory bodies. One option would be to abrogate the privilege for all the coercive 
powers of federal bodies.7 Another option would be to assess when it is appropriate to 
abrogate the privilege, based on the nature of each piece of legislation and the 
particular role and functions of the federal body concerned.   
6.8 In the Issues Paper in this Inquiry, Client Legal Privilege and Federal 
Investigatory Bodies (IP 33), the ALRC discussed possible ways in which the privilege 
could be abrogated.8 There are essentially two streams of argument in favour of 
abrogation. The first relates to the alignment with the underlying rationale. As noted in 
Chapter 2, if client legal privilege is viewed as a private right, then there are many 
occasions—particularly relating to the administration of the law by federal bodies—
when it could be argued that the public interest should override those rights. The 
second stream is based more on practical considerations—that the availability of the 
privilege allows it to frustrate and delay investigations, and it may be used cynically to 
prevent or hinder the discovery of the truth. 
Arguments for abrogation 
Suppression of relevant evidence 
6.9 As noted in Chapter 2, all legal privileges operate to allow people to resist 
providing information that they would otherwise need to disclose. This information 
may be highly relevant to the matters under investigation. Jeremy Bentham, the 18th 
century radical reformer and proponent of utilitarianism, was a staunch critic of client 
legal privilege.9  
6.10 For Bentham, the happiness of society (the object of utilitarianism) was 
increased by conviction and punishment, not by the suppression of evidence. 
Disclosure of all legally-operative facts, facts investitive or divestitive of right, of all 
facts on which right depends, such, without any exception, ought to be, such, with a 
few inconsistent exceptions, actually is, the object of the law. … If falsehood is not 
favoured by the law, why should concealment? … Expect the lawyer to be serious in 
his endeavours to extirpate the breed of dishonest litigants! Expect the fox-hunter first 
to be serious in his wishes to extirpate the breed of foxes.10 
                                                        
6  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543. 
7  This model of abrogation could be combined with a number of different safeguards, including immunity 
after disclosure, which is discussed in Ch 7.  
8  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), 196. 
9  See J Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827). Book IX, Ch V is entitled ‘Examination of the 
Cases in which English Law Exempts One Person From Giving Evidence Against Another’.  
10  Ibid, 311, 312. 
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6.11 In Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend, Kirby J expressed the 
view that: 
a brake on the application of legal professional privilege is needed to prevent its 
operation bringing the law into ‘disrepute’, principally because it frustrates access to 
communications which would otherwise help courts to determine, with accuracy and 
efficiency, where the truth lies in disputed matters.11 
6.12 In the report in the inquiry concerning the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) and 
the Oil-for-Food Programme (the AWB Royal Commission), Commissioner Cole 
singled out the significant ‘public interest’ that lies behind the establishment of Royal 
Commissions and the conflict of that public interest with ‘the fundamental right of 
persons to obtain legal advice under conditions of confidentiality’.12 The 
Commissioner identified a clash between ‘the public interest in discovering the truth’ 
and ‘the private interest of companies or individuals in maintaining claims for legal 
professional privilege’.13 He indicated that in some cases, depending on ‘the issues the 
subject of the Royal Commission’, the public interest should prevail over the private.14 
6.13 A clash also can be identified between competing public interests, as opposed to 
a conflict between a public and a private interest. That is, there may be times ‘when the 
public interest in the conduct of investigations overrides the public interest in client 
legal privilege’.15 In Baker v Campbell, Wilson J commented along these lines, in 
saying that: 
It must be recognized that competing public interests may be involved. New forms of 
criminal activity pose a clear threat to the public welfare and may call for new 
measures of criminal investigation and law enforcement. The dictates of good 
administration of complex social and commercial legislation may require increasing 
resort to compulsory procedures.16 
Hampering the effectiveness of investigations 
6.14 It is argued that if client legal privilege were modified or abrogated, 
investigations could be more efficient or effective, and compliance improved. 
Dawson J has commented that ‘a claim of legal professional privilege might well 
hamper an investigation as much as, if not more than, a claim of privilege against self-
incrimination’.17 
                                                        
11  Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance (1997) 188 CLR 501, 581. 
12  T Cole, Report of the Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme (2006), [7.66]. 
13  Ibid, [7.66]. 
14  Ibid, [7.67]. 
15  Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 102 (2005), [14.173]. 
16  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 96. 
17  Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319, 335. 
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6.15 There is a pragmatic view regarding the ability of regulators to perform their 
functions effectively while the privilege is in place. As noted by the New Zealand Law 
Commission, ‘on the face of it, removal of an obstruction to the power to require 
information must enable the power to work more smoothly’.18 
6.16 A number of federal investigatory agencies have argued that their powers to 
obtain information are vital to performing their statutory functions. In The Daniels 
Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (Daniels),19 the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) argued that the purpose of investigating contraventions of the Trades 
Practices Act 1974 (TPA) would be impaired or frustrated if client legal privilege 
could be used to resist compliance with a notice under s 155. The ACCC’s view was 
that, since the expansion of client legal privilege in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v 
Commissioner of Taxation (Esso),20 which adopted the dominant purpose test,21 there 
was a significant chance that more legal advice would become unavailable due to the 
privilege.22  
6.17 In Corporate Affairs Commission of NSW v Yuill (Yuill), which preceded 
Daniels, a key factor in the decision was that to allow client legal privilege as a reason 
for failing to comply with a notice to produce documents would impair (or even 
destroy) the effectiveness of the mechanism created to enforce the laws governing 
corporations.23 
6.18 The decision of the Full Federal Court in Daniels (later overturned by the High 
Court) was influenced by a view that unlawful conduct 
often comprises many separate acts, some of which may be effected through lawyers. 
Without information about contacts between the person under investigation and that 
person’s lawyer, it may be impossible for [the regulator] to see the whole picture.24 
6.19 The complexity of modern business arrangements arguably tilts the balance 
towards the removal of privilege to facilitate monitoring of compliance with the law, 
particularly given the new compliance functions of lawyers, and the potential for the 
dominant purpose test to shield many revealing documents from inspection. As noted 
                                                        
18  New Zealand Law Commission, Tax and Privilege: Legal Professional Privilege and the Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue’s Powers to Obtain Information, Report 67 (2000), [9]. 
19  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543. 
20  Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49. 
21  The dominant purpose test is discussed in Ch 3. 
22  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543, 557.  
23  Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319, 326. This case is 
discussed further in Ch 5. 
24  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Daniels (2001) 108 FCR 123, 137 (Wilcox J). 
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by Wilson J in Baker v Campbell, new forms of criminal activity may call for new 
measures of criminal investigation, law enforcement and an increasing resort to 
compulsory procedures in the interest of ‘the dictates of good administration’. 25 
6.20 The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has told the 
ALRC that there are particular difficulties investigating misconduct in the financial 
sector and that: 
The type of matters that ASIC considers usually involve transactions that have many 
technical aspects in the legal, business, financial products or accounting areas. These 
areas are regulated and often legal advice is obtained in relation to the transactions. In 
some cases, lawyers are involved at every stage. Access to the correspondence 
flowing to and from lawyers is sometimes key to fully understanding how a 
transaction or series of transactions developed. The contents of correspondence 
created for the purposes of legal advice can contain details of the information known 
by persons of interest, or details of what those persons were seeking to do.26 
6.21 In relation to taxation law, the Privy Council has observed: 
The whole rationale of taxation would break down and the whole burden of taxation 
would fall only on diligent and honest taxpayers if the Commissioner [of Taxation] 
has no power to obtain confidential information about taxpayers who may be 
negligent or dishonest.27   
6.22 In a submission to the ALRC’s inquiry into the use of civil and administrative 
penalties in federal law,28 the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) stated that, while 
Baker v Campbell expressed the view that client legal privilege ensures ‘some 
protection of the citizen—particularly the weak, the unintelligent and ill-informed 
citizen—against the leviathan of the modern state’,29 the ATO’s experience is that it is 
rare for a privilege claim to be made by, or on behalf of, a citizen who would fit that 
description. Often it is claimed by large corporations or promoters of tax avoidance 
schemes.30 
6.23 The New Zealand Law Commission also has downplayed fears that abrogation 
would deliver regulators unfettered power in such matters. 
Taxation obligations are imposed by an elected Parliament. Performance of those 
obligations by each taxpayer is as much in the interests of other taxpayers as of the 
                                                        
25  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 96. 
26  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. 
27  New Zealand Stock Exchange v CIR [1992] 3 NZLR 1, 4. 
28  Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties 
in Australia, ALRC 95 (2002). 
29  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 120. 
30  Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties 
in Australia, ALRC 95 (2002), [19.82]. 
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state. Because the taxpayer has the comprehensive knowledge of his financial position 
that the Commissioner does not, it is the taxpayer who is in the position of strength.31 
6.24 In another submission to the ALRC’s inquiry into the use of civil and 
administrative penalties in federal law,32 the ACCC expressed the view that various 
species of privilege have been employed in the past to diminish significantly its ability 
to undertake investigations efficiently and thoroughly into alleged contraventions of 
the TPA. This was particularly the case in circumstances where legal advisers may be 
commercial partners in a transaction alleged to raise issues under the TPA.33  
6.25 In Daniels, McHugh J did not accept this argument in relation to the ACCC, 
noting that documents that are subject to client legal privilege must be a very small 
percentage of the documents requested in a s 155 notice. McHugh J also expressed the 
view that: 
Only in recent times has the Commission or its predecessor claimed that legal 
privilege does not apply to documents that are subject to a s 155 notice. The 
Commission’s long acceptance of its earlier position supports the view that the 
section’s object would not be frustrated by holding that it does not abolish the right to 
claim immunity for documents protected by legal professional privilege.34 
6.26 This view was shared by the majority in Daniels, who noted that a 
communication made between a client and a lawyer for the purpose of contravening 
the TPA would not be protected by privilege:  
it is difficult to see that the availability of legal professional privilege to resist 
compliance with a notice under s 155(1) of the Act would result in any significant 
impairment of the investigation of contraventions of the Act, much less in the 
frustration of such investigations. At least, that conclusion is far less obvious than in 
the case of the privilege against self-exposure to penalties.35 
                                                        
31  New Zealand Law Commission, Tax and Privilege: Legal Professional Privilege and the Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue’s Powers to Obtain Information, Report 67 (2000), [10]. 
32  Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties 
in Australia, ALRC 95 (2002). 
33  Ibid, [19.39]. 
34  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543, 564. 
35  Ibid, 557 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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6.27 In its submission to this Inquiry, the ACCC provided an example where material 
that was claimed as privileged would have been of assistance in an investigation. 
CASE STUDY ONE 
The ACCC issued s 155 notices as part of an investigation into a resale price 
maintenance allegation. Documents were provided by the company which 
included advice from a lawyer commenting on the documentation prepared by 
the company for distribution to retailers. The company later claimed that the 
legal advice was privileged and had been supplied inadvertently. Accordingly, 
the ACCC agreed to return the privileged document and make no further use of 
it. In the assessment of an ACCC investigator who read the relevant documents, 
the material supplied and then returned had the potential to open up lines of 
inquiry which could have established additional breaches of the TPA. 
Delay and frustration 
6.28 Claims of client legal privilege—even where asserted in good faith—may 
frustrate or delay investigations. At present, there is no forum, other than a court, 
where the proper basis for a claim can be determined.36  
6.29 The submission of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP), 
for example, identified a number of cases where privilege claims led to significant 
delays and hampered the progress of investigations.37  
CASE STUDY TWO 
In Kennedy v Wallace,38 ASIC and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
executed a search warrant on 13 November 2003, at which time the relevant 
documents over which privilege was claimed were seized from Mr Kennedy. 
The final ruling of the Full Federal Court (that the documents were not 
privileged) was handed down on 23 December 2004.39 The practical impact of 
the delay was that ASIC was not able to consider any evidence in those 
documents for just over thirteen months. 
                                                        
36  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. 
37  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 61, 12 June 2007. 
38  Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 208 ALR 424. 
39  Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 213 ALR 108. See I Govey, ‘Legal Professional Privilege and Commonwealth 
Investigatory Bodies’ (Paper presented at 35th Australian Legal Convention, Sydney, 23 March 2007), 5. 
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CASE STUDY THREE 
R v Pearce and Ors40 concerned a mass–marketed tax scheme, where 
accountants had received advice from a Queen’s Counsel about the legitimacy 
of the scheme in order to induce people to enter into the scheme.  The relevant 
evidence in this matter included letters and faxed communications from 
accountants who organised the scheme to the Queen’s Counsel, in which they 
had sought changes to the advice to tailor it to suit their design and maximise its 
marketing potential.  Search warrants were executed and claims for client legal 
privilege were made over these documents. The documents were held at the 
Federal Court Registry on the basis that the applicants had to commence action 
concerning legal professional privilege within a certain period of time. No 
action in relation to the privilege claim was commenced and the documents 
remained in the Federal Court Registry for a number of years, until the 
investigators sought access to the documents. The applicants made no attempt to 
enforce their claim of privilege.  The documents were used in the trial of three 
persons accused of conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth. 
CASE STUDY FOUR 
In the investigation into the affairs of Harts Australia Ltd, a tax and accounting 
adviser,41 search warrants were issued on 6 September 1996, and executed on 
9 and 10 September 1996.  On 11 September 1996, Hart began a Federal Court 
challenge to the execution of the search warrants and claimed privileged 
material had been seized. The litigation was not resolved until 5 December 
2002, over 6 years after the search warrants were executed. 
6.30 In relation to the investigation in the Hart matter, the CDPP submitted that: 
The effect of the privilege claim was to paralyse the investigation, divert considerable 
investigative resources (both human and financial) and delay the investigation and 
eventual prosecution for over six years. At one stage the investigative agency was 
required to meticulously catalogue each of the thousands of documents it had seized 
under the search warrants so that the litigation could progress.42  
                                                        
40  R v Pearce (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, 13 July 2004). For report of the appeal see 
R v Pearce (2005) 216 ALR 690. 
41  Hart v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2002) 196 ALR 1. 
42  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 61, 12 June 2007. This investigation 
was also referred to by the AFP: Australian Federal Police, Consultation LPP 28, Canberra, 1 June 2007. 
Blanket claims are discussed further in Chs 8 and 9. 
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6.31 The ATO also submitted that blanket claims of client legal privilege can delay 
audit activities by significant periods of time.  
Claims can also operate to limit our ability to access information that is not privileged 
because claims are made over communications that are not privileged. Sometimes 
through negotiation or litigation we might gain access to these documents, but in other 
instances we may never receive the relevant information.43  
6.32 The duration of disputes was a significant reason for the minority decision of 
Kirby J in Esso.44 Kirby J suggested that the sole purpose test should remain in order to 
avoid the application of a test (the dominant purpose test) which is 
susceptible to more protracted pre-trial disputation and contentious evaluation with 
interlocutory applications and the appeals to which they give rise. If there is any doubt 
about this, consider how long it would take to sort out, in the case of almost 600 
documents, the disputed question whether the dominant purpose of each 
communication was to seek or receive legal advice.45 
6.33 In Daniels, Kirby J noted that in some areas of the ACCC’s responsibility, such 
as the administration of mergers, ‘speed on the part of the Commission and its officers 
is essential to the proper discharge of the functions imposed by Parliament’.46  
Abuse of client legal privilege claims 
6.34 Allegations of abuse of client legal privilege have been made in Australia and 
overseas. One court in the United States, for example, has said of the tobacco industry 
that it 
seems to believe and argues that when an attorney is somehow referenced within a 
document or generates a document, attorney-client privilege or work-product 
immunity must protect disclosure of the subject document.47 
6.35 In 2000, the Australian National Audit Office, in conducting a review of tax 
penalties, reported that it was informed that: 
legal professional privilege is being used as a tactical tool to impede and frustrate both 
the progress and ultimate outcomes of taxation audits (in terms of restricting the 
auditor’s ability to access factual information about transactions and arrangements).48 
6.36 Commissioner Cole’s report in the AWB Royal Commission expressed 
concerns about AWB’s claims of client legal privilege. He stated that AWB had not 
                                                        
43  Australian Taxation Office, Submission LPP 65, 22 June 2007. 
44  Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49. 
45  Ibid, 154. 
46  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543, 574. 
47  Burton v RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company 167 FRD 134 (D Kan, 1996), 184. 
48  Australian National Audit Office, ATO Administration of Tax Penalties, Audit Report 31 (2000), [3.46]. 
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produced a list of documents that formed the basis of the privilege claim.49 He also 
noted that many documents for which privilege had been claimed initially were no 
longer claimed to be privileged.50 In Commissioner Cole’s view, AWB’s lawyers had 
failed to produce documents that would have been required to be produced to the 
Commission at some stage, and thus had greatly increased the time and expense of the 
Commission.51  
6.37 The ACCC submitted that, in the context of responding to s 155 notices,52 there 
is scope to claim client legal privilege without a proper basis, and that from time to 
time, the ACCC considered that such improper claims have been made.53 
6.38 The ACCC provided an example of how improper claims might only be 
discovered in a ‘random’ way. In a matter where a company had claimed privilege over 
certain documents sought pursuant to a s 155 notice, when those documents were 
obtained from another company which did not claim privilege, it revealed that the 
claims made by the first company were not soundly based.54 
6.39 However, in consultations, a number of groups of lawyers argued that it was 
important to draw a distinction between over-cautious or incorrect claiming of the 
privilege and actual abuse.55 Issues concerning alleged abuse of client legal privilege 
claims are considered further in Chapter 9. 
Difficulties in Royal Commissions 
6.40 The report of the AWB Royal Commission discussed in detail the difficulties 
caused by claims to client legal privilege that were made by the AWB during that 
Royal Commission. The AWB raised up to 40 claims of client legal privilege 
concerning more than 1,400 documents.56 
6.41 The AWB challenged Commissioner Cole’s decision to reject a claim for client 
legal privilege over a particular document as well as his capacity to determine privilege 
claims at all. In the Federal Court, Justice Young held that the document in question 
was not subject to privilege. Young J’s decision also cast doubt on the ability of a 
                                                        
49  T Cole, Report of the Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme (2006), [7.42]. 
50  Ibid, [7.55]. 
51  Ibid, [7.64]. The AWB case is discussed further in Ch 9. 
52  See Chs 4 and 5. 
53  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. This is discussed 
further in Ch 9. 
54  Ibid, see Ch 8 for further discussion of issues and problems in making a claim for privilege. 
55  Members of the Victorian Bar, Consultation LPP 21, Melbourne, 25 May 2007; Members of the New 
South Wales Bar, Consultation LPP 18, Sydney, 23 May 2007; Regulatory lawyers of Clayton Utz, 
Consultation LPP 13, Sydney, 15 May 2007. 
56  T Cole, Report of the Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme (2006), [7.44]. 
246 Privilege in Perspective  
 
Royal Commissioner to inspect a document in respect of which client legal privilege 
has been claimed, to determine whether the claim is sustained. Amendments were then 
made to the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) designed to put beyond doubt that a 
Royal Commissioner may require the production of a document in respect of which 
client legal privilege is claimed, for the purpose of making a finding about that claim.57 
6.42 Following these amendments to the Royal Commissions Act, the AWB 
continued action in the Federal Court contending, amongst other arguments, that the 
amendments were unconstitutional. In the course of the hearings on this issue, the 
AWB dropped the privilege claim over 15 volumes of documents it had previously said 
would be unavailable to the inquiry. Ultimately, around 900 documents remained in 
issue in the Federal Court.58 Commissioner Cole reported that client legal privilege was 
frequently claimed in respect of a portion of a document but, after discussion in the 
hearing room or between counsel, a review of the claim resulted in the claim not being 
maintained.59 A number of the claims for privilege were rejected by the Federal Court. 
However, the claims had delayed the progress of the inquiry by nine months.60  
6.43 Commissioner Cole concluded that circumstances may arise where it is 
appropriate that client legal privilege be abrogated.61 In his view, however, there 
should not be a blanket abrogation of client legal privilege in all Royal Commissions, 
as it is not possible to predict generally the circumstances where it could be said that 
the public interest in discovering the truth should prevail over the private interest in 
maintaining client legal privilege. In Commissioner Cole’s view, that decision would 
depend upon the issues that are the subject of the particular Royal Commission.62 On 
this basis, he recommended that there should be capacity in the Royal Commissions Act 
to permit the Governor-General in Council, by Letters Patent, to determine that, in 
relation to the whole or a particular aspect of matters the subject of inquiry, client legal 
privilege should not apply.63 
6.44 Client legal privilege is abrogated for Royal Commissions established in New 
South Wales (NSW) and Victoria. Section 17(1) of the Royal Commissions Act 1923 
(NSW) states that a ‘witness summoned to attend or appear before the commission 
shall not be excused from answering any question or producing any document or other 
                                                        
57  See Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) s 6AA(2), (3). 
58  T Cole, Report of the Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme (2006), [7.55]. 
59  Ibid, [7.59]. 
60  Ibid, [7.55]. 
61  The view of client legal privilege as a ‘private interest’ is discussed in Ch 2. 
62  T Cole, Report of the Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme (2006), [7.67]–[7.68]. 
63  Ibid, rec 4.  
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thing on the ground … of privilege or on any other ground’. This has been held to 
apply to client legal privilege as well as to the privilege against self-incrimination.64  
6.45 Under the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic), if a person is required by a Royal 
Commission to answer a question or produce a document, the person is not excused 
from complying with the requirement on the ground that their answer or document 
would disclose matters in respect of which the person could claim client legal 
privilege.65 Client legal privilege was abrogated in the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) for the 
Longford Royal Commission into the accident at the Esso Gas Plant in Longford in 
1998.66 
6.46 As noted in Chapter 5, the James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 
2004 (Cth) abrogated client legal privilege in relation to certain material, allowing its 
use in investigations of the James Hardie Group and any related proceedings.67 This 
was done because, in the Australian Government’s view, there are situations in which 
the abrogation of the privilege is justified in order to serve a higher public policy 
interest.68 Whilst the James Hardie investigation was a New South Wales Special 
Commission of Inquiry, the operation and rules of Special Commissions of Inquiry are 
effectively the same as those of a Royal Commission.69 
Arguments against abrogation  
6.47 The main arguments against abrogation are based on the underlying rationale for 
the privilege, as outlined in Chapter 2. The benefit of fostering a candid client-lawyer 
relationship is one of the main reasons stated for opposing the abrogation of client legal 
privilege. In recent cases, judges have shown a broad acceptance of the proposition that 
an assurance of confidentiality is necessary to allow full and frank communications 
between clients and their lawyers. Deane J has commented that: 
Ultimately much depends on one’s assessment of the extent of the detriment to the 
efficacy of legal professional privilege which would be likely to result from the 
proposed curtailment of the protection which it affords. In my view, that detriment 
could well be significant.70 
6.48 In contrast, Dr Jonathan Auburn argues that lawyers are reluctant to question 
what he terms the ‘abstract principles’ behind the privilege. 
                                                        
64  See R v Hood (1997) 91 A Crim R 526. 
65  Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) s 19D. In other state legislation governing Royal Commissions, client legal 
privilege is either expressly preserved (as in the ACT), or the legislation is silent on the issue. 
66   Crimes (Confiscation and Evidence) Amendment Act 1998 (Vic). 
67  James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s 4. 
68  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 December 2004, 1 (P Costello—
Treasurer), 2.  
69  Special Commissions of Inquiry Act 1983 (NSW). 
70  Carter v Northmore Hale Davey & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121, 139. 
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Lawyers are confident that their experience in dealing with clients shows that the 
abstract principle behind the privilege holds true in practice. Thus it may be partly 
because the privilege is, on one level, counter-intuitive, and so demands justification 
from those who use it, that it has drawn such stern defence from the legal 
profession.71 
6.49 Auburn states that: 
If the benefits to confidentiality resulting from the privilege are unknown, there is no 
reason to assume they are slight. At the same time, there is no reason to assume that 
such benefits would be completely destroyed by further incursions into the over-stated 
sanctity of the privilege.72  
6.50 Empirical studies on privilege and confidentiality in the United States have 
proven to be inconclusive, although some have suggested that laypersons may have 
little understanding of the privilege.73  
6.51 It is also argued that removal of the privilege may actually damage, rather than 
enhance, compliance. Fear of compulsory disclosure may deter candid, careful, 
detailed, written advice being given by lawyers to their clients and increase the amount 
of oral advice by lawyers.74 Removing privilege also might deter complex advice 
testing the limits of the law. 
The majority decision in Yuill did not acknowledge the important part that 
professional legal advice can play in encouraging compliance with the law … instead, 
the reasoning of the majority was confined to analysing linguistic, textual and 
historical considerations without reference to the underlying policy debate.75 
6.52 As noted above, in Daniels, both McHugh and Kirby JJ rejected the ACCC’s 
view that it could not conduct investigations without access to privileged documents. 
Kirby J, in particular, noted that the ACCC has acknowledged in the past that legally 
privileged documents were unlikely to assist an investigation.76 Geoff Healy and 
Andrew Eastwood suggest that legal advice about a client’s past conduct, while it may 
refer to relevant facts and circumstances, 
                                                        
71  J Auburn, Legal Professional Privilege: Law and Theory (2000), 65. 
72  Ibid, 66. 
73  ‘Attorney-Client and Work Product Privilege in a Utilitarian World: An Argument for Recomparison’ 
(1995) 108 Harvard Law Review 1697, 1700. See also J Auburn, Legal Professional Privilege: Law and 
Theory (2000), 78. 
74  See, eg, B Saul, ‘Legal Professional Privilege: Balancing Law Enforcement Against Protecting the 
Regulated’ (2002) 76(2) Law Institute Journal 68. 
75  A Bruce, ‘The Trade Practices Act 1974 and the Demise of Legal Professional Privilege’ (2002) 30 
Federal Law Review 373, 394, citing D Boniface, ‘Legal Professional Privilege and Disclosure Powers of 
Investigative Agencies’ (1992) 16 Criminal Law Journal 320, 328. 
76  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543, 583. 
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will rarely be, of itself, a relevant fact. Accordingly the effect of the expansion of the 
doctrine’s ambit on the ability of regulators to probe and monitor corporate activity is, 
it is suggested, likely to be manageable.77 
6.53 The 2003 Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 
(Dawson Review)78 recommended that client legal privilege be specifically preserved  
under the TPA, on the basis of its role in compliance. 
The privilege is in the public interest because it facilitates the obtaining of legal 
advice and promotes the observance of the law. This is particularly desirable in the 
area of competition law, which is often complex. Corporations and individuals should 
not be discouraged from seeking legal advice for fear that their communications might 
subsequently be used against them by the ACCC. Nor should clients be inhibited in 
giving instructions to their lawyer in order to obtain legal advice or be confined to 
oral communications. The Committee believes that legal professional privilege should 
be preserved under the Act.79 
6.54 Healy and Eastwood also suggest that the limits placed on client legal privilege 
ensure that it does not unduly frustrate regulatory investigations. They cite the 
discussion in Pratt Holdings v Commissioner of Taxation80 as demonstrating the 
difficulty of establishing the dominant purpose in cases of complex business 
transactions where advice is obtained from a number of professionals.81  
This limitation also acts as a natural barrier to any attempt by large corporations to 
take advantage of the increased scope of legal professional privilege. The mere 
provision of a document to an internal or external lawyer will not render a document 
subject to legal professional privilege if the document was brought into existence for 
commercial reasons.82 
6.55 In addition, occasional abuse of the privilege is not necessarily a reason for 
outright removal of the protection. The American Bar Association (ABA) established a 
task force on attorney-client privilege in 2004 to inform the public and legal profession 
on the importance of the doctrine. The ABA argues that: 
While it may be true that in some limited instances attorneys abuse the privilege as a 
tactic to delay and hinder the discovery of otherwise discoverable material, such 
instances do not justify encroaching upon the protections afforded by the privilege.83  
                                                        
77  G Healy and A Eastwood, ‘Legal Professional Privilege and the Investigative Powers of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission’ (2005) 23 Company and Securities Law Journal 375, 386. 
78  Australian Government Trade Practices Act Review Committee, Review of the Competition Provisions of 
the Trade Practices Act (2003). 
79  Ibid, Ch 13, rec 13.5. 
80  Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 207 ALR 217. See discussion in Ch 3. 
81  G Healy and A Eastwood, ‘Legal Professional Privilege and the Investigative Powers of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission’ (2005) 23 Company and Securities Law Journal 375, 338. 
82  Ibid, 338. 
83  American Bar Association, Report of the Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege (2005). 
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6.56 In the United States (US), rules are already in place to address concerns about 
abuse of privilege. For example, Rule 3.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
provides that ‘a lawyer shall not unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence 
or conceal a document having potentially evidentiary value’. 
6.57 If client legal privilege is sometimes being abused, there is a question about 
what measures could be put in place, short of abrogation, to prevent or redress such 
abuse. A number of detailed recommendations are made in Chapter 9, concerning 
guidance in professional rules of conduct about the making and maintaining of 
privilege claims, professional disciplinary action and education. 
Client legal privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination 
6.58 The common law privilege against self-incrimination entitles a person to refuse 
to answer any question, or produce any document, if that answer or the production 
would tend to incriminate that person.84 The privilege also provides protection against 
self-exposure to a civil or administrative penalty.85 In relation to the investigatory 
powers of federal regulators, a common approach has been to abrogate or modify the 
privilege against self-incrimination expressly by statute so that individuals are not 
entitled to refuse to produce documents, but are permitted to assert the privilege 
subsequently in civil or criminal proceedings commenced after the investigation.86 
6.59 Given that both the privilege against self-incrimination and client legal privilege 
have the potential to ‘defeat or stultify the purpose for which a coercive and 
investigative power is conferred’,87 it is worth considering whether there are 
fundamental differences between the two which would justify the abrogation of one 
and not the other. 
6.60 Prior to the High Court’s decision in Daniels, the question of whether client 
legal privilege should be accorded differential treatment from the privilege against self-
incrimination was directly examined in Re Compass Airlines Pty Ltd.88 In that case it 
was argued by counsel for the liquidators that express abrogation of the privilege 
against self-incrimination in s 597(12) of the Corporations Law implied the abrogation 
of client legal privilege. Lockhart J held that the privilege against self-incrimination 
and client legal privilege rest upon different foundations and are expressions of 
different public policy principles. Consequently, there was no necessary implication 
                                                        
84  Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328. 
85  Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477. 
86  B Bolton, ‘Compelling Production of Documents to the ASC’ (1995) 25 Queensland Law Society Journal 
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that client legal privilege had been abrogated.89 In the same case, Beaumont and 
Gummow JJ reached the conclusion that it was one thing to construe the provision as 
taking away by implication the right of silence; but it was a different thing entirely to 
read into such a provision ‘an intention to eliminate the very different privilege 
inherent in a proper legal professional relationship’.90 
6.61 The decision in Re Compass Airlines Pty Ltd was largely based on an earlier 
decision Re Transequity Ltd (in liq).91 There it was held that client legal privilege 
is to be found in an underlying principle of common law, where a person should be 
entitled to seek and obtain legal advice in the conduct of his own affairs and legal 
assistance in and for the purpose of the conduct of actual or anticipated litigation 
without the apprehension of being thereby prejudiced.92  
6.62 Hence, it attracts an entirely different theoretical and policy foundation than the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
6.63 In Daniels, however, the Full Federal Court based its decision of whether to 
treat client legal privilege on an equal footing with the privilege against self-
incrimination by answering the question whether the TPA would be hobbled or 
thwarted if privilege were applied. Wilcox J held that the policy considerations in 
relation to the privilege against self-incrimination are equally apposite to client legal 
privilege.93 Moore J noted, however, that there was a difference between the two 
privileges based on the types of information sought. 
Different considerations arise in relation to communications for which a claim of legal 
professional privilege might be made. Privileged documents, for example, may be 
sought by a notice under s 155 in circumstances where the documents could 
ultimately prove to have a limited bearing on whether or not there had been a 
contravention of the TPA. Documents or information resisted on the grounds of the 
privilege against self-incrimination may be thought, in the ordinary course, to be 
likely to have a greater bearing on whether there had been a contravention.94 
6.64 Wilcox J’s view was later rejected by the High Court.95 The decision of the Full 
Federal Court also has been criticised for making only passing reference to Re 
                                                        
89  Ibid, 459. 
90  Ibid, 464. 
91  Re Transequity Ltd (in liq) (1991) 6 ACSR 517. 
92  Ibid, citing Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 114 (Deane J). 
93  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Daniels (2001) 108 FCR 123, 137. 
94  Ibid, 146. See also S McNicol, ‘Before the High Court: Australian Competition and Consumer 
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Compass Airlines Pty Ltd, and for not considering the conceptual differences between 
the privilege against self-incrimination and client legal privilege.96 
Trends in the United States 
6.65 In the wake of such corporate scandals as the collapse of Enron and WorldCom 
in the past decade, US federal bodies such as the Department of Justice, the Securities 
and Exchanges Commission, the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission and 
the New York Stock Exchange began routinely to demand that corporations and their 
employees or agents cooperate fully with government investigations. As part of these 
investigations, enforcement bodies have asked corporations to waive attorney-client 
privilege and work-product protections, to make available to authorities, amongst other 
things, documents and reports of internal investigations.97  
6.66 In January 2003, US Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson issued a 
memorandum Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Thompson 
Memorandum), in which federal prosecutors are advised that a corporation should not 
be given credit for cooperating with the government if it refused to waive its attorney-
client privilege, or if it advanced legal fees to employees facing investigations.98  
6.67 Following the release of the Thompson Memorandum, concerns were expressed 
by members of Congress, former US Attorneys General and Deputy Attorneys 
General, civil libertarians, as well as academics and practitioners, about the effect of 
the memorandum on the right to counsel. On 15 September 2006, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee held hearings on the Thompson Memorandum’s effect on the right to 
counsel in corporate investigations. From the public hearing, two particular strands of 
criticism of the memorandum emerged: 
• the policy has contributed to a coercive ‘culture of waiver’, where government 
agencies believe it is reasonable and appropriate for them to expect a company 
under investigation to waive broadly its attorney-client privilege. The fear of 
indictment further exacerbates the corporation’s concern that it might be seen or 
labelled as ‘uncooperative’ if it decides to assert privilege;99 and 
                                                        
96  R Travers, ‘Confidentiality of Legal Advice after Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v 
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• the emphasis on waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-product protection 
threatens to create a counter-productive climate of distrust between corporations 
and their employees, it further dissuades clients from being forthcoming with 
their attorneys, and inhibits any motivation to comply with regulations.100  
6.68 On 8 December 2006, Senator Arlen Specter introduced the Attorney-Client 
Privilege Protection Act. In the legislation, federal enforcement agents and attorneys 
would be barred from: 
• demanding, requesting or conditioning treatment on the ‘disclosure by an 
organisation, or persons affiliated with that organisation of any communication 
protected by the attorney-client privilege or any attorney work-product’; and 
• conditioning a decision on whether to use a civil or criminal charge relating to 
an organisation or person, or use as a factor in determining whether an 
organisation or person is cooperating with the Government on any valid 
assertion of the attorney-client privilege.101  
6.69 Under the legislation, a corporation is not prohibited from making, and a federal 
enforcement agent or attorney is not precluded from accepting, a voluntary or 
unsolicited offer to share the internal investigation materials of such an organisation.  
6.70 On 12 December 2006, less than a week after Senator Specter introduced the 
proposed legislation, Deputy Attorney General McNulty issued revised charging 
guidelines for federal prosecutors Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations (the McNulty Memorandum). 
6.71 The McNulty Memorandum notes the concerns expressed by those associated 
with the corporate legal community that the practices of federal bodies may be 
discouraging to full and candid communication between corporate employees and 
counsel. The Memorandum sets forth a balancing test by which prosecutors can 
determine whether they have a ‘legitimate need’ for materials protected by the 
attorney-client privilege or the work-product protection.  
6.72 To determine whether a legitimate need exists, the following factors are 
relevant: 
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• the likelihood and degree to which the privileged information will benefit the 
federal body’s investigation; 
• whether the information sought can be obtained in a timely and complete 
fashion by using alternative means that do not require waiver; 
• the completeness of the voluntary disclosure already provided; and 
• the collateral consequences to a corporation of a waiver. 
6.73 If a prosecutor determines that there is a legitimate need, the prosecutor must 
seek the least intrusive waiver necessary to conduct a complete and thorough 
investigation, and should follow a step-by-step approach to requesting information. 
The memorandum divides information sought into two categories:  
• Category I—includes purely factual information such as witness statements, 
factual interviews, memoranda, organisation charts, factual chronologies and 
factual summaries. It also includes contemporaneous legal advice when an 
organisation is asserting the ‘advice of counsel’ defence and legal advice falling 
under the crime-fraud exception to the privilege. 
• Category II—includes other privileged attorney-client communication, such as 
legal advice given to the corporation before, during or after the underlying 
misconduct. It extends to attorney notes, memoranda or reports containing 
counsel’s mental impression and conclusions, legal determinations as a result of 
internal investigation or legal advice given to the corporation.  
6.74 Before obtaining Category I information, the prosecutor must get written 
authorisation from the US Attorney who must consult with the Assistant Attorney 
General of the Criminal Division. Category II information only can be obtained in ‘rare 
circumstances’ when purely factual information provides an incomplete basis to 
conduct a thorough investigation, and approval from the Deputy Attorney General is 
required.102 
6.75 The ABA regards the McNulty Memorandum as a ‘modest improvement’ on the 
previous policy, but remains concerned that the changes have not gone far enough. 
According to ABA President Karen Mathis:  
the new guidelines fall far short of what is needed to prevent further erosion of 
attorney-client privilege … instead of eliminating the improper department practice of 
requiring companies to waive privileges in return for cooperation credit, the new 
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policy merely requires high-level department approval before waiver requests can be 
made.103  
6.76 It is important to note that these matters in the US deal with information 
obtained voluntarily as part of a regulator’s leniency policies and not pursuant to the 
coercive information-gathering powers that are being considered as part of this Inquiry. 
Nonetheless, the distinctions drawn as to when there is a legitimate need for privileged 
material in an investigation are instructive for the purposes of this Inquiry. 
Is abrogation or modification necessary or desirable? 
6.77 In IP 33, the ALRC posed a number of questions about whether abrogation or 
modification of client legal privilege was necessary or desirable. The comments in 
submissions and consultations highlighted the following concerns: that greater 
efficiency or effectiveness are not principled reasons for abrogation of the privilege; 
and that abrogation of the privilege would have an undesirable effect on the legal 
advice provided by lawyers and, therefore, on compliance. However, a number of 
submissions expressed the view that there was a limited set of special circumstances in 
which there was an overriding public interest in the availability of otherwise privileged 
material. 
Would abrogation or modification achieve greater efficiency or effectiveness? 
6.78 ASIC submitted that an abrogation or modification of the client legal privilege 
rules would achieve greater efficiency or effectiveness in the work of some federal 
investigatory agencies, including Royal Commissions, because it would assist agencies 
and Royal Commissions to understand ‘a transaction that is not obvious on its face, and 
ultimately assist in quicker resolution of some investigations’.104 
6.79 The CDPP submitted that it is particularly concerned about the impact that 
claims for client legal privilege can have on investigatory agencies’ powers of 
investigation under search warrants and the prosecution process in general:   
It has become apparent to this office that the making of claims for legal professional 
privilege over documents during the execution of search warrants can be used as a 
tool to impede and delay the criminal investigation. Once a claim for legal 
professional privilege is made over the document, the document is essentially 
removed from consideration in the investigation until the claim for legal professional 
privilege is resolved. This can have the effect of denying the investigator access to 
crucial evidence in the investigation of criminal offences for substantial periods of 
time.105   
                                                        
103  American Bar Association, ‘Thompson Memo Changes Not Enough, ABA Says’ (Press Release, 
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104  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. 
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6.80 The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) made a submission in similar terms: 
There are cases where claims of the privilege have delayed, undermined and 
frustrated ongoing criminal ACC investigations and operations. Unless the parties 
cooperate, a claim of privilege over documents which the ACC wishes to see has the 
effect of putting those documents out of the agency’s reach for significant periods. 
Where the ACC becomes tied up in protracted litigation, there may be a need to 
reassess and redirect its investigations. This can be exploited by others and used as a 
delaying tactic.106 
6.81 However, a significant number of submissions did not agree that modification or 
abrogation of the privilege would achieve greater efficiency or effectiveness in the 
work of federal investigatory agencies.  
6.82 The Law Council of Australia (Law Council) stated that while there may be 
some cases where there has been delay and frustration, this is a minority of cases, and 
greater evidence should be required before modification or abrogation of a 
fundamental right was proposed.107 It did not accept the proposition that the 
effectiveness of federal investigations is hampered or diminished by client legal 
privilege. 
The Law Council wishes to emphasise, in responding to this question, that greater 
efficiency and effectiveness of investigation are not the only interests to be weighed 
in the balance. Nor are they the most important. Other interests to be weighed are the 
proper administration of justice and individual civil rights. A proper balancing of 
these interests must be achieved in each particular category of investigation in 
question.108 
6.83 A number of submissions agreed that efficient resolution of claims was more 
likely to be of assistance to agencies than modification or abrogation of the privilege 
doctrine.109 
If the Commonwealth is concerned about inefficiencies arising from claims of 
privilege then it should focus its efforts on developing a fast track method for 
adjudicating those claims rather than stripping people of fundamental rights.110 
What would be the other effects of abrogation? 
6.84 The Law Council argued that the most likely consequence of abrogation of 
privilege would be a major change in the manner in which legal work is carried out, 
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with possible negative consequences for the documentation of certain activities, 
particularly in commercial contexts.  
Even with the protection of privilege, clients are often reluctant to tell their lawyers 
the whole story. Without the assurance that communications will remain confidential, 
clients will become even more reluctant to speak openly. Such a fear about speaking 
openly is counter-productive to the provision of legal advice.111 
6.85 Others agreed that if a client were concerned about the consequences of legal 
advice, they would brief their lawyer orally (rather than in writing) and ask that advice 
be given verbally as well.112   
6.86 The Law Council submitted that this was the experience of several practitioners 
during the period between the Full Federal Court decision and the High Court decision 
in Daniels:  
while appeals in relation to Daniels were underway, the ACCC was urging 
corporations to adopt compliance programs that included systems of internal reporting 
of potential contraventions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and subsequent 
consultation with legal advisers. During that period, corporations and individual 
employees were reluctant to implement such reporting systems due to concerns that 
documents created with the intention of securing compliance, but with a dominant 
purpose of obtaining legal advice, would be used by the ACCC against the 
corporation. Accordingly, clients were reluctant to seek legal advice (or at least 
written advice) during that period.113  
6.87 In contrast, ASIC observed that, having accessed and reviewed legally 
privileged material following the decision in Yuill, there was no discernible decrease 
after Yuill in the extent to which legal advice was sought and obtained by the entities 
that ASIC regulates. It noted, however, that this impression is not based upon any 
empirical study.114 
6.88 Community legal centres shared a concern about the impact that modification 
could have on their clients.115 One centre submitted that: 
Abrogation of client legal privilege could result in communications between lawyer 
and client no longer being confidential. This would have a huge impact on the way 
clients seek legal advice, and could result in a lower standard of access to justice.116 
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6.89 Fitzroy Legal Service stated that the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth), 
which removes client legal privilege in relation to AFP investigations into serious 
terrorist offences,117 has left lawyers uncertain about what kind of advice to provide to 
clients facing AFP investigations and reluctant to commit to written instructions.118 
6.90 The Law Council also noted that abrogation could discourage overseas 
companies from doing business in Australia.119  
Is abrogation appropriate for some bodies? 
6.91 The weight of submissions was that no different rationale for client legal 
privilege was evident in relation to federal investigatory bodies as a whole, nor should 
particular ‘categories’ of body be exempt.120 The Australian Institute of Company 
Directors (AICD) submitted that ‘the fundamental basis for client legal privilege does 
not change merely because of the function undertaken by particular agencies at any 
point in time’.121 
6.92 Another submission stated that arguments based on the seriousness of the 
function of an agency—for example, enforcement functions compared with auditing 
functions—are not convincing.  
Arguably, the more serious the function, the more important the function to the 
general public, but also the more significant are the consequences of the investigation 
to the person or corporation being investigated.122 
6.93 ASIC, however, took the view that any abrogation or modification of client legal 
privilege in relation to a body’s information-gathering and enforcement powers should 
be made based upon specific consideration of those powers, the persons and entities 
subject to them, and the areas and markets that are being regulated.  
The decision to abrogate must reflect a balancing of the public interest that underpins 
client legal privilege as against other public interests, such as in having all relevant 
evidence available during an investigation and/or hearing of a proceeding. Where this 
balance lies depends on many factors, including the role and function of the 
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Commonwealth body, the subject matter of its jurisdiction, the outcomes that are 
expected from that body and the role of the body within our economic and social 
structure. In ASIC’s view this should be considered on a body-by-body basis.123 
6.94 With respect to ‘watchdog’ bodies, such as the Inspector-General of Intelligence 
and Security (IGIS) and the Commonwealth Ombudsman, where client legal privilege 
had already been expressly abrogated, submissions noted that the focus of such bodies 
on the public accountability of government provides an appropriate logic for 
abrogation of privilege. 
6.95 For example, the IGIS submitted, in support of the powers currently given to his 
office under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) (IGIS 
Act), that adequate accountability of government entities is vital for several reasons.  
These are neatly encapsulated in a quotation from the publication Accountability in 
the Commonwealth Public Sector by the Management Advisory Board and its 
Management Improvement Advisory Committee, No 11, June 1993: 
Accountability is fundamental to good governance in modern, open societies. 
Australians rightly see a high level of accountability of public officials as one 
of the essential guarantees and underpinnings, not just of the kinds of civic 
freedoms they enjoy, but of efficient, impartial and ethical public 
administration. Indeed, public acceptance of government and the roles of 
officials depends upon trust and confidence founded upon the administration 
being held accountable for its actions. 
Given the importance of ensuring the proper accountability of public bodies, a strong 
argument can be made out to limit or remove the possibility of entities claiming client 
legal privilege when being lawfully reviewed by other parts of the executive arm of 
government. 124 
6.96 The Commonwealth Ombudsman agreed that the ability to access an agency’s 
legal advice is of significant practical importance and necessary for the Ombudsman’s 
statutory role to be satisfactorily fulfilled. For example, the legal advice given to an 
agency about the interpretation of its legislation may form part of the ordinary 
documentary background needed to understand fully the issues in a case.125 
Royal Commissions 
6.97 There were various submissions about whether client legal privilege should be 
abrogated in the context of Royal Commissions. Overall, there was support for 
abrogation of privilege in the case of public inquiries of public importance, such as 
Royal Commissions.126 As was noted in the submission of the Human Rights and 
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Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), ‘there are some circumstances where the 
public interest in abrogating client legal privilege may be greater than the individual’s 
interest in maintaining the privilege’. 127 
6.98 In contrast, the NSW Bar Association argued strongly against abrogation of 
client legal privilege in a ‘forum-specific’ manner, namely for Royal Commissions or 
other public inquiries.128 Against the proposition that the establishment of a Royal 
Commission presupposed a ‘countervailing public interest in the pursuit of truth’, the 
NSW Bar Association submitted that: 
This assumption, however, would be deeply flawed. Royal Commissions and Special 
Commissions of Inquiry are discretionary creatures of executive government, not 
triggered by, or subject to, independent constitutional or legislative requirements. As 
Scott Prasser observes:  
the executive government origin of public enquiries and their ad hoc quality 
poses special problems in explaining why, and predicting when, an inquiry 
will be appointed. A significant difficulty is that full access to all of the 
reasons for appointing a particular inquiry is not available to the public. 
Further, public inquiries are usually appointed under a range of motivations, 
including short-term political expediency entwined with the obtaining of more 
expert advice or expediting and even promoting community participation.129 
6.99 The ACCC also disagreed that there was a stronger rationale for the abrogation 
of the privilege in relation to Royal Commissions. In its view ‘the public interest in 
effective investigation and enforcement of the law is equally in the public interest’.130 
6.100 The IGIS drew a distinction between Royal Commissions that were 
‘inquisitorial/investigatory’ and those of a ‘policy advisory’ nature.131 With respect to 
the former, he commented that: 
Such Royal Commissions will have been established because there is a matter of 
substantial public interest/concern. A great deal of public monies is usually expended. 
Ascertaining the truth is the fundamental purpose of having the Royal Commission. 
Such Royal Commissions are relatively unusual and abrogation of privilege would not 
impact to any significant degree on the instrumental rationales for client legal 
privilege—it would be most surprising if the possibility of a Royal Commission was 
on people’s ‘mental horizon’ when conducting their affairs and obtaining legal advice. 
In any case, the public interest in Royal Commissions ascertaining the truth should be 
paramount.132 
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6.101 The IGIS expressed the view that Royal Commissions concerned mainly with 
policy issues, in contrast, ‘should not, in practice, need to access material of the sort 
which might raise issues of client legal privilege’.133 
6.102 The Law Council noted that there are fundamental differences between ordinary 
federal investigatory bodies and Royal Commissions. These include that Royal 
Commissions are: 
• established under the executive arm of government, and derive their functions 
from their terms of reference which are issued by the Australian Government, 
whereas the powers and functions of bodies such as ASIC, ACCC and the ATO 
are established by an Act of Parliament with a standing brief; 
• often established in response to political pressures and therefore may have a 
greater sense of urgency;  
• not directed at building evidence for the purpose of prosecution. In some cases, 
prosecution or investigation may follow their recommendations, but 
prosecutions are not a direct consequence of the inquiry.134 
6.103 Given the support in submissions in response to IP 33 for the abrogation of 
client legal privilege in Royal Commissions, the ALRC proposed in DP 73 that where 
a Royal Commission has been established to investigate a matter of public concern, 
Parliament should consider in each case whether client legal privilege should be 
abolished.135 This proposal was based on the public interest in arriving at the truth in 
these special circumstances and would allow for the interests of justice in particular 
matters to be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
6.104 In relation to other investigations undertaken by federal bodies, the ALRC 
proposed that abrogation should never be wholesale across an agency, but rather 
should be enacted by Parliament as special legislation on the basis of a particular 
investigation.136 
6.105 The ALRC’s preliminary view was that consideration of whether or not it is 
appropriate to abrogate client legal privilege should be based on a specific set of public 
interest criteria. In determining how the interests of justice should be balanced, the 
ALRC was influenced by the recommendations contained in the Queensland Law 
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Reform Commission’s (QLRC) report on Abrogation of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination137 and the approach taken in the McNulty Memorandum in the US.  
6.106 The proposed factors to be considered in determining whether abrogation could 
be justified were: 
• the nature and gravity of the matters under consideration, including whether the 
issue is one of major public importance that has a significant impact on the 
community in general or on a section of the community. Without limiting the 
matters that might be considered of major public importance, this could include 
investigations, including covert investigations, into allegations of major criminal 
activity, organised crime or official corruption; serious misconduct by a public 
official; or matters of national security. Abrogation also may be appropriate 
where issues involve dangers to human life or human health; very serious 
damage to property or the environment; or significant economic detriment; 
• whether the information sought can be obtained in a timely and complete way 
by using alternative means that do not require abrogation of client legal 
privilege; and especially 
• the likelihood and degree to which the privileged information will benefit the 
Royal Commission or investigation, particularly where the legal advice itself is 
central to the issues being considered. This should involve consideration of 
whether the information obtained as a result of abrogation of the privilege will 
advance the relevant public interest in the ‘truth’ being established.138  
Submissions and consultations 
6.107 The ALRC’s proposal received mixed reactions. Many submissions and 
consultations argued that, given its importance, client legal privilege never should be 
abrogated. Others submitted that client legal privilege should be abrogated for only 
certain agencies or powers, and not on an investigation by investigation basis. Finally, 
some submissions supported the ALRC’s proposal to construct a principled basis for 
determining when client legal privilege should be abrogated, but questioned whether 
this was best achieved through enactment of the principles in an act of general 
application. 
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Client legal privilege should never be abrogated 
6.108 The Law Council reiterated its view that it does not believe that it is necessary to 
abrogate client legal privilege in any circumstances, submitting that: 
• no empirical case has been made to justify the abrogation of the privilege in 
Royal Commissions, covert investigations, or in any other federal investigation; 
• the public interest rationale for the privilege (as described by the ALRC) creates 
a stronger presumption against abrogation than exists for privileges and 
immunities based solely on individual rights; 
• there has been no complaint that client legal privilege has prevented the truth 
from ultimately being reached in federal investigations and Royal Commissions, 
rather, concerns have chiefly arisen because of delays and a lack of clear 
policies and procedures; and 
• the effect of abrogation is very difficult to quantify and therefore there is no 
basis for reaching a view that the behaviour of those seeking advice has not been 
affected in those circumstances where the privilege is already abrogated.139 
6.109 The Law Society of NSW also strongly opposed any abrogation of the privilege. 
In its view: 
The restrictions on abrogation identified by the ALRC (such as ‘special 
circumstances’, ‘major public importance’, ‘significant impact on the community’ 
etc) will prove to be illusory and paper thin. If Parliament wanted to abrogate or 
modify privilege for a particular purpose, or to satisfy a particular enquiry, it would 
do so taking a pragmatic and not necessarily principled view.140 
6.110 The Australian Corporate Lawyers Association (ACLA) expressed concern that 
the ALRC’s approach to abrogation of the privilege on an investigation by 
investigation basis was too ‘open ended’ and would have the effect of a large scale 
winding back of the privilege.  
It is important that clients at the time of seeking confidential advice have sufficient 
certainty that their advice will remain confidential. That certainty is undermined if at 
some future time a ‘major investigation’ or a Royal Commission could override the 
confidentiality of those communications.141 
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6.111 Civil Liberties Australia (ACT) Inc (Civil Liberties Australia)  submitted that it 
does not follow (as suggested by the ALRC’s proposal) that abrogation of the privilege 
may be more readily justified when an investigatory body or court is dealing with 
matters of major public importance, ‘rather, it will often be the case that the more 
serious the matter, the more important the retention of the privilege becomes’. In 
circumstances of serious crime, it submitted that the greater public interest lies in 
protecting rights and a citizen’s access to a fair trial.142 
Royal Commissions 
6.112 The Australian Financial Markets Association was supportive of the proposal to 
allow Parliament to abrogate privilege, but expressed the view that this only should 
occur in the case of Royal Commissions, which would be presided over by a former 
judicial officer.143 
6.113 The Law Council disputed the ALRC’s contention that the particular nature of 
Royal Commissions meant that they should have greater access to all available 
material. 
Moreover, the Law Council is not aware of any Royal Commission in which it is 
claimed that the truth was not ultimately reached. Despite concerns that client legal 
privilege claims by AWB Ltd delayed proceedings by several months, Commissioner 
Cole made several findings and recommendations concerning the conduct of AWB 
Ltd and its officers. Commissioner Cole did not claim in any part of his final report to 
the Commonwealth that he did not ultimately obtain all information necessary to 
make his findings and recommendations. Nor did Commissioner Cole suggest that 
information or documents properly subject to client legal privilege may have assisted 
in more serious findings against AWB Ltd and its employees/directors. Accordingly, 
the chief complaint in the AWB Inquiry was that client legal privilege claims delayed 
proceedings.144 
Difficulties with abrogation for particular investigations  
6.114 ASIC accepted the reasoning behind the ALRC’s proposal, although it 
considered that there are compelling public policy and practical reasons to abrogate 
client legal privilege generally in relation to the exercise of its coercive powers. 
However, ASIC expressed concern about the efficiency of the proposal in practical 
terms. In its view, investigations could be prejudiced by the delay that would be 
occasioned by having to seek the enactment of legislation to abrogate privilege for 
those investigations.145  
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6.115 The ACCC also argued that allowing Parliament to legislate in relation to a 
particular investigation was not a realistic option. 
Major investigations are commonly subject to severe time constraints, as well as 
being highly sensitive and confidential. It would simply not be practical for an agency 
such as the ACCC to seek an abrogation, via Parliamentary processes, in relation to an 
investigation.146 
6.116 APRA remained of the view that abrogation of client legal privilege for 
confidential non-curial investigations reflects an appropriate balancing of public 
interests. APRA also argued that the factors proposed for the abrogation for particular 
investigations or Royal Commissions are impractical. In APRA’s view, the factors  
proposed would make it virtually impossible to get legislation passed abrogating the 
privilege in a time frame that would assist the investigation or Royal Commission.  
It is unlikely to be possible to demonstrate that the factors are satisfied until an 
investigation has already commenced. Given the time lag to get legislation passed the 
investigation or Royal Commission will either be substantially complete or 
substantially delayed before the legislation is enacted.147  
6.117 The ACC told the Inquiry that the application of the privilege has resulted in 
protracted and complex litigation in relation to the special investigations undertaken by 
it and that complete or partial abrogation of the privilege would be the appropriate 
solution to these problems.148 The ACC shared the ACCC’s view that securing 
parliamentary authority for particular investigations would not work in the context of 
ACC special investigations which are often subject to time pressures and necessary 
secrecy.149 
6.118 The CDPP submitted that it preferred a legislative model that abrogates 
privilege in respect of the exercise of certain powers that are conferred for the purpose 
of inquiries or investigations, rather than particular investigations. It argued that the 
parameters of an investigation may not be fully known when it commences and thus it 
would be difficult to know in what respect privilege was abrogated.150 
6.119 The AFP submitted that, as a general proposition, it did not support the 
application of client legal privilege to investigations.151 
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6.120 ITSA argued that client legal privilege should be abrogated under the 
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), to the extent that it would prevent a proper investigation of 
a debtor’s ‘examinable affairs’ (as defined in the Act) for the benefit of creditors.152 
The proposed criteria 
6.121 A number of submissions and consultations expressed the view that there was a 
risk the proposed criteria could act as a ‘road map’ for governments seeking reasons to 
abrogate privilege, rather than as a set of conditions that must be met before abrogation 
could be considered.153 The Law Council considered the criteria of ‘special 
circumstances’ a ‘nebulous phrase’. It also expressed concern that if covert 
investigations were expressly identified as one type of investigation that could warrant 
abrogation, then the legislation would be creating an expectation that client legal 
privilege will routinely be abrogated in those contexts.154  
6.122 The NSW Bar Association agreed that the term ‘special circumstances’ was 
insufficient to indicate that privilege should only be abrogated in the most exceptional 
circumstances.155 
6.123 The Law Council further argued that in the case of Royal Commissions, the 
significant public pressure and need for political expediency would mean that 
governments will adopt a standard practice of abrogating privilege whenever a Royal 
Commission is established.156 In the Law Council’s view, the legislation should require 
Parliament to consider where agency practices to expedite the resolution of privilege 
claims have been unsuccessful, meaning that procedures to resolve privilege claims 
should be considered before abrogation is looked at as an option.157 
6.124 The Law Council also disagreed with the second criterion proposed by the 
ALRC. In its view, the requirement for Parliament to consider ‘whether the 
information sought can be obtained in a timely and complete manner using alternative 
means’ rendered it easy to conclude that the information is not appropriately available 
by alternative means.158 
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6.125 Allens Arthur Robinson argued that, when coupled with political and regulatory 
pressure, ‘that road map and the proposed considerations will lead to Parliament 
legislating to abrogate privilege more frequently’.159 
Binding Parliament 
6.126 A number of submissions and consultations expressed reservations with the 
proposal on the basis that setting out criteria by which Parliament may decide to 
abrogate client legal privilege under future acts is an attempt prospectively to restrain 
the legislative power of future parliaments, and thus may be unconstitutional.160 As a 
general principle of law, Parliament cannot be bound by, nor can it bind, a future 
Parliament.161  
ALRC’s views 
6.127 As discussed in Chapter 2, and above, the majority of submissions and 
consultations in this Inquiry endorsed the retention of the doctrine of client legal 
privilege in the context of federal investigations.  
6.128 In IP 33, the ALRC asked questions to try to gauge the possible effect of 
abrogation of client legal privilege on the provision of legal services and on 
compliance. It was strongly contended in submissions and consultations that 
abrogation would have negative consequences in terms of clients not seeking legal 
advice or seeking only oral or undocumented advice. 
6.129 It is hard to assess accurately the extent to which these claims are correct. In 
Carter v Northmore Hale Davy & Leake, Toohey J argued that the effect on openness 
of any inroad into client legal privilege is not something capable of assessment—
although it must be taken into account.162 The availability of client legal privilege has 
been so universal163 that there are few examples that would allow the ALRC to predict 
confidently the effects of abrogation. ASIC has asserted that, despite privilege arguably 
being abrogated by implication under the ASIC Act, corporations still seek legal advice 
on the corporations law. The ALRC was told, however, that many lawyers practising in 
the corporations law area dispute ASIC’s claim that privilege is abrogated and advise 
their clients not to produce privileged material.164  
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6.130 Auburn suggests that the scope of the privilege has changed a number of times 
over the centuries with little apparent effect on lawyer-client relations, citing the 
changes in Australian law before and after Baker v Campbell.165 This may, however, be 
an overstatement of the effect of Baker v Campbell, as there is argument about whether 
it was a major shift in the law or simply a recognition of what many assumed was the 
common law position.166  
6.131 Kendall has suggested that most arguments in favour of abrogation presume that 
the communication would take place regardless of whether privilege exists. In his 
view, in the absence of compelling empirical evidence that the existence of client legal 
privilege has no effect on client disclosures, it is unjustified to assume that there would 
be no effect.167 The ALRC has been unable to locate any significant Australian or 
British empirical studies on client legal privilege. As noted above, empirical studies on 
privilege and confidentiality in the US have proven to be inconclusive. 
6.132 In Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties in 
Australia (ALRC 95), the ALRC recommended that, as a default position and in the 
absence of any clear, express statutory statement to the contrary, client legal privilege 
should exist in relation to all forms of inquiry by any regulator.168 In ALRC 102, the 
ALRC affirmed this approach, and argued that abrogation only should occur where 
Parliament had considered and debated the circumstances where client legal privilege 
should not be available.169 
6.133 These views have been confirmed again by the findings of this Inquiry. As 
outlined in Chapter 2, the ALRC supports the doctrine of client legal privilege as a 
fundamental principle of common law that facilitates compliance with the law. The 
ALRC agrees with the findings of the Dawson Review—that, in the course of ordinary 
enforcement and investigatory activities, the importance of the privilege in 
encouraging compliance overrides the benefits of abrogation to the regulator.170 As 
such, any wholesale abrogation of the privilege in relation to federal investigations is 
not supported. 
6.134 While a case can be made that client legal privilege claims do frustrate and 
delay investigations, the ALRC agrees with the views expressed in submissions and 
consultations that efficiency and effectiveness of investigations are not in themselves 
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sufficiently good reasons for abrogation of the privilege. The frustrations evident in the 
examples given to this Inquiry by the CDPP may be seen to be due largely to a lack of 
clear processes for resolution of claims, rather than a fundamental problem with the 
doctrine itself. 
6.135 The ALRC’s view is that federal bodies could achieve greater efficiency and 
effectiveness in relation to claims of client legal privilege by addressing the significant 
issues and problems associated with the practices and procedures for making and 
resolving claims in federal investigations. These matters are addressed in Chapter 8. 
6.136 Given the general support for the operation of the privilege, the ALRC has 
considered whether there may be any particular circumstances in which abrogation is 
appropriate. 
6.137 In ALRC 95, the ALRC noted that:  
In the field of regulation, one crucial public interest is securing effective compliance 
or prosecutions. The policy question for the legislature is to decide in what 
circumstances public interest considerations should overrule human rights protection, 
and whether the regulation of particular activities mandates different 
considerations.171 
6.138 As noted in Chapter 2, client legal privilege is not best described as an 
individual human right; rather it is facilitative of a broader, general right of access to 
justice. In this sense, client legal privilege is not a balancing of a private right against 
the public interest, but rather the balancing of two public interests. Therefore, the 
ALRC agrees with the view expressed by Brennan J in Baker v Campbell that client 
legal privilege already largely encompasses a balancing of the competing public 
interests.172 
6.139 However, many submissions argued that the abrogation of client legal privilege 
was appropriate in very limited circumstances, where a higher public interest may 
exist. A number of commentators have expressed the view that ‘invoking a language of 
rights does not per se … make out a case for absolutism’.173 
6.140 The ALRC acknowledges the need to provide certainty within the doctrine. In 
Attorney-General v Kearney, Dawson J stated that: 
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The policy which lies behind the doctrine views unrestricted communication between 
a lawyer and client upon professional matters as being necessary for the proper 
functioning of our legal system. If inroads could be made upon the privilege in 
individual cases by involving a ‘higher public interest’ its application would become 
uncertain and the policy behind it would be effectively undermined.174 
6.141 There is, however, already some level of uncertainty in the operation of the 
privilege, because of the exclusionary rules.175 When clients seek legal advice, they 
cannot know that, later, their privilege may be waived because of their actions, or that 
confidentiality may be breached in some other way.176 Therefore, the fact that the 
privilege may not apply in some particular examples of federal investigations is 
unlikely to result in the ‘chilling effect’ feared by lawyers. It is the broader, overall 
application of the privilege that will promote client candour.  
6.142 The ALRC is of the view that abrogation should only be legislated in 
circumstances in which there is a higher competing public interest in the availability of 
otherwise privileged information. This must be something considerably greater than 
the ordinary investigatory interests of a federal agency.  
6.143 The ALRC has identified three examples where a higher public interest may 
warrant abrogation of the privilege: major investigations which fit specified criteria; 
Royal Commissions; and the oversight of public sector agencies. 
Major inquiries 
6.144 In this Inquiry, the ALRC has identified 42 federal bodies that have coercive 
information-gathering or related powers. As a general proposition, it is clear that most 
of those agencies do not require access to privileged material in order to perform their 
investigatory or enforcement functions. Amongst the agencies which responded to the 
ALRC’s request for information regarding their coercive information-gathering 
powers, however, the ACCC, ASIC, and APRA argued that abrogation of the privilege 
was necessary in order for them to perform some of their functions.177  
6.145 In Chapter 5, the ALRC expresses the view that the assessment of whether or 
not abrogation or modification of the privilege is warranted in a particular case should 
be undertaken with reference to consistent criteria, regardless of whether the 
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investigation or inquiry is being undertaken by a federal investigatory body or a Royal 
Commission. 
6.146 It is not only Royal Commissions or special inquiries that undertake 
investigations of public importance and significance. Complex investigations with 
important social and economic ramifications are also undertaken by federal agencies 
such as the ACCC, ACC, ASIC and APRA. While not routinely dealing with matters 
where legal advice is central to the issues under consideration, other agencies may 
nonetheless conduct investigations into matters of public importance in which issues of 
access to privileged material may arise.  
6.147 A further important criterion is whether the material which would be covered by 
client legal privilege goes to the very heart of the issues under consideration. For 
example, it was reported that the Victorian Director of Public Prosecutions has asked 
the ACC to investigate potential criminal conduct by lawyers in the British American 
Tobacco litigation.178 In this case, claims of client legal privilege could affect severely 
the ability of the ACC to investigate these allegations—although it should be noted that 
the privilege belongs to British American Tobacco and not its lawyers. This is 
consistent with the views expressed by ASIC and the ACCC in submissions to this 
Inquiry, that legal advice may be central to determining whether there has been 
misconduct. 
6.148 As noted above, in determining how the interests of justice should be balanced, 
the ALRC has been influenced by the recommendations contained in the QLRC’s 
report on Abrogation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination179 and the approach 
taken in the McNulty Memorandum in the US. The ALRC supports the view of the 
QLRC that: 
If it cannot be demonstrated that information obtained as a result of the exercise of 
coercive powers is likely to significantly protect or advance the relevant public 
interest, it is unlikely that the abrogation would be justified. Conversely, if it is clear 
that the abrogation is likely to substantially promote the public interest, it is more 
likely that the abrogation can be justified.180 
6.149 The ALRC acknowledges that there may be some practical difficulties with the 
proposal to abrogate client legal privilege through an act of Parliament on an 
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investigation by investigation basis. This particularly will be the case where the 
investigation is a covert one or involves a matter of urgency. Nonetheless, the ALRC 
does not consider that a case has been made out for a need to abrogate privilege on a 
body-by-body basis. In many cases, given the complexity of legislation which is 
administered by these agencies, the compliance rationale would tip the balance in 
favour of protection of the privilege rather than against it. The balance should depend 
upon the issue under investigation—including whether the issue is one of major public 
importance that has a significant impact on the community. For example, in the context 
of the James Hardie inquiry, it was argued that: 
a thorough investigation of the conduct of James Hardie, with proceedings brought 
where misconduct is found, is essential to maintaining community confidence in the 
Australian corporate regulatory regime.181 
6.150 There should also be scope for privilege to be abrogated on the basis of a 
particular information-gathering power of a federal body. One exception to the 
argument above is the effect of client legal privilege on the major criminal 
investigations undertaken by the ACC. As noted in Chapter 4, the ACC has a range of 
coercive powers, including covert powers, which are used where ordinary law 
enforcement methods are considered unlikely to be effective. The ACC Board 
determines the use of these powers.182 Chapter 8 discusses the complex issues that arise 
where a federal body is undertaking a covert investigation and notifying the target to 
allow an opportunity to claim privilege would be likely to prejudice that investigation. 
The ALRC is of the view that reforms to practice and procedure cannot adequately or 
completely address such circumstances, and that particular difficulties of covert 
investigations should be one of the relevant factors considered by the Australian 
Parliament in deciding whether to abrogate client legal privilege in a particular case. 
With respect to the ACC, these powers are available when the Board determines that 
the relevant criminal activity warrants a special investigation.183 In many 
circumstances, these types of crimes will fall under the matters of public significance 
discussed below as warranting abrogation. On this basis, the ALRC is of the view that 
Parliament should consider abrogating client legal privilege under the special 
investigation provisions of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth). 
6.151 The ALRC has taken account of the concerns expressed in submissions and 
consultations that the proposed factors to be taken into consideration in determining 
whether the privilege should be abrogated could be viewed as a ‘checklist for 
abrogation’. Given the importance the ALRC has placed on maintenance of the 
                                                        
181  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 December 2004, 1 (P Costello—
Treasurer), 1. 
182  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2005–06, 10; Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 
(Cth) ss 4, 7C. 
183  Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth), 7C. 
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privilege,184 and the recommendation made in Chapter 5 that client legal privilege 
should always be deemed to apply in the absence of clear words to the contrary, it is 
the ALRC’s view that it should be clear that abrogation only should be considered in 
exceptional circumstances (as opposed to ‘special circumstances’ in the original 
proposal). The ALRC also notes that, while there may be concerns that the factors 
could be a ‘road map for abrogation’, Parliament may presently legislate to abrogate 
privilege with no principled criteria articulated on which to base that decision. 
6.152 The ALRC acknowledges that a legislative provision stating the basis on which 
a future Parliament could choose to abrogate client legal privilege would potentially 
raise the difficulty of ‘entrenchment’. With some exceptions for constitutional 
provisions, it is generally the case that: 
A legislature cannot bind itself—whether as to subject matter or the manner and form 
of legislation—unless it is directed or empowered to do so by some ‘higher law’, that 
is, some (logically and historically) prior law not laid down by itself.185 
6.153  The federal client legal privilege legislation recommended in Chapter 5 should 
therefore largely deal with the issues of practice and procedure outlined in Chapter 8, 
and not the criteria for abrogation. To make this position clearer, the ALRC has made a 
recommendation below which outlines the exceptional circumstances under which 
Parliament could consider abrogation of the privilege, but has not recommended that 
they be included in legislation. 
6.154 Again, to emphasise the importance of the privilege, the ALRC has amended the 
final criteria to require consideration of the degree to which a lack of access to the 
privileged information will hamper or frustrate the operation of the investigation, 
rather than the degree to which the investigation would be assisted by the availability 
of the information. The ALRC believes that this will more clearly articulate to policy 
makers the need to abrogate privilege only where an investigation will be hampered to 
a significant degree. 
Recommendation 6–1 In accordance with Recommendation 5–2, in the 
absence of any clear, express statutory statement to the contrary, client legal 
privilege should apply to the coercive information-gathering powers of federal 
bodies. However, where the Australian Parliament believes that exceptional 
circumstances exist to warrant a departure from the standard position, it can 
legislate to abrogate client legal privilege in relation to a particular investigation 
undertaken by a federal investigatory body, or a particular power of a federal 
investigatory body.  
                                                        
184  See Ch 2. 
185  O Phillips, Constitutional and Administrative Law (5th ed, 1973), 75. 
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Any such legislative provision should take into account the following factors in 
determining whether client legal privilege may be abrogated: 
(a)  the subject of the investigation, including whether the inquiry concerns a 
matter (or matters) of major public importance that has (or have) a 
significant impact on the community in general or on a section of the 
community, or is a covert investigation;  
(b)   whether the information sought can be obtained in a timely and complete 
way by using alternative means that do not require abrogation of client 
legal privilege; and especially 
(c)  the degree to which a lack of access to the privileged information will 
hamper or frustrate the operation of the investigation and, in particular, 
whether the legal advice itself is central to the issues being considered by 
the investigation. 
Royal Commissions  
6.155 The ALRC considers that a strong case can be made to abrogate client legal 
privilege in some Royal Commissions. As canvassed above, the discovery of the truth 
has been described as a prime function of a Royal Commission.186 Royal Commissions 
are established only where a particular area of public concern has been identified for 
which the usual investigations and proceedings would not suffice, and their purpose is 
to determine factual circumstances, report on the matters specified in the Letters Patent 
and make recommendations.  
6.156 Client legal privilege is presently abrogated for Royal Commissions in New 
South Wales and Victoria. The ALRC received no evidence suggesting that this 
abrogation of the privilege in those jurisdictions had led to any problems. 
6.157 The Law Council suggested in its submission to DP 73 that even though the 
ALRC has not heard any suggestions that there have been significant issues following 
the abrogation of the privilege in Royal Commissions in those states, 
there is simply no basis or foundation for reaching a view that that the behaviour of 
those seeking legal advice has not been affected, or that their willingness to either 
seek advice or disclose relevant information has not been diminished.187 
                                                        
186  T Cole, Report of the Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme (2006), Vol 1, [7.66]. 
187  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007. 
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6.158 The ALRC finds the argument difficult to sustain that clients are not seeking 
legal advice or being free and frank with their lawyers on the basis that the subject 
matter on which they seek advice may, in the future, be the subject of a Royal 
Commission. In the ALRC’s view, the rarity and seriousness of a Royal Commission is 
quite different from the ordinary operation of a regulator’s powers, where a client is 
likely to be mindful that, for example, the ATO could be interested in their tax 
arrangements. 
6.159 The ALRC agrees, however, with the submission of the IGIS and the comments 
of Commissioner Cole in the AWB Royal Commission, that the subject matter of every 
Royal Commission will not require abrogation of the privilege. Consistent with the 
importance of the privilege, abrogation should be minimised and limited to 
circumstances where it is both necessary and beneficial to a successful outcome for a 
particular Royal Commission.  
6.160 Rather than a blanket abrogation of the privilege for Royal Commissions, the 
ALRC accepts the submission of the NSW Bar Association that consideration should 
be given to the importance of the public interest to which the information in question 
relates and whether abrogation reasonably could be expected to advance or protect that 
public interest. 
6.161 In DP 73, the ALRC considered whether abrogation should be contemplated as 
part of the establishment of a Royal Commission through the Letters Patent (as 
recommended by Commissioner Cole), or through an individual Act of Parliament that 
abrogates the privilege in relation to a particular Royal Commission (a similar 
approach to the James Hardie inquiry).  
6.162 The ALRC’s preliminary view was that, given the importance of the privilege, 
any circumstances where client legal privilege is not to be available should be 
considered and debated by Parliament.  
6.163 However, the ALRC recognises that there are practical and procedural 
difficulties with this approach. For instance, Royal Commissions are often established 
as a matter of some urgency and it may not be possible for legislation to be passed in 
the time frame required for the Commission to commence its work.  
6.164 The ALRC also has been persuaded that, as Royal Commissions are essentially 
part of the function of the Executive arm of government, it is more appropriate for the 
Executive to have the discretion to determine when and how privilege should apply to 
a particular Commission. The ALRC therefore endorses the recommendation of 
Commissioner Cole, that there should be capacity in the Royal Commissions Act to 
permit the Governor-General, by Letters Patent, to determine that, in relation to the 
whole or a particular aspect of matters the subject of inquiry, client legal privilege 
should not apply. The criteria by which this should be determined should be the same 
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criteria as that on which abrogation could be deemed appropriate in other 
investigations, as outlined in Recommendation 6-1. 
Recommendation 6–2 In accordance with Recommendation 5–2, in the 
absence of any clear, express statutory statement to the contrary, client legal 
privilege should apply to the coercive information-gathering powers of federal 
bodies. However, the Australian Parliament should amend the Royal 
Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) to allow that, in exceptional circumstances, the 
Governor-General may, as part of the Letters Patent establishing the Royal 
Commission, state that it is not a reasonable excuse for the purposes of 
subsection 3(2B) or (5) of the Act for a person to refuse or fail to produce a 
document on the basis that the document is subject to client legal privilege. 
The following factors should be taken into account in deciding whether client 
legal privilege may be abrogated: 
(a)  the subject of the Royal Commission of inquiry, including whether the 
inquiry concerns a matter (or matters) of major public importance that has 
(or have) a significant impact on the community in general or on a section 
of the community;  
(b)  whether the information sought can be obtained in a timely and complete 
way by using alternative means that do not require abrogation of client 
legal privilege; and especially 
(c)  the degree to which a lack of access to the privileged information will 
hamper or frustrate the operation of the Royal Commission and, in 
particular, whether the legal advice itself is central to the issues being 
considered by the Commission. 
Government accountability 
6.165 The ALRC agrees with the current policy of abrogation of client legal privilege 
for bodies which focus on the public accountability of government. As noted above, 
submissions to this Inquiry argued that adequate accountability of government entities 
is vital to ensure the proper functioning of democratic institutions. The rationales for 
the privilege of protecting the citizen against the incursions of the state and promoting 
compliance are not justifications for protecting advice received by a government body 
from investigation by an agency charged with ensuring its accountability.  
6.166 Under the IGIS Act, a person is not excused from giving information or 
producing a document on the ground that it would disclose legal advice given to a 
 6. Modification or Abrogation of Privilege? 277 
 
Minister, an agency, or an authority of the Commonwealth.188 A similar provision 
exists under s 9(4)(ab) of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) and s 96(1) of the Law 
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth). 
6.167 In IP 33, the ALRC expressed the view that these provisions only appear to 
cover the advice arm of the privilege, and that a claim for client legal privilege would 
seem to excuse a person from giving information or producing a document if the 
document fell within the litigation limb of the privilege.  
6.168 In submissions, both the IGIS and the Commonwealth Ombudsman expressed 
concern about this limitation. The IGIS submitted that privilege in respect of the 
litigation arm also should be abrogated expressly. 
There could well be occasions when the Inspector-General should, to properly achieve 
the stated objectives of the IGIS Act, examine the compliance of agencies with the 
Legal Services Directions issued by the Attorney-General pursuant to section 55ZF of 
the Judiciary Act 1903. There has been significant growth in the number of litigation 
actions to which ASIO is a party or otherwise involved.189 
6.169 The Commonwealth Ombudsman also agreed that this limitation would have the 
capacity to constrain an Ombudsman investigation as it may excuse an agency from 
explaining to the Ombudsman how it planned and conducted litigation, even if the 
litigation is or would have been connected to a matter subject to investigation.190 
6.170 HREOC submitted that s 24(3) of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission Act 1986 (Cth) also should be amended, as it is cast in similar terms to the 
legislation above. Whilst HREOC does not use its coercive information-gathering 
powers frequently as a matter of practice, there are conceivable circumstances in which 
HREOC may wish to seek an agency’s legal advice, such as in the context of a national 
inquiry into a human rights issue.191 
6.171 The ALRC agrees that there is no reason why a distinction should be drawn 
between litigation and advice privilege for the purpose of abrogation in these 
circumstances. The ALRC considers that the IGIS Act, the Ombudsman Act 1976 
                                                        
188  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) s 18(6)(b). A similar provision also exists 
in the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 24(3), however, HREOC has 
advised this Inquiry that it does not consider that client legal privilege is abrogated under its Act, and that 
it does not seek legal advice as part of its investigatory functions: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission, Submission LPP 28, 4 June 2007. 
189  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission LPP 22, 1 June 2007. The IGIS noted, 
however, that any abrogation in respect of litigation should not extend to any situation where both an 
agency and the Inspector-General are parties to a particular action, while recognising that such a situation 
was unlikely. 
190  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission LPP 47, 12 June 2007. 
191  Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Submission LPP 99, 2 November 2007. 
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(Cth), and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act should be 
amended to indicate that both arms of the privilege are covered by the abrogation. 
Recommendation 6–3 The Australian Parliament should amend the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth), the Ombudsman 
Act 1976 (Cth) and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 
1986 (Cth) to state that where client legal privilege cannot be claimed over legal 
advice given to a Minister, an agency or an authority of the Commonwealth, this 
abrogation applies to litigation privilege as well as advice privilege.  
Review  
6.172 A central theme of this Report is that many of the difficulties associated with 
claims of client legal privilege in federal investigations could be solved or alleviated if 
there were greater transparency and clearer guidelines and procedures, while still 
respecting the fundamental principle of client legal privilege. 
6.173 However, the ALRC considers that the new federal client legal privilege 
legislation should include provision for a later review of the effectiveness of its 
provisions relating to the procedures for making and resolving privilege claims in 
federal investigations. That review should take place five years after the legislation 
comes into force. If significant issues related to the operation of client legal privilege 
claims still exist, thought should be given to whether there is a need for abrogation of 
the privilege to be reconsidered. 
6.174 Given the significance of abrogation and the general desirability of maintenance 
of the privilege, the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) should provide that, where 
client legal privilege has been abrogated or modified in a Royal Commission, the 
Commissioner must include within the report consideration of the degree to which the 
abrogation or modification has facilitated the effectiveness of the Royal Commission. 
This will help ensure that claims of the need for abrogation continue to be open to 
scrutiny and debate.192 
                                                        
192  It is noted there is some precedent for this approach. Following amendments that abolished derivative use 
immunity under s 597 of the Corporations Law, the (then) Australian Securities Commission was 
required to report to the Attorney General about the extent to which, and in what ways, the amending 
provisions assisted it in carrying out investigations and gathering information: see Ch 7. 
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Recommendation 6–4 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide that, five years after it comes into force, a review is to be conducted of 
the effectiveness of its provisions relating to the procedures for making and 
resolving privilege claims in federal investigations. 
Recommendation 6–5 The Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) should 
provide that, where client legal privilege has been abrogated or modified in a 
Royal Commission, the Commissioner must include within the report 
consideration of the degree to which the abrogation or modification has 
facilitated the effectiveness of the Royal Commission. 
Other possible models of modification 
Documents not related to representation 
6.175 At common law, unless abrogated expressly or by necessary implication, the 
privilege against self-incrimination applies to any documents that an individual is 
required to produce.193 However, some case law recognises that some documents can 
be considered to be ‘real evidence’, which is not protected by the privilege. For 
example, in Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (Caltex), 
Mason CJ and Toohey J observed that there was a difference between requiring a 
person to testify as to their guilt, and requiring the production of documents already in 
existence that constitute evidence of guilt.194 
6.176 In Caltex, McHugh J cited Lord Templeman in Istel v Tully195 to the effect that: 
it was difficult to see why in civil proceedings the privilege against self-incrimination 
should be exercisable so as to enable a litigant to refuse relevant and even vital 
documents that are in his possession or power and which speak for themselves.196  
6.177 In its report on Abrogation of the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, the 
QLRC found that one of the justifications for abrogation could be, in the case of 
information in documentary form, whether the document was in existence at the time 
the requirement to provide the information was imposed.197  
                                                        
193   Queensland Law Reform Commission, Abrogation of the Privilege against Self-Incrimination: Final 
Report, R 59 (2004), 36. See Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281. 
194  Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477, 493. See also the 
discussion of approaches to the application of immunity (to documents and oral statements) in Ch 7. 
195  Istel v Tully [1993] AC 45, 53. 
196  Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477, 555. 
197  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Abrogation of the Privilege against Self-Incrimination: Final 
Report, R 59 (2004), 62–63. 
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6.178 In the US, pre-existing documents that must be kept as part of a requirement of a 
regulatory scheme, are not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.198 
After considering the US case law, the New Zealand Law Commission similarly 
recommended that the privilege should not apply to pre-existing documents or real 
evidence. The fact that there is no compulsion at the time of creation minimises any 
likelihood of compulsion causing the evidence to be unreliable, or for the information 
to be created from an abuse of power.199  
6.179 In IP 33, the ALRC asked whether a distinction should be drawn in the 
application of client legal privilege between documents or communications that relate 
to the representation of a client once investigation processes commence, and pre-
existing documents. In particular, the ALRC was interested in hearing views about 
whether arguments supporting such a distinction in the context of the privilege against 
self-incrimination are applicable to client legal privilege.200 
Submissions and consultations 
6.180 In general, submissions and consultations were not supportive of drawing a 
distinction between communications that relate to the representation of a client once 
investigation processes commence, and pre-existing documents. 
6.181 The Law Council argued that the underlying justifications for the privilege 
against self-incrimination are substantially different from those which underpin client 
legal privilege.  
The characterisation of the privilege against self-incrimination as a human right which 
is effectively designed to prevent a witness or party from causing prejudice to him or 
herself while assisting with enquiries on an unrelated matter makes it appropriate that 
the privilege should be limited to interviews and information given in the course of 
investigations. By contrast, client legal privilege, as a human right, exists in 
recognition of an individual’s need for, and right to, obtain legal advice and 
representation.201 
6.182 ASIC agreed with the premise that the privilege against self-incrimination is 
different from that of client legal privilege—and those principles that form the basis of 
the application of self-incrimination privilege should not be applied to any 
modification of client legal privilege. In ASIC’s view, the principles underlying client 
legal privilege do not provide a basis for distinguishing between its application to:  
                                                        
198  Shapiro v United States 335 US 1 (1948). See also New Zealand Law Commission, The Privilege against 
Self-Incrimination: A Discussion Paper (1996), 61. 
199  New Zealand Law Commission, The Privilege against Self-Incrimination: A Discussion Paper (1996), 
63. 
200  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), Question 6–5. 
201  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. See also Victoria Legal Aid, Submission 
LPP 55, 14 June 2007. 
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• pre-existing documents that are produced during an inquiry or investigation; and  
• oral information concerning pre-existing oral or documentary communications 
that is given during the course of an examination.202  
6.183 The CDPP submitted that although this model was worth considering, a concern 
was how such a model would apply to offences that continue after the investigation 
commences. In such cases, documents and communications could fall within both 
categories, raising the possibility that the claim of client legal privilege in those cases 
may have to be litigated.203 
6.184 Dr Ronald Desiatnik argued that a distinction of this kind would be unworkable, 
since privileged advice after the commencement of an investigation would often relate 
to pre-existing documents. He also argued that such a distinction would  
only serve to ensure the early commencement of the investigations, a myriad of 
questions of what constitutes the start of an investigation process, and unnecessary 
complexities (eg is the person to be dependent on the advice of the investigatory body 
as to when it commenced its investigation, in making a claim for privilege?204 
6.185 ASIC and the ACCC agreed, however, that were client legal privilege to be 
abrogated, this should not include privileged documents and communications that arise 
in the course of an investigation related to a person’s representation in that 
investigation.205 
ALRC’s views 
6.186 The ALRC agrees that a number of practical difficulties arise with this approach 
to modification of client legal privilege. In the case of ongoing unlawful behaviour, 
such as behaviour constituting a breach of a continuous disclosure rule, there may be 
difficulty in determining what is prior conduct or communications for the purpose of 
this rule.  
6.187 The ALRC also agrees that this distinction does not fit with the rationale for 
client legal privilege. If an aim of client legal privilege is to encourage compliance, 
rather than something closer to protecting against self-incrimination, then there is no 
meaningful distinction to be drawn between pre-existing documents and those created 
following the commencement of the investigation.  
                                                        
202  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. 
203  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 61, 12 June 2007. 
204  R Desiatnik, Submission LPP 24, 1 June 2007. 
205  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007; Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. 
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6.188 In cases where client legal privilege is to be abrogated, however, on the basis of 
a higher public interest as outlined above in Recommendations 6–1 and 6–2, then this 
should not extend to documents and communications related to a person’s 
representation in that investigation. This issue is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
Qualified privilege 
6.189 Under the common law, the lawyer-client relationship is the only one in which 
communications are completely protected from disclosure in court. However, the 
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) provides for a ‘qualified’ professional confidential 
relationship privilege.206 In ALRC 102, the ALRC, NSW Law Reform Commission 
(NSWLRC) and the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) recommended that 
the Commonwealth Evidence Act adopt the professional confidential relationships 
privilege, following the model of the New South Wales Act.207 
6.190 Under s 126A of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), a ‘protected confidence’ for the 
purpose of the section means a communication made by a person in confidence to 
another person (the confidant): 
(a) in the course of a relationship in which the confidant was acting in a 
professional capacity, and 
(b) when the confidant was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose 
its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law or can be inferred 
from the nature of the relationship between the person and the confidant. 
6.191 Section 126B provides that:  
(1) The court may direct that evidence not be adduced in a proceeding if the court 
finds that adducing it would disclose: 
 (a) a protected confidence, or 
 (b) the contents of a document recording a protected confidence, or 
 (c) protected identity information. 
(2) The court may give such a direction:  
 (a) on its own initiative, or 
 (b) on the application of the protected confider or confidant concerned 
(whether or not either is a party). 
(3) The court must give such a direction if it is satisfied that:  
                                                        
206  Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) pt 3.10 div 1A. The Norfolk Island Evidence Act 2004 follows the NSW 
model and has a qualified confidential relationships privilege.  
207  Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 102 (2005), Rec 15–1. The Commissions also 
recommended that the confidential relationships privilege should apply to pre-trial discovery and the 
production of documents in response to a subpoena. 
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 (a) it is likely that harm would or might be caused (whether directly or 
indirectly) to a protected confider if the evidence is adduced, and 
 (b) the nature and extent of the harm outweighs the desirability of the 
evidence being given. 
(4) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account for the 
purposes of this section, it is to take into account the following matters:  
 (a) the probative value of the evidence in the proceeding, 
 (b) the importance of the evidence in the proceeding, 
 (c) the nature and gravity of the relevant offence, cause of action or 
defence and the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding, 
 (d) the availability of any other evidence concerning the matters to which 
the protected confidence or protected identity information relates, 
 (e) the likely effect of adducing evidence of the protected confidence or 
protected identity information, including the likelihood of harm, and 
the nature and extent of harm that would be caused to the protected 
confider, 
 (f) the means (including any ancillary orders that may be made under 
section 126E) available to the court to limit the harm or extent of the 
harm that is likely to be caused if evidence of the protected confidence 
or the protected identity information is disclosed, 
 (g) if the proceeding is a criminal proceeding—whether the party seeking 
to adduce evidence of the protected confidence or protected identity 
information is a defendant or the prosecutor, 
 (h) whether the substance of the protected confidence or the protected 
identity information has already been disclosed by the protected 
confider or any other person. 
6.192 Division 1A does not create a true privilege, but allows the court a discretion to 
direct that evidence not be adduced where it would involve the disclosure of a 
protected confidence.208 The court must balance the matters set out in s 126B(4), 
including the probative value of the evidence in the proceeding and the nature of the 
offence, with the likelihood of harm to the protected confider in adducing the evidence, 
and then decide if it is appropriate to give a direction under the section. 
The evidence must be excluded if there is a likelihood that harm would be or might be 
caused, whether directly or indirectly, to the person who imparted the confidence and 
the nature and extent of that harm outweighs the desirability of having the evidence 
given or the documents produced.209 
                                                        
208  Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 126B. See also Wilson v New South Wales [2003] NSWSC 805, [18]. 
209  New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, L Council, 1120 (J Shaw—Attorney General). See S Odgers, 
Uniform Evidence Law (6th ed, 2004), [1.3.11940]. 
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6.193 A qualified privilege acknowledges that it may be in the interests of justice to 
protect the confidentiality of a particular relationship in the context of that matter. The 
fact that the privilege is qualified, and that parties are able to make an argument about 
why the material should be disclosed, allows a judge to exercise discretion and assess 
the interests of justice in the circumstances of each particular case.  
6.194 A qualified privilege could address the need to avoid a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach to the difficulties raised by privilege claims, and may allow for interests of 
justice in particular matters to be considered. In a case like a James Hardie matter or a 
Royal Commission on an issue of public importance, a qualified privilege could allow 
the case to be made for access and those interests to be balanced against the rights of 
the individuals in those matters. A qualified privilege would be in line with the 
recommendation of the AWB Inquiry discussed above, where Commissioner Cole 
indicated that in some cases, depending on ‘the issues the subject of the Royal 
Commission’, the public interest should prevail over the private.210 
6.195 Arguments against the adoption of a qualified privilege include that the 
‘balancing test’ could be difficult to assess in some cases and that such a provision 
cannot guarantee confidentiality. A qualified privilege also creates uncertainty because 
whether or not the privilege applies cannot be known in advance of the court’s ruling 
in each case. Client legal privilege affords an absolute protection because it always has 
been considered to be in the interests of justice that a client knows that certain 
disclosures to a lawyer will remain confidential.  
Submissions and consultations 
6.196 There was little support for a qualified privilege in submissions.211 Keith 
Kendall submitted that the problem with statutorily modifying client legal privilege in 
this fashion is that it is ‘likely to represent the thin end of the wedge’.212 
6.197 The Law Society of NSW argued that there were many practical difficulties with 
the concept. It suggested that there is a difference between the absolute nature of client 
legal privilege (which requires certainty to operate) and other confidential 
relationships. The Law Society also argued that there was a very practical problem that 
such a claim cannot be determined at the investigation stage, and a court would be 
required to rule as to whether the privilege applied or not.213 
                                                        
210  T Cole, Report of the Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme (2006), [7.67]. 
211  Taxation Institute of Australia, Submission LPP 54, 15 June 2007; National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 
52, 13 June 2007; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 12 June 2007; R Desiatnik, Submission 
LPP 24, 1 June 2007. 
212  K Kendall, Submission LPP 57, 31 May 2007. 
213  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
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6.198 This view was shared by the ACCC, which submitted that a qualified privilege 
at the investigation stage is not a practical option, as it would require a court to rule on 
the question of public interest, resulting in potentially significant delays. The ACCC 
also argued that a qualified privilege would not be appropriate once the matter has 
proceeded beyond the investigation stage.  
A situation where privilege applies in an unqualified way at the non-curial stage, and 
in a qualified way at the curial stage would not assist investigations, as the ACCC 
would be unlikely to obtain the evidence required for use in subsequent proceedings 
in the first place.214 
ALRC’s views 
6.199 There are several practical difficulties with adoption of a qualified privilege in 
the context of investigations. Whether a document is privileged or not could not be 
determined at the investigation stage, as it would require a court to rule on the question 
of public interest. This could serve to increase delay and uncertainty in investigations 
for both the agency and the party asserting privilege. 
6.200 If lawyers were bound to tell a client that the court may conduct a balancing test 
on the admissibility of the communications at the time of providing legal advice, this 
could create a ‘chilling effect’ by discouraging candour on the part of clients.215  
6.201 In addition, the undertaking of a ‘balancing test’ in the context of a federal 
investigation is substantially different from that undertaken by a court. The balancing 
exercise undertaken under Division 1A of the Evidence Act is between the public 
interest in having all material available to the court for determination and the private 
harm to the relationship between the confider and his or her adviser. In the context of 
client legal privilege, the balancing test would be between the public interest in 
facilitating the provision of confidential legal advice, and the public interest facilitating 
the investigation of wrongdoing. This balancing test should occur on a principled basis, 
as outlined in Recommendations 6–1 and 6–2. 
6.202 Therefore, the ALRC’s view is that a qualified privilege is not an appropriate 
model for dealing with claims of client legal privilege in the context of federal 
investigations.  
Extension to other professionals 
6.203 Chapter 2 considers the various rationales which are said to underlie the 
operation of client legal privilege. In IP 33, the ALRC asked whether, if a key rationale 
of the privilege is to encourage clients to seek professional advice on their legal rights 
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and responsibilities, the doctrine should be extended to other professionals who, while 
not lawyers, provide what amounts essentially to legal advice.216 
6.204 All of the submissions received by the ALRC in response to IP 33 concentrated 
on the issue of taxation advice and accounting advisers (although some submissions 
that were critical of any extension at times mentioned other professions). As noted later 
in this chapter, two submissions were received in response to DP 73 nominating 
industrial officers as a group warranting similar protection.217 At present in Australia 
there is no other area where a non-lawyer may give legal advice that is not already 
covered by the privilege. As discussed below, patent attorneys are allowed the 
privilege under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth).218 The Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 
distinguishes between immigration assistance and immigration legal assistance for the 
purpose of marking out the limits of permissible conduct for migration agents who are 
not qualified lawyers.219 
6.205 In this Inquiry, the ALRC has not considered the more general issue of 
extending privilege to all other professional communications. In the report on Uniform 
Evidence Law, the ALRC, the NSWLRC and the VLRC supported adoption of a 
general qualified confidential relationships privilege that would cover other categories 
of confidential communications.220 The present Inquiry is focused on the operation of 
client legal privilege in relation to federal investigatory bodies. While the ALRC will 
not be making broader recommendations on the extension of the privilege in other 
areas, it is within the Terms of Reference to look at client legal privilege in the 
particular context of federal investigations, and appropriate to consider whether 
privilege logically should be extended to clients who receive legal advice from other 
professionals that may fall within the ambit of federal coercive information-gathering 
powers. 
‘Legal’ privilege 
Why lawyers? 
6.206 Whenever the question of client privilege arises for consideration, a natural 
question is to consider why the ‘privilege’ should apply only to the confidential 
relationship of lawyer and client and not to other confidential relationships. As early as 
1597 Francis Bacon provided the following explanation for why the privilege should 
be one in relation to lawyers, not others: 
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The greatest trust between Man and Man is the trust of Giving Counsel: For in other 
confidences Men commit the parts of Life; their Lands, their Goods, their Children, 
their Credit, some particular Affair: but to such, as they make their Counsellors, they 
commit the whole, by how much the more they are obliged to all faith and integrity.221 
6.207 The Law Reform Committee of England and Wales, in considering privilege in 
civil proceedings in 1967, offered the following reasoning for protecting lawyer-client 
relationships, rather than other relationships: 
What distinguishes legal advice from other kinds of professional advice is that it is 
concerned exclusively with rights and liabilities enforceable in law, ie in the ultimate 
resort by litigation in the courts or in some administrative tribunal. It is, of course, 
true that on many matters on which a client consults his solicitor he does not expect 
litigation and certainly hopes that it will not occur; but there would be no need for him 
to consult his solicitor to obtain legal advice unless there were some risk of litigation 
in the future in connection with the matter upon which advice is sought. As Lord 
Brougham pointed out, it is to minimise that risk by ensuring that he so conducts his 
affairs as to make it reasonably certain that he would succeed in any litigation which 
might be brought in connection with them, that the client consults his solicitor at 
all.222 
6.208 In Baker v Campbell, the High Court endorsed this logic: 
The restriction of the privilege to the legal profession serves to emphasise that the 
relationship between a client and his legal adviser has a special significance because it 
is part of the function of the law itself. Communications which establish and arise out 
of that relationship are of their very nature of legal significance, something which 
would be coincidental in the case of other confidential relationships.223 
Beyond lawyers? 
6.209 State and territory legislation traditionally has restricted ‘legal work’ or ‘legal 
practice’ to qualified lawyers holding a current practising certificate.224 Indeed, 
unauthorised legal practice amounts to an offence.225 However, there are now express 
exceptions to this rule, including ‘legal practice engaged in under the authority of a law 
of ... the Commonwealth’—for example, work of a legal nature performed by licensed 
tax agents and registered patent attorneys.226  
                                                        
221  F Bacon, ‘Of Counsel’ The Essays, or, Counsels, Civil and Moral of Sir Francis Bacon (1691 ed) 53. The 
collection of essays was first published in 1597.  
222  Law Reform Committee of England and Wales, Privilege in Civil Proceedings (1967), 9; cited in 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence, ALRC 26 (1985), 495. 
223  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 128. Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence, ALRC 26 
(1985), [877]; Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 102 (2005), [14.43]–[14.48]. 
224  See, eg, Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 14. See also Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 
National Legal Profession Model Bill (2006), s 2.2.2(1). 
225  Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 14(1). 
226  Ibid s 14(2)(a). 
288 Privilege in Perspective  
 
6.210 Legal practice has been defined in one case as: 
the advising of a particular person in a particular situation and the production of a 
document which affects legal rights and is tailored to the particular needs of that 
person.227 
6.211 As ‘lawyers’ work’, in the nature of advice on legal matters, is now performed 
by others, should client legal privilege apply in such circumstances and, if so, to what 
extent?228  
6.212 The ‘compliance rationale’ for client legal privilege is discussed in Chapter 2—
that is, clients can obtain the fullest legal advice only where the lawyer is in possession 
of all relevant facts, so the protection of communications encourages greater 
compliance with the law as the client is in the best position to be informed about what 
does (and does not) amount to complying conduct. This rationale has led some 
regulatory bodies, both in Australia and overseas, to adopt various measures to extend 
a privilege or concession to other professionals whose advice falls within these types of 
regulatory frameworks. 
Comparative examples 
United States 
6.213 The widespread expansion of accounting firms into the arena of legal advice 
prompted the US Congress to pass legislation in 1998 amending the Internal Revenue 
Code to extend client legal privilege to federally authorised tax practitioners.229 Section 
7525 of the Code provides that: 
With respect to tax advice, the same common law protections of confidentiality which 
apply to a communication between a taxpayer and an attorney shall apply to a 
communication between a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax practitioner to 
the extent that the communication would be considered a privileged communication if 
it were between a taxpayer and an attorney. 
6.214 ‘Tax advice’ is given the broad meaning of ‘advice which is in the individual’s 
authority to practice’.230 Some limitations are applied to the privilege. For example, the 
privilege may only be asserted in non-criminal tax matters brought by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) or in a Federal Court.231 It has no application to state matters. It 
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also does not apply to any communications regarding participation in a corporate tax 
shelter.232 
6.215 Concerns have been raised, however, regarding the scope of s 7525. The IRS 
has the discretion to choose civil or criminal action, giving rise to concerns about 
whether the availability of the privilege could influence that choice, and what happens 
if a civil proceeding becomes a criminal one at a later date.233 There is also uncertainty 
about the definition of ‘tax advice’, as there are no clear guidelines as to the 
appropriate responsibilities of tax professionals. It has been suggested that the section 
should be construed as meaning that communications only will be protected if they 
would have been covered by client legal privilege if made by a client to a lawyer.234  
New Zealand 
6.216 In June 2005, the New Zealand Inland Revenue Department followed the US 
example and enacted a new statutory privilege for opinion on tax law by registered tax 
practitioners. This extension was aimed at ‘promoting the efficient conduct of 
compliance with the law by allowing tax practitioners who give opinions on tax law to 
have a candid relationship with their clients’.235 
6.217 The New Zealand scheme works as follows: 
• The privilege applies only to opinions on tax law given at any time (whether 
before or after the filing of a tax return in respect of a tax period) by members of 
approved professional bodies. 
• The privilege applies only if claimed by the taxpayer and only in respect of 
identified documents and information.  
• If a document includes both an opinion on tax law and other information, the 
whole document will have to be provided, with any proper deletions of the 
material consisting solely of the opinion on tax law being clearly identified in 
the document. The balance of any document consisting of material that was not 
an opinion on tax law would not be privileged. 
• If the Inland Revenue disputes the validity of a privilege claim, the privilege 
does not apply unless the claimant applies within one month for the 
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determination by a District Court of what part, if any, is privileged because it is 
an opinion on tax law. This requires the taxpayer to provide the unedited 
document to the court for review. 
• The privilege does not apply to advice designed to promote illegal activities; 
however it is not restricted to civil proceedings.236 
6.218 Unlike the US model, the New Zealand approach does not use client legal 
privilege as the basis for the privilege.237 Kendall argues that the US model of tying the 
tax privilege to common law client legal privilege means that any developments in the 
common law will affect the application of the provision. The New Zealand model 
deliberately separates the statutory tax privilege from the common law of client legal 
privilege so this consequence will not follow.238 
United Kingdom 
6.219 In the United Kingdom (UK), s 20B of the Tax Management Act 1970 (UK) sets 
out the privilege for a tax adviser against the powers of the Inland Revenue Department 
to call for relevant documents belonging either to a taxpayer whose affairs are under 
scrutiny or to others. Under the provision, a tax adviser (who can be ‘any person 
appointed to give advice about the tax affairs of another person’) cannot be obliged to 
make available to tax authorities documents that are the adviser’s property, and consist 
of communication between the adviser and either the client or another tax adviser of 
the client, the purpose of which is the giving or obtaining of tax advice.  
6.220 The legislation sets out further exceptions in s 20B(11)–(12) for documents that 
contain information: explaining any tax return, accounts or other documents which the 
adviser has assisted the client in preparing for the tax authorities; or giving the identity 
or address of the taxpayer under investigation or any agent of the adviser, where this is 
not already known. 
6.221 The new Legal Services Act 2007 (UK),239 makes a number of changes to the 
regulation of the legal profession, including permitting new business structures to be 
introduced into the legal services market—‘alternative business structures’—allowing 
consumers to obtain legal services from a business entity employing both lawyers and 
non-lawyers. The Act allows clients of an alternative business structure to have the 
same privilege in their communications with authorised non-lawyers who provide legal 
                                                        
236  Taxation Administration Act 1994 (NZ) s 20B. 
237  K Kendall, ‘Prospects for a Tax Advisors’ Privilege in Australia’ (2005) 1(3) Journal of the Australasian 
Tax Teachers Association 46, 62. 
238  Ibid, 63. 
239  The Act was passed on 30 October 2007. 
 6. Modification or Abrogation of Privilege? 291 
 
advice within the practice as if they had received legal services from a lawyer.240 The 
Act is a response to a number of reports produced in Britain looking at the efficiency 
and regulation of legal services and concern about unjustified restrictions of 
competition in the legal services market.241 
6.222 Section 330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (UK) was amended to extend the 
ambit of client legal privilege to non-legal professional advisers, such as accountants, 
auditors and tax advisers. Section 330 creates a criminal offence of failure to disclose 
money laundering for persons in a regulated sector where that person has reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that another person is engaged in money laundering, and that 
information came to a person in the course of business in the regulated sector. Under 
this Act, legal advisers and ‘other relevant professional advisers’242 are exempt from 
the requirement to disclose the information where it was received in privileged 
circumstances.243  
Australia 
6.223 In Australia, as a general rule, only qualified lawyers may give legal advice.244 
However, there are some exceptions to this, for example, tax agents who are registered 
with the Tax Agents’ Board may give advice on Commonwealth taxation law.245 
Registered patent attorneys also may give advice on patents law.246 
6.224 In recognition of the type of advice offered by tax agents, and the benefits to 
compliance of free and frank advice, the ATO has issued an administrative guideline 
which allows certain types of advice prepared for the purpose of advising a client on 
taxation matters to be kept confidential between taxpayers and their professional 
accounting advisers. The ATO’s Access and Information Gathering Manual states that: 
While recognising that the Commissioner has the statutory power to access most 
documents, he accepts that there is a class of documents which should, in all but 
exceptional circumstances, remain confidential to taxpayers and their professional 
accounting advisors. In respect of such documents, the Tax Office acknowledges that 
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taxpayers should be able to consult with their professional accounting advisors to 
enable full discussion in respect of their rights and obligations under tax laws and for 
advice to be communicated frankly.247 
6.225 This approach is widely described as ‘the accountants’ concession’.248 Similar to 
client legal privilege, the concession is available for advice prepared by an external 
professional accounting adviser who is independent of the taxpayer.249  
6.226 Documents which record a taxation transaction or arrangement entered into by a 
taxpayer are considered ‘source documents’ and not covered by the concession. These 
include: 
papers prepared in connection with the conception, implementation and formal 
recording of a transaction or arrangement and which explain the setting, context and 
purpose of the transaction or arrangement.250  
6.227 Examples of source documents include ledgers, journals, working papers for 
financial statements, profit and loss accounts, balance sheets and documents 
comprising a permanent audit file. Such documents will be freely sought by ATO 
officers. Some advice papers which are created contemporaneously with a relevant 
transaction or arrangement, may themselves represent a record of what has actually 
occurred because they shed light on the transaction or arrangement. These types of 
documents are considered ‘restricted source documents’ and will only be sought by the 
ATO in exceptional circumstances.251 
6.228 Advice that is prepared solely for the purpose of advising a client on matters 
associated with taxation are covered by the concession, except where the advice forms 
an integral part of the conception or implementation of a transaction or arrangement. 
This is significantly more limited than client legal privilege, where the dominant 
purpose test applies. 
6.229 The concession is also available for documents that are advice or advice papers 
that are ‘non-source documents’—meaning, for example, that they do not materially 
contribute to an understanding of the client’s tax strategy or relate to advice on 
arrangements that the tax payer has not put into place.  
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6.230 Documents that otherwise would be covered by the concession may be 
requested by the ATO in exceptional circumstances. Under the ATO’s Guidelines to 
Accessing Professional Accounting Advisors Papers,252 senior ATO officers are 
authorised to approve the lifting of the concession where it has been claimed and the 
ATO is unable to ascertain from the documents provided ‘the facts necessary to 
determine the taxation consequences of the particular transactions or arrangements’.253 
The concession may also be lifted in other circumstances where, for example, there are 
reasonable grounds to believe a fraud or evasion has taken place. Where a 
determination is made that exceptional circumstances exist, the ATO officer must give 
the person a copy of the decision to lift the concession. A decision under the ATO 
Guidelines is not reviewable under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 
1977 (Cth).254  
6.231 Again, this concession provides the taxpayer with less protection than would be 
the case with client legal privilege, as privilege applies regardless of the 
circumstances.255 Kendall has noted that, as the Guidelines do not have the backing of 
statute, they do not provide additional legal rights to taxpayers—although they do 
create a legitimate expectation that the ATO will adhere to their terms.256 
6.232 Patent attorneys are also afforded a privilege under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). 
Section 200(2) of the Act states that ‘a registered patent attorney has the same extent of 
privilege over communications with their client in intellectual property matters as is 
afforded in ordinary solicitor-client relationships’.  
Scope of the concessions 
6.233 While the above arrangements resemble client legal privilege, their scope is far 
more restricted. They are based on one of the rationales of client legal privilege: 
namely, that allowing the free flow of information between client and adviser improves 
understandings of legal rights and responsibilities and promotes compliance. It has 
been argued by accountants and others that it should flow logically that, where legal 
advice is being provided by another professional person, such advice should also be 
given some protection from disclosure.257  
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Submissions and consultations  
6.234 In IP 33, the ALRC asked whether the doctrine of client legal privilege should 
be extended to other professionals who, while not lawyers, provide what amounts 
essentially to legal advice.258 
6.235 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA) submitted that, 
given the extension of privilege in other jurisdictions, the fact that Australia has not yet 
adopted a formal legislative framework extending client legal privilege to tax advice or 
opinions on tax law, ‘suggests it is out of step with global concepts on tax 
administration and commercial reality’. The ICAA recommended enactment of a 
statutory regime recognising client legal privilege for accountants and tax agents which 
would ‘be on an equal footing to client professional privilege currently afforded to 
lawyers in respect of curial and pre-curial contexts’.259 
6.236  This view was shared by the Corporate Tax Association, which submitted that 
changes to the role of taxation advisers over time needed to be recognised. 
It needs to be borne in mind that the doctrine of legal professional privilege was 
developed many centuries ago, at a time when the provision of legal advice was the 
sole providence of lawyers. There was no accounting profession as such, with the role 
of bookkeepers confined mainly to the keeping of accounts and producing of non-
public accounting reports. Moreover, there were few, if any, complex revenue laws 
about which people or entities needed advice. Much has changed over time, not only 
in relation to the complexity of business and related laws and regulations, but also to 
the provision of advice. Indeed, it has been the recognition by the ATO of the 
essential role played by the taxation profession that the administrative access 
guidelines … were developed. A number of other countries have recognised this 
anomaly, and have enacted what amounts to statutory legal professional privilege for 
taxation advisers.  
Given that the Commonwealth taxation law specifically authorises registered tax 
agents to provide legal advice on Commonwealth taxation law, the CTA submits that 
there is a compelling case for Australia to follow the lead of countries such as the US, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom in this respect.260 
6.237 The Australian Financial Markets Association argued that it is important to 
recognise that the privilege is that of the client, not that of their lawyer or accountant 
who provides tax advice.  
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In this context, we believe clients should be given the choice between a lawyer and 
accountant for tax advice on matters that should be covered by client legal privilege. 
It is especially important that clients like small businesses and individuals should have 
access on this basis to accountants with whom they are more likely to have formed an 
ongoing client/adviser relationship over time. It is also important for business more 
generally that the market for privileged advice is not limited to a relatively small 
number of advisers and that they have a reasonable capacity to rely on internal advice 
for this purpose.261  
6.238 Kendall submitted that the rationale of client legal privilege is not about the 
protection of client confidences per se, but ensuring that the legal system is able to 
function properly. This proper functioning is best served when legal advisers, as the 
bridge between persons subject to the legal system and the legal system itself, are fully 
apprised of the relevant facts. Therefore, the compliance rationale can be extended to 
the accounting profession, where, in practice, tax accountants play the same role as 
lawyers.262 
6.239 Other stakeholders did not support any extension of the privilege beyond 
lawyers.263 This view was based primarily on two reasons: first, that the rationale of the 
privilege depends on the giving of ‘legal advice’, which only should be given by 
lawyers;264 and secondly, that other professionals were not subject to the same 
accountability as lawyers. The Law Council, while not commenting on the merits of 
extending the privilege, noted that: 
The acts of lawyers are subject to independent supervision by statutory agencies, as 
well as judicial oversight. In addition, lawyers as officers of the court owe a 
paramount duty to the court and the administration of justice. If privilege were to be 
extended to another profession, consideration needs to be given to whether the 
applicable regulatory regime is comparable to that governing lawyers.265 
6.240 The Law Society of NSW agreed that:  
The fact that lawyers are officers of the Court and owe duties to the Court, imposes a 
degree of control upon the processes by which claims of privilege are made. Lawyers 
can be personally liable for costs incurred in mounting applications without any basis 
for doing so and also subject to professional misconduct procedures. These potential 
threats impose a degree of care and restraint upon lawyers in relation to making 
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claims for privilege. Similar care may not be exercised by other categories of 
advisors.266 
6.241 The Australian Government Solicitor submitted that the question of what, if any, 
concession should be granted in this area should be characterised not as an extension of 
client legal privilege, but as another head of privilege. Such a ‘professional 
relationships’ privilege should be discretionary, as under the Evidence Act.267 
6.242 A number of submissions took the view that any concession in relation to tax 
advice should be provided for in legislation rather than in administrative guidelines. 
For example, the Taxation Institute of Australia submitted that Parliament should set 
the policy, 
rather than there being an administrative guideline which has an exception that results 
in a general belief amongst accountants that the concession will be withdrawn when it 
suits the ATO.268 
6.243 The ICAA agreed that the fact that the ATO can lift the accountants’ concession 
if it considers that ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist is a substantial limitation on its 
operation.269 In its view, the criteria for what amounts to exceptional circumstances are 
broad and ill-defined. The ICAA also criticised the concession on the basis that it has a 
sole purpose test, as opposed to the dominant purpose test under client legal privilege 
law and was critical of the fact that decisions based on the Guidelines were not subject 
to judicial review.270 
Protecting tax advice 
6.244 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that federal client legal privilege legislation 
should provide that a person who is required to disclose information under a coercive 
information-gathering power of a federal body is not required to disclose a document 
that is a tax advice document prepared for that person.271 This proposal was based on 
the New Zealand model, set out above. 
6.245 Under the proposal, a ‘tax advice document’ was defined as a confidential 
document created by an independent professional accounting adviser for the dominant 
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purpose of providing that person with advice about the operation and effect of tax laws.  
It did not include ‘source documents’, such as documents which record transactions or 
arrangements entered into by a person (for example, formal books of account or 
ledgers). It was proposed that the advice had to be provided by an independent 
professional accounting adviser who is a registered ‘tax agent’ for the purpose of 
s 251L(1)(b) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth).272  
6.246 An important feature of the proposal was that privilege claims in respect of ‘tax 
advice documents’ prepared by professional accounting advisers must be certified by 
lawyers (where certification is requested by a federal body). This aspect of the proposal 
is considered in Chapter 8, which deals with requirements for certification generally.273 
Submissions and consultations  
6.247 The proposal in DP 73 was overwhelmingly supported by accounting groups.274 
However, the proposed definition of an ‘independent professional accounting adviser’ 
and the definition of ‘tax advice’ attracted comment. 
Definitions 
6.248 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that an ‘independent professional accounting 
adviser’, for the purpose of claiming the accountant-client privilege, must be a 
registered tax agent under the definition in the Income Tax Assessment Act. It was 
noted in submissions that, in many cases, tax agent registration occurs with the firm of 
accountants, with the principal or others as nominees as opposed to registration of 
individual agents. Nominees may then legally give tax advice under the Act.275  
6.249 It was suggested to the ALRC that the proposal should be amended to allow that 
an independent professional accounting adviser must be a registered tax agent or a 
nominee or employee of a registered tax agent, who is a qualified tax accountant.276 
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6.250 The ALRC also received a number of submissions expressing concerns about 
the proposed requirement that a lawyer certify claims to tax advice privilege, where 
required. These concerns are discussed in Chapter 8. 
6.251 The CDPP argued that accountants giving advice about law, as allowed under 
the Taxation Administration Act, is not the same thing as giving ‘legal advice’. 
An opinion about tax law is only legal advice if it resulted from the application of 
legal skill, but if it did not then it is merely advice.277 
6.252 The ICAA submitted that the definition of a ‘tax advice document’ should be 
amended to include:  
• the client’s communication to the tax agent requesting the tax advice, together 
with any other documents giving instructions in respect of it;  
• drafts or working papers created in the course of preparing advice (but 
recognising the distinction between a ‘tax advice document’ and ‘source 
documents’);  
• a copy, summary or other record of the advice created by the client or another 
party where the advice, if prepared by a lawyer, would be privileged if copied, 
summarised or otherwise recorded; and 
• a record of oral advice whether prepared by the tax adviser or client.278 
6.253 The ICAA further argued that, given that a record of oral advice should be a ‘tax 
advice document’ 
it must follow that neither the tax agent nor the client should be compelled to disclose 
oral advice under questioning under section 264 (1)(b) of the Income Tax Assessment 
Act or under any other Commonwealth statutory power where a lawyer who had 
given the same advice could not be so compelled.279 
Perspective of federal bodies 
6.254 In the CDPP’s view, it is unclear whether a privilege for tax advice documents 
would have the effect of increasing compliance with the law. The CDPP submitted that 
such a privilege would frustrate the detection of revenue fraud and that ‘the detection, 
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prosecution, conviction and punishment of persons who defraud the revenue promotes 
compliance with the law’.280 
6.255 The ATO considered that the current accountants’ concession ‘functions 
effectively and provides meaningful protection to the confidentiality of tax advice 
documents’:  
The Tax Office has not been alerted to any specific evidence (from professional 
bodies, or otherwise) that the concession is not operating effectively in practice, or 
that there is a particular need for the administrative concession to be enshrined in 
legislation. 281 
6.256 However, the ATO agreed with the ALRC’s proposal that a statutory privilege, 
if enacted, should follow a model similar to that currently used in New Zealand. It 
preferred the New Zealand approach of creating a separate privilege for tax advice, 
rather than trying to incorporate tax advice into the category of communications that 
are privileged under client legal privilege, as this would create a number of conceptual 
and practical difficulties.282  
6.257 The ATO noted that New Zealand’s Taxation Administration Act 1994 requires 
certain factual information to be disclosed in respect of a claim for tax opinion 
privilege. For example, people can be required to disclose tax contextual information in 
relation to a tax advice document. The ATO considered that: 
this would be a useful feature to incorporate into any regime that may be introduced 
for tax advice privilege in Australia. The Tax Office is generally uninterested in the 
substance of legal or taxation advice provided to a taxpayer, but often requires access 
to the factual information underlying such advice in order to properly carry out its 
audit activities.283 
6.258 While the ATO agreed with the examples of source documents in DP 73, such 
as transactional documents in the form of ledgers and journals, the ATO considered 
that it would be useful to clarify that source documents (or copies of source 
documents) will not be protected in any circumstances, even where they are given to a 
tax agent for the purpose of obtaining tax advice.284 
6.259 The ATO also suggested that the proposal adopt the section of  the US scheme 
that specifically excludes communications regarding participation in potential tax 
shelters from being protected from production. Otherwise, the ATO considered that 
that: 
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• it would be practically impossible for it to determine whether the privilege 
should apply in relation to advice about a particular taxation scheme without 
being able to access the relevant communications, and 
• the privilege could be misused to facilitate the mass marketing of tax effective 
schemes.285 
6.260 The ATO also asked the ALRC to consider whether it should adopt the current 
limitation in the accountant’s concession whereby the concession can be lifted where 
‘exceptional circumstances’ exist.286 
6.261 APRA expressed no view on the proposal, on the basis that it was restricted to 
tax agents giving tax advice. It opposed any extension of privilege to accountants and 
other finance professionals such as actuaries ‘as APRA’s performance of its 
supervisory functions is dependent on access to such advice’.287 ASIC submitted that, 
although it had concerns about the impact on its investigations, it accepted the 
reasoning underlying the proposal.288 
6.262 The ACC argued that, while the privilege may be helpful in a regulatory context, 
the serious organised crime investigated by the ACC often involves the investigation of 
complex financial arrangements including advice on taxation law. As such, the creation 
of a tax advice privilege would impact on the effectiveness of ACC special 
investigations.289 
6.263 ITSA expressed concern about the extension of privilege to accountants in the 
particular context of investigations into a debtor’s affairs.  
In the ordinary course, a debtor will have had contact with an accountant or financial 
adviser prior to their bankruptcy. Such an adviser may provide information to the 
debtor on methods of transferring assets to avoid their obligations to creditors … If a 
bankrupt were able to claim that these communications were privileged, 
investigations into and successful prosecution of these and other bankruptcy offences 
would be significantly impeded.290 
6.264 The Insolvency Practitioners Association agreed that tax liabilities are often a 
central issue in the insolvency of a company. It opposed the extension of privilege to 
accountants, even if limited as proposed.291 
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6.265 While noting the limitations on the proposed tax advice privilege, namely that 
the privilege would not apply where a tax advice document was created in relation to 
the commission of a fraud or offence, ITSA stated that: 
While those limitations may overcome the potential for bankrupts to claim the 
proposed privilege over documents relevant to bankruptcy offences, they may not 
assist the trustee in relation to the clawback provisions.292 This is because it is not 
necessary to establish ‘fraud’ on behalf of the bankrupt to recover property under the 
provisions.293 
Extension to other professions 
6.266 The ALRC received a number submissions arguing that privilege should be 
extended to other professions as well as tax accountants.  
6.267 The Australasian Compliance Institute expressed the view that records of 
compliance systems required special protection:  
An essential feature of compliance programs is often the preparation of compliance 
reports in respect of compliance failures. In order for these reports to be effective, it is 
necessary that they deal with compliance failures fully and frankly. The Institute notes 
that a difficulty with this is the potential for self-incrimination, as currently these 
kinds of reports are not subject to legal professional privilege. Given the public 
benefits of effective compliance programs, the Institute proposes that there should be 
a rebuttable presumption of privilege protecting an organisation from production to a 
Commonwealth body or a court of reports made by a person for legitimate 
compliance purposes.294 
6.268 Two submissions argued that client legal privilege should be expanded to 
include union industrial officers. The ACTU stated that the case for privilege to be 
extended to industrial officers was equally strong as the case of a tax advice privilege. 
Industrial officers (who may or may not be legally qualified) have a right to appear on 
behalf of unions and their members in the Industrial Relations Court of Australia and 
the Federal Court and Federal Magistrates Court.295 
Thus the situation may arise where an industrial officer may act as counsel in superior 
and inferior courts but his or her advice to his or her ‘client’ and case preparation may 
be required to be disclosed to his or her adversary, but not the other way around if the 
adversary is represented by a legal practitioner.296 
6.269 The ACTU acknowledged the problem that only lawyers (and certain others) 
can give legal advice. However it argued that: 
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This is not an insurmountable problem … if the substance of the advice goes to the 
industrial and employment rights and obligations of the receiver of the advice, and is 
confined to matters over which an industrial officer may litigate or act upon, then that 
is a boundary within which industrial officer advice can be circumscribed. 297 
6.270 The Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (Construction and General 
Division) endorsed the view of the ACTU, arguing that ‘there is no sound policy 
reason why material should have a different status depending on whether the union 
officers were or were not qualified legal practitioners’.298 
6.271 The Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia (IPRIA) argued that the 
meaning of s 200(2) of the Patents Act, discussed above, is unclear. IPRIA stated that 
the meaning of the section has not been judicially explained to date and, in particular, 
expressed concern that a 2004 decision of the Federal Court found that Australian 
patent attorney privilege only attaches to communications between a client and a patent 
attorney registered in Australia, and not an attorney registered overseas.299 
6.272 The Law Council recommended that a further review be undertaken of the need 
to create a different form of privilege for tax advisers and other similar professional 
relationships.300 
ALRC’s views 
6.273 As noted above, in Baker v Campbell, Dawson J justified the restriction of client 
legal privilege to members of the legal profession on the basis that: 
The restriction of privilege to the legal profession serves to emphasise that the 
relationship between a client and his legal advisor has a special significance because it 
is part of the functioning of the law itself. Communications which establish and arise 
out of that relationship are of their very nature of legal significance, something which 
would be coincidental in the case of other confidential relationships.301 
6.274 The ALRC agrees that the purpose of client legal privilege is different from that 
of other confidential relationships. It is not the protection of confidences that creates 
public interest rationale for client legal privilege, but the effect that protection of legal 
advice has on the operation of the legal system. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
the basis of the protection is the promotion of full and frank disclosure for the purpose 
of obtaining legal advice (and legal services in litigation).  
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6.275 The ALRC considers the ‘compliance rationale’ to be a significant part of the 
modern basis for the doctrine of client legal privilege in serving the administration of 
justice. It follows from this reasoning that where legal advice is lawfully being given in 
a similar context by a non-lawyer, then the privilege should extend to the provision of 
that advice as well. As with client legal privilege, the privilege belongs to the client, 
and relates to protection of the legal advice supplied to them, not the profession of 
person providing the advice.  
6.276 Australian taxation law is complex, and the self-assessment system requires tax 
payers to have a good understanding of their rights and obligations before they can 
make an assessment of their tax liability. This justifies why the tax legislation makes 
allowance for accountants to give legal advice on taxation law and the ATO has 
provided an administrative concession to tax accountants. The ALRC is also influenced 
by the fact that, on the basis of this reasoning, tax advice is covered by a privilege 
under US, UK and New Zealand legislation. 
6.277 The ALRC therefore recommends that federal client legal privilege legislation 
should provide that a person who is required to disclose information under a coercive 
information-gathering power of the Commissioner of Taxation is not required to 
disclose a document that is a tax advice document prepared for that person. If the 
ALRC’s recommendation in ALRC 102—that the privilege provisions of the Evidence 
Act be extended to pre-trial proceedings—is adopted, then consideration could be given 
to the inclusion of a similar provision in that Act.302 
6.278 The ALRC supports the New Zealand model of creating a separate ‘tax advice 
privilege’, rather than simply extending client legal privilege to accountants giving tax 
advice. This will allow Parliament greater control over the operation and scope of the 
tax advice privilege. Under the common law, client legal privilege is a dynamic 
doctrine that has adapted and extended over time. Linking an accountants’ advice to 
client legal privilege could lead to extensions of the protection afforded to the advice 
provided by tax accountants that are inconsistent with its rationale. The ALRC also 
considers there should be some additional restrictions placed on the operation of the 
tax advice privilege, which are discussed below.  
6.279 Following the New Zealand model, the dominant purpose test is proposed. This 
means that communications that are made for the dominant purpose of providing tax 
advice will be protected. What constitutes the ‘dominant purpose’ of the advice should 
be determined in accordance with the definition applied in client legal privilege 
matters.303 The ALRC considers that there should be an exception for advice given in 
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furtherance of a crime or fraud, adopting the position in the Evidence Act. The tax 
advice must be confidential. As is the case with client legal privilege, a taxpayer should 
not be able to claim privilege over advice that he or she has not kept confidential. 
6.280 The ALRC supports drawing a distinction between source and advice 
documents, as is presently the case under the current ATO accountants’ concession. 
This is consistent with the principles of client legal privilege, under which privilege 
does not generally attach to evidence of transactions such as contracts or conveyances, 
even where these are provided to a lawyer for advice or for use in litigation.304 The 
ALRC agrees with the submission of the ATO, that the legislation should clarify that 
source documents, will not be protected in any circumstances, even where they are 
given to a tax agent for the purpose of obtaining advice. 
6.281 The ALRC is also supportive of the provision in the New Zealand legislation 
which does not apply the privilege to contextual information provided for the purpose 
of providing tax advice. It should be very clear in the operation of this privilege that 
only the advice itself will be protected, and not any other information that may form 
part of the accountant’s file or briefing. The legislation should state that no privilege 
should apply to ‘tax contextual information’ given for the purpose of providing tax 
advice. ‘Tax contextual information’ should be defined as information about:  
• a fact or assumption that has occurred or is postulated by the person creating the 
tax advice document;  
• a description of a step involved in the performance of a transaction that has 
occurred or is postulated by the person creating the tax advice document; or  
• advice that does not concern the operation and effect of tax laws. 
6.282 In line with submissions received, the ALRC has amended its original proposal 
to allow that an independent professional accounting adviser must be a registered ‘tax 
agent’ or a nominee or employee of a registered tax agent, who is a qualified tax 
accountant.  
6.283 The ALRC notes the concerns expressed by ITSA, that privilege could be 
claimed over an accountant’s advice that would assist in the investigation of 
bankruptcy offences. It further notes the concerns of the ACC regarding the difference 
between regulatory matters and the types of very serious crime it investigates. As 
outlined above, the ALRC is recommending the creation of a privilege for tax advice 
on the basis that it is consistent with the compliance rationale for client legal privilege 
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and can be justified given the complexity of taxation law. The ALRC is, however, keen 
not to replicate the much broader protection offered by client legal privilege and does 
not wish to create barriers to the investigation of offences outside the areas of general 
compliance with taxation laws. The ALRC notes that the US, United Kingdom and 
New Zealand models apply the privilege to the information-gathering powers of the 
Internal Revenue Service (US) and the Inland Revenue Departments (UK and NZ) 
respectively. The ALRC similarly recommends that the tax advice privilege should be 
available only against the information gathering powers of the Commissioner of 
Taxation. This should serve as an appropriate limitation on the operation of the 
privilege and will not affect the investigatory powers of other agencies.  
6.284 The ALRC notes that this could create issues in cross-agency investigations, 
where information gathered by one agency cannot be shared with another. In Chapter 
5, where this issue is discussed, the ALRC expresses the view that while harmonisation 
of privilege rules is desirable, there are difficulties in prescribing a ‘one-size fits all’ 
rule to be applied inflexibly to all federal bodies—regardless of their particular 
exigencies or indeed the exigencies of particular inquiries or investigations. 
6.285 The ALRC has noted the ATO’s support for the adoption of part the US model 
which excludes communications regarding participation in potential tax avoidance 
schemes from being protected. In the ALRC’s view, this kind of advice already should 
be covered by the general fraud or crime exception (which is not a feature of the US 
model). The ALRC understands that there have been some difficulties with this 
provision in the US. Given that most tax advice concerns methods by which tax payers 
can minimise their tax, there has been confusion about the breadth of the exception and 
its meaning.305 
6.286 Claims that a document is a ‘tax-advice’ document for the purpose of the 
privilege must be made in accordance with the procedure set out in Recommendations 
8–3 to 8–15. As noted above, the ALRC has recommended an additional protection 
that a federal body may request that a lawyer certify that there are reasonable grounds 
for a claim of client-accountant privilege. Whether advice meets the dominant purpose 
test is often a matter of some complexity, and should be determined and certified by a 
lawyer rather than an accountant. This additional protection also removes the difficulty 
of whether accounting professional bodies have sufficient sanctions to address 
improper claims, by placing the responsibility for certifying there are reasonable 
grounds for the making of the claim on a lawyer. The details of this additional 
requirement are part of the recommendations on a uniform procedure for claiming 
privilege contained in Chapter 8. Issues regarding the professional accounting bodies 
are also discussed in Chapter 9. 
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6.287 The ALRC has noted the submissions of the ACTU and the CFMEU, but is not 
persuaded at this time that a case has been made to create a privilege for industrial 
officers. Whilst they might represent clients and give information on the law, industrial 
officers are not permitted to give legal advice in the same manner as tax accountants.306 
It is the fact that the same advice can be given by accountants and lawyers on taxation 
law that the ALRC sees as the crucial factor in the extension of privilege to tax advice. 
Similarly, the ALRC does not believe that a case has been made out to protect the 
advice of compliance professionals, especially when a considerable part of that advice 
could involve non-legal considerations. 
6.288 The ALRC also has noted the submission of IPRIA regarding the application of 
client legal privilege to patent attorneys. In the absence of any case law to the contrary, 
the ALRC considers it may be assumed, based on the wording of the Patents Act, that 
the full entitlements of client legal privilege apply to patent attorneys. As it does not 
concern the information-gathering powers of a federal regulatory body, it would be 
outside the Terms of Reference of this Inquiry for the ALRC to comment on the 
availability of the privilege to patent attorneys registered outside Australia. 
Recommendation 6–6 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide that a person who is required to disclose information under a coercive 
information-gathering power of the Commissioner of Taxation is not required to 
disclose a document that is a tax advice document prepared for that person.  
A ‘tax advice document’ should be defined as a confidential document created 
by an independent professional accounting adviser for the dominant purpose of 
providing that person with advice about the operation and effect of tax laws.  
A ‘tax advice document’ does not include ‘source documents’, such as 
documents which record transactions or arrangements entered into by a person 
(for example, formal books of account or ledgers). Source documents, even 
where given to a tax agent for the purpose of obtaining tax advice, will not be 
protected by the privilege.   
An independent professional accounting adviser must be a registered ‘tax agent’ 
for the purpose of s 251A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) or a 
nominee or employee of a registered tax agent, who is a qualified tax 
accountant. 
No privilege should apply to ‘tax contextual information’ given for the purpose 
of providing tax advice. ‘Tax contextual information’ is information about: 
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(a)  a fact or assumption that has occurred or is postulated by the person 
creating the tax advice document; 
(b)  a description of a step involved in the performance of a transaction that 
has occurred or is postulated by the person creating the tax advice 
document; 
(c)  advice that does not concern the operation and effect of tax laws. 
No privilege should apply where a tax advice document is created in relation to 
the commission of a fraud or offence or the commission of an act that renders a 
person liable to a civil penalty; or where the person or the accounting adviser 
knew or ought reasonably to have known that the document was prepared in 
furtherance of a deliberate abuse of power. 
Claims that a document is a tax advice document must be made in accordance 
with the procedures set out in Recommendations 8–3 to 8–5. Resolution of 
claims should be in accordance with the procedures set out in Recommendations 
8–6, 8–7, 8–11 and 8–14. 
Claims that a document is a tax advice document may be required to be certified 
by a lawyer in accordance with the procedures set out in Recommendation 8–3. 
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Introduction 
7.1 The Terms of Reference ask the ALRC to consider whether it would be 
desirable to introduce or clarify statutory safeguards where client legal privilege is 
modified or abrogated, with a view to harmonising any such safeguards across the 
Commonwealth statute book. 
7.2 This chapter considers existing safeguards; those that might be put in place if 
client legal privilege were abrogated or modified; and whether harmonisation of 
safeguards is necessary or desirable. In particular, the chapter raises issues about 
whether restrictions should be placed on the use of privileged communications 
obtained by compulsion, and whether the privilege should remain available against 
third parties. 
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Representation of a client in an investigation 
7.3 A person’s ability to seek and receive legal advice in responding to the coercive 
powers of a federal body is a significant safeguard in ensuring informed compliance 
with the requirements imposed by those powers. Legal advice may prevent a person 
from incurring penalties as a result of non-compliance. Moreover, where a person is 
the target of a federal investigation, representation in that process can help to ensure 
that his or her interests are properly protected and that informed decisions are made 
about how to proceed.1 
7.4 Representing a client in an investigation may involve giving advice about how 
to respond to a notice requiring the production of documents or information; or 
representing a client at a compulsory examination. For example, a person’s lawyer may 
be present during an examination under the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act), and is entitled to address the inspector and 
examine his or her client on matters in respect of which the client has been examined 
by an inspector.2 For the purpose of representing a client in an investigation, a lawyer 
might also take notes of the client’s instructions or prepare a chronology of events.  
7.5 Where privilege is abrogated by express words or necessary implication, there is 
some uncertainty about whether the abrogation covers communications that relate to 
the representation of the client in an investigation or advice given concerning the 
investigation itself—as distinct from privileged communications that relate to the 
actual matter under investigation.  
7.6 Ashley Black has stated that, as a matter of practice, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC) does not typically seek to exercise its 
investigatory powers under the ASIC Act to obtain access to documents relating to the 
representation of a client in an investigation.3  
7.7 However, the ALRC understands that there have been occasions when federal 
bodies have sought access to such documents. Professor Warren Pengilley notes that: 
A conference participant said publicly that the ACCC had issued [a notice under s 155 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)]. This was complied with only to be met by a 
second s 155 notice requesting production of the advice the client was given in 
replying to the first s 155 notice.4 
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7.8 If one accepts the argument that a federal body should be allowed access to 
privileged material in order to achieve greater efficiency in investigations, then it has 
been suggested that this argument is at its: 
• strongest when it concerns access to advice given while events under 
investigation were occurring; and 
• weakest when it concerns access to confidential communications or material 
tending to disclose confidential communications made or prepared for the 
purpose of representing a party in the investigation itself—because this material 
is not, in any sense, part of the ‘matter’ under investigation.5 
7.9 Black has expressed the view that the compulsory disclosure of communications 
relating to the representation of the client in an ASIC investigation would involve a 
fundamental threat to a person’s right to legal representation in connection with an 
investigation.6 Nicholas Korner has also expressed the view that the compulsory 
disclosure of such communications undermines, and is inconsistent with, the right to 
legal representation.7 
7.10 In Commonwealth of Australia v Frost, Ellicot J held that a person who was 
granted leave to appear before a Board of Accident Inquiry pursuant to reg 291(4) of 
the Air Navigation Regulations 1947 (Cth) was entitled to claim client legal privilege 
in relation to documents that were brought into existence for the sole purpose of being 
used to enable legal advisers to represent that person before the Board. Ellicot J 
considered that preserving this type of privilege was an incident of the statutory right to 
legal representation. 
In my opinion, the right to legal representation before the Board, which reg 291(5) 
expressly confers, carries with it the right to claim legal professional privilege. …  
If the person represented could not in strict confidence instruct his solicitor, confer 
with solicitor and counsel, receive advice and obtain and supply to counsel the proofs 
of witnesses for the purposes of his representation before the Board the value of the 
right to representation must be seriously diminished.8 
7.11 Where privilege is abrogated, there is precedent for a distinction to be drawn 
between advice relating to the investigation itself and advice relating to the subject 
                                                        
5  See N Korner, ‘The Role of Procedural Fairness in ASC Proceedings—Do the Rules Go Far Enough?’ 
(Paper presented at Corporations Law Workshop, Wollongong, 18–20 November 1994), 118–119. 
6  A Black, ‘Representation of Clients in Investigations by the Australian Securities & Investments 
Commission’ (2005) (June–August) Commercial Law Quarterly 16, 19. 
7  N Korner, ‘The Role of Procedural Fairness in ASC Proceedings—Do the Rules Go Far Enough?’ (Paper 
presented at Corporations Law Workshop, Wollongong, 18–20 November 1994), 119. 
8  Commonwealth of Australia v Frost (1982) 41 ALR 626, 632, 633. See also Three Rivers District Council 
v Governor and Company of Bank of England [2005] 1 AC 610, mentioned in Ch 3. 
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matter of the investigation. In the context of discussing enforcement of cartel laws in 
Germany, commentators have stated that: 
The concept of legal privilege in Germany is not as broad as under the EU rules. 
Attorney-client communication at the premises of the undertaking under investigation 
is only protected by legal privilege if the communication specifically relates to the 
ongoing investigation (defence correspondence). The [Federal Cartel Office] will 
have full access to advice that was given before the initiation of proceedings relating 
to the conduct under investigation.9 
Submissions and consultations 
7.12 In the Issues Paper in this Inquiry, Client Legal Privilege and Federal 
Investigatory Bodies (IP 33), the ALRC asked if client legal privilege were to be 
abrogated or modified, whether there should be a distinction drawn between privileged 
communications relating to the representation of a client in the investigation process 
(to remain protected from disclosure), and privileged communications that relate to the 
subject matter of the investigation.10  
7.13 In response to IP 33, some stakeholders expressed opposition to such a 
distinction being drawn, on the basis that they opposed any modification or abrogation 
of client legal privilege.11 The Taxation Institute of Australia submitted that, in general, 
no such distinction should be drawn, but that it ‘should depend upon the particular 
circumstances’.12 
7.14 Other stakeholders supported the protection of privileged documents relating to 
the representation of a client in the investigation,13 including on the basis that it was 
important to maintain the integrity of the process.14 The Law Society of New South 
Wales (NSW) submitted that: 
Irrespective of the presence or absence of a right to representation, communications 
relating to advising or representing a client in relation to an investigation should 
                                                        
9  A Rinne, T Siebert and A Walz, The European Antitrust Review 2007: A Global Competition Review 
Special Report—Germany: Cartels (2007) Global Competition Review <www.globalcompetitionre 
view.com/ear/germany_cartels.cfm> at 30 August 2007. 
10  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), Question 6–1. 
11  Victoria Legal Aid, Submission LPP 55, 14 June 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 
4 June 2007; R Desiatnik, Submission LPP 24, 1 June 2007. 
12  Taxation Institute of Australia, Submission LPP 54, 15 June 2007. See also Insolvency and Trustee 
Service Australia, Submission LPP 62, 20 June 2007, which expressed the view that in the context of 
bankruptcy, ‘the circumscribing of the information-gathering powers [under the Bankrutpcy Act 1966 
(Cth)] by reference to the debtor’s ‘examinable affairs’ provides an appropriate balance between the 
disclosure of information which would allow for a full investigation of a debtor’s financial affairs and 
that which would tend to interfere with the conduct of proceedings unrelated to those affairs’. 
13  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007; Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. 
14  D Jackson, J Sheahan and R Kelly, Consultation LPP 32, Sydney, 14 June 2007. 
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remain privileged, notwithstanding any abrogation or modification of privilege so far 
as it relates to the original subject matter.15 
7.15 A number of stakeholders commented on the difficulty—or arbitrariness—of 
drawing a distinction between advice relating to the investigation itself and advice 
relating to the subject of the investigation.16 The Australian Government Solicitor 
(AGS) submitted that, although the distinction appeared ‘generally workable’, 
a practical shortcoming with the distinction could arise where the conduct which is 
the subject of the investigation is on-going, or, at least, where the conduct continues 
after an investigation into it has commenced. Undue subtlety may come into play in 
trying to apply the distinction.17 
7.16 Similarly, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) 
expressed concern about how the distinction would accommodate offences that 
continue after the investigation commences. 
In such cases documents and communications may fall within both categories which 
raises the possibility that the claim of client legal privilege in those cases may have to 
be litigated to determine whether the privilege applies or not.18 
7.17 The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) submitted 
that  it  
would be content with a regime whereby privilege is retained in documents or 
communications relating to the representation of a client from the time the ACCC 
makes the client aware of the investigation. The ACCC realises that where it is 
investigating past conduct, such material is generally not part of the ‘matter’ under 
investigation. Insofar as such material may fall within that description (for example, 
where the conduct is ongoing or for proposed mergers), the ACCC is prepared to 
accept a practical solution whereby, even in these cases, privilege remains available 
from the point where the ACCC makes the client aware of the investigation.19 
7.18 In the Discussion Paper in this Inquiry, Client Legal Privilege and Federal 
Investigatory Bodies (DP 73), the ALRC proposed that federal client legal privilege 
legislation should provide that, if another federal statute expressly abrogates or 
modifies client legal privilege, such abrogation or modification does not extend to legal 
advice that relates to the investigation itself, or to the representation of the client in the 
investigation, provided that, or to the extent that, the investigation concerns offences 
                                                        
15  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
16  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 61, 12 June 2007; Australian 
Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 50, 13 June 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 
4 June 2007.  
17  Australian Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 50, 13 June 2007. 
18  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 61, 12 June 2007. 
19  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. 
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alleged to have been committed prior to the commencement of the investigation.20 The 
proposal was formulated in this way to address the concerns expressed by stakeholders 
about how the distinction would accommodate offences that continued after the 
investigation commenced.  
7.19 Some stakeholders expressed support for the proposal.21 However, a number of 
stakeholders expressed only qualified support for the proposal, insofar as they 
submitted that the proposal should not be expressed to be limited to offences 
committed prior to the commencement of the investigation.22 The Law Council of 
Australia (Law Council), the Law Society of NSW and National Legal Aid all 
submitted that Proposal 7–1 should exclude the words ‘provided that or to the extent 
that, the investigation concerns offences alleged to have been committed prior to the 
commencement of the investigation’.23  
7.20 Each of these stakeholders expressed the view that clients should be equally 
entitled to claim client legal privilege where an investigation concerns offences alleged 
to have been committed after an investigation into it has commenced. For example, 
National Legal Aid submitted that: 
This is essential because otherwise people may be dissuaded from seeking advice or 
providing full and frank disclosure in relation to ongoing conduct.24 
7.21 Australian Financial Markets Association submitted: 
This proposal will provide legal clarity and appropriate protection for clients who are 
the subject of current investigation. However, [Australian Financial Markets 
Association] regards it as appropriate that offences committed in the past that remain 
current at the time an investigation commences should be protected by client legal 
privilege.25 
7.22 Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac) submitted that: 
Even though the alleged offences may be continuing after the commencement of the 
investigation, it should be possible for [client legal privilege] to be retained for advice 
                                                        
20  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 7–1. 
21  Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission LPP 107, 5 November 2007; Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Submission LPP 101, 2 November 2007; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 
Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission 
LPP 84, 31 October 2007; R Desiatnik, Consultation, Sydney, 26 October 2007. The Australian Federal 
Police submitted that it would not object to the proposal: Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 
29 November 2007.  
22  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission 
LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007; 
Westpac Banking Corporation, Submission LPP 85, 1 November 2007. See also Australian Financial 
Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007. 
23  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission 
LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. 
24  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007. 
25  Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007. 
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in relation to an investigation so long as the advice solely relates to the investigation 
and is brought into existence for the sole purpose of being used to enable legal 
advisers to represent their client.26 
7.23 Westpac also submitted that there needed to be clarification of 
the extent to which client legal privilege would be abrogated or modified where an 
investigation does not, at least initially, concern ‘offences’ as such. For example, 
sometimes investigations are initiated in relation to a set of events or circumstances 
without any specific allegations of an offence having been committed by the entity 
being investigated. [Client legal privilege] should equally apply to advice relating to 
these types of investigations.27 
7.24 AGS reiterated its view that the distinction between privileged communications 
relating to the representation of a client in the investigation and privileged 
communications relating to the subject matter of the investigation appeared to be 
‘generally workable’ but noted that: 
Undue subtlety in trying to apply the distinction could emerge as advice as to the 
conduct and the investigation itself would be to some degree intermingled as to be 
very difficult to separate one from the other. … The distinction might be criticised for 
having a fairly arbitrary effect depending on the point in time at which the 
investigation commenced.28 
ALRC’s views 
7.25 It is important that persons be able freely to seek legal advice concerning their 
response to federal coercive powers, and, where necessary or appropriate, to seek legal 
representation in federal investigations.29 This is a significant aspect of the fairness of 
an investigation process—increasing the likelihood that persons are properly informed 
about their obligations, and that their rights are properly protected.  
7.26 The ALRC considers that, as a matter of principle, any abrogation or 
modification of client legal privilege should be limited to abrogation or modification 
concerning advice on the subject matter of an investigation as opposed to advice on, or 
representation in, the investigation itself. This principle should be legislatively 
affirmed. 
7.27 Having regard to the views expressed in submissions, the ALRC considers that 
this important principle ought to apply regardless of whether an investigation concerns 
offences or conduct allegedly committed prior to, or after, the commencement of an 
                                                        
26  Westpac Banking Corporation, Submission LPP 85, 1 November 2007. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Australian Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 113, 5 November 2007. 
29  The ALRC recommends in Ch 8 that federal bodies develop and publish their policies and procedures in 
relation to notifying persons that they may wish to seek independent legal advice or legal representation 
in this regard: see Rec 8–22. 
316 Privilege in Perspective  
investigation. Of course, it will be easier to apply the distinction where an investigation 
concerns past completed conduct—for example, a one-off contravention of a particular 
statute alleged to have been committed on a particular day.  
7.28 It may be more difficult to apply the distinction where an investigation concerns 
alleged offences that continue after the commencement of an investigation. For 
example, a federal investigation concerning alleged illegal fundraising may involve a 
series of separate but related offences committed before and after the commencement 
of the investigation. However, perceived difficulties in application are not reason 
enough to deny the benefit of the safeguard to persons receiving advice on 
investigations concerning continuing offences or offences allegedly committed 
following the commencement of an investigation. Provided that the dominant purpose 
of legal advice is to advise a person in relation to the investigation itself, then that 
advice ought to be protected, notwithstanding any abrogation of client legal privilege 
in relation to the subject matter of the investigation.  
7.29 The ALRC notes that Westpac suggested the introduction of a sole purpose test 
in this regard—protecting legal advice relating to an investigation concerning conduct 
that continues or occurs after the commencement of an investigation provided that the 
sole purpose of that advice is to advise on the investigation and not on the subject 
matter of the investigation.30 However, the ALRC considers that it would be confusing 
to adopt a sole purpose test in this context, given that the common law on the doctrine 
of client legal privilege is now settled, having shifted from the sole purpose test to the 
dominant purpose test.31  
7.30 Consequently, the ALRC has amended Proposal 7–1 to remove the proviso that 
the investigation concerns offences committed prior to the commencement of the 
investigation. In so doing, the ALRC also has addressed the concern expressed by 
Westpac that the benefit of this safeguard should equally apply to investigations that 
may not involve alleged offences. 
Recommendation 7–1 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide that, if another federal statute expressly abrogates or modifies client 
legal privilege, such abrogation or modification does not extend to legal advice 
that relates to the investigation itself, or to the representation of the client in the 
investigation.  
                                                        
30  Westpac Banking Corporation, Submission LPP 85, 1 November 2007. 
31  See Ch 3. 
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Restrictions on the use of privileged information 
7.31 An important issue in relation to client legal privilege is determining the use to 
which privileged information, obtained by coercion, can be put if privilege were to be 
abrogated or modified.  
7.32 At one end of the spectrum, it is possible for no restrictions to be placed on the 
use of privileged information obtained by coercion. For example, the James Hardie 
(Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth), which abrogates privilege, does not 
contain any provisions restricting the use of otherwise privileged material.32 The Act 
provides that a claim of client legal privilege in relation to ‘James Hardie material’ 
does not prevent that material from being admissible in a ‘James Hardie proceeding’.33 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) 
Bill 2004 states that: 
Authorised persons, including ASIC and the DPP, will be able to obtain materials that 
would otherwise be subject to legal professional privilege and use them for the 
purposes of certain investigations and proceedings.34 
7.33 The Evidence Act 1958 (Vic), which abrogates client legal privilege in Royal 
Commissions established in Victoria, does not expressly restrict the use to which 
otherwise privileged information produced to a Royal Commission can be put.35  
7.34 At the other end of the spectrum, there are two broad types of statutory 
provisions that limit the use of privileged communications obtained through the 
exercise of coercive powers. The first type is a provision conferring what is known as 
‘use immunity’. This usually limits the use of the information in any subsequent 
criminal or civil penalty proceedings against the person who provided the information, 
except in proceedings in relation to the falsity of the evidence itself.  
7.35 The second type of provision is one conferring ‘derivative use immunity’. This 
is wider than use immunity, in that it also renders inadmissible in subsequent 
proceedings any evidence obtained as a result of the person having disclosed or 
provided a privileged communication. Therefore, any documents obtained or witnesses 
identified as a result of the information having been provided are not admissible 
against the person compelled to answer.36  
                                                        
32  The James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) is also discussed in Ch 5. 
33  See Ibid s 4(4). ‘James Hardie material’ and ‘James Hardie proceeding’ are defined in s 3. 
34  Explanatory Memorandum, James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Bill 2004 (Cth), [1.3].  
35  Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) s 19C(D). Restricting use of privileged information in Royal Commissions of 
inquiry is discussed further below. 
36  See P Sofronoff, ‘Derivative Use Immunity and the Investigation of Corporate Wrongdoing’ (1994) 10 
Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 122, 122. 
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7.36 Since few federal statutes expressly abrogate client legal privilege, express use 
or derivative use immunity provisions in this context are comparatively rare. Such 
provisions are more commonly found in the context of federal laws that abrogate the 
privilege against self-incrimination.37 It may therefore be useful to draw upon 
experiences relating to the application of the immunities where the privilege against 
self-incrimination is abolished—and this is done later in this chapter. 
7.37 Where client legal privilege is taken to have been impliedly removed, it may 
mean that no use immunity is expressly conferred.38 As noted in Principled 
Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties in Australia (ALRC 95), this 
leads to the curious result that statutes expressly removing client legal privilege may 
contain greater protections than statutes interpreted as impliedly removing the 
privilege.39 Hence, persons subject to coercive information-gathering powers may have 
different levels of protection afforded to them depending on whether privilege is 
removed expressly or by implication, without any policy rationale for the difference in 
treatment.40 
Legislation conferring use immunity  
7.38 Examples of use immunity provisions in the context of the abrogation of client 
legal privilege can be found in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), the Inspector-
General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) (IGIS Act), and the ASIC Act. 
Each of these is addressed below. 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) 
7.39 A person is not excused from providing certain property tracking records 
pursuant to an order made by a magistrate under s 202 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002 on the ground that the records would disclose information that is the subject of 
client legal privilege.41 However, in the case of a natural person, the record is not 
admissible in criminal proceedings against the person, except in respect of specified 
offences under the Criminal Code concerning the production of false or misleading 
information or documents.42 
                                                        
37  See, eg, Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) s 96; Australian Crime Commission 
Act 2002 (Cth) s 30(4), (5); Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 68; 
Retirement Savings Account Act 1997 (Cth) s 117; Medicare Australia Act 1973 (Cth) s 8S. 
38  See, however, discussion below on Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 76(1)(d). 
39  Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties 
in Australia, ALRC 95 (2002), [19.52]. 
40  The ALRC has recommended that federal client legal privilege legislation should provide that, in the 
absence of clear, express words to the contrary, client legal privilege applies to the coercive information-
gathering powers of federal bodies, thereby removing abrogation by necessary implication. See Rec 5–2. 
41  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) s 206(1)(c). 
42  See Ibid s 206(2). 
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Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) 
7.40 A person is not excused from providing documents or information to the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) on the grounds that to do so 
would disclose legal advice to a minister, agency or authority of the Commonwealth.43 
However, the information or documents are not admissible in evidence against the 
person in any court or in any proceedings except in prosecutions for specified offences, 
including: 
• an offence against s 18 of the IGIS Act which requires the giving of information 
or the production of documents; 
• attempting, inciting or conspiring to commit an offence against s 18 of the IGIS 
Act;  
• being an accessory after the fact in relation to an offence against s 18 of the 
IGIS Act; and 
• offences against the Criminal Code concerning the production of false or 
misleading information or documents.44 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) 
7.41 The ASIC Act provides that a statement that a person makes at a compulsory 
examination is inadmissible against the person in a proceeding if: 
• the statement discloses matter in respect of which the person could claim client 
legal privilege; and 
• the person objects to the admission of evidence of the statement.45 
Legislation conferring derivative use immunity  
7.42 The Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003 (Cth) contains an example of a 
provision conferring both use and derivative use immunity. Under s 16(1) of that Act a 
tax official is not excused from giving information, producing a document, or 
answering a question on the ground that to do so would disclose material that is 
protected against disclosure by client legal privilege. However, s 16(2) provides that 
neither: 
                                                        
43  See Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) s 18(6), which is discussed in Ch 5 as 
an example of a provision that partially abrogates or modifies client legal privilege. 
44  See Ibid s 18(6). 
45  See Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 76(1)(d). 
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• the information or answer given or the document produced; nor 
• any information, document or thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence 
of giving the information or answer or producing the document; 
is admissible against the person in proceedings, other than in proceedings for specified 
offences, including providing false or misleading information or documents or 
obstructing a Commonwealth public official. 
Types of proceedings to which immunity provisions apply 
7.43 Use and derivative use immunity provisions only prohibit the use of privileged 
evidence obtained from a person by a coercive information-gathering power against 
that person. They do not prevent a federal investigatory body from using the privileged 
information against another person or entity in subsequent proceedings, subject to the 
general rules of evidence. 
7.44 Use and derivative use immunity provisions typically apply to subsequent 
criminal proceedings and any proceedings for the imposition of a penalty, such as civil 
penalty proceedings. Immunity provisions do not usually apply to civil proceedings 
that do not seek the imposition of a penalty, so they do not affect civil proceedings 
initiated by federal investigatory bodies seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, 
restraining orders or asset-freezing orders.46  
7.45 The issue of whether immunity provisions apply to banning or disqualification 
orders has arisen in the context of the abrogation of the privilege against exposure to a 
penalty. In Australian Securities Commission v Kippe, the Federal Court held that the 
purpose of a proceeding to impose a banning order was to protect the public and not to 
punish the person in respect of whom the order was sought—and therefore answers in 
respect of which an examinee had claimed the privilege against exposure to a penalty 
could be used against the examinee in that proceeding.47  
7.46 In Rich v Australian Securities & Investments Commission, the High Court 
stated that Kippe should be overruled, and held that an order seeking the 
disqualification of a person from managing a company did impose a penalty, albeit not 
a pecuniary one. The High Court stated that a proceeding seeking relief may both 
protect the public and also penalise the person against whom relief is granted.48  
                                                        
46  Compare Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW) s 17(2) and Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) s 19C(2) where use 
immunity is conferred on all types of civil proceedings. See also Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) s 7C. 
47  Australian Securities Commission v Kippe (1996) 67 FCR 499. 
48  Rich v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2004) 220 CLR 129, [30]–[37].  
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7.47 On 20 August 2007, the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Bill 2007—
which abrogates the privilege against exposure to a penalty in relation to banning 
orders and disqualifications—received assent.49  
7.48 In the Second Reading of that Bill, the then Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Treasurer, the Hon Christopher Pearce MP, stated that:  
The government will legislate to restore the longstanding position that the privilege 
against exposure to a penalty does not apply in proceedings where ASIC is seeking 
disqualification or banning orders and no other penalty.50 
Use and derivative use immunities considered 
7.49 If safeguards restricting the use of privileged communications obtained by 
coercion were to be introduced in the event of abrogation or modification of client 
legal privilege, questions arise about the precise form of those safeguards; in particular, 
if an immunity were to be conferred, which form it should take.51 
7.50 In the 1990s, a number of arguments were made for and against the conferral of 
derivative use immunity in the context of the abrogation of the privilege against self-
incrimination in relation to investigations conducted by the then Australian Securities 
Commission (ASC), the predecessor to ASIC. These arguments are addressed below. 
In IP 33, the ALRC asked whether such arguments are applicable in considering the 
application of derivative use immunity in the context of any possible abrogation of 
client legal privilege.52 As noted below, ASIC expressed the view that the arguments 
are of direct relevance.53 
7.51 The Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 (Cth) (ASC Act), a predecessor 
to the ASIC Act, originally contained a provision conferring: 
• derivative use immunity in respect of oral statements obtained under compulsion 
or the signing of a record of examination; and 
                                                        
49  The relevant provision will commence operation on 31 December 2007. 
50  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 31 May 2007, 3 (C Pearce—
Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer), 4. 
51  In Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative 
Penalties in Australia, ALRC 95 (2002), Rec 19–3, the ALRC recommended that where legislation 
abrogated or modified client legal privilege, a default use immunity provision should apply in the absence 
of any clear express statutory statement to the contrary. In Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Integrity: But Not By Trust Alone—AFP & NCA Complaints and Disciplinary Systems, ALRC 82 (1996), 
Rec 57, the ALRC recommended that derivative use immunity apply in relation to the abrogation against 
self-incrimination in investigations of complaints against the Australian Federal Police and the (then) 
National Crime Authority (NCA). 
52  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), [7.30]. 
53  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. 
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• use immunity in respect of the production of books pursuant to a compulsory 
power; 
where the statement, signing the record or the production of books had the tendency to 
incriminate the person giving the information or producing the documents or to make 
him or her liable to a penalty.54  
Benefits of derivative use immunity in the ASC Act 
7.52 Potential benefits of conferring a derivative use immunity in these 
circumstances included: 
• encouraging disclosures, making persons more likely to cooperate during 
examinations, because they knew they had the protection of the immunity;55 
• protecting against an investigatory body misusing its powers;56 
• giving meaningful protection to direct use immunity—because any attempt to 
admit as evidence in criminal proceedings the indirect consequences of the 
person giving the information or document would undermine the protection 
granted in respect of the answer itself;57 and 
• ensuring an appropriate balance between the interests of the state and individual 
liberties.58 
Criticisms of derivative use immunity in the ASC Act 
7.53 The inclusion of a derivative use provision in the ASC Act was strongly 
criticised by the then ASC, as well as the CDPP.59 The ASC and CDPP claimed that 
the practical effect of the derivative use immunity provision was ‘to place 
insurmountable obstacles in the way of successful prosecutions’.60  
7.54 In a combined submission to the Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and 
Securities (JSCCS), the ASC and CDPP argued for the removal of derivative use 
immunity, submitting that:  
                                                        
54  Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 (Cth) s 68 (since repealed). 
55  See J Kluver, Report on Review of the Derivative Use Immunity Reforms (1997), [3.52]–[3.53]. 
56  See Ibid, [3.67]. 
57  See J Longo, ‘The Powers of Investigation of the Australian Securities Commission: Balancing the 
Interests of Persons and Companies Under Investigation with the Interests of the State’ (1992) 
10 Company and Securities Law Journal 237, 242 (referring to a view of the Law Institute of Victoria). 
58  See Ibid, 237, 251. 
59  P Sofronoff, ‘Derivative Use Immunity and the Investigation of Corporate Wrongdoing’ (1994) 
10 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 122, 123. See also Parliament of Australia—Joint 
Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities, Use Immunity Provisions in the Corporations Law 
and the Australian Securities Commission Law (1991). 
60  Parliament of Australia—Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities, Use Immunity 
Provisions in the Corporations Law and the Australian Securities Commission Law (1991), [1.12]. 
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Should any prosecution of a person so compelled arise the prosecutor must prove that 
the evidence being advanced was not gained directly or indirectly from the answers or 
documents obtained where the privilege against self-incrimination was claimed by the 
person being examined.61 
7.55 The CDPP stated that: 
If there is an examination, every piece of evidence collected after that examination 
will be subject to debate … that is going to unduly complicate trials, make them 
prolix, there will be hearings within hearings to determine just when the document 
was obtained, whether its use was derivative, et cetera.62 
7.56 The ASC considered that the provision conferring derivative use was an 
‘absurdity’ because: 
[Section 38 of the ASC Act] confers a power and section 68 establishes dire 
consequences for exercising it … because you then cannot use the material you find 
as a result of the answer to the question.63 
7.57 The ASC highlighted the following predicament where oral explanation of a 
transaction was required because it was not documented: 
In the course of investigating the matter, we asked the simple question of one of the 
parties: ‘Did you in fact come to any agreement concerning your shares with X?’ The 
unfortunate position is that when the answer to that is, ‘Yes, I did. We discussed it on 
two occasions; the nature of the agreement was to this effect’, we cannot thereafter 
use not only the evidence of the person subject to examination but also the evidence 
of X to whom he refers.64 
7.58 The view was expressed that the derivative use provision rendered the ASC’s 
investigatory power 
a poisoned chalice—since you get the investigative power and if you use it you kill 
off your ability to bring a criminal action in some cases.65 
7.59 Other arguments against derivative use immunity, identified in John Kluver’s 
Report on Review of the Derivative Use Immunity Reforms,66 include that: 
• a person might cooperate in an examination simply to achieve a considerable 
forensic advantage for himself or herself—namely to ensure that any 
information or document derived from the information provided was thereby 
                                                        
61  See Ibid, [1.13]–[1.14]. 
62  See Ibid, [3.5.1]. 
63  See Ibid, [3.14]. 
64  See Ibid, [3.4.4]. 
65  See Ibid, [4.12]. 
66  J Kluver, Report on Review of the Derivative Use Immunity Reforms (1997). 
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rendered inadmissible in any later criminal or penalty-exposing proceedings 
against the person;67 and 
• the application of the immunity can have arbitrary or anomalous outcomes. The 
immunity only protects the examinee, not any other person who might also be 
incriminated in consequence of the information provided in the examinee’s 
answer. Any document or other thing obtained as a direct or indirect result of the 
examinee’s answer could still be used against another person, subject to 
evidentiary rules. The order in which persons were examined could therefore 
fundamentally affect the potential benefit of the derivative use immunity for 
particular examinees.68 
The abolition of derivative use immunity in the ASC Act  
7.60 The JSCCS recommended that s 68 of the ASC Act and s 597(12) of the (then) 
Corporations Law be amended to remove the derivative use immunity provisions.69 In 
so doing it accepted the ASC’s evidence that 
the immunity applying to the production of documents and the derivative immunity 
applying to oral evidence curtail the ASC’s investigatory powers to an extent that 
seriously limits its capacity to discharge the responsibilities placed on it by 
Parliament.70 
7.61 Following the recommendations of the JSCCS, the Corporations Legislation 
(Evidence) Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) abolished the derivative use immunity 
previously available under s 597 of the Corporations Law and s 68 of the ASC Act. 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Legislation (Evidence) 
Amendment Bill 1992 stated that derivative use immunity placed an  
excessive burden on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the negative 
fact that an item of evidence (of which there may be thousands in a complex case) has 
not been obtained as a result of information subject to the use immunity.71 
7.62 The amending Act also required that a report be made to the Attorney-General 
by 1997 about the extent to which, and in what ways, the amending provisions helped 
the ASC in carrying out investigations and gathering information.72 
                                                        
67  Ibid, [3.54]. 
68  See Ibid, [3.71]–[3.74]. 
69  See Parliament of Australia—Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities, Use Immunity 
Provisions in the Corporations Law and the Australian Securities Commission Law (1991), [4.20]. 
70  Ibid, [4.11]. 
71  Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Legislation (Evidence) Amendment Bill 1992 (Cth), 1. 
72  See Corporations Legislation (Evidence) Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) s 10. 
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7.63 In May 1997, Kluver concluded that the provisions removing derivative use 
immunity had  
greatly assisted the ASC in its enforcement of the national scheme laws, primarily by 
increasing the Commission’s ability to more fully and expeditiously utilise its power 
to conduct compulsory oral examinations. …  
The amendments have also assisted the ASC in initiating early injunctive or other 
civil protective proceedings to preserve assets or otherwise limit or reduce the 
financial harm arising from suspected wrongdoing.73 
7.64 Kluver also expressed support for the retention of ‘direct’ use immunity,74 
noting that it provided protection to examinees without significantly impeding the 
ASC’s investigative and enforcement functions.75 
Application of immunities to document production and oral statements 
7.65 Federal provisions that contain use or derivative use immunity provisions—
either in the context of the abrogation of client legal privilege or self-incrimination—
take differing approaches to the application of that immunity to documents and oral 
statements.  
7.66 For example, the ASIC Act only gives use immunity to persons in relation to the 
making of an oral statement or the signing of a record, and not to the production of 
documents.76 In this regard, the JSCCS recommended that the then ASC Act be 
amended to remove use immunity with regard to the fact that a person has produced a 
document, where production might tend to incriminate that person.77 
7.67 In contrast, the Medicare Australia Act 1973 (Cth)—in the context of the 
abrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination—confers use and derivative use 
immunity in relation to both the production of documents and the giving of information 
pursuant to Medicare Australia’s coercive information-gathering power under the 
Act.78 
                                                        
73  See J Kluver, Report on Review of the Derivative Use Immunity Reforms (1997), 1–2. 
74  Ibid, 3. 
75  Ibid, [3.89]. 
76  Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 76(1)(d) concerning use immunity in 
respect of a privileged statement made at an oral examination is discussed above. See also s 68 in relation 
to use immunity in respect of statements and signing of records of examination which might tend to 
incriminate a person or make him or her liable to the imposition of a penalty. 
77  Parliament of Australia—Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities, Use Immunity 
Provisions in the Corporations Law and the Australian Securities Commission Law (1991), [4.20]. 
78  See Medicare Australia Act 1973 (Cth) s 8S. 
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7.68 In Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd, Mason CJ 
and Toohey J stated: 
It is one thing to protect a person from testifying as to guilt; it is quite another thing to 
protect a person from the production of documents already in existence which 
constitute evidence of guilt … [Documents] are in the nature of real evidence which 
speak for themselves as distinct from testimonial oral evidence which is brought into 
existence in response to an exercise of investigatory power or in the course of legal 
proceedings.79 
7.69 In IP 33, the ALRC expressed interest in hearing views about whether a 
distinction should be drawn in the application of the immunities to the production of 
documents and the making of oral statements—in particular, whether arguments 
supporting such a distinction in the context of the privilege against self-incrimination 
have any force in the context of client legal privilege. Stakeholders’ views on this are 
set out separately below. 
Royal Commissions of inquiry 
7.70 As discussed in Chapter 4, Royal Commissions of inquiry normally are 
established only where a particular area of public concern has been identified. Their 
purpose is to determine factual circumstances, report on the matters specified in the 
Letters Patent (terms of reference) and make recommendations.  
7.71 The discovery of the truth has been described as a prime function of a Royal 
Commission.80 However, while the pursuit of the truth may be a compelling argument 
for the abrogation of privilege in Royal Commissions, does the argument have any 
force in considering the issue of whether use or derivative use immunity should apply?  
7.72 In this regard, it is important to note that the responsibility for implementing the 
recommendations of a Royal Commission may fall on other Commonwealth 
investigatory bodies. The application of a use or derivative use immunity on privileged 
evidence obtained by compulsion by a Royal Commission might significantly frustrate 
the ability of other federal bodies to bring proceedings to seek redress in respect of 
improper or unlawful conduct identified by the Royal Commission.81 
7.73 The Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW) abrogates client legal privilege but 
confers a use immunity that applies in any civil or criminal proceedings against the 
person.82 In contrast, while the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) has a specific provision 
conferring use immunity in the context of the abrogation of self-incrimination,83 the 
                                                        
79  Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477, 493.  
80  T Cole, Report of the Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme (2006), Vol 1, [7.66]. 
81  Views of stakeholders on whether immunities should apply to Royal Commissions of inquiry, if client 
legal privilege were to be abrogated, are set out below. 
82  See Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW) s 17(2). 
83  See Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) s 19C(2). 
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statute is silent on the question of immunity in the context of the abrogation of client 
legal privilege.84  
7.74 In X v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority,85 the High Court decided that 
the use by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) of the evidence of 
X and Y86 before the HIH Royal Commission did not contravene s 6M of the Royal 
Commissions Act 1902 (Cth).87 
7.75 Following the HIH Royal Commission, APRA issued notices to X and Y under 
the Insurance Act 1973 (Cth), requiring them to show cause why they should not be 
disqualified from holding positions in Australia as senior managers or agents of a 
foreign general insurer. The ‘show cause’ notices were based on APRA’s preliminary 
view that X and Y were not ‘fit and proper’ persons for those roles. APRA formed its 
preliminary view having regard to X and Y’s involvement in the HIH transactions and 
their evidence given to the HIH Royal Commission. The High Court stated: 
The evidence that X and Y gave at the Royal Commission may provide some, or even 
all, of the material which APRA may consider, and upon which it may rely, in giving 
effect to the regulatory provisions of the Insurance Act. Any disadvantage suffered by 
X or Y, as a consequence of the proper application of those regulatory provisions, 
would not be ‘for or on account of’ his attendance at the Royal Commission or the 
evidence he gave.88 
7.76 It has been suggested that the High Court’s decision is of significance for 
clarifying the proper interpretation of s 6M of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) 
and the use of evidence obtained during Royal Commissions by regulatory authorities 
in genuine discharge of their statutory functions.89 
Submissions and consultations 
Application of immunities 
7.77 In IP 33, the ALRC asked if client legal privilege were to be abrogated or 
modified, whether any safeguards should be put in place—in particular, whether use or 
derivative use immunity should be conferred.90 
                                                        
84  See Ibid s 19D. 
85  X v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2007) 232 ALR 421. 
86  X and Y were two senior managers of an international reinsurance business based in Germany. 
87  Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) s 6M provides that a person who uses, causes or inflicts any violence, 
punishment, damage, loss or disadvantage to any person for or on account of the person having appeared 
as a witness before a Royal Commission; or any evidence given by him or her before any Royal 
Commission, is guilty of an indictable offence. 
88  X v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2007) 232 ALR 421, [59]. 
89  Sparke Helmore Lawyers, High Court Challenge to Regulator’s Use of Royal Commission Evidence 
Unsuccessful (2007) <www.sparke.com.au/sparke/news/publications.jsp> at 10 April 2007. 
90  See Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), Question 7–2. 
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7.78 In response to IP 33, submissions and consultations were divided on the issue of 
immunities. Some stakeholders that opposed abrogation of client legal privilege also 
expressed opposition to safeguards in the form of either of the immunities.91 For 
example, the NSW Bar Association submitted that: 
An abrogation of the privilege before a range of federal investigative agencies 
coupled with a use immunity would effectively amount to a destruction of the 
privilege itself. …  
The fact that the privileged communication could still be used in other proceedings 
and by other parties, once it was publicly disclosed, or that the very same federal 
investigative agency could still use it as a basis to generate further or other evidence 
from which a charge could be made against the client, means the client would be most 
reluctant to engage in the full sharing of information characteristic of the lawyer-
client relationship. 
A related problem is that, once the client’s communication is disclosed, it may be able 
to be used against the client in proceedings where the client is a witness and not a 
party and thus unable to assert any use immunity. … 
Further, it has not been established that the addition of a derivative use immunity can 
overcome the above problems with a mere use immunity or that it is broadly 
acceptable.92  
7.79 On the other hand, the Law Council submitted that if there were to be abrogation 
of client legal privilege, safeguards had to be put in place and either use or derivative 
use immunity should apply.93 Similarly, National Legal Aid submitted that it would 
support the introduction of ‘appropriate safeguards’ in the event client legal privilege 
was abrogated or modified, and that such safeguards had to be considered on a case by 
case basis.94 
7.80 ASIC suggested the adoption of a safeguard other than an immunity. It 
submitted that: 
Instead we suggest a balanced approach to the use of otherwise privileged material 
may be achieved by applying legal privilege as a qualified privilege in court 
proceedings.95 
7.81 ASIC explained its support of such an approach in the following way: 
ASIC’s use in enforcement actions of materials otherwise covered by client legal 
privilege should be limited to court proceedings, and should be subject to the 
                                                        
91  See, eg, New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007; R Desiatnik, Submission 
LPP 24, 1 June 2007; New South Wales Public Defenders Office, Consultation LPP 31, Sydney, 12 June 
2007. 
92  New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. The NSW Bar Association also 
emphasised the ‘related but distinct’ rationales for client legal privilege and the privilege against self-
incrimination, submitting that client legal privilege should be more closely protected than the privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
93  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
94  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 52, 13 June 2007. 
95  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. 
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discretion of a judge. That is, if ASIC wishes to rely on the material as evidence in a 
civil or criminal proceeding, it will be admissible only if a judge exercises a discretion 
based on the evidential value of the material and the detriment that may be suffered 
by a claimant.96 
7.82 Set out below is a summary of the views of stakeholders on the application of 
each of the immunities.  
Use immunity 
7.83 In response to IP 33, some stakeholders expressed a preference for the conferral 
of use immunity in the event that client legal privilege is abrogated—on the basis that 
it represented a more practical limitation than derivative use immunity. For example, 
the CDPP submitted that: 
While this office is of the view that use immunity would be a more practical 
limitation than derivative use immunity … , this office must also point out that there 
are obvious disadvantages to the prosecution if use immunity applies in that the 
prosecution is unable to use the communication that was previously privileged in 
evidence. The impact that this would have on prosecutions would depend on the 
individual facts of the case.97 
7.84 The ACCC submitted that: 
If legal professional privilege was to be abrogated in relation to s 155 notices [issued 
under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)] the ACCC would not consider the 
implementation of a use immunity provision to be inappropriate, provided such a 
provision was clearly restricted in application to the use of the information in 
subsequent criminal proceedings.98 
7.85 In contrast, ASIC submitted: 
Given that access to legally privileged material may be critical to undertaking some 
enforcement actions, ASIC believes that, should there be an abrogation/modification 
of legal privilege, a use immunity should not be applied in that context.99  
7.86 In IP 33, the ALRC said that it was interested in hearing whether the conferral 
of use immunity (in respect of those statutes that have abrogated or modified client 
                                                        
96  Ibid. Victoria Legal Aid also expressed support for judicial discretion to admit or exclude privileged 
information to operate as a safeguard if client legal privilege were to be abrogated or modified: Victoria 
Legal Aid, Submission LPP 55, 14 June 2007.  
97  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 61, 12 June 2007. See also I Turnbull, 
Submission LPP 18, 3 June 2007. 
98  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. 
99  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. 
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legal privilege), has stymied the conduct of investigations conducted under those 
statutes.100 In this regard, the IGIS submitted that: 
Section 18(6) of the IGIS Act provides for use immunity and I can say confidently 
that this has not been an inhibition to effective investigation in my experience.  
Arguably, use immunity provides additional incentive for a person to cooperate …  
In my view, it is intuitively fair that use immunity be available if the normal right 
concerning self-incrimination is not available.101 
Derivative use immunity 
7.87 In response to IP 33, submissions and consultations were divided between those 
who supported the conferral of derivative use immunity—either in specific contexts102 
or more generally,103 including as a default protection104—and those who opposed 
derivative use immunity.105 
7.88 The Law Society of NSW submitted that: 
Consistent with a view that the privilege ought not be abrogated or limited (save, 
perhaps, in certain very narrow and well defined circumstances involving a clearly 
paramount public interest) derivative use immunity ought to apply as a default 
protection.106 
7.89 NSW Young Lawyers expressed the view that: 
If client legal privilege was abrogated or modified, anything less than applying 
derivative use immunity would fail to protect the person’s fundamental common law 
right to claim client legal privilege.107 
7.90 Victoria Legal Aid agreed with the benefits identified in IP 33 for conferring 
derivative use immunity—including that it encouraged disclosures, protected against 
investigatory bodies misusing their powers, and ensured an appropriate balance 
between the interests of the state and individuals.108  
                                                        
100  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), [7.28]. 
101  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission LPP 22, 1 June 2007. 
102  Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority, Submission LPP 45, 6 June 2007; Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau, Submission LPP 34, 28 May 2007. 
103  Victoria Legal Aid, Submission LPP 55, 14 June 2007; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 
12 June 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
104  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
105  See, eg, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007; 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 61, 12 June 2007; Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007; I Turnbull, Submission 
LPP 18, 3 June 2007; B McKillop, M Kumar and F Beaupert, Consultation LPP 16, Sydney, 21 May 
2007. 
106  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
107  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 12 June 2007. 
108  Victoria Legal Aid, Submission LPP 55, 14 June 2007. 
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7.91 The Australian Transport Safety Bureau submitted that: 
A derivative use immunity provision is appropriate in the context of the [Transport 
Safety Investigation Act 2003 (Cth) (TSI Act)] where the exercise of the powers is not 
meant to apportion blame or assist with determining liability, but is for the purpose of 
improving transport safety in the future. 109 
7.92 In contrast, a number of federal bodies—as well as other stakeholders—
expressed opposition to derivative use immunity. For example, the IGIS submitted 
that: 
Derivative use immunity is not provided for in the IGIS Act and I see no reason to 
contemplate its introduction into the Act.110 
7.93 The ACCC submitted that it 
would be strongly opposed to a derivative use immunity provision, which would 
prevent it from using any evidence obtained as a result of the provision or disclosure 
of a privileged communication in subsequent legal proceedings. Such a provision 
would clearly affect the ACCC’s ability to use privileged information obtained in its 
investigation where it would otherwise assist in proving a contravention of the [Trade 
Practices Act].111 
7.94 ASIC submitted that: 
If derivative use immunity applies, an investigatory body may restrict its ability to 
undertake enforcement action by compelling the production of otherwise privileged 
information at an early stage of an investigation. This is because, in doing so, a body 
exposes itself to the risk of a challenge in relation to material subsequently gathered 
on the basis that that material was obtained as a result of derivative use of the 
privileged material. Such a challenge may not ultimately succeed, but the risk of it 
being made and consequent delays to an investigation would make a prudent regulator 
cautious about accessing such material. …  
The submissions, findings and recommendations that were made in the 1990s that 
derivative use immunity should not apply in the context of the abrogation of the 
privilege against self-incrimination pursuant to s 68 of the ASC Law are directly 
relevant to any consideration of abrogating client legal privilege in combination with 
a derivative use immunity. That relevance is not based on the principles underlying 
the two privileges being the same, but on the practical difficulties that would be 
created by the application of a derivative use immunity.112 
                                                        
109  Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Submission LPP 34, 28 May 2007. 
110  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission LPP 22, 1 June 2007. 
111  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. 
112  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. Another 
stakeholder agreed with the proposition that derivative use immunity placed ‘insurmountable obstacles to 
prosecution’: I Turnbull, Submission LPP 18, 3 June 2007. 
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7.95 The AGS noted that derivative use immunity ‘by depriving a document of any 
evidentiary value’ would in many cases ‘so derogate from the effect of abrogation of 
the privilege as to render the abrogation as of little or no value’.113  
7.96 The ALRC’s views on the application of the immunities are set out below. 
Scope of immunities 
Application of immunities to corporations and individuals 
7.97 In IP 33, the ALRC asked whether, if use or derivative use immunity were to be 
introduced as a safeguard in the event of client legal privilege being abrogated or 
modified, a distinction should be drawn between the application of the immunities to 
corporations and individuals.114  
7.98 IP 33 noted that there are some differences in the consequences of protecting 
individuals and corporations from having privileged information obtained by coercion 
used against them in criminal proceedings. These differences flow from the fact that 
many of the sentences that can be imposed on natural persons following a criminal 
conviction cannot be imposed on corporations.  
7.99 Submissions and consultations strongly supported the application of the 
immunities to both individuals and corporations, in the event that the immunities were 
introduced as a safeguard.115 Stakeholders expressed the view that a distinction 
between individuals and corporations should not be made mainly on the basis that the 
rationales for the privilege—in particular the compliance rationale—applied equally to 
corporations as it did to individuals.  
7.100 For example, ASIC submitted that: 
Given that the principal rationale that underlies client legal privilege is equally 
applicable to natural persons and corporations, there is no basis, as a matter of 
principle, for corporations to have a lesser entitlement to immunities than natural 
persons.116 
                                                        
113  Australian Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 50, 13 June 2007. A similar view was expressed by the 
CDPP: Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 61, 12 June 2007. Academics 
from the University of Sydney Law School also noted that derivative use immunity could ‘shut off useful 
evidence’: B McKillop, M Kumar and F Beaupert, Consultation LPP 16, Sydney, 21 May 2007. 
114  See Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), Question 7–3(a), [7.45]–[7.49]. In Ch 3, the ALRC addresses the related issue of whether client 
legal privilege should apply only to natural persons and not corporations.  
115  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007; Victoria Legal 
Aid, Submission LPP 55, 14 June 2007; Taxation Institute of Australia, Submission LPP 54, 15 June 
2007; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 12 June 2007; Australian Institute of Company 
Directors, Submission LPP 43, 8 June 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
116  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. NSW Young 
Lawyers expressed a similar view: NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 12 June 2007. 
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7.101 Victoria Legal Aid expressed support for conferring immunity on both 
corporations and individuals, noting that: 
whilst the liberty of the corporation itself is not at stake, the liberty of individual 
corporate officers may be.117 
7.102 The Law Society of NSW expressed the view that: 
The arguments in favour of differential application of the privilege and consequential 
safeguards as between corporations and individuals do not seem particularly strong. 
Contrast the position regarding privilege against self-incrimination.118 
Application of immunities to document production and oral statements 
7.103 In IP 33, the ALRC asked, if use or derivative use immunity were to be 
introduced as a safeguard in the event of client legal privilege being abrogated or 
modified, whether a distinction should be drawn between the application of the 
immunities to the production of documents and the making of oral statements.119 
7.104 The majority of submissions and consultations that addressed this issue 
expressed the view that no such distinction should be made.120 For example, the Law 
Council submitted that such a distinction ‘may result in less advice being committed to 
written form, particularly on sensitive matters’.121 The Law Society of NSW expressed 
the view that: 
It seems contrary to principle, and to common sense, for the privilege and any 
consequential protections to apply only to statements and not to documents.122 
Harmonisation of approach 
7.105 In IP 33, the ALRC raised the question whether it is legitimate to have one type 
of immunity apply across the range of federal statutes if privilege were to be abrogated 
or modified, or whether different investigatory contexts justify the application of 
different types of immunity.123 In particular, IP 33 asked if distinctions should be 
drawn: 
                                                        
117  Victoria Legal Aid, Submission LPP 55, 14 June 2007. 
118  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
119  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), Question 7–3(b). 
120  See, eg, Victoria Legal Aid, Submission LPP 55, 14 June 2007; Taxation Institute of Australia, 
Submission LPP 54, 15 June 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007; 
Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007; Regulatory lawyers of Clayton Utz, 
Consultation LPP 13, Sydney, 15 May 2007. 
121  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. Victoria Legal Aid expressed a similar view: 
Victoria Legal Aid, Submission LPP 55, 14 June 2007. 
122  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007.  
123  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), [7.56]. 
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• among federal bodies, depending upon the functions that they perform? 
• between federal agencies exercising coercive powers and Royal Commissions of 
inquiry?  
• between federal investigations conducted in public, and those conducted in 
private?124 
Different approaches based on function? 
7.106 In response to IP 33, submissions and consultations were divided, with some 
supporting the application of immunities across the range of federal bodies—
irrespective of the functions performed by those bodies125—and some suggesting 
instead that the issue of safeguards should be considered on a case by case basis.126 
7.107 The Law Society of NSW expressed the view that it would be ‘worthwhile if the 
need to develop a functional taxonomy of investigative agencies can be avoided’.127 
Similarly, NSW Young Lawyers submitted that: 
The immunities should apply in the same manner regardless of the functions of the 
Commonwealth bodies. … There is no guarantee that a document produced or 
statement provided to a Commonwealth body exercising a compliance function will 
not be used by a Commonwealth body exercising an enforcement function. If these 
safeguards were not in place, the person would not be encouraged to cooperate with 
the Commonwealth body for fear of future action being taken against them.128 
7.108 However, National Legal Aid submitted that: 
Any modification/abrogation of the privilege should be on a case by case basis taking 
into account the functions of the agency and the subject matter. The question of 
safeguards should be dealt with accordingly.129 
Royal Commissions  
7.109 There was a divergence of opinion concerning the application of the immunities 
to Royal Commissions, if client legal privilege were to be abrogated in that context. 
For example, the Law Council submitted that if privilege were to be abrogated or 
                                                        
124  Ibid, Question 7–3(c)–(e). 
125  See, eg, Victoria Legal Aid, Submission LPP 55, 14 June 2007; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 
LPP 49, 12 June 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
126  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 52, 13 June 2007. See also Law Council of Australia, Submission 
LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
127  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
128  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 12 June 2007. 
129  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 52, 13 June 2007.  
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modified specifically for Royal Commissions, use or derivative use immunity should 
apply.130 The Law Society of NSW expressed the view that: 
wider rather than narrower immunities should apply in the case of Royal 
Commissions as opposed to Commonwealth agencies exercising coercive powers, the 
James Hardie example notwithstanding.131 
7.110 Other stakeholders maintained that if privilege were to be abrogated or modified 
in the context of a Royal Commission, then there should be no restrictions on the use to 
which otherwise privileged information obtained by the Royal Commission could be 
put, and cautioned against the use of immunity provisions in such a context.132 
7.111 One stakeholder submitted that: 
Where the privilege does not apply to the investigation leading to, and the conduct of 
a commission of public importance, the privilege [should] also be lost in relation to 
any related proceedings, in the way that the James Hardie Act has done. It would 
make the work of commissions of public importance appear somewhat futile if their 
findings could not be successfully acted upon because material available to them was 
not then admissible in subsequent court proceedings.133 
7.112 Similarly, ASIC submitted that it 
envisages that, in some cases, its investigations would be helped by any legally 
privileged information which a Royal or other Special Commission may be able to 
obtain if client legal privilege were abrogated in relation to those Commissions. 
Accordingly, ASIC believes that caution should be exercised in considering the 
application of any immunities to information obtained by Royal Commissions or 
other Special Commissions of Inquiry.134 
Default safeguard: judicial discretion to admit evidence 
7.113 In DP 73, the ALRC did not propose either a use immunity provision or a 
derivative use immunity provision as a default safeguard in the event that client legal 
privilege was abrogated and a federal statute was silent about the use to which 
otherwise privileged information could be put.135  
7.114 Rather, the ALRC proposed that federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide that in the absence of any clear, express statutory statement to the contrary, 
                                                        
130  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
131  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
132  I Temby, Submission LPP 72, 19 July 2007; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 
Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007; Hon T Cole, Consultation LPP 9, Sydney, 1 March 2007. 
133  I Temby, Submission LPP 72, 19 July 2007. 
134  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. 
135  See Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, 
DP 73 (2007), [7.12]. 
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where federal legislation abrogates the application of client legal privilege to the 
exercise of a federal coercive information-gathering power: 
(a) a federal body that seeks to rely on otherwise privileged information as evidence 
in any court proceedings must apply to the court for permission to do so;  
(b) the court will have a general discretion to allow use of the information as 
evidence, balancing the public interest in allowing the information to be used 
against a consideration of whether the use of that information would be unfairly 
prejudicial to a party; and 
(c) a federal body is precluded from using otherwise privileged information against 
the holder of the client legal privilege in any administrative penalty 
proceedings.136 
7.115 This proposal was supported by some stakeholders.137 Allens Arthur Robinson 
supported the proposal but noted that: 
There may be significant grounds for dispute as to where the proper balance between 
public interest and unfair prejudice (referred to in 7–2(b)) may lay. Accordingly, we 
suggest it might be helpful for further indicia to be outlined in relation to these 
matters.138 
7.116 Some stakeholders expressed concern about the uncertainty of outcome 
associated with adopting a judicial discretion to admit privileged information.139 
Stakeholders also expressed concern about the proposed factors that the court would be 
required to balance.140 The CDPP, while expressing support for a mechanism that 
allowed for the use of otherwise privileged information in court proceedings against 
the subject of the proceedings, submitted that it had concerns about the proposed 
model: 
It is … difficult to see room for a judicial discretion, in principle, with respect to 
client legal privilege. …. A judicial discretion could only be apt where Parliament 
                                                        
136  Ibid, Proposal 7–2. 
137  Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007; Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. The AFP submitted that it would not object to this 
proposal: Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007. NSW Young Lawyers 
supported that part of the proposal requiring the federal body to apply to court for permission to rely on 
otherwise privileged information as evidence. However, it did not support the use of otherwise privileged 
information as evidence in any court proceedings except in criminal proceedings in respect of the falsity 
of the evidence itself: NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 116, 1 November 2007. 
138  Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission LPP 107, 5 November 2007. 
139  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Submission LPP 101, 2 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 
1 November 2007; New South Wales Bar Association, Consultation LPP 50, Sydney, 4 December 2007. 
140  Australian Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 113, 5 November 2007; Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 101, 2 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission 
LPP 94, 1 November 2007. 
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decides that, with respect to a particular statutory scheme, the public interest may be 
better served by abrogation than by maintaining client legal privilege depending on 
matters that are better able to be assessed by a court than by Parliament. Such 
matters, in our view, are limited to: the importance of each privileged communication 
to the court proceedings that the coercive powers under the relevant legislative 
scheme relate to. This is a different test to the one proposed. …  
Judicial consideration of unfair prejudice normally relates to evidence whose 
reliability or cogency is in question, and, generally speaking, evidence is considered 
to be unfairly prejudicial when it can be taken to be more detrimental to a party’s case 
than it actually is. There is already a general discretion to exclude such evidence 
whether it is privileged or not. There does not appear to be any basis for specific 
judicial consideration of unfair prejudice with respect to client legal privilege 
material. A more relevant test would consider the probative value of the evidence.141 
7.117 AGS submitted: 
Unlike other situations in which a public interest test is applied by the court, for 
example, in a decision to uphold a claim of public interest immunity or to exclude 
evidence alleged to be illegally obtained—where the court evaluates the claim against 
factors extraneous to the proceedings … the situation here requires the court to 
exercise the discretion only based upon factors that bear upon the proceedings 
themselves. 
 … the notion of what would be unfairly prejudicial can only draw its colour from the 
connection of the information to the matters in issue in the proceedings. If this is the 
case, the public interest test will inevitably reflect a judgment of the evidential worth 
of the information.142 
7.118 The Law Council submitted: 
The assessment of the ‘public interest in allowing the information to be used’ is likely 
to be problematic. Courts are imperfectly equipped to deal with matters involving an 
assessment of the public interest where no guidance is provided in legislation as to 
what factors the court is to take account. … 
Likewise, it is unclear what is meant by the ‘unfairly prejudicial’ in this context. …  
If the safeguard in Proposal 7–2 is to be effective, then it should be reformulated in 
terms which have recognisable meaning, and which pay proper regard to the 
importance of protecting privileged communications. A suitable mechanism might be 
a presumption against use, which could be displaced where the otherwise privileged 
evidence reveals matters constituting serious misconduct, or conduct which has a 
serious adverse impact on the rights of others, and which is not likely to be proved by 
any other means.143 
                                                        
141  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 101, 2 November 2007. More 
generally, the CDPP expressed concern that the proposed safeguard should not hamper Parliament’s 
ability to legislate for the abrogation of client legal privilege without any limitation on the use of that 
material. 
142  Australian Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 113, 5 November 2007. 
143  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007. 
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7.119 The Law Council also submitted that derivative use immunity should apply as a 
default safeguard.144 It stressed the importance of having such a provision in place 
where privilege is abrogated by the exercise of covert powers—such as covert ‘B-
party’ warrants created under the Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 
2006 (Cth).145 The Law Council noted the recommendations made by the Senate Legal 
and Constitutional Legislation Committee in relation to the provisions of the 
Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) that agencies should 
be prevented from using material uncovered when exercising a B-party warrant, where 
the material revealed bona fide communications, inter alia, between a lawyer and 
client, and that 
the Bill be amended to introduce defined limits on the use and derivative use of 
material collected by B-party warrants.146 
Notification of application of safeguards 
7.120 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that federal client legal privilege legislation 
should provide that where client legal privilege has been abrogated in respect of any 
federal coercive information-gathering power, federal bodies should be required to 
notify persons the subject of such powers, as well as those who produce information on 
a voluntary basis, about whether any safeguards apply to the use of otherwise 
privileged information in subsequent proceedings.147 
7.121 This proposal was generally supported.148 AGS submitted that: 
A body exercising coercive powers should give information to persons against whom 
the powers are being exercised explaining the powers’ source, and the obligations to 
which the powers’ exercise gives rise. …  
We see it as beneficial, in identifying the source of the coercive power in question to 
refer also to those provisions of the source legislation that qualify the exercise of the 
powers including those that create safeguards.149 
7.122 APRA submitted that it agreed with the proposal but considered that 
                                                        
144  Civil Liberties Australia also expressed the view that any abrogation of privilege in relation to a criminal 
investigation should be accompanied by a derivative use immunity provision: Civil Liberties Australia 
(ACT) Inc, Submission LPP 86, 1 November 2007. 
145  B-party warrants ‘enable agencies to obtain an interception warrant for communications of an associate of 
a person of interest’: Parliament of Australia—Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, 
Provisions of the Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Bill (2006), 5. 
146  See Ibid recs 22, 23; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007.  
147  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 7–3. 
148  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 116, 1 November 2007; Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission 
LPP 107, 5 November 2007; National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007 Australian 
Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, 
Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 
31 October 2007; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. 
149  Australian Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 113, 5 November 2007. 
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failure to comply with this obligation should not invalidate an otherwise proper 
exercise of the power or use of the material so produced.150 
7.123 The Hon John Hannaford, formerly NSW Attorney General, and now an 
examiner with the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), submitted that: 
Proposal 7–3 should apply where there has been a modification of [client legal 
privilege] not just where client legal privilege has been abrogated. However, the 
codification of such a proposal will only generate a further level of statutory 
challenge. Where an organisation such as the ACC is subject to oversight by a 
Parliamentary Committee, it should be left to such a Committee to satisfy itself that 
the principles that underpin such a recommendation of the ALRC are satisfactorily 
implemented.151 
Public versus private investigations 
7.124 The general theme that emerged from submissions in response to IP 33 was that 
no distinction should be drawn between the application of the immunities to federal 
investigations conducted in public and those conducted in private, but that additional 
safeguards should be introduced to protect privileged information given in a public 
investigation.152 
7.125 For example, the Law Society of NSW expressed the view that: 
It might be thought that any proposal that lesser protections should apply to 
proceedings conducted in public view could have a counter-productive effect, leading 
to the possibility of perceived ‘show trials’ were evidence obtained by Royal 
Commissions over otherwise valid objections later used to secure convictions.153 
7.126 NSW Young Lawyers submitted that: 
For investigations conducted in public, there is usually strong media presence that 
gives rise to an expectation to deal with illegal or unlawful conduct that is uncovered 
during an investigation. There is a significant risk that the media will influence the 
conduct of the proceedings. 
The public interest is not affected by whether the investigation is conducted in private 
or public. Ultimately, the applicability of the immunities should not be varied to align 
with the current public interest issue that the media is focusing on.154 
                                                        
150  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007.  
151  J Hannaford, Submission LPP 114, 19 November 2007. 
152  See Victoria Legal Aid, Submission LPP 55, 14 June 2007; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 
12 June 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007; Law Council of 
Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007.  
153  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
154  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 12 June 2007. 
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7.127 Victoria Legal Aid submitted that: 
We support conferring the immunity in all investigations. However, as an additional 
safeguard, we suggest that in public hearings [information subject to a claim for client 
legal privilege] should be provided in camera.155 
7.128 ASIC agreed that: 
Any detriment a claimant of privilege may suffer due to an abrogation or modification 
of client legal privilege may be reduced if the disclosure of the privileged information 
is restricted. Such a requirement may be imposed for both Royal Commissions and 
court proceedings.156 
7.129 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that where federal client legal privilege is 
abrogated or modified in a federal investigation that takes place in a public setting—
such as a Royal Commission—evidence that may disclose communications subject to 
client legal privilege should be presented in-camera or may be subject to a non-
publication order.157 
7.130 This proposal was generally supported.158 Members of the South Australian Bar 
Association noted, in particular, the importance of providing for a non-publication 
order and expressed the view that the substance of the ALRC’s proposal should be 
provided for in legislation.159 Concern was expressed that in-camera hearings should 
not be made mandatory, nor become the norm in practice.160 
ALRC’s views 
7.131 The ALRC considers that if client legal privilege is abrogated or modified in 
respect of any federal investigation, the ordinary presumption should be that safeguards 
ought to be implemented—in one form or another—to protect the use to which 
otherwise privileged information can be put. A consideration of specific factors 
(addressed below) may operate to displace that presumption. 
                                                        
155  Victoria Legal Aid, Submission LPP 55, 14 June 2007. The Law Council expressed a similar view: Law 
Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
156  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. 
157  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 7–4. 
158  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 116, 1 November 2007; Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission 
LPP 107, 5 November 2007; National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Australian 
Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, 
Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 
31 October 2007; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007; 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. The AFP 
submitted that it would not object to the proposal: Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 
29 November 2007. 
159  Members of the South Australian Bar Association, Consultation LPP 38, Adelaide, 17 October 2007. 
160  Advisory Committee members, Third Advisory Committee meeting, 15 November 2007. 
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Harmonisation 
7.132 The ALRC is of the view that attempting to prescribe a ‘one-size fits all’ 
approach to safeguards—regardless of the functions or exigencies of the particular 
federal investigatory body, or indeed the exigencies of particular inquiries or 
investigations—is fraught with difficulties. This is consistent with the view expressed 
by the ALRC in Chapter 5 concerning the difficulties in establishing a uniform 
approach to the application of client legal privilege. 
7.133 As discussed previously in this Report, federal bodies with coercive 
information-gathering powers operate in vastly different areas and there are important 
differences in their aims, functions, operations and powers.161 Significantly, while 
some bodies have enforcement functions, others do not, and of those bodies possessing 
enforcement functions there are noteworthy differences in their policies and practices 
concerning resort to enforcement activity. 
7.134 Consequently, if privilege is or were to be abrogated, the safeguards that may be 
appropriate and practical in the context of some federal investigations—for example 
those conducted by an oversight body, such as the IGIS—may not be appropriate in the 
context of other investigations, such as those conducted by a Royal Commission of 
inquiry. 
7.135 The divergence of stakeholders’ views on the application of the immunities is 
also testimony to the difficulties of attempting to adopt a uniform approach to 
safeguards. For example, the ACCC supported use immunity in certain proceedings, 
while ASIC did not.  
7.136 The recommended adoption of a default safeguard provision in the event that 
client legal privilege is abrogated (discussed below) may, however, introduce an 
appropriate degree of uniformity, without impeding flexibility of approach where 
warranted. 
Relevant factors to be considered 
7.137 As discussed in Chapter 6, the ALRC envisages that any abrogation of client 
legal privilege will occur only in a few exceptional circumstances—not as a matter of 
course. Therefore, the issue of what safeguards, if any, should apply in a particular 
federal investigation where privilege is abrogated should similarly arise only in 
exceptional circumstances. If circumstances are found to warrant the abrogation of the 
privilege, consideration will have to be given to whether it is appropriate for the 
application of any particular safeguard to render nugatory the effect of abrogation. 
                                                        
161  The different investigatory contexts of federal bodies are set out in Ch 4 and discussed more generally in 
Ch 5. 
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7.138 The factors relevant to a consideration of whether, and which, safeguards should 
be applied in the event of an abrogation or modification of the privilege overlap, to 
some degree, with the factors relevant to considering whether the public interest in a 
particular case warrants the abrogation or modification of the privilege.162 These 
factors, which are not exhaustive, include: 
• the federal body’s role and functions;  
• the nature and gravity of the matters under consideration, including whether the 
investigation concerns an issue of major public importance that has a significant 
impact on the community in general or on a section of the community; and 
• the likelihood and degree to which the privileged information will benefit any 
action, including enforcement action, to be taken as a result of the investigation, 
particularly where legal advice is central to the issues being considered.163 
Enactment of a default provision 
7.139 In order to give effect to the presumption that, where client legal privilege is 
abrogated or modified, safeguards should apply to protect the use to which otherwise 
privileged information can be put, the ALRC is of the view that federal client legal 
privilege legislation should contain a default safeguard provision—the form of which 
is addressed below.  
7.140 The ALRC envisages that the default provision will operate in the same way as 
the default provision proposed in Chapter 5 (preserving the application of client legal 
privilege to the coercive powers of federal investigatory bodies), in that it can be 
displaced only by express words conveying a contrary approach. The ability to displace 
the default provision ensures that an appropriate degree of flexibility is retained with 
respect to the application of safeguards—recognising the exigencies of different 
investigatory contexts.  
7.141 The default provision will only apply where past or future federal legislation 
that abrogates or modifies privilege is silent on the issue of use of otherwise privileged 
information.164 It is not intended to displace existing provisions conferring use or 
derivative use immunity—such as those in the IGIS Act, the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002 and the Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003—in respect of which no 
particular criticisms have been levelled in the context of this Inquiry.  
                                                        
162  See discussion in Ch 6. 
163  The Law Council suggested that there were other relevant factors in this regard: Law Council of 
Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007. 
164  One Advisory Committee member commented that it is possible that legislation abrogating privilege is 
silent on the use of otherwise privileged information because Parliament’s intention is to allow for the use 
of otherwise privileged information. In such circumstances, in the absence of an express amendment 
authorising unrestricted use, the default provision would apply.  
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7.142 Similarly, the existence of a default provision is not intended to deter 
Parliament, in the event that client legal privilege is abrogated in particular instances in 
the future, from deciding to impose a use immunity or derivative use immunity 
provision in respect of otherwise privileged information or making a decision not to 
impose any restrictions on use having regard to the particular circumstances under 
consideration. However, the ALRC would expect, as a general principle, that the 
circumstances in which privilege would be abrogated with no accompanying 
restrictions on use would be exceptional, especially where privileged information is 
obtained covertly.165  
Choosing between use immunity and derivative use immunity as a default 
provision 
7.143 As a general proposition, the ALRC considers that the default safeguard should 
be one that is ‘low to mid range’ on the spectrum of safeguards. Therefore, the ALRC 
does not support the adoption of derivative use immunity (which is broader in 
application than use immunity) as a default provision—despite the fact that the ALRC 
considers that the application of a derivative use immunity may be appropriate in the 
context of investigations conducted by some federal bodies, such as the Inspector-
General of Taxation. 
7.144 The ALRC is mindful of the criticisms made of derivative use immunity by the 
then ASC, the CDPP and the JSCCS in the context of its application to the privilege 
against self-incrimination in ASC investigations. The ALRC tends to agree that 
derivative use immunity can operate as a ‘poisoned chalice’,166 present genuine 
practical obstacles to enforcement action, and render virtually worthless the effect of 
abrogation of privilege.  
7.145 Consequently, the ALRC supports use immunity as a more appropriate default 
safeguard than derivative use immunity. ALRC 95 recommended that, where 
legislation abrogated or modified client legal privilege, a default use immunity 
provision should apply in the absence of any clear express statutory statement to the 
contrary.167 
                                                        
165  As noted in Ch 5, an alternative option for reform—identified in the final stages of the Inquiry—would be 
to have the default provision incorporated as a rule of interpretation of Commonwealth Acts and 
delegated legislation, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. However, the ALRC did not 
have the opportunity to consult on this option and thus feels unable to make a recommendation in this 
regard.  
166  Parliament of Australia—Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities, Use Immunity 
Provisions in the Corporations Law and the Australian Securities Commission Law (1991), [4.12], 
referred to above. 
167  Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties 
in Australia, ALRC 95 (2002), Rec 19–3. 
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Choosing between use immunity and judicial discretion to admit evidence as a 
default provision 
7.146 The ALRC has some reservations about the arbitrary nature in which a use 
immunity provision might operate where client legal privilege—as opposed to the 
privilege against self-incrimination—is abrogated. As noted above, a use immunity 
provision typically limits use of privileged information in any subsequent criminal or 
civil penalty proceedings against the person who provided the information, except in 
proceedings in relation to the falsity of the evidence itself. In the context of the 
privilege against self-incrimination, by definition, people can only ‘self-incriminate’ 
themselves—so there is a rationally consistent basis for limiting the use of the 
information against the person who provided it. 
7.147 Similarly, where a person who is the holder of client legal privilege in a 
communication produces that communication in response to a federal investigatory 
coercive power, there is a rational basis for adopting the position that the privileged 
information cannot be used against that person. However, in responding to the coercive 
powers of federal investigatory bodies, a person other than the holder of the privilege 
may produce a document containing a communication subject to client legal privilege. 
As noted previously in this Report, information may be compelled not only from 
persons suspected of wrongdoing, but also from persons or entities who happen to have 
information or documents that may be relevant to an investigation into the conduct of 
others.168 In such cases, it appears meaningless to confer a safeguard on the person who 
produced the information.  
7.148 Therefore, the ALRC is of the view that if a use immunity provision were to be 
adopted as a default provision, careful attention would need to be given to its drafting, 
to make it clear that the information the subject of the claim could not be used against 
the holder of the privilege. In DP 73, the ALRC expressed interest in hearing views 
about whether the statutes that currently confer use immunity in the context of the 
abrogation of client legal privilege need to be clarified in this respect.169 No views 
were offered on this issue. 
7.149 The ALRC has some reservations about proposing a default use immunity 
provision in the context of an abrogation of client legal privilege in Royal 
Commissions of inquiry. The ALRC notes the concerns expressed by some 
stakeholders that the work of Royal Commissions could be rendered futile if their 
recommendations could not be acted upon because of an inability to use otherwise 
privileged information. Of course, whether the work of any particular Royal 
Commission would be compromised would depend upon the extent to which use of 
information the subject of client legal privilege was central to the ability to mount 
action to implement that Royal Commission’s recommendations. Presumably, if the 
                                                        
168  See discussion on third parties in Ch 8. 
169  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), [7.126]. 
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Australian Parliament considers that abrogation of privilege in a particular Royal 
Commission of inquiry is warranted, having regard to the fact that legal advice itself is 
central to the issues being considered, then it is likely to be equally important for other 
federal bodies to be able to use that legal advice in any subsequent action.  
7.150 The ALRC is of the view that a feasible and preferable alternative to conferring 
absolute use immunity in criminal and civil proceedings, as a default safeguard 
provision, is to allow a judicial discretion to limit the use as evidence in criminal or 
civil proceedings of otherwise privileged information obtained pursuant to the exercise 
of a federal coercive information-gathering power that abrogates privilege. This 
approach would require a federal body to apply to a court if it wishes to rely on 
otherwise privileged information as evidence in any court proceedings. This would 
equally apply to federal bodies wishing to use, as evidence, privileged information that 
they had obtained pursuant to their coercive powers, as well as federal bodies, wishing 
to use, as evidence, privileged information provided to a Royal Commission of inquiry.  
7.151 In DP 73, the ALRC expressed the view that the court should have a general 
discretion to admit the use of otherwise privileged information, balancing the public 
interest in allowing the information to be used against a consideration of whether the 
particular use of that information would be unfairly prejudicial to a party.170 In 
adopting that approach, the ALRC noted that it had received some support in 
submissions, and was consistent with that recently recommended by the New Zealand 
Law Commission.171  
7.152 However, having regard to the views expressed in submissions and consultations 
in response to DP 73, the ALRC has reformulated its proposed judicial discretion 
safeguard. The ALRC now considers that there should be a presumption against use of 
the evidence, which is able to be displaced in the court’s discretion, having regard to 
the following factors: 
• the public interest in limiting the effects of the abrogation of an important 
common law right; 
• whether the otherwise privileged information was obtained pursuant to the 
exercise of a covert investigatory power; and 
• the probative value of the otherwise privileged evidence, including whether it 
reveals matters tending to constitute serious misconduct or conduct which has a 
                                                        
170  See Ibid, [7.129]. 
171  Ibid; New Zealand Law Commission, Search and Surveillance Powers, Report 97 (2007), rec 12.19 states 
that ‘the court should have the discretion to give directions that are necessary to limit the use made of any 
privileged information that is obtained as a result of the exercise of an enforcement power’. 
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serious adverse impact on the community in general or on a section of the 
community. 
7.153 With respect to the Law Council’s submission, that a relevant factor should be 
whether the otherwise privileged information is not likely to be proved by any other 
means, the ALRC considers that it would be extremely difficult for a federal body to 
establish this negative fact affirmatively in court proceedings. 
7.154 The ALRC considers that the above judicial discretion is an appropriate 
safeguard to be applied in the event that client legal privilege is abrogated or modified 
in a particular Royal Commission.172  
7.155 As the judicial discretion to admit evidence is limited to civil and criminal 
proceedings, it needs to be supplemented by a default residual use immunity provision 
barring the use of otherwise privileged information in administrative penalty 
proceedings. 
7.156 Importantly, the discretionary safeguard that is recommended differs from the 
qualified privilege approach discussed in Chapter 6, and rejected by the ALRC as an 
option for reform. A qualified privilege acknowledges that it may be in the interests of 
justice to protect the confidentiality of a particular relationship in the context of a 
matter. In a case where client legal privilege is expressly abrogated by statute, the 
Australian Parliament already has made the decision that, in the context of the 
application of a particular federal investigatory power, the public interest in obtaining 
privileged information outweighs any harm that might be done to the relationship 
between a lawyer and a client. Protecting the relationship between a lawyer and client 
is therefore not the premise on which the judicial discretionary safeguard is founded. 
7.157 The benefit of adopting use immunity as a safeguard is that it promotes certainty 
of approach—pursuant to the ALRC’s model, the privileged information will not be 
able to be used against the privilege holder in subsequent proceedings. The provision 
can make it clear that the proceedings include criminal, civil and administrative penalty 
proceedings. The restriction against the use of the information is inflexible, however, 
not catering for the particular circumstances of any case. 
7.158 In contrast, adopting a judicial discretion to admit privileged information in civil 
and criminal proceedings has the disadvantage of being uncertain in outcome, but the 
advantage of flexibility—acknowledging that in particular cases where the Australian 
Parliament has decided in the public interest to abrogate client legal privilege, there 
also may be a public interest to allow use of that information as evidence in criminal or 
civil proceedings.  
                                                        
172  See Ch 6 and Rec 6–2. 
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7.159 Therefore, while ALRC 95 recommended a general default use immunity 
provision to apply to criminal, civil and administrative penalty proceedings—in the 
context of a broader inquiry on federal civil and administrative penalties—in the 
context of this focused inquiry on client legal privilege, the ALRC has identified a 
judicial discretion to admit privileged information in court proceedings as a preferable 
alternative to conferring use immunity in civil and criminal proceedings, as a default 
safeguard. The ALRC recommends that adoption of the judicial discretion be 
supplemented by a more limited use immunity provision—aimed to prevent the use of 
otherwise privileged information in administrative penalty proceedings—the latter 
being consistent with the approach in ALRC 95.  
7.160 In the event that use immunity or derivative use immunity is applied as a 
safeguard in any particular case, the ALRC sets out below its views on the scope of 
those immunities. 
Application of immunities to corporations and individuals 
7.161 The ALRC agrees with the strong views expressed by stakeholders that if use or 
derivative use immunity were to be conferred in the event that client legal privilege 
were abrogated or modified, then no distinction should be made in the application of 
the immunities to corporations and individuals.  
7.162 This is consistent with the ALRC’s views (expressed in Chapter 3) that client 
legal privilege should be available to both individuals and corporations. Given that the 
rationales for the privilege are equally applicable to individuals and corporations, it is 
philosophically coherent to refrain from drawing a distinction in the application of the 
immunities on the basis of whether the privilege belongs to a natural person. While the 
privilege against self-incrimination applies only to individuals and not corporations, 
the rationale for the privilege against self-incrimination is distinct from the rationale 
for client legal privilege. 
Application of immunities to document production and oral statements 
7.163 The ALRC considers that if use or derivative use immunity were to be conferred 
in the event that client legal privilege is abrogated or modified, then no distinction 
should be made in the application of the immunities to the production of documents 
and the making of oral statements containing communications subject to client legal 
privilege.  
7.164 The ALRC is persuaded by the views of a majority of stakeholders on this issue. 
As noted in Chapter 6, it has been suggested that one of the effects of abrogating client 
legal privilege might be to chill legal communications or to render it less likely that 
lawyers will provide written, as opposed to oral, advice. The ALRC considers that the 
application of use or derivative use immunity to the production of documents 
containing communications subject to client legal privilege would go some way 
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towards negating the concern that the abrogation of client legal privilege will provide a 
strong disincentive for lawyers to record their legal advice. 
Notification of application of safeguards 
7.165 In Chapter 8, the ALRC expresses the view that federal bodies should be 
required to notify persons the subject of coercive information-gathering powers, as 
well as those who provide information on a voluntary basis, whether or not client legal 
privilege applies to the exercise of a particular power or to the production of 
information on a voluntary basis.173 This does not entail a federal body giving advice 
about whether or not privilege applies to any particular communication or document 
but only whether client legal privilege is available as an excuse for not producing 
documents or information in complying with any given information-gathering power. 
7.166 Consistent with that approach, when client legal privilege has been abrogated or 
modified, it is important for persons to know about whether and what safeguards apply 
to the use of their otherwise privileged information in any subsequent proceedings. 
Federal bodies should be required to notify persons whether legislation permits the 
unrestricted use of otherwise privileged information in subsequent proceedings or 
whether any of the following safeguards apply to an abrogation of client legal 
privilege: a judicial discretion to admit otherwise privileged information in court 
proceedings, or a use or derivative use immunity.  
7.167 The precise manner of notification should not be prescribed in legislation. The 
ALRC considers that it is best to retain some flexibility in this regard.174 
Public versus private investigations 
7.168 The ALRC agrees with the views expressed by stakeholders that additional 
safeguards need to be put in place to protect the dissemination of privileged 
information disclosed in a federal investigation that takes place in a public setting—
especially in light of the fact that public investigations—such as high profile Royal 
Commissions—can generate a great deal of publicity. The ALRC notes, in this regard, 
that a Royal Commission has power to direct that evidence be taken in private in 
certain situations.175 
7.169 Taking into account the views expressed on Proposal 7–4, and the fact that the 
ALRC has made a recommendation that the Royal Commissions Act 1902 be amended 
to allow privilege to be abrogated in particular Royal Commissions if specified criteria 
are met,176 the ALRC considers that the Royal Commissions Act should contain a 
commensurate amendment that a relevant factor to be considered by a Royal 
Commissioner in making an order that evidence be disclosed in camera or be subject to 
                                                        
173  See discussion in Ch 8 on ‘Notification of application of privilege’ and Rec 8–1. 
174  The ALRC’s views on manner of notification are set out more fully in Ch 8. 
175  See Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) s 6D(2), (3). 
176  See Rec 6–2. 
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a non-publication order is that the evidence may or will disclose communications 
subject to client legal privilege.  
Recommendation 7–2 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide that, in the absence of any express statutory statement concerning the 
use to which otherwise privileged information can be put (for example, 
provisions conferring use immunity or derivative use immunity or authorising 
unrestricted use of otherwise privileged information), where federal legislation 
abrogates the application of client legal privilege to the exercise of a federal 
coercive information-gathering power the following default provision should 
apply: 
(a)  a federal body that seeks to rely on otherwise privileged information as 
evidence in any court proceedings must apply to the court for permission 
to do so;  
(b)  there should be a presumption against use of the evidence which is able to 
be displaced in the court’s discretion, having regard to the following 
factors: 
 (i)   the public interest in limiting the effects of the abrogation of an 
important common law right; 
 (ii)  whether the otherwise privileged information was obtained 
pursuant to the exercise of a covert investigatory power; and 
 (iii)  the probative value of the otherwise privileged evidence, including 
whether it reveals matters tending to constitute serious misconduct 
or conduct which has a serious adverse impact on the community 
in general or on a section of the community; and 
(c) a federal body is precluded from using otherwise privileged information 
against the holder of client legal privilege in any administrative penalty 
proceedings. 
Recommendation 7–3 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide that where client legal privilege has been abrogated or modified in 
respect of any federal coercive information-gathering power, federal bodies 
should be required to notify persons the subject of such powers, as well as those 
who produce information on a voluntary basis, about whether any safeguards 
apply to the use of otherwise privileged information in subsequent proceedings.  
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Recommendation 7–4 If Recommendation 6–2 is adopted, the Royal 
Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) should be amended to provide that a relevant factor 
to be considered by a Royal Commissioner in making an order that evidence be 
disclosed in camera or be subject to a non-publication order is that the evidence 
may or will disclose communications subject to client legal privilege. 
Availability of privilege against third parties 
7.170 If privilege were to be abrogated or modified, should privilege remain available 
against third parties, despite not being available against a federal investigatory body? 
Should the fact that a statutory provision abrogates the privilege in response to the 
coercive information-gathering power of a federal body mean that the communications 
can become available to other parties wishing to have access to them? There is 
authority for the proposition that the production of communications under compulsion 
does not, of itself, constitute a waiver of client legal privilege.177 
7.171 Some Commonwealth statutes abrogating or modifying client legal privilege 
contain provisions limiting the extent of the abrogation or modification. For example: 
• The Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) provides that the 
fact that a person is not excused from answering a question or producing a 
document on the ground that it would disclose certain types of legal advice or 
communications protected by client legal privilege, does not otherwise affect a 
claim of privilege that anyone may make in relation to that answer or 
document.178 
• The Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003 (Cth) provides that information or 
documents do not cease to be the subject of client legal privilege merely because 
they are given or produced in response to a statutory request or requirement.179  
• The James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth), which 
abrogates client legal privilege in relation to ‘James Hardie material’, provides 
that the Act does not otherwise abrogate or affect the law relating to client legal 
privilege.180 It also provides that, if apart from the Act, material would have 
been privileged for the purposes of s 42(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 
1982 (Cth), s 33(2) of the Archives Act 1983 (Cth), or s 197(2) of the Proceeds 
                                                        
177  See Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v George Weston Foods Ltd (2003) 129 FCR 298; 
Woollahra Municipal Council v Westpac Banking Corporation (1992) 33 NSWLR 529.  
178  Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) s 96(6). 
179  Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003 (Cth) s 18. 
180  See, eg, James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) s 6. ‘James Hardie material’ is 
defined in s 3.  
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of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), then for the purposes of those subsections material is 
still taken to be privileged from production in legal proceedings.181 
7.172 The Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) provides that a Royal Commission 
record or material referred to in a Royal Commission record does not cease to be the 
subject of a claim for client legal privilege merely because a person or body has 
custody of the record, or is given access to the records under regulations or a direction 
under the Archives Act 1983 (Cth). 
7.173 The Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003 prohibits the Inspector-General 
from including in his or her reports to the minister and in annual reports information 
produced that is the subject of client legal privilege or is derived from information or a 
document that is the subject of privilege.182  
7.174 Federal investigatory bodies may be subject to statutory duties of confidentiality 
or secrecy.183 However, there are several ways in which a federal investigatory body in 
possession of material obtained under compulsion may be called upon to produce or 
release that information. A federal investigatory body may: 
• be issued with a subpoena to produce documents;184  
• receive a statutory request for release of information;185 
• be requested to release information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 
1982 (Cth); 
• be required to disclose communications in order to discharge the prosecution’s 
duty of disclosing material which the prosecution intends to use to prove its case 
or affects the credibility or reliability of any witness, as well as the duty of 
disclosing unused material;186 or  
                                                        
181  Ibid s 5.  
182  Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003 (Cth) s 27. 
183  See, eg, Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 127; Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth) s 56. 
184  For example, an accused person may issue a subpoena to the federal investigatory body that conducted 
the investigation which led to charges being laid against him or her. 
185  See, eg, Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 25, which allows ASIC to 
release a transcript of a compulsory examination together with a copy of any related book to a person’s 
lawyer if the lawyer satisfies ASIC that the person is carrying on or is contemplating in good faith a 
proceeding to which the examination related. ASIC may impose conditions on the release of the 
information. See also Ibid s 127, which authorises ASIC to release information of its own volition or 
where it has been requested to do so. 
186  The prosecution’s duty of disclosure is considered further below. 
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• be a party to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with other 
Commonwealth or state bodies, which provides for the exchange of 
information—although an MOU does not provide a legal basis for the disclosure 
of information. Its operation is dependent upon the use or disclosure being 
authorised by law or statute.187  
7.175 The Administrative Review Council (ARC), in a draft report on the coercive 
information-gathering powers of federal bodies, recommended that ‘issues of privilege 
and immunity need to be taken into consideration when releasing information to 
another agency.’188 
7.176 In relation to the prosecution’s duty of disclosure, referred to above, the CDPP’s 
Statement on Prosecution Disclosure provides that the prosecution should disclose to 
the defence all unused material in its possession, unless it is considered that client legal 
privilege should be claimed in respect of the material.189 However, it is not clear 
whether the exception applies only to material in respect of which the investigatory 
body—as opposed to a third party—could claim privilege.  
7.177 In R v McLaughlin, Judge David of the District Court of South Australia made 
the following comments concerning the use of a transcript of interview produced on 
compulsion to ASIC, in respect of which receivers maintained a claim for client legal 
privilege: 
In my view the relevant sections of the ASIC Act make it clear that legal professional 
privilege is abrogated to the extent of the relevant documents being handed over to 
ASIC for the purposes of further investigation. I find that there is clear implication 
that privilege is further abrogated to allow the material to be handed over to the … 
[CDPP]. … I find there is a further clear implication that the [CDPP] would be 
allowed to have the material inspected by the defence in any action pursuant to 
procedures of disclosure in criminal trials.190 
                                                        
187  See, eg, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority and Australian Taxation Office, Memorandum of 
Understanding Between the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority and the Australian Taxation 
Office, 16 April 1999, [4.2], which provides that: ‘The agencies agree that, subject to legislative 
provisions, information available to one agency which is relevant to the responsibilities of the other 
agency will be shared as requested. … This will be subject to … any conditions which the provider of the 
information might place upon the use or disclosure of the information, such as claims of legal 
professional privilege’. 
188  Administrative Review Council, Government Agency Coercive Information-Gathering Powers [Draft 
Report] (2007), Principle 21. 
189  See Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Statement on Prosecution Disclosure 
<www.cdpp.gov.au/Prosecutions/Disclosure/> at 10 April 2007, [4.2]. 
190  R v McLaughlin [2004] SADC 86, [20]. Judge David held that the transcript could be viewed by the 
defendant and his counsel ‘for the purpose of the forthcoming trial but the abrogation of legal 
professional privilege is confined to that purpose and will go no further’: Ibid, [21]. 
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Practices of federal bodies 
7.178 In IP 33, the ALRC expressed interest in hearing about the practices and policies 
of federal investigatory bodies in relation to maintaining privilege against third 
parties.191  
7.179 The federal investigatory bodies that provided information to the ALRC in this 
regard included those in respect of which client legal privilege has been expressly 
abrogated.192 They also included ASIC, which has taken the view that certain of its 
powers abrogate client legal privilege.193 
7.180 David Vos, the current Inspector-General of Taxation noted: 
The [Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003 (Cth)] provides the Tax Office and 
taxpayers with the basis to maintain privilege against third parties … This is despite 
the fact that they have provided privileged information to my office. In the case of 
privileged information obtained from the Tax Office, the privilege will also be 
maintained where I have referred to that information in my reports to Government. As 
an additional safeguard, the secrecy provisions prevent my office’s disclosure of 
protected information to third parties.194  
7.181 Similarly, Ian Carnell, the current IGIS stated: 
If necessary, the privilege could be maintained against third parties because the 
Inspector-General and the staff of the office cannot be compelled to disclose 
information (see in particular s 34 of the IGIS Act). This has not arisen as a practical 
issue in the experience of this office.195 
7.182 ASIC informed the ALRC about its approach to protecting privileged 
information from third parties in each of the contexts raised in IP 33: 
In considering whether to release legally privileged material, ASIC places 
considerable weight upon the submission made by the claimants of legal privilege and 
upon the fact that legal privilege applies to the material. Accordingly, notwithstanding 
that ASIC may be authorised by statute to release legally privileged information, it 
will only do so in very limited circumstances and where it is satisfied that: 
(i) it is necessary to achieve the purpose of the release; and  
(ii) there are no other appropriate avenues pursuant to which the proposed recipients 
of the information should seek to obtain the information. 
                                                        
191  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), [7.74]. 
192  Namely the Inspector-General of Taxation and the IGIS. 
193  See Ch 5. As noted in Ch 1, from 3 December 2007, ASIC notifies persons who are subject to its 
compulsory powers that they are not required to provide documents or information that are subject to a 
valid claim for privilege. 
194  Inspector-General of Taxation, Submission LPP 13, 16 May 2007.  
195  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission LPP 22, 1 June 2007. 
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If ASIC were to release legally privileged information its practice would be to impose 
strict conditions which limit the use of the information and prevent its disclosure 
beyond officers of the agency to which it was disclosed. 
Duty of disclosure in criminal matters 
ASIC believes that the prosecution’s obligations of disclosure are subject to claims of 
legal professional privilege. 
Accordingly, in the absence of a court order, if ASIC holds legally privileged 
material, ASIC (via the prosecution) will not disclose those documents to the defence 
but will merely provide … a description of those documents and will notify the 
defence that the disclosure of the documents is precluded by legal professional 
privilege. 
Subpoenas for production in civil and criminal matters 
Where ASIC receives a subpoena for the production of legally privileged documents, 
it is obliged to and does produce those documents to the court. However, those 
documents are produced in a separate bundle and are identified as being subject to a 
claim of legal professional privilege. …  
It is ASIC’s practice, upon receipt of a subpoena, to notify the persons who are 
entitled to claim legal professional privilege of the fact that the subpoena has been 
issued to ASIC and that ASIC is required to produce the privileged documents. ASIC 
does so in order to enable those persons to take any action which they consider 
necessary in order to assert their claim of privilege. In doing so, those persons may 
seek to have the documents excused from production to the court or if the documents 
have already been produced, they may seek orders precluding access to them.196 
7.183 Medicare Australia, the Australian Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA), and APRA also provided information in this regard. Medicare Australia 
informed the ALRC that ‘while [it] was unaware of examples where the issue has 
arisen, as a matter of principle, Medicare Australia would seek to maintain privilege 
against third parties’.197 
7.184 ACMA submitted that: 
Subject to compliance with its statutory and legal obligations, ACMA would 
generally maintain privilege in respect of any information which it receives as a result 
of the exercise of its coercive powers, against third parties (for instance, if privilege 
was waived for the purposes of giving information to ACMA). It is noted however, 
that to date, ACMA has not had to deal with a request to release such information 
under a legislative provision or in relation to a criminal matter.198  
                                                        
196  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 5, 29 March 2007. 
197  Medicare Australia, Submission LPP 6, 10 April 2007. 
198  Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission LPP 20, 29 May 2007. 
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7.185 APRA stated that the issue of providing privileged material to third parties has 
only arisen rarely. 
APRA’s practice has been not to produce such material unless consent has been 
obtained from the party concerned or, at least, that the party has had the opportunity 
to comment on the proposed release. …  
APRA accepts its duty of disclosure in criminal matters would require it to disclose 
the existence of all information in its possession. As yet, no policy has been required 
prescribing how to deal with issues of confidentiality, whether privileged or 
otherwise, in response to APRA’s obligations in criminal matters.199 
Trends in the United States 
7.186 Chapter 6 discusses the trends in the United States (US) for government 
agencies to seek waiver of client legal privilege from companies under investigation. 
Judicial opinions in the US have diverged in relation to the question of whether a 
disclosure of privileged information to a government agency constitutes a waiver 
against third parties.  
7.187 Since 1978, the United States Courts of Appeal have been divided on the issue 
of selective waiver—that is, allowing a corporation or person to disclose confidential 
communications to a particular party—such as a government agency—and limit the 
scope of the waiver to that particular party only. The three different positions adopted 
by the courts are: 
• selective waiver is permissible; 
• selective waiver is never permissible; and 
• selective waiver is permissible only in situations where the government has, 
prior to the disclosure, signed a binding confidentiality agreement with the 
corporation.200 
7.188 One commentator has stated that: 
Although the attorney-client privilege is ordinarily waived by disclosure of privileged 
information to a third party, a circuit split exists over whether waiver occurs when 
disclosure is made to the government. The Eighth Circuit has held that the attorney-
client privilege is waived only with respect to the government, and the DC Circuit 
                                                        
199  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 74, 6 July 2007. 
200  Z Dostart, ‘Selective Disclosure: The Abrogation of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product 
Doctrine’ (2005–06) 33 Pepperdine Law Review 723, 734. See also A Pinto, ‘Cooperation and Self-
Interest Are Strange Bedfellows: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege Through Production of 
Privileged Documents in a Government Investigation’ (2003–04) 106 West Virginia Law Review 359, 
368. 
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takes the position that the disclosure of privileged information to any third party, 
including the government, destroys the privilege.201 
7.189 The US trends have to be assessed in context, however. The disclosure of 
privileged information to federal bodies is not typically pursuant to the exercise of a 
federal investigatory power that abrogates client legal privilege—but rather, as outlined 
in Chapter 6, pursuant to practices and policies of federal bodies to require ‘voluntary 
disclosure’ of such information. 
Submissions and consultations  
Availability of privilege against third parties 
7.190 In IP 33, the ALRC asked, if client legal privilege were to be abrogated or 
modified, whether it should remain available against third parties—for example, in 
response to a subpoena issued to the federal body or pursuant to a statutory request for 
release of that information.202  
7.191 The clear majority of submissions in response to IP 33 that addressed this 
question supported client legal privilege being maintained against third parties in the 
event that it is abrogated in any federal investigation—many stating that the public 
interest considerations that might warrant the abrogation of the privilege in the context 
of a federal investigation had no or minimal application to third parties.203  
7.192 For example, the Law Council submitted that: 
The Law Council does not support abrogation or modification of [client legal 
privilege]. However, in the event that it is abrogated or modified as against the 
Commonwealth, the Law Council strongly supports the retention of [the privilege] 
against third parties. Legislative abrogation or modification … would be only for the 
purpose of facilitating the activities of coercive investigative bodies. It should not 
follow that the privilege should also disappear in other situations in which it is 
currently available. Statutory provisions should expressly provide that, despite any 
such abrogation or modification … all other protections of client legal privilege must 
remain. The destruction of the privilege for one purpose does not justify the removal 
of the privilege for other unrelated purposes.204 
                                                        
201  Z Dostart, ‘Selective Disclosure: The Abrogation of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product 
Doctrine’ (2005–06) 33 Pepperdine Law Review 723, 734. 
202  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), Question 7–4. 
203  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007; Australian 
Corporate Lawyers Association, Submission LPP 66, 22 June 2007; Victoria Legal Aid, Submission 
LPP 55, 14 June 2007; Taxation Institute of Australia, Submission LPP 54, 15 June 2007; Australian 
Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 50, 13 June 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission 
LPP 40, 1 June 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
204  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. Similarly, the Taxation Institute of Australia 
expressed the view that ‘it was critically necessary that there be a raft of provisions available to preserve 
the privilege [against third parties]’: Taxation Institute of Australia, Submission LPP 54, 15 June 2007. 
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7.193 The Law Society of NSW expressed the view that: 
What may stand as an argument at the margin for abrogating or limiting client legal 
privilege based on the competing public interests at stake in Commonwealth 
investigations does not carry the same weight in favour of third parties, except 
perhaps in the case of the requirement that the Commonwealth investigatory bodies 
discharge any prosecutorial duties they may have by disclosing material upon which 
they intend to rely in order to prove their case.205 
7.194 The AGS submitted that the jurisprudential basis for the abrogation or 
modification of the privilege not affecting the availability of the privilege against third 
parties ‘would seem to be strong’: 
To treat the abrogation of client legal privilege for the exercise of a coercive power as 
a constructive or implied waiver of the privilege would seem a far reaching measure 
in itself and go beyond any need served by the coercive power. The High Court’s 
decision in Johns v Australian Securities Commission,206 in our view, affords firm 
support for the proposition that information obtained by coercive powers remains 
confidential in the hands of the acquiring agency, only to be used as provided for 
under the legislation conferring those powers.207 
7.195 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that federal client legal privilege legislation 
should provide that, in the absence of any clear, express statutory statement to the 
contrary, where other federal legislation abrogates or modifies client legal privilege in 
federal investigations that abrogation or modification does not affect the holder of the 
privilege from maintaining privilege against a third party.208 
7.196 This proposal was generally supported.209 For example, the Law Council 
described the proposal as ‘sensible’ and submitted that: 
However, there would need to be careful attention given to the drafting of any 
legislative provision to ensure that it protected all communications revealed as a 
consequence of the abrogation. For example, it would need to extend to 
communications which the revealing party produces voluntarily in order to place 
other communications in context.210 
                                                        
205  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
206  Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408, 423–424. 
207  Australian Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 50, 13 June 2007. 
208  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 7–5. 
209  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 116, 1 November 2007; Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission 
LPP 107, 5 November 2007; National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Australian 
Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, 
Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 
31 October 2007; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007; 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. The AFP 
submitted that it would not object to the proposal: Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 
29 November 2007. 
210  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007. 
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7.197 The CDPP also submitted that care would need to be taken in formulating the 
provision, noting that ‘with respect to material that it provided to the CDPP in a brief 
of evidence for the purpose of prosecution, the CDPP may fall into the category of 
‘third party’.211  
7.198 The Australian Corporate Lawyers Association (ACLA), while supporting the 
proposal, did not agree that the position should be open to change by legislation.212 
Westpac welcomed the proposal and submitted that it should be clarified that ‘other 
third parties’ includes other investigatory bodies; and widened to include 
circumstances where privilege has been voluntarily waived in respect of information 
provided to a federal body on a confidential basis for a specific matter.213 
Prosecution statement on disclosure 
7.199 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that the CDPP should amend its Statement on 
Prosecution Disclosure to make it clear that the exception of disclosing unused 
privileged information to the defence applies irrespective of whether the privilege 
holder is the federal investigatory body that refers the matter to the CDPP, or a party 
that produced information to that federal investigatory body in the course of its 
investigation.214 
7.200 This proposal was supported by a variety of stakeholders.215 However, the 
CDPP opposed the proposal on the basis that it did not think such clarification was 
needed. It submitted: 
The Statement clearly indicates that the prosecution must disclose to the defence all 
unused material unless an exception applies, and there is no reason to read into the 
Statement a distinction between an investigating agency and a third party with respect 
to a claim of client legal privilege.216 
ALRC’s views 
7.201 As a general principle, the ALRC considers that client legal privilege should 
remain available against third parties when it is abrogated in respect of a federal 
investigatory body’s powers. A private litigant, for example, should not be able to gain 
a forensic advantage over another party to litigation by being able to access privileged 
information produced on compulsion to a federal investigatory body—when it would 
not otherwise be able to have access to such information.  
                                                        
211  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 101, 2 November 2007. 
212  Australian Corporate Lawyers Association, Submission LPP 83, 31 October 2007. 
213  Westpac Banking Corporation, Submission LPP 85, 1 November 2007. 
214  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 7–6. 
215  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Australian Financial Markets Association, 
Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 
2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007;  Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. 
216  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 101, 2 November 2007. 
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7.202 The ALRC agrees with the proposition that the higher public interests that may 
warrant an abrogation of client legal privilege in a federal investigation are unlikely, or 
less likely, to warrant an outright abrogation of the privilege against third parties. This 
is particularly so if one considers that a third party might wish to use the privileged 
information produced to a federal investigatory body for purposes unrelated to the 
investigation.  
7.203 Therefore, the ALRC is of the view that federal client legal privilege legislation 
should include a default provision that—in the absence of any clear, express words to 
the contrary—where other federal legislation abrogates or modifies the privilege in 
federal investigations, that abrogation or modification does not affect the holder of the 
privilege from maintaining privilege against a third party.  
7.204 Federal bodies should take appropriate steps to protect privileged information 
that they obtain during their investigations, from disclosure to third parties.217 The 
ALRC supports the practices—adopted by some federal bodies that made a submission 
to this Inquiry—of seeking the consent of privilege holders before releasing or 
producing their privileged information or giving notification about any proposed 
release or production to enable them to take steps to protect their position.  
7.205 As a general proposition, the ALRC considers that client legal privilege should 
also remain available against all third parties—irrespective of whether they are private 
litigants or other federal bodies. However, where the third party is another federal body 
different policy considerations may come into play. The issues of maintaining the 
privilege against third parties—especially where those third parties are federal 
bodies—and of use of otherwise privileged information are interrelated. For example, 
the default discretionary safeguard provided for in Recommendation 7–2 envisages that 
there may be circumstances in the public interest where a federal body may be able to 
use otherwise privileged material produced to a Royal Commission, assuming that 
privilege is abrogated in respect of an inquiry being undertaken by a Royal 
Commission.218 In those circumstances, that federal body would not be considered a 
third party against whom the privilege could be maintained and, if the matter were 
being pursued criminally, nor would the CDPP fall into such a classification. Careful 
attention therefore will need to be taken in drafting the precise words of a legislative 
provision implementing the ALRC’s recommendation to reflect the relationship 
between these two issues.  
7.206 The ALRC remains of the view that it would be beneficial if the CDPP amended 
its Statement on Prosecution Disclosure to make it clear that the exception of 
disclosing unused privileged information to the defence applies irrespective of whether 
                                                        
217  This is discussed further in the section below on practices and procedures. 
218  See Rec 6–2, and discussion above on restrictions on use of privileged information. 
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the privilege holder is the federal investigatory body that refers the matter to the CDPP, 
or a party that produced information to that federal investigatory body in the course of 
its investigation. Increased clarity in this respect may prove to be of particular utility in 
guiding federal investigatory bodies whose powers may become subject to an 
abrogation of client legal privilege about their duties of disclosure.219 
Recommendation 7–5 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide that, in the absence of an express statutory statement to the contrary, 
where federal legislation abrogates or modifies client legal privilege in federal 
investigations that abrogation or modification does not affect the holder of the 
privilege from maintaining privilege against a third party.  
Recommendation 7–6 The Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions (CDPP) should amend its Statement on Prosecution Disclosure to 
make it clear that the exception of disclosing unused privileged information to 
the defence applies irrespective of whether the privilege holder is the federal 
investigatory body that refers the matter to the CDPP, or a party that produced 
information to that federal investigatory body in the course of its investigation. 
Practice and procedure 
7.207 Questions arise about whether particular practices and procedures need to be 
developed and implemented by federal investigatory bodies in the event that client 
legal privilege is abrogated or modified in respect of their powers. 
7.208 Chapter 8 discusses a number of general issues of practice and procedure, 
including notification by federal bodies of whether client legal privilege applies to their 
coercive information-gathering powers, and making and resolving claims for client 
legal privilege. It also contains a number of recommendations directed towards the 
development and publication of practices and procedures by federal investigatory 
bodies about their approaches to various aspects of client legal privilege, and addresses 
the general benefits of developing and publishing policies. The section in this chapter 
on practice and procedure is therefore to be read as a complement to the fuller 
exposition of this topic in Chapter 8.220 
7.209 In the specific context of considering safeguards where privilege is abrogated or 
modified, there is a question about how a federal body that receives privileged 
information pursuant to the exercise of a coercive power should manage and record 
that information. This issue is of particular importance where there are legislative 
                                                        
219  Ch 6 sets out the factors that the ALRC considers relevant in making any decision to abrogate client legal 
privilege. 
220  See, in particular, those parts of Ch 8 headed ‘Notification of application of privilege’ and ‘Other policies 
and procedures’, and Recs 8–1, 8–2, 8–22(a). 
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restrictions on the use of that information, or despite the production of privileged 
information, the privilege is not taken to have been lost against third parties. 
7.210 In this respect, it is relevant to note that ASIC’s covering letter to recipients of 
certain notices under the ASIC Act states that the person’s claim for privilege will be 
recorded on registration of the documents.221 
Submissions and consultations 
7.211 In IP 33, the ALRC asked, if client legal privilege were to be abrogated or 
modified, whether federal investigatory bodies should be required to develop and 
publish their policies in relation to accurately informing persons of their position, and 
managing and recording the documents or communications received in respect of 
which a claim for privilege has been made.222  
7.212 In relation to the question about ‘accurately informing persons of their position’, 
IP 33 asked, if a statute were to abrogate or modify the application of client legal 
privilege to the exercise of a federal information-gathering power, whether it should be 
incumbent on the federal body exercising that power to notify the subjects of that 
power whether: 
• and to what extent, the privilege has been abrogated or modified;  
• the abrogation or modification applies to privileged communications relating to 
the representation of the client in the investigation process; 
• use or derivative use immunity applies; and 
• the privilege remains available as against third parties?223 
7.213 The clear majority of submissions that addressed these questions expressed 
support for federal bodies to develop and implement such practices and to publish their 
                                                        
221  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 5, 29 March 2007. 
222  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), Question 7–5.  
223  Ibid, [7.76]. 
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policies in this regard.224 The Law Council submitted that such measures were 
‘imperative’.225  
7.214 A number of stakeholders commented, in particular, on the desirability of, or 
even necessity for, procedures being put in place for managing and recording any 
document or communication received, in respect of which a privilege claim has been 
made. For example: 
• Victoria Legal Aid submitted that federal bodies should ‘implement appropriate 
document management systems to protect the confidentiality of [privileged] 
information’;226  
• the Law Society of NSW stated that ‘it was essential that privileged 
communications be carefully segregated and managed’;227 and 
• the Law Council noted that: 
The retention of [client legal privilege] against third parties would be ineffectual if a 
Commonwealth body did not develop practices and procedures requiring that 
documents the subject of a privilege claim be clearly identified as such, and be kept 
separately from other documents.228 
7.215 The Law Society of NSW also supported the development of a protocol 
addressing the return of privileged information by federal investigatory bodies.229 
7.216 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that if client legal privilege is abrogated or 
modified in respect of any federal body with coercive information-gathering powers, 
that federal body should be required to: 
(a) implement appropriate document management systems to ensure that documents 
the subject of a client legal privilege claim are: 
(i) clearly identified and recorded as such; 
(ii) stored and managed appropriately; and 
                                                        
224  Victoria Legal Aid, Submission LPP 55, 14 June 2007; Taxation Institute of Australia, Submission 
LPP 54, 15 June 2007; National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 52, 13 June 2007; Law Society of New 
South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 
2007; R Desiatnik, Submission LPP 24, 1 June 2007. ASIC expressed support for the development and 
publication of such policies ‘once the issues concerning client legal privilege raised in the Issues Paper 
have been solved’: Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 
2007. See also Australian Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 50, 13 June 2007. 
225  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
226  Victoria Legal Aid, Submission LPP 55, 14 June 2007. 
227  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
228  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
229  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
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(iii) returned, as soon as possible, to the person who produced them; and 
(b) publish its policies and procedures in this regard.230 
7.217 This proposal was generally supported.231 For example, the Australian Financial 
Markets Association stated that ‘the document management procedures proposed are 
welcome’.232 A number of stakeholders who supported the proposal also submitted that 
it should be amended to require federal bodies to restrict access to otherwise privileged 
information to persons involved in the relevant investigation.233  
7.218 Members of the South Australian Bar Association expressed the view that 
federal legislation should require federal bodies to implement document management 
systems and publish their policies.234  
ALRC’s views 
Notification obligations 
7.219 In Chapter 8, the ALRC expresses the view that federal bodies should be 
required to notify persons: 
• whether or not client legal privilege applies to the exercise of a coercive 
information-gathering power or to the voluntary production of information; and  
• that they may wish to seek independent legal advice concerning their response 
to a coercive information-gathering power.235  
7.220 Earlier in this chapter, the ALRC recommends that federal bodies should be 
required to notify persons whether any safeguards apply to the use of otherwise 
privileged information in subsequent proceedings.236 
                                                        
230  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 7–7. 
231  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Australian Financial Markets Association, 
Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 
2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007; Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007.  
232  Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007. 
233  Ibid; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South 
Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. 
234  Members of the South Australian Bar Association, Consultation LPP 38, Adelaide, 17 October 2007. 
235  See Recs 8–1, 8–22. In Ch 8 the ALRC also expresses the view that federal bodies should be required to 
develop and publish policies concerning the manner of notification: see Rec 8–2. 
236  Rec 7–3. 
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7.221 The ALRC is of the view that the above recommendations are sufficient to 
ensure that persons are informed of their position concerning the production and use of 
information subject to a client legal privilege claim in the event that the privilege is 
abrogated or modified. 
Recording, managing and returning documents the subject of a claim 
7.222 The ALRC considers that, if client legal privilege is abrogated or modified, it 
should be incumbent on federal bodies to implement appropriate document 
management systems to ensure that documents the subject of a privilege claim are:  
• clearly identified or recorded as such;  
• stored and managed appropriately—for example, this might entail keeping such 
documents separate from ones in respect of which no claim is made, to the 
extent that this is reasonably practicable, and restricting access to privileged 
information ‘on a need to know basis’ within federal investigatory bodies;237 and 
• returned to the person who produced them as soon as that can be done, having 
regard to the exigencies of the investigation and any action that is to be taken as 
a result of the investigation.  
7.223 Clearly identifying and/or segregating privileged information is essential to 
ensure that a federal body can take appropriate steps to prevent the disclosure of that 
information to third parties in respect of whom the privilege is not taken to have been 
waived.  
7.224 However, the ALRC considers that it would be too prescriptive to impose a 
legislative requirement that federal bodies implement document management systems 
for the handling of documents subject to a privilege claim, and publish their policies in 
this regard. Further, as noted in Chapter 8, the ALRC recognises that there may be 
aspects of policy and procedure that some federal bodies do not wish to publish for 
sensitive operational reasons, and that it may be appropriate for abridged versions to be 
made public. 
Recommendation 7–7 If client legal privilege is abrogated or modified 
in respect of any federal body with coercive information-gathering powers, that 
federal body should: 
(a)  implement appropriate document management systems to ensure that 
documents the subject of a client legal privilege claim are: 
                                                        
237  See, eg, S Marsic and L Inge, Government Law Group—Managing Confidential Information (2007) 
Australian Government Solicitor. 
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  (i)  clearly identified or recorded as such; 
  (ii)  stored and managed appropriately, including restricting access to 
persons in the federal body involved in the relevant investigation; 
and 
  (iii) returned, as soon as practicable, to the person who produced them; 
and 
(b)  publish its policies and procedures in this regard. 
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Introduction 
8.1 A strong theme that emerged in this Inquiry is the need to address the significant 
issues and problems associated with the practices and procedures for making and 
resolving client legal privilege claims in federal investigations. Existing practices and 
procedures have been criticised for being inadequate, inconsistent or uncertain—
causing delay and hindering access by federal bodies to information not the subject of a 
claim for privilege. 
8.2 It is important to distinguish criticisms concerning client legal privilege claims 
from general criticisms of federal investigatory practices. For example, stakeholders 
have expressed concerns about the onerous nature of electronic information requests or 
that broadly worded notices issued by federal bodies have the capacity to require the 
production of privileged material that is only peripherally relevant to the actual 
transactions under investigation. 
8.3 This chapter addresses a number of issues concerning the practices and 
procedures for making and resolving client legal privilege claims in federal 
investigations. It discusses the respective obligations of persons the subject of coercive 
information-gathering powers, and the federal bodies exercising those powers. The 
chapter contains a mix of legislative and policy-based recommendations aimed at 
achieving transparency, clarity and uniformity in procedures, as well as reducing delay.  
Notification of application of privilege 
8.4 Arguably, before a person can make a claim for client legal privilege in response 
to a federal coercive information-gathering power, he or she ought to be aware of 
whether or not the legislation under which the power is being exercised preserves, 
modifies or abrogates the privilege.  
8.5 In the Issues Paper in this Inquiry, Client Legal Privilege and Federal 
Investigatory Bodies (IP 33), the ALRC asked whether federal bodies should be 
required to provide accurate information to persons of their position concerning 
privilege, when that information should be given, and in what manner.1 For example, 
should notices to produce documents—or the covering letter to such documents—state 
expressly whether or not the privilege applies to the exercise of the coercive powers the 
subject of the notice? Should persons, who are the subject of compulsory oral 
questioning, be informed up-front as to whether or not they can claim client legal 
privilege? 
                                                        
1  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), [5.43]. 
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8.6 Prior to considering judicial commentary, and the views of stakeholders on this 
issue, it is convenient to canvass the actual practices of federal bodies concerning 
notification of whether the privilege applies to their coercive powers.  
Practices of federal bodies 
8.7 The ALRC wrote to approximately 40 federal bodies with coercive information-
gathering powers and asked whether they make the recipients of notices, concerning 
the exercise of a compulsory power, aware of their rights in relation to client legal 
privilege. The responses to this question revealed inconsistent practices in this regard. 
Examples of notification 
8.8 Few federal bodies notify persons about whether or not privilege applies to the 
exercise of their coercive information-gathering powers; although it is often the case 
that notice is given only in respect of the exercise of particular powers—and not across 
the range of a federal body’s coercive information-gathering powers. The manner in 
which persons are notified varies.  
8.9 Some federal bodies provide notification about the application of client legal 
privilege by providing recipients of notices with a copy of the relevant legislative 
provisions concerning privilege.2 For example, notices issued by the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) under s 155 of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) are accompanied by a copy of s 155.3 As mentioned in 
Chapter 5, s 155(7B) states that a person is not required to produce a document that 
would disclose privileged information.  
8.10 In other instances, notification is provided in the notice setting out the coercive 
power,4 or in the covering letter to a notice. Letters enclosing notices issued by the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to persons who are not 
lawyers, pursuant to its investigative powers under ss 30–33 of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act), state expressly that 
the recipient is not excused from producing documents on the ground that the 
documents may contain information which is privileged. The covering letter to such 
notices contains a statement to the following effect: 
You are not excused from producing documents on the ground that the documents 
may contain information that is subject to legal professional privilege. If you believe 
                                                        
2  Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, Submission LPP 69, 20 July 2007; Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 2, 14 March 2007. 
3  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 2, 14 March 2007. 
4  For example, notices issued under s 255 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) 
contain a statement that only a lawyer is entitled to refuse to comply with a requirement under the notice 
concerning a privileged communication made by or to the lawyer in his or her capacity as such: 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 5, 29 March 2007. 
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that any of the documents contain information which is subject to legal professional 
privilege, you should prepare a list which identifies each document you claim is 
privileged and include the list when producing the books to ASIC. The claim of 
privilege will be recorded on registration of the documents.5 
8.11 Where a notice is issued to a lawyer under ss 30–33 and s 49(3) of the ASIC 
Act, the covering letter informs the lawyer of his or her right to refuse to produce 
information if it would involve disclosing a client’s privileged communication.6 
8.12 The Australian Taxation Office’s Access and Information-Gathering Manual 
(the ATO Manual) instructs Australian Taxation Office (ATO) officers that at the time 
of giving a person a notice or, at the very latest, at the time of entering premises, they 
are to hand out and explain Charter Booklet No 9, Fair Use of Our Access and 
Information-Gathering Powers. That booklet states: 
You’ll be given reasonable opportunity at any time to consult with your advisers. We 
will respect your right to claim legal professional privilege for certain 
communications between you and your barrister or solicitor.7 
8.13 The Office of the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner stated: 
All witnesses who are served with a Notice to attend and answer questions under 
section 52(e) of the [Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005] 
receive a covering letter setting out in plain English the requirements of the Notice. 
The covering letter clearly states that the examination will be held in line with the 
[Guidelines in Relation to the Exercise of Compliance Powers in the Building and 
Construction Industry] which are available from the contact officer upon request. … 
[Client legal privilege] is covered in the Guidelines.8 
8.14 A number of federal bodies stated that they provide notification to persons about 
the application of client legal privilege when exercising search warrant powers.9 ASIC, 
for example, stated that search warrants issued pursuant to s 3E of the Crimes Act 1914 
(Cth)—whether in respect of searches of legal premises, non-legal premises or the 
                                                        
5  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 5, 29 March 2007. See also G Healy 
and A Eastwood, ‘Legal Professional Privilege and the Investigative Powers of the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission’ (2005) 23 Company and Securities Law Journal 375, 376. As noted in 
Ch 1, from 3 December 2007, ASIC’s policy is that people who are subject to its compulsory powers will 
be explicitly notified that they are not required to provide documents or information that are subject to a 
valid claim for client legal privilege. People who make such a claim are requested to provide specific 
details of the material over which the claim is made and the basis of the claim: Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, Correspondence, 11 December 2007; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, Correspondence, 12 December 2007. 
6  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 5, 29 March 2007. 
7  Australian Taxation Office, Access and Information Gathering Manual <www.ato.gov.au> at 23 August 
2007, [6.64]; Australian Taxation Office, Taxpayers’ Charter: Fair Use of Our Access and Information 
Gathering Powers (2007) <www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/N2559book9web.pdf> at 23 August 
2007, 5. 
8  Office of the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner, Submission LPP 33, 4 June 2007. 
9  Australian Customs Service, Submission LPP 56, 13 June 2007; Australian Pesticides and Veterinary 
Medicines Authority, Submission LPP 45, 6 June 2007; Medicare Australia, Submission LPP 6, 10 April 
2007; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 5, 29 March 2007. 
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person—contain a statement endorsing the right of the person to make claims for client 
legal privilege, and attach guidelines about client legal privilege claims.10  
8.15 Medicare Australia stated that:  
A person who has consented to a search of their premises will generally not be made 
expressly aware of their rights in relation to legal professional privilege. [But] where a 
person has consented to a search of premises under s 8X [of the Medicare Australia 
Act 1973] … Medicare Australia investigators would be expected to provide the 
person with [a copy of the guidelines setting out the procedures for making a privilege 
claim in respect of the searches of legal premises and/or non-legal premises].11  
Examples of non-notification 
8.16 Many federal bodies do not notify the recipients of notices issued under coercive 
information-gathering powers about their rights to claim client legal privilege.12 
Federal bodies expressed diverse reasons for adopting this approach.  
8.17 Some federal bodies were of the view that such notification would constitute the 
provision of legal advice and was therefore inappropriate.13 Others expressed concern 
that notification would lead to the withholding of information. The Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) stated that it  
has held the concern that specifically advising of any potential right to claim legal 
professional privilege may result in significant information about the contributing 
factors of an accident being withheld. Again, though, we emphasise that we exercise 
our powers in a context different to many other investigatory agencies.14  
                                                        
10  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 5, 29 March 2007. Search warrant 
guidelines are discussed separately below. 
11  Medicare Australia, Submission LPP 6, 10 April 2007. 
12  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 74, 6 July 2007; Australian Government 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Submission LPP 71, 29 June 2007; Comcare, Submission LPP 64, 
14 June 2007; Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, Submission LPP 62, 20 June 2007; Australian 
Government Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Submission LPP 46, 12 June 2007; Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau, Submission LPP 34, 28 May 2007; Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis 
Centre, Submission LPP 31, 4 June 2007; Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Submission 
LPP 28, 4 June 2007; Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission LPP 20, 29 May 
2007; Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, Submission LPP 17, 1 June 2007; Officers from the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Inspector-General of Security and Intelligence, 
Consultation LPP 34, Sydney, 26 June 2007. 
13  Australian Government Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Submission LPP 71, 29 June 2007; Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Submission LPP 28, 4 June 2007. 
14  The ATSB noted that its seeks to avoid apportioning blame or determining liability in its investigations: 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Submission LPP 34, 28 May 2007. See also discussion of the 
ATSB’s functions in Ch 4. 
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8.18 The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority submitted that: 
In the ordinary course of the exercise of [its] powers, circumstances have not yet 
arisen whereby there has been a need for recipients to be made aware of their rights in 
relation to legal professional privilege.15  
8.19 The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) stated that it was not 
aware of any obligation on its part to notify persons about the possibility that a claim 
for privilege may be available. It expressed the view that ‘the exercise of what rights 
and entitlements are available is a matter for the recipient of the relevant notice’.16 
8.20 In contrast to ASIC’s position concerning the issue of notices under the ASIC 
Act, ASIC does not refer to client legal privilege in notices that it issues under the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). ASIC recognises that privilege applies to its powers 
under that Act. 
ASIC does not, as a matter of practice, seek legally privileged information pursuant to 
its Corporations Act powers, and, in our experience, such information is not provided 
to ASIC in answer to Corporations Act notices.17 
8.21 The notices that ASIC issues requiring a person to appear for an examination 
pursuant to s 19 of the ASIC Act do not contain any direct reference to client legal 
privilege.18 ASIC stated that: 
Unless the application of legal professional privilege is raised by the examinee and/or 
the examinee’s lawyer, no direct reference is made to legal professional privilege in 
the preamble to a s 19 examination. 
If an examinee refuses to answer a question and/or asserts that he/she is entitled to 
refuse to answer a question on the basis of legal professional privilege, then it is 
ASIC’s practice to respond to the examinee as follows: 
ASIC considers that the case that deals with the question of legal professional 
privilege in relation to ASIC notices is Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) 
v Yuill. That case means that you are not able to refuse to answer the question 
even if the answer discloses information subject to legal professional 
privilege. Accordingly, I direct you to answer the question. 
(Should the examinee continue to refuse to answer the question) ... I note for 
the record that you have claimed that you are not obliged to answer my 
question because to do so would disclose information subject to legal 
professional privilege. ASIC does not accept that you may validly refuse to 
answer my question, even if the answer would disclose information subject to 
legal professional privilege. ASIC will consider whether to seek an order that 
you answer this question and it reserves all of its rights to do so. If ASIC 
                                                        
15  Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, Submission LPP 17, 1 June 2007. 
16  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 74, 6 July 2007. 
17  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 5, 29 March 2007. 
18  Notices under s 49(3) of the ASIC Act similarly do not contain an express reference to client legal 
privilege: see Ibid. 
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obtains such an order, it will be necessary to complete this examination at a 
later time. Otherwise, I propose to continue with this examination.19 
8.22 Similarly, the standard introductory remarks for an examination under 
s 155(1)(c) of the TPA do not contain specific information concerning the rights of the 
recipient in relation to privilege.20 
8.23 The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) stated 
that it does not currently make recipients of notices concerning the exercise of powers 
under the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth) aware of their rights in 
relation to client legal privilege, but noted that: 
The provisions under the [Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing 
Act 2006 (Cth)] are relatively new and the notice forms and policies in regard to them 
are still being formulated.21 
8.24 The nature of covert coercive information-gathering powers precludes the giving 
of notification about whether client legal privilege applies to the exercise of those 
powers.22  
Should federal bodies be required to give notification? 
8.25 The common law, other inquiries and stakeholders in this Inquiry have 
expressed varying views on whether a federal body should be required to notify the 
subjects of coercive powers about whether client legal privilege applies to the exercise 
of a coercive power. 
8.26 In Fieldhouse v Commissioner of Taxation, Lockhart J stated that: 
The citizen is plainly at risk, whether through ignorance or otherwise, of being denied 
a fundamental right to assert a claim for legal professional privilege. There is I think 
much to commend the view that when issuing notices under s 264 [of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)] it would be appropriate for the Commissioner to insert a 
paragraph or two in the notice drawing the attention of the recipient to his rights with 
respect to legal professional privilege so that at least he is alerted to them and can take 
whatever steps he wishes to obtain legal advice.23 
                                                        
19  Ibid. As mentioned above, from 3 December 2007, ASIC’s policy is that people who are subject to its 
compulsory powers will be explicitly notified that they are not required to provide information subject to 
a valid claim for privilege. 
20  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 2, 14 March 2007. 
21  Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, Submission LPP 31, 4 June 2007. 
22  Officers from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Inspector-General of Security and 
Intelligence, Consultation LPP 34, Sydney, 26 June 2007. See also Carmody v Mackellar (1997) 76 FCR 
115, discussed in Ch 5. 
23  Fieldhouse v Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 25 FCR 187, 200. 
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8.27 Though not strictly a case in the context of federal investigations, the decision of 
the Full Court of the Federal Court in SZHWY v Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship supports the principle of notifying a person about his or her rights 
concerning client legal privilege.24 The Federal Court quashed a decision of the 
Refugee Review Tribunal because the Tribunal had asked an applicant for review to 
divulge the content of a conversation with his legal representative without informing 
him of his right to claim client legal privilege. Lander J stated: 
In my opinion, the Tribunal was under an obligation to advise the [applicant] that he 
was entitled to refuse the questions which the Tribunal asked of him if they were to 
disclose the contents of a confidential communication with his lawyer for the purpose 
of obtaining or giving legal advice or assistance or for use in the proceedings before 
the Tribunal. …  
In my opinion, the Tribunal, when conducting its inquiry and in the exercise of its 
inquisitorial function, should advise a person of their right to claim … legal 
professional privilege if it appears that a question asked of the person may give rise to 
a legitimate claim of that privilege.25 
8.28 The Administrative Review Council (ARC), in its draft report on the coercive 
information-gathering powers of federal bodies, has recommended that if client legal 
privilege is available, federal bodies should indicate this in the notice setting out the 
power or in related correspondence.26  
8.29 In response to IP 33, academics from the University of Sydney Law School 
expressed the view that it was important for federal bodies to let persons know of their 
right to claim privilege.27 Similarly, BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance submitted that 
protocols governing federal bodies should provide for: 
The holder of the information to be informed by the relevant body of the holder’s 
legal rights and obligations. Included in this should be notification that the holder is 
not obliged to hand over material that is subject to client legal privilege.28 
8.30 On the other hand, the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS) expressed the 
view that: 
It must be remembered that, with the exercise of coercive powers, the investigatory 
body responsible has made a judgment that it needs to invoke the powers. This will, in 
some cases, have, in turn, involved a judgment that the prospect of the person holding 
those documents volunteering them otherwise is poor. Particularly in the latter case, 
requirements that involve the need to forewarn persons against whom those powers 
are to be exercised of potential legal considerations, such as the making of privilege 
claims, may not only prove needlessly tedious, but may also, by encouraging the 
                                                        
24  SZHWY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 64. 
25  Ibid, [75]; [77]. See also [163] where Rares J expressed the view the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional 
error. 
26  Administrative Review Council, Government Agency Coercive Information-Gathering Powers [Draft 
Report] (2007), Principle 13. 
27  B McKillop, M Kumar and F Beaupert, Consultation LPP 16, Sydney, 21 May 2007. 
28  BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance, Submission LPP 21, 1 June 2007. 
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persons concerned to clarify all these considerations, only facilitate delay or 
obstruction on their part in responding. Overall, this could finish up reducing the 
utility of the powers themselves.29 
8.31 In the Discussion Paper in this Inquiry, Client Legal Privilege and Federal 
Investigatory Bodies (DP 73), the ALRC proposed that federal client legal privilege 
should require federal bodies with coercive information-gathering powers—the 
exercise of which raise, or are likely to raise, the issue of the application of the 
privilege—to notify persons the subject of those powers, as well as those who provide 
information on a voluntary basis, whether or not client legal privilege applies to: 
• the exercise of a particular power; and 
• the voluntary production of information.30 
8.32 This proposal was generally supported in submissions and consultations.31 For 
example: 
• The Australian Financial Markets Association submitted that the notification 
procedures proposed are ‘appropriate and reasonable’.32  
• National Legal Aid submitted that: 
The notification should be brought to the direct attention of persons and explain as far 
as possible in plain English its meaning and effect.33  
• AGS submitted that: 
In … its submission on the Issues Paper, [AGS] had questioned the merit of the 
notification requirement of the type proposed here. However, on consideration of the 
Discussion Paper, for the purposes of facilitating a successful resolution of the 
mediation processes of the type supported in  … the proposals for resolving privilege 
claims, [AGS] would support a general notification requirement.34 
                                                        
29  Australian Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 50, 13 June 2007. 
30  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 8–1. 
31  See, eg, Australian Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 113, 5 November 2007; National Legal Aid, 
Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 
2 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007; Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. The Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) submitted that it would not object to this proposed measure: Australian Federal Police, 
Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007. 
32  Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007. 
33  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007. 
34  Australian Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 113, 5 November 2007. 
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• The Law Council of Australia (Law Council) agreed with the substance of the 
proposal but, in light of its opposition to abrogation of client legal privilege, 
submitted that the emphasis of the proposal should be to require a positive 
obligation on federal bodies to notify persons that their powers do not override 
client legal privilege. Further, it submitted that the notification should include 
informing persons that they do not need to produce communications which are 
subject to privilege, although they may need to identify such documents.35 
8.33 On the other hand, APRA expressed the view that notification should only be 
necessary where privilege has been abrogated and the recipient is unlikely to seek legal 
advice before responding to the notice. APRA noted that the institutions regulated by it 
are of a ‘sufficient size and sophistication’ to be able to obtain legal advice on the 
application of privilege.36  
8.34 A confidential submission queried the extension of the proposal to the voluntary 
production of information.37 
8.35 The ALRC’s views on whether a federal investigatory body should be required 
to give notification of the application of client legal privilege are set out below. 
Manner of notification 
8.36 As the discussion above bears out, the federal bodies that provide notification 
about the application of privilege do so in various ways.  
8.37 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that federal bodies with coercive information-
gathering powers—the exercise of which raise or are likely to raise the issue of the 
application of client legal privilege—should develop and publish policies in relation to 
the manner of notifying persons whether the privilege applies to the exercise of their 
information-gathering powers and to the voluntary production of information.38 
8.38 This proposal was generally supported;39 although APRA expressed the view 
that if there were legislative clarification of the application of client legal privilege, 
APRA should not be required to publish policies and procedures about how it notifies 
persons about their entitlement to claim privilege.40  
                                                        
35  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007. Identifying documents the subject of a 
claim is discussed in the section on making privilege claims. 
36  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007. 
37  Confidential, Submission LPP 108, 14 November 2007. 
38  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 8–2. 
39  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Australian Financial Markets Association, 
Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission 
LPP 84, 31 October 2007. The AFP submitted that it would not object to this proposed measure: 
Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007. 
40  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007. 
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8.39 Both the Law Council and the Law Society of NSW supported the proposal, 
provided that the notification given by a federal investigatory body is served on, or 
delivered personally to, the person the subject of the information-gathering power. 
General notification, such as by information posted on a federal body’s website, was 
said to be insufficient.41  
8.40 Members of the South Australian Bar Association expressed the view that the 
ALRC’s proposal should be the subject of legislation.42 However, the Law Council 
supported the ALRC’s approach in not prescribing the form of notification in 
legislation and allowing for flexibility in this regard, although it expressed the view 
that it was desirable, to the extent possible, for federal bodies to adopt a uniform 
approach in developing guidelines. The Law Council also expressed the view that it 
would not generally be acceptable for federal investigatory bodies simply to provide 
recipients of notices with a copy of relevant legislative provisions in relation to client 
legal privilege as a means of notifying them about their rights.43 
ALRC’s views 
Notification 
8.41 As discussed elsewhere in this Report, the High Court has held that client legal 
privilege is an important common law right.44 The ALRC considers that it is important, 
in order for persons to exercise the right to claim privilege, that they are notified by the 
federal body exercising a coercive information-gathering power about whether or not 
client legal privilege applies to that power. This does not entail a federal body giving 
advice about whether or not privilege applies to any particular communication or 
document—only whether client legal privilege is available as an excuse for not 
producing documents or information in complying with any given information-
gathering power. 
8.42 If the privilege applies, persons will be alerted to their ability to make a claim 
and to withhold the production of privileged documents. The ALRC envisages that 
notification by a federal body that client legal privilege applies to a coercive 
information-gathering power would make it clear that a person need not produce 
privileged communications. But even if the privilege is abrogated, persons should be 
notified that, while they may not withhold documents or information on the basis of 
client legal privilege, they should still indicate which documents would have been the 
subject of a privilege claim. In such cases, the federal body can take any appropriate 
                                                        
41  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, 
Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. 
42  Members of the South Australian Bar Association, Consultation LPP 38, Adelaide, 17 October 2007. 
43  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007. 
44  See discussion on The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 in Ch 5. 
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steps to safeguard that material—for example, to protect it from disclosure as against 
third parties.45  
8.43 The ALRC considers that such notification—in addition to promoting clarity of 
approach—is an aspect of fairness.46 The need for fairness arises particularly—but not 
exclusively—in respect of unrepresented persons who are the subject of coercive 
powers.47 In the context of litigation, the Commonwealth and its agencies are obliged 
under its own rules to act as ‘model litigants’, fairly, with complete propriety, and in 
accordance with the highest professional standards in handling claims and litigation 
brought by or against them.48 In the ALRC’s view, there is a strong argument that 
comparable standards of fairness should be applied to the Commonwealth and its 
agencies in conducting investigations. 
8.44 The ALRC is not persuaded by the argument made in a submission that 
notification should only be provided where (a) privilege is abrogated; and (b) in the 
federal body’s opinion, the recipient is unlikely to obtain legal advice before 
responding to a notice.49 First, such an approach ignores the important role that 
notification may play in preventing persons from producing privileged information 
because they are unaware of a right to claim client legal privilege in responding to a 
coercive power which does not abrogate privilege. Second, a federal body’s opinion 
may be ill-founded; but even where there is a reasonable basis for such an opinion, it 
may not accurately predict the actions of the recipient of a notice. Therefore, persons 
who do not, in fact, obtain legal advice prior to answering a notice when a federal body 
believed that they would do so, nonetheless would have lost the benefits of being 
notified by the federal body.  
8.45 It is important that the information provided by federal bodies to persons about 
their right to claim privilege is accurate. Given that, following the decision in Daniels, 
ASIC’s position—that client legal privilege is abrogated in respect of its powers under 
the ASIC Act—has been questioned,50 there may be an issue about whether it is 
appropriate for ASIC to state unequivocally in its covering letters to notices issued to 
non-lawyers under ss 30–33 of the ASIC Act that client legal privilege is not 
available.51  
                                                        
45  Safeguards are discussed in Ch 7. 
46  The issue of clarity is considered in Ch 5. 
47  The issue of unrepresented persons is considered below. 
48  Legal Services Direction 2005: Appendix B—The Commonwealth’s Obligation to Act as a Model 
Litigant. 
49  See Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007. 
50  See discussion in Ch 5 on the implications of The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543. 
51  As noted above, from 3 December 2007, ASIC’s policy is that persons who are subject to its compulsory 
powers will be notified expressly that they are not required to produce documents or information subject 
to a valid claim for client legal privilege.  
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8.46 It is also important, as noted by many stakeholders in this Inquiry, that the 
notification given by federal bodies is in plain English. 
8.47 One qualification to the ALRC’s views that federal bodies should be required to 
give such notification is that, in the interests of practicality, such an obligation should 
be imposed only on those federal bodies that exercise coercive information-gathering 
powers which raise or are likely to raise the application of client legal privilege. If a 
particular coercive information-gathering power is unlikely to bring privileged 
information within its ambit—for example, the powers of the Australian Fisheries 
Management Authority (AFMA) to examine equipment capable of being used for 
fishing, or search premises for documents relating to the receiving of fish,52 the 
obligation to give notification will not arise.  
8.48 The ALRC also considers that persons who produce information or documents 
on a voluntary basis—where such information or documents could have been sought 
pursuant to a coercive information-gathering power—also should be notified whether 
client legal privilege applies to the voluntary production of information. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, many federal bodies seek information from persons on a cooperative 
basis—preferring to encourage voluntary compliance with requests for information.53 
8.49 A person who chooses to cooperate in a federal investigation should not be 
prejudiced by not being told about their rights concerning privilege. For example, if a 
person is served with a notice pursuant to s 155 of the TPA in an investigation being 
conducted by the ACCC, that person is not required to produce documents the subject 
of a claim for client legal privilege. If the person is prepared to produce documents to 
the ACCC in the absence of a notice, the ACCC should let that person know that if the 
information were sought on a compulsory basis, a claim for client legal privilege would 
be available. Of course, it is always open to a person to produce privileged information 
to a federal body on a voluntary basis—just as a person may choose to waive privilege 
in responding to a coercive power which preserves its application. 
8.50 The ALRC supports the approach taken by Medicare Australia in providing 
information about client legal privilege to persons who consent to searches under s 8X 
of the Medicare Australia Act 1973 (Cth). 
                                                        
52  Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) s 84(1)(f),(h)(ii). See discussion of AFMA in Ch 4.  
53  These bodies include the ACCC, APRA, the ATO, the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission and the Inspector-General of Taxation. The ATO noted that claims 
for privilege can be made in many circumstances, including when a tax officer requests information or 
documents from a taxpayer on a cooperative basis: see Australian Taxation Office, Submission LPP 65, 
22 June 2007. 
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Manner of notification 
8.51 The ALRC considers that it would be too prescriptive to require all federal 
bodies to provide notice only in one particular way. Depending on the type of power 
that is being exercised, notification could be done in one of the following ways: 
(a) in the notice setting out the coercive power, or in the covering letter to such 
notice; 
(b)  in the search warrant, or in an attachment to the search warrant; 
(c)  in a letter requesting information to be produced on a voluntary basis; 
(d) by providing a copy of the relevant section of the legislation which abrogates, 
modifies or preserves the privilege at the time a notice setting out the coercive 
power is issued or a search warrant is exercised; or 
(e) in the case of information sought orally, by informing the person prior to the 
commencement of questioning. 
8.52 As a general proposition, the ALRC considers that federal bodies ought to 
provide notification in the actual notice or related correspondence (the approach in (a) 
above), as opposed to merely providing the recipient with a copy of the relevant 
section of the legislation concerned with the application of client legal privilege (the 
approach in (d) above). Of course, it would be appropriate for federal bodies to 
supplement any notification that they give in a notice or related correspondence with 
extracts of relevant legislative provisions. 
8.53 However, the ALRC considers that it is best to allow flexibility in this regard. 
Accordingly, while supporting a legislative duty on the part of federal bodies to 
provide the requisite notification, the ALRC recommends that federal bodies develop 
and publish their own practices and procedures in relation to the precise manner of 
notification that they adopt.  
8.54 The ALRC agrees with the views expressed by the Law Council and Law 
Society of NSW that general notification by a federal body—for example by posting 
information on its website—would be insufficient. Consequently, the ALRC has 
slightly modified its original proposal to make it clear that the policies and procedures 
to be developed by federal bodies in relation to notification in this context are intended 
to deal with the issue of notifying persons the subject of coercive information-
gathering powers, and not the world-at-large. 
  
 8. Practice and Procedure 381 
 
Recommendation 8–1 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
require federal bodies with coercive information-gathering powers—the exercise 
of which raise, or are likely to raise, the issue of the application of the 
privilege—to notify persons the subject of those powers, as well as those who 
provide information on a voluntary basis, whether or not client legal privilege 
applies to: 
(a)  the exercise of a particular power; and  
(b)  the voluntary production of information. 
Recommendation 8–2 Federal bodies with coercive information-
gathering powers—the exercise of which raise, or are likely to raise, the issue of 
the application of client legal privilege—should develop and publish policies 
and procedures in relation to the manner of notifying persons the subject of 
those powers whether the privilege applies to the exercise of such information-
gathering powers and to the voluntary production of information. 
Making a privilege claim 
Background 
8.55 As stated in Chapter 3, client legal privilege must be claimed in order to be 
applied. A party making a claim of privilege must provide the party seeking disclosure 
with sufficient information to allow it to make a decision about whether the claim for 
privilege could be supported.54 However, those who make privilege claims in federal 
investigations are not generally subject to legislative requirements to provide details of 
their claims to federal bodies.55 
Policies of federal bodies 
8.56 Unlike many federal bodies, the ATO has policies and procedures setting out 
how persons should make client legal privilege claims in its investigations. The ATO 
Manual sets out what a person claiming privilege should do.56 Drawing on principles 
                                                        
54  National Crime Authority v S (1991) 29 FCR 203, 211. See also Barnes v Commissioner of Taxation 
[2007] FCAFC 88, [18], which stated that ‘the authorities emphasise the need for focused and specific 
evidence in order to ground a claim for legal professional privilege’. On the facts of that case, the Full 
Federal Court (at [19]) held that the evidence supporting the privilege claim was ‘manifestly insufficient 
and [did] not establish any basis for [the] claim of privileges.’ 
55  The lack of transparency of privilege claims is discussed below. 
56  Australian Taxation Office, Access and Information Gathering Manual <www.ato.gov.au> at 23 August 
2007, [6.22], [6.6.49]–[6.6.50]. 
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established by the common law, the ATO’s policy in relation to persons claiming 
privilege is that the person should: 
• make it clear that the claim is being made—a vague assertion of the privilege is 
insufficient; 
• provide the ATO with enough information to enable it to decide whether to 
accept or resist the claim; 
• justify the claim—resort to a verbal formula is insufficient;  
• provide evidence of all the elements of the relevant limb of privilege for each 
document for which privilege is claimed, and specify the features of each 
document, including its date;57 and 
• not make a blanket claim—that is, assert that all documents in a room or cabinet 
are privileged without examining the documents to verify their claim. However, 
a person does not make a blanket claim where they refuse access to all 
documents until they have established whether they are privileged.58 
8.57  The ATO has proformas that it requests persons claiming privilege to complete 
for each individual claim—although it acknowledges that they are not compelled to do 
so.59 There are separate proformas for claims made in respect of: 
• communications in documents prepared by in-house legal advisers; 
• communications in attachments to a primary document; and 
• copies of original documents.60 
8.58 In addition, under the guidelines agreed between the Commissioner of Taxation 
and the Law Council in relation to the exercise of the ATO’s access powers at lawyers’ 
premises in circumstances where a claim of client legal privilege is made (ATO 
Guidelines),61 where a lawyer asserts privilege in response to the exercise of a coercive 
information-gathering power by the ATO on a lawyer’s premises, a list of the 
documents in respect of which privilege is claimed is to be made. That list is to contain 
a number of specific details, including:  
                                                        
57  Ibid, [6.2.2]. 
58  Ibid, [6.6.49]–[6.6.50]. 
59  See Ibid, [6.6.18], [6.6.26], [6.6.31]–[6.6.32]. 
60  Australian Taxation Office, Submission LPP 65, 22 June 2007. 
61  See Australian Taxation Office, Access and Information Gathering Manual <www.ato.gov.au> at 
23 August 2007, App B. 
  
 8. Practice and Procedure 383 
 
• the nature and date of each document; 
• the exact number of documents and pages contained in the documents withheld; 
• the identity of the person who prepared or signed the document, and to whom it 
was directed; 
• a physical description of each document—for example, typed or handwritten; 
• whether the document is an original or photocopy; 
• the grounds on which privilege is claimed in respect of each document; and 
• the person in whose name the claim is made.62 
8.59 APRA stated that there have been very few claims made for privilege in its 
investigations but that usually where such a claim is made, a fairly detailed description 
of documents subject to the claim is provided—either in support of the claim or at 
APRA’s request.63 
Privilege claims in litigation 
8.60 In considering what the processes should be for making client legal privilege 
claims in response to the coercive information-gathering powers of federal bodies, it is 
useful to consider, by analogy, the processes that exist in relation to the making of such 
claims in the context of discovery obligations in litigation. 
8.61 In the Federal Court, a party giving discovery is required to: 
• list all documents which have been in its possession, custody or power; 
• describe each document, or in the case of a group of documents of the same 
nature describe the group, sufficiently to enable the document or group to be 
identified; and 
• where the party claims that any document is privileged from production, 
sufficiently state the grounds of privilege.64 
                                                        
62  See Ibid, App B, [23].  
63  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 74, 6 July 2007. 
64  Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 15, r 6(2)–(4). 
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8.62 Form 22 of the Federal Court Rules envisages the listing of privileged 
documents, and verification on oath by the party. It reads in part: 
1. The party has in his possession, custody or power the documents enumerated in 
Schedule 1. 
2. The documents enumerated in Part 2 of Schedule 1 are privileged from production 
on the ground– 
(a) as to documents numbered 4–7 inclusive, that (state the ground); 
(b) as to documents 8 and 9, that (state the ground). 
8.63 However, the New South Wales (NSW) Bar Association submitted that, in its 
experience, ‘typically a party does not list privileged documents individually, unless 
vigorously pressed to do so’.65 
8.64 Where the party making the list of documents has a solicitor in the proceeding, 
the solicitor is required to certify that, according to instructions received, the list and 
the statements in the list are correct.66 
8.65 The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) require a party giving 
discovery to identify any document that is claimed to be privileged and to specify the 
circumstances under which the privilege is claimed to arise.67 The list is to be 
accompanied by a supporting affidavit, in which the deponent is to state, in respect of 
any document that is claimed to be privileged, the facts relied on as establishing the 
existence of the privilege.68 If the party giving discovery has a solicitor, the list also 
must be accompanied by a solicitor’s certificate of advice.69  
8.66 In general terms, other court rules governing discovery also require a party 
making a privilege claim to describe or identify privileged documents (whether 
individually or by reference to a group); state the basis of the claim on oath; and have 
the list certified by a lawyer if the party is represented.70 
Issues and problems 
8.67 Submissions and consultations in response to IP 33 revealed a number of issues 
and problems concerning the making of privilege claims. These included:  
                                                        
65  New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. 
66  Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 15, r 6(8). 
67  Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 21.3(2)(d). Rule 21.3(2)(b) allows documents to be 
described by group. 
68  Ibid r 21.4(2). 
69  Ibid r 21.4(3). 
70  Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) r 29.04, Form 29B; Supreme Court Rules 
(NT) rr 21.03, 21.04, Form 29A; Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) rr 607–609, Form 2.23; Uniform 
Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) rr 217(3)(c), 226; Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 26 rr 4, 
15A. 
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• that persons are not always given an opportunity to make a claim;71  
• a lack of consistency in the manner in which claims are made; 
• a lack of transparency in claims;  
• the need to address blanket claims of privilege; 
• over-claiming of privilege;72 
• over-use of masking of documents;  
• to a lesser degree, ‘warehousing’ and ‘privileging’;73 and  
• concerns about waiving privilege in the process of making a claim.74  
8.68 Some of these issues are considered in more detail below.  
Lack of opportunity to make a claim 
8.69 The circumstances in which information can be required to be produced vary in 
significant respects. Persons the subject of a coercive power may have some time 
within which to produce documents or information. For example, some statutes 
stipulate a minimum period within which documents are to be produced.75 In other 
circumstances, information must be produced immediately. This may be the case 
where statutory notices to produce documents require production forthwith or within 
24 hours, or where documents are sought to be seized during a search. 
8.70 Whether a person has been allowed a reasonable opportunity to make a claim for 
privilege may be more of a contentious issue in the context of the execution of 
searches. BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance stated that: 
                                                        
71  See, eg, Fitzroy Legal Service, Submission LPP 29, 4 June 2007; BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance, 
Submission LPP 21, 1 June 2007. 
72  See, eg, New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. National Legal Aid also 
expressed the view that there were issues in relation to ‘inappropriate’ privilege claims: National Legal 
Aid, Submission LPP 52, 13 June 2007. 
73  New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. ‘Warehousing and privileging’ are 
discussed in Ch 9.  
74  See, eg, Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. Issues concerning abuse of privilege 
claims are also considered in Ch 9. 
75  See, eg, Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) ss 11C, 11D (at least 30 days’ notice to be given); A New 
Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 158; Medicare Australia Act 1973 
(Cth) s 8Q (at least 14 days’ notice to be given). 
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Federal investigatory bodies are in a position where they are able to demand access to 
information in circumstances where the relevant individual or corporation is denied 
the ability to obtain legal advice as to whether access should be denied.76 
8.71 The ATO Manual states that an ATO officer exercising access powers is 
required to give the custodian of documents an adequate opportunity to claim privilege, 
unless there is no realistic possibility of privilege being applicable.77 A reasonable 
opportunity to allow a person to make a claim has been described as going beyond a 
mere obligation to respond reasonably to a claim when made.78 
8.72 In Oke v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, the evidence 
established that a search was carried out in several rooms of the premises prior to the 
arrival of the occupant’s solicitor despite the occupier’s assertion that there were 
privileged documents on site.79 Further, the occupier’s solicitor was not permitted to 
inspect documents sought to be seized by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) officers 
prior to inspection by them in order to determine whether a claim for privilege 
legitimately could be made. Mansfield J concluded that such inappropriate behaviour 
on the part of the AFP no doubt resulted in the solicitor making a blanket claim for 
privilege, and that: 
The transcript recording of the execution of the … warrant reveals that, although the 
AFP officers were aware of an occupier’s right to claim privilege over documents 
which may prima facie appear to fall within the warrant’s terms, they had a limited 
understanding of what was required to give meaning to that right.80 
Lack of transparency in claims 
8.73 IP 33 raised the question whether those subject to notices, search warrants or 
other coercive-information gathering powers should be required to: (a) notify a federal 
body that documents the subject of a privilege claim have been withheld; and (b) 
provide the federal body with details of those documents.81  
8.74 Submissions and consultations in response to IP 33 revealed that some federal 
bodies experience difficulties in testing privilege claims because those subject to 
coercive powers sometimes do not alert the federal body of the existence of a claim or, 
when claims are made, insufficient details are provided.82  
                                                        
76  BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance, Submission LPP 21, 1 June 2007. See also Fitzroy Legal Service, 
Submission LPP 29, 4 June 2007. 
77  Australian Taxation Office, Access and Information Gathering Manual <www.ato.gov.au> at 23 August 
2007, [6.2.3], [6.6.4]–[6.6.11]. 
78  Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 1998) (1998) 70 SASR 281, 290; Kennedy v Baker (2004) 135 FCR 
520, [99]. 
79  Oke v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2007) 168 A Crim R 503, [121]. 
80  Ibid, [122]. 
81  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), [5.55]. 
82  See, eg, Australian Taxation Office, Submission LPP 65, 22 June 2007; Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. 
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8.75 The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) submitted that 
greater transparency is required in the making of client legal privilege claims to federal 
bodies in answer to their coercive information-gathering powers. 
While legitimate claims for [privilege] are an essential right for clients 
communicating with their legal representatives, at times, it is not obvious that the 
claim is appropriate or proper in the circumstances.83 
8.76 The ACCC expressed concern that: 
in the context of responding to s 155 notices, there is scope to claim legal professional 
privilege without a proper basis and that, from time to time, … improper claims have 
been made. …  
Sometimes … parties claiming legal professional privilege over documents do not 
alert the ACCC to a claim of privilege being made at all. … Documents are provided 
in response to a s 155 notice without reference to the fact that other documents have 
not been produced upon the basis of a claim for privilege. Alternatively, the party 
producing documents may simply assert that privilege has been claimed over 
documents without providing a schedule of those documents or any details about them 
or the claim (such as the nature of the communication or the relevant parties). It is the 
ACCC’s experience that, when notice recipients are asked for an explanation of the 
basis upon which privilege is claimed, the response has been that there is no legal 
obligation to provide such information …  
As a result, … in most cases, the ACCC is not in a position to determine whether such 
claims are properly made.84 
8.77 The ACCC provided the following case studies to illustrate its point.85 
CASE STUDY ONE 
Company A responded to a s 155 notice by supplying a large number of 
documents (approximately 32 folders). A considerable number of these were 
masked in whole or in part. The documents were labelled as ‘privileged’ or 
‘redacted’. 
The supply of the documents came with a cover letter that stated ‘documents to 
which Company A claims to have legal professional privilege have been either 
excluded or masked (where only part of the document is privileged)’. A list of 
excluded documents was not provided, nor was any further information or 
explanation given relating to the grounds of the privilege. ….  
                                                        
83  Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission LPP 20, 29 May 2007. 
84  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. 
85  Ibid. 
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ACCC staff discovered that documents that were masked were also provided in 
unmasked form (identical documents). This revealed that some of the claims of 
legal professional privilege made by Company A had been invalid. 
ACCC staff raised concern about the way in which Company A had complied 
and in response, Company A relinquished claims of privilege over some of the 
documents. However, when initially pressed for an explanation for each claim of 
privilege, Company A stated that ‘it does not consider that it is under a legal 
obligation to provide such information’. The information provided by Company 
A to explain the basis for [its] claims for privilege was so vague and general that 
it was of no assistance to ACCC staff in determining whether they should seek 
the release of the documents in court. 
CASE STUDY TWO 
[This example] demonstrates the … ‘random’ way the ACCC might discover an 
improper claim for privilege. It involved the investigation of allegations of an 
anti-competitive agreement between Company B and Company C. Company B 
claimed privilege over documents (or part of documents) that it provided to the 
ACCC pursuant to a s 155 notice. A s 155 notice in similar terms was also 
served upon Company C. The documents produced by Company C included 
complete copies of the documents over which privilege had been claimed by 
Company B. This revealed that some of the claims of legal professional 
privilege made by Company B were not soundly based. 
8.78 The ATO submitted that: 
A major problem that arises concerning the making of a claim for [privilege] in 
response to an exercise of our information-gathering powers is that claims often 
provide very little information and do not provide us with sufficient details to decide 
whether the documents would even be relevant to our compliance activities …  
The Tax Office considers that [its proformas] have gone some way in helping to 
resolve [privilege] disputes. However, in practice, we find that taxpayers often refuse 
to complete the forms where their claim for [privilege] relates to a large number of 
documents. Whilst the forms have some basis in law insofar as the common law 
prescribes that a claim for [privilege] must be in proper form and expose sufficient 
facts to justify the claim, we cannot compel taxpayers to complete the forms.86 
8.79 However, the Taxation Institute of Australia expressed the view that the ATO’s 
regime for making a valid claim of privilege is unworkable and onerous, requiring the 
                                                        
86  Australian Taxation Office, Submission LPP 65, 22 June 2007.  
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completion of multiple proforma documents ‘for each and every document over which 
a claim for privilege is made’.87 
Lack of consistency in providing particulars of claims 
8.80 The difficulties encountered by the ACCC in obtaining particulars of privileged 
information contrasts with that of APRA—which, as stated above, noted that in most 
cases where a claim of privilege is made, a detailed description of the documents is 
provided to APRA. 
8.81 There is an enormous disparity in the approaches taken by persons subject to 
federal coercive powers to justify their claims of privilege. At one end of the spectrum, 
persons choosing to cooperate within the ATO’s framework provide the details 
requested in the ATO’s proformas in respect of each document for which they make a 
claim. At the other end of the spectrum, persons fail to inform the ACCC of the fact 
that documents are withheld on the basis of privilege.  
Blanket claims 
8.82 The ATO submitted that there is a major problem with claimants making 
‘blanket claims’ of privilege—alleging that all documents in a room or in their 
possession are privileged without examining the documents to verify the claim. 
We consider that blanket claims should not be permitted, and that a specific claim for 
privilege should be made in respect of each and every document.88 
8.83 ASIC submitted that: 
Blanket claims of privilege are unhelpful because they do not identify the particular 
documents in respect of which privilege is claimed and the basis of the claim. 
Accordingly, they provide limited assistance in resolving privilege claims or in 
allowing them to be tested. However, … provision for them may be necessary where 
it is not possible to expeditiously review and make privilege claims over documents, 
particularly those that may be stored electronically.89 
Over-masking 
8.84 The NSW Bar Association submitted: 
Masking most frequently occurs not in respect of primary privilege claims, but in 
respect of secondary or derivative claims: a summary of legal advice in one sentence 
                                                        
87  Taxation Institute of Australia, Submission LPP 54, 15 June 2007. Another stakeholder group noted that 
the ATO required more information than a court would require to uphold a claim for privilege: 
Regulatory lawyers of Clayton Utz, Consultation LPP 13, Sydney, 15 May 2007. 
88  Australian Taxation Office, Submission LPP 65, 22 June 2007. 
89  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. 
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in a 10-page board paper, extracts of a conversation with a solicitor in a client’s 
longer file note etc …  
Over-masking is likely to be the product either of an attempt to widen a privilege 
claim inappropriately or of a caution bred of a lack of understanding about how 
appropriately to mask a document.90 
Waiver 
8.85 The ATO and the Law Council noted that there was a concern among the 
subjects of coercive information-gathering powers that providing extensive information 
about a client legal privilege claim (such as completing an ATO proforma) could 
amount to a waiver of privilege.91  
Submissions and consultations on reform options 
8.86 The Australian Corporate Lawyers Association (ACLA) submitted that there 
would be ‘value in putting greater focus on the processes by which [client legal 
privilege] claims are made and on the accountabilities of those … by whom they are 
made’.92 
8.87 Other stakeholders made specific suggestions about improving the processes by 
which privilege claims are made, and these are discussed below.  
Provision of particulars 
8.88 There was strong support in submissions and consultations in response to 
IP 33—from federal bodies and the legal profession—for requiring claimants, when 
responding to federal coercive powers, to provide details of the communications in 
respect of which they claim privilege.93  
8.89 ACMA submitted that requiring a claimant to provide a detailed description of 
the documents in respect of which a privilege claim is made would significantly assist 
a federal body in determining whether a claimant was properly resisting disclosure. 
                                                        
90  New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. See also Members of the Victorian 
Bar, Consultation LPP 21, Melbourne, 25 May 2007. 
91  Australian Taxation Office, Submission LPP 65, 22 June 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission 
LPP 26, 4 June 2007. See also Members of the Victorian Bar, Consultation LPP 21, Melbourne, 25 May 
2007. 
92  Australian Corporate Lawyers Association, Submission LPP 66, 22 June 2007. 
93  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007; Australian 
Taxation Office, Submission LPP 65, 22 June 2007; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 
Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007; New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007; 
Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007; Australian Communications and 
Media Authority, Submission LPP 20, 29 May 2007; New South Wales Public Defenders Office, 
Consultation LPP 31, Sydney, 12 June 2007; G Healy and A Eastwood—Freehills, Consultation LPP 30, 
Sydney, 12 June 2007. The Law Council submitted that claimants should provide descriptions of 
documents if the federal body requested them to do so: Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 
4 June 2007.  
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For example, a document description that indicated an advice from Counsel to a client 
might be sufficient to satisfy the regulator that … the claim for privilege in respect of 
that document was legitimate.94 
8.90 The ATO submitted that there should be a mandated process for claiming client 
legal privilege and that this process should 
• prescribe minimum details that must be provided by the claimant in support of a 
claim—this should be a level of detail that allows federal investigatory agencies 
to decide whether to accept or reject a claim …  
• require persons who make claims in respect of communications with in-house 
legal advisers to provide additional details about the communication. This will 
assist agencies to assess the independence of the in-house adviser and ascertain 
the capacity in which he or she provided the advice …  
• prohibit blanket claims; and 
• clarify that complying with minimum disclosure requirements would not result 
in a common law waiver of [privilege].95  
8.91 The ACCC submitted that privilege claimants should be required to identify to a 
regulator the privilege claims which are made and the basis for those claims. The 
ACCC supported a legislative requirement that claimants provide a number of specific 
details—as set out in the ATO Guidelines—including the nature and date of each 
document, the identity of the person who prepared or signed the document and to 
whom it was directed, and whether the document is an original or photocopy.96 
8.92 The Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) also supported a 
legislative mechanism as a way of addressing the lack of consistency in the making of 
privilege claims. 
It is inappropriate to rely on guidelines as the basis for making claims because: 
• not all agencies make guidelines, and they differ. This is of particular 
concern in multi-task forces; 
• as they are voluntary, the consequences of non-compliance by the 
agency are uncertain; [and] 
• they can be easily changed by administrative process potentially 
without consultation, and grant too much power and/or discretion to 
the regulator.97 
                                                        
94  Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission LPP 20, 29 May 2007. 
95  Australian Taxation Office, Submission LPP 65, 22 June 2007. 
96  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. 
97  Australian Institute of Company Directors, Submission LPP 43, 8 June 2007. 
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8.93 The NSW Bar Association expressed support for amendment to Federal Court 
and Supreme Court discovery rules requiring the listing of documents brought into 
existence prior to the commencement of litigation 
by reference to date, type, author and recipient of the document, or if this information 
is not available, a sufficient description of the document, and [for] the facts relied 
upon for the existence of the privilege [to be] identified as specifically as possible on 
a document by document basis.98 
8.94 It submitted that: 
While the requirement that a party specify the grounds for a claim for privilege may 
appear to adequately expose the basis of the privilege claim for testing and may also 
provide the necessary discipline for the claimant, we consider that the utility of this 
requirement may be undermined to the extent that documents over which a claim for 
privilege is made are not listed individually. 99 
8.95 ASIC submitted that guidelines to assist in making claims would be useful.100 
APRA noted that where it has been provided with descriptions of documents ‘such 
descriptions … [have] enabled a fairly well informed decision to be made’.101 
8.96 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed a procedure for the making of privilege claims in 
federal investigations. Key elements of that procedure included that a federal body: 
• must provide a person with a reasonable opportunity to claim client legal 
privilege; and 
• may, in its discretion, request particulars of client legal privilege claims, 
including 
(i) a sufficient description of the documents containing the privileged 
communications either individually or by bundle where the documents 
are of the same or similar nature;  
(ii) an identification of privileged communications prepared by in-house 
counsel;  
(iii) details about the independence of in-house counsel; and  
(iv) identification of any ‘tax advice documents’ (defined in Proposal 6–3) 
prepared by a professional accounting adviser.102 
                                                        
98  New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. 
99  Ibid. 
100  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. 
101  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 74, 6 July 2007. 
102  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 8–3. 
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8.97 The proposal to provide persons with a reasonable opportunity to claim privilege 
and to allow a federal body to request particulars of a client legal privilege claim was 
generally supported,103 although stakeholders made submissions on the detail of the 
balance of the proposal. For example: 
• the Australian Financial Markets Association submitted that the procedure 
proposed for the making of claims was ‘appropriate and reasonable’;104  
• the ACCC submitted that Proposal 8–3, together with other proposals made in 
DP 73 in relation to practice and procedure, would ‘assist in identifying 
improper claims of privilege’ as well as ‘testing’ claims of privilege;105 and 
• the ATO submitted that it was  
very supportive of the ALRC’s [proposals] prescribing a mandatory mechanism for 
the making of [client legal privilege] claims. We consider that this process will enable 
federal agencies to more easily assess the veracity of a claim for privilege, and help to 
address significant delays to the Tax Office’s compliance activities.106 
8.98 Submissions highlighted the need for the proposal to clarify whether the 
particulars had to be provided with each claim or only on the request of a federal 
body,107 and whether it was intended to cover the provision of particulars of claims 
where documents are not produced in response to the exercise of a coercive 
information-gathering power by a federal body.108 
Particulars of privileged communications 
8.99 Stakeholders supported the proposal for claimants to specify the grounds on 
which privilege is claimed, but there was some uncertainty about the level of detail that 
                                                        
103  For example, National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Australian Financial Markets 
Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 
Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission 
LPP 84, 31 October 2007; Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, Submission LPP 82, 
31 October 2007; Members of the South Australian Bar Association, Consultation LPP 38, Adelaide, 
17 October 2007. The AFP submitted that it would not object to the proposed measure: Australian 
Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007. 
104  Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007. 
105  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 92, 26 October 2007. 
106  Australian Taxation Office, Submission LPP 81, 29 October 2007. 
107  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007. 
108  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 92, 26 October 2007. 
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would be considered sufficient to describe privileged communications.109 The fields of 
description that stakeholders submitted ought to be provided to a federal body 
variously included:  
• the date;  
• type of communication;  
• author; 
• recipient;  
• position of author/recipient;  
• nature of the document; and  
• dominant purpose.110 
8.100 ASIC did not support allowing documents of the same or similar nature to be 
described by bundle because such an approach would ‘undermine the rigour that a 
privilege claimant should exercise in assessing whether each document satisfies the 
requirements of attracting client legal privilege’.111 ASIC also submitted that the 
proposal should: 
• require a privilege claimant to provide details of the facts relied upon as giving 
rise to the claim; and 
• be extended to cover privilege claims over oral communications. Specifically, if 
requested, a person should provide ‘details of the date, time, parties to, location 
of, and means by which the communication took place’.112 
Particulars concerning in-house counsel 
8.101 There was strong opposition in submissions and consultations to requiring 
claimants, on the request of a federal body, to identify privileged communications 
prepared by in-house counsel, and to provide particulars of the independence of in-
                                                        
109  See, eg, Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission LPP 107, 5 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, 
Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission 
LPP 84, 31 October 2007. 
110  Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission LPP 107, 5 November 2007; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. 
111  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. 
112  Ibid. 
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house counsel.113 Unsurprisingly, such opposition was expressed by in-house counsel 
and groups representing in-house counsel, but opposition also was expressed by private 
law firms and legal representative bodies.  
8.102 Strong themes that emerged from submissions and consultations in expressing 
overall opposition to mandatory provision of particulars concerning in-house counsel 
include that: 
• There is no justification for presuming that in-house counsel are not sufficiently 
independent or are of lesser independence than external lawyers.114 For 
example, Sue Laver, in-house counsel for Telstra Corporation submitted: 
All lawyers, whether employed in corporate roles, or in firms or at the bar 
seek to be paid for the work they do. No principle has been advanced to 
support a proposition that in-house counsel (who are usually employed on a 
salary) are more susceptible [to act under ‘dictation’ from their client or to 
face a conflict of interest] than their colleagues employed in firms, or at the 
bar (who are usually retained on hourly rates).115 
• As a matter of course, particulars of independence should not have to be 
provided to federal bodies, although where the issue arises in a particular 
circumstance, a federal body may choose to seek such information.116 For 
example, the Law Council submitted: 
A general requirement to provide details about counsel’s independence may 
be unnecessary in a particular case, and may well be onerous and wasteful of 
resources, particularly in an urgent situation. …  
The Law Council suggests that a presumption as to the independence of an in-
house counsel be established to ensure, that prima facie, an in-house counsel 
is treated in the same way as any other legal adviser … If the investigating 
agency decides to question the independence of counsel … [it] should be 
required to provide a notice to that effect, setting out its reasons for doing so. 
                                                        
113  Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission LPP 107, 5 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission 
LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Westpac Banking Corporation, Submission LPP 85, 1 November 2007; 
Australian Corporate Lawyers Association, Submission LPP 83, 31 October 2007; Australian Corporate 
Lawyers Association, Consultation LPP 46, Sydney, 26 October 2007; Allens Arthur Robinson, 
Consultation LPP 43, Sydney, 24 October 2007. However, the Law Society of NSW did not oppose the 
requirement that communications involving in-house counsel be identified, although it objected to a 
general requirement to provide particulars about in-house counsel’s independence: Law Society of New 
South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. 
114  See, eg, S Laver, Submission LPP 110, 7 November 2007; Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission LPP 107, 
5 November 2007; Australian Corporate Lawyers Association, Submission LPP 83, 31 October 2007. 
115  S Laver, Submission LPP 110, 7 November 2007. 
116  Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission LPP 107, 5 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission 
LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007.  
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The [claimant] would then provide details of the independence of their in-
house legal advisers … 117 
• There is uncertainty about the level of detail that would be required in providing 
‘sufficient’ details of independence. Concern was also expressed that the 
relevant test should not be that the details are ‘sufficient’ in the opinion of the 
federal body, because the federal body’s requirements may be unreasonable.118 
• The appropriate focus should be on whether the person is a lawyer, acting as a 
lawyer and what the dominant purpose of the advice is.119 For example, Allens 
Arthur Robinson submitted that: 
The dominant purpose of a communication is far more likely to be prima facie 
determinative of whether the document is privileged than considerations as to 
an in-house [counsel’s] independence. For instance, simply because an in-
house [counsel] is sufficiently independent at a theoretical level, does not 
mean that all communications between that person and their internal clients 
will be privileged.120 
8.103  Similarly, Sue Laver submitted: 
The mere provision of information regarding the reporting lines of an in-
house counsel, the holding of a practising certificate, titles or roles held will 
not provide an agency with information to assess in the particular 
circumstances whether a particular advice is privileged. At best it may provide 
a level of comfort to the agency that the person who is employed by the client 
was acting as a lawyer, giving legal advice. This is not ‘independence’. It is 
purely fulfilling a requirement of the ‘test’ for client legal privilege, namely 
was the advisor acting as a lawyer.121 
Identification of ‘tax advice documents’  
8.104 The general theme that emerged from submissions was that, if privilege were 
extended to ‘tax advice documents’ prepared by professional accounting advisers, then 
it was appropriate for such documents to be identified.122 
                                                        
117  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007. See also Westpac Banking 
Corporation, Submission LPP 85, 1 November 2007, which expressed the view that requiring details of 
independence was unnecessary in light of the proposal that a claimant specify the grounds on which 
privilege is claimed. It also noted that, under the ALRC’s proposal, a federal body could obtain extra 
comfort by requesting verification and certification of claims made. 
118  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. See also National Legal Aid, 
Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007. 
119  See, eg, Australian Corporate Lawyers Association, Submission LPP 83, 31 October 2007. 
120  Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission LPP 107, 5 November 2007. 
121  S Laver, Submission LPP 110, 7 November 2007. 
122  See, eg Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South 
Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. Tax advice documents are defined in Rec 6–6.  
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Verification on oath and certification of claim 
8.105 In response to IP 33, stakeholders also expressed some support for privilege 
claims made to federal bodies to be verified on oath and/or certified by lawyers—as is 
the practice in relation to discovery. ACMA stated that, depending on the nature of a 
claim and the nature of the investigation, it may seek an affidavit from a claimant about 
the nature of the documents the subject of a claim.123  
8.106 The ACCC submitted that where the claim is made by a lawyer on behalf of a 
client, the lawyer should be required to verify on oath that 
he or she has reviewed all documents in respect of which the claim for privilege has 
been made and is satisfied that the claim is a proper one; and secondly, that he or she 
is satisfied that none of the documents in respect of which the claim has been made 
come within the fraud or crime exception to legal professional privilege.124 
8.107 The NSW Bar Association supported a similar approach. It submitted that the 
senior solicitor with carriage and control of the matter should certify, at the time of 
making a privilege claim, that each privilege claim is supported by reasonable grounds, 
and that the grounds for each claim have been identified.  
Such a certificate could be analogous in form and status to certificates given by a 
practitioner under section 347(b) of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) … 
warranting reasonable prospects of success in respect of proceedings.125  
8.108 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed, as part of its procedure for making client legal 
privilege claims in federal investigations, that a federal body, in its discretion, could 
request: 
• the person making the claim to verify the claim on oath or affirmation; and 
• the claimant’s lawyer to certify that, having reviewed the documents the subject 
of the privilege claim, in his or her opinion there are reasonable grounds for the 
making of the claim.126 
Verification 
8.109 The proposal concerning verification was generally supported by the same 
stakeholders, mentioned above, that supported the ALRC’s approach in providing a 
                                                        
123  Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission LPP 20, 29 May 2007. 
124  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. 
125  New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. 
126  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 8–3. 
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mechanism for the making of claims in federal investigations. Only the following few 
stakeholders specifically commented on that part of the ALRC’s proposal dealing with 
the verification of claims: 
• The Law Society of NSW submitted that it did not oppose the requirement to 
verify the particulars of a privilege claim on the request of a federal body.127 
• APRA supported the proposal ‘subject to any such verification being 
acknowledged as not conclusive’.128  
• The Law Council submitted that a federal investigatory body should only 
require verification of a claim in ‘exceptional circumstances’ because unlike a 
court, such a body ‘is not the arbiter of a client legal privilege claim and does 
not stand in the same position as a court.’129 
Certification 
8.110 Some stakeholders supported that part of the ALRC’s proposal dealing with 
certification of claims, including on the basis that it would assist lawyers in resisting 
pressure from their clients to make improper claims.130 Allens Arthur Robinson 
submitted that federal bodies should have the option of requesting certification of 
privilege claims without requesting particularisation of those claims. 
In many instances the preparation of a list of the type outlined in Proposal 8–3(b), 
given the volume of documents which are sometimes the subject of a regulator’s 
request, could be extremely onerous in terms of time and cost. We think there would 
be merit in a presumption that regulators would first only request lawyer certification 
and that only in circumstances where certification proved inadequate for the 
regulator’s purpose, a list could be required. … A presumption of that type would for 
the majority of cases obviate the cost associated with preparing what would, very 
often, be lengthy lists in relation to claims for privilege which are relatively 
uncontroversial but where the regulator simply wants peace of mind that the request 
has been properly complied with.131 
8.111 A strong theme that emerged in submissions was that any certification provided 
by a lawyer of a client’s privilege claim should state that, based upon the client’s 
instructions, in the lawyer’s opinion there are reasonable grounds for making the 
                                                        
127  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. 
128  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007. 
129  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007. 
130  See, eg, Allens Arthur Robinson, Consultation LPP 43, Sydney, 24 October 2007. However, members of 
the South Australian Bar Association expressed reservations about the certification process: Members of 
the South Australian Bar Association, Consultation LPP 38, Adelaide, 17 October 2007. 
131  Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission LPP 107, 5 November 2007. 
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claim.132 The Law Council also expressed the view that a request for certification of a 
privilege claim should only be made in exceptional circumstances.133 
8.112 More specifically, the requirement under the ALRC’s proposed regime, that 
privilege claims in respect of ‘tax advice documents’ prepared by professional 
accounting advisers be certified by lawyers (where certification is requested by a 
federal body), was opposed by professional accounting bodies. Opposition was 
expressed on various grounds, including that: it would incur greater expense for a 
client; was a task within the skills of tax agents; and there was adequate regulation of 
the profession to guard against the making of improper claims.134 
8.113 The Institute of Chartered Accountants submitted: 
We see this particular requirement for certification by a lawyer as being unwarranted 
in a pre-curial federal investigation. Certification by a tax agent or its nominee or 
employee is sufficient and provides for sufficient accountability to guard against 
improper claims. …  
The proposed statutory regime recognising client professional privilege for tax agents 
should be on an equal footing to client professional privilege currently afforded to 
lawyers.135 
8.114 The National Institute of Accountants submitted that the proposed requirement 
‘defeats any purpose in having such an extension of the privilege as the client will still 
need to seek additional legal advice’.136 
Waiver 
8.115 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that federal client legal privilege legislation 
should specify that providing a description of the documents or bundle of documents in 
accordance with legislative requirements of itself will not amount to a waiver of 
privilege.137 
                                                        
132  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, 
Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007; Australian Corporate Lawyers Association, Submission LPP 83, 
31 October 2007. 
133  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007. 
134  National Institute of Accountants, Submission LPP 87, 1 November 2007; Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia, Submission LPP 82, 31 October 2007. 
135  Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, Submission LPP 82, 31 October 2007. 
136  National Institute of Accountants, Submission LPP 87, 1 November 2007. 
137  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 8–4. 
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8.116 This proposal received widespread support.138 For example, the Australian 
Financial Markets Association submitted that it provided clarity.139 No opposition to 
the proposal was expressed in submissions or consultations. 
Time limits 
8.117 In response to IP 33, ASIC and the ATO expressed the need for time limits to be 
set within which claimants are to provide details of client legal privilege claims in 
response to the coercive information-gathering powers of federal bodies. 
8.118 In this regard, the ATO submitted that the process for making a claim should 
prescribe statutory time periods within which details of a claim must be provided, or 
allow for a longer period where this is agreed to in writing by the relevant federal 
investigatory agency and the claimant.140 
8.119 ASIC submitted that details of privilege claims should be provided within time 
limits that are defined but may be flexible depending upon the particular 
circumstances.141 It noted that flexibility was necessary to take into account the fact 
that documents the subject of privilege claims may be voluminous or mixed amongst 
large amounts of non-privileged documents covered by the coercive power. 
8.120 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that federal client legal privilege should specify 
that the particulars of documents subject to a claim for privilege are to be provided to 
the federal body within the time frame defined by that body, which must be reasonable 
having regard to the circumstances of each particular request for information. The 
proposal set out examples of the types of factors that may be relevant.142 
8.121 This proposal was generally supported.143 Some stakeholders supported the 
proposal, but noted that other factors may be relevant.144 For example, the Law Council 
submitted: 
                                                        
138  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Australian Financial Markets Association, 
Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 
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This proposal is supported in principle, but the factors listed are insufficient and may 
lead to instances of injustice. There may be significant prejudice to a party under 
investigation, where the federal body requesting information specifies a very short 
time-frame for production of details of a client legal privilege claim. … [A]ny adverse 
effect on the client and its resources in responding urgently should be included as a 
relevant factor.145 
8.122 ASIC submitted that the proposal should be extended to cover time limits for 
complying with requests for verification and certification of privilege claims.146 
Failure to provide particulars 
8.123 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that federal client legal privilege legislation 
should provide that, where a person fails to comply with a federal body’s request to 
provide particulars of communications in respect of which privilege is claimed, the 
federal body may apply for a declaration that the privilege is not maintainable unless 
particulars are provided to the court forthwith, or within a designated time determined 
at the discretion of the court.147 
8.124 Opinions in submissions and consultations were divided. Some stakeholders 
expressed support for the proposal,148 and suggested that it be extended to cover a 
failure to verify a claim.149 APRA supported the principle underlying the proposal, but 
submitted that: 
A federal body should be able to apply to a court for the declaration if the particulars 
are not provided at the time the privilege is claimed, rather than having to request the 
particulars when the claim is made.150 
8.125 Other stakeholders suggested modifications to the proposal. The Law Council 
submitted that the court ought to be given a broad discretion to hold, where 
appropriate, that, despite a failure to comply, a declaration that privilege is not 
maintainable should not be given.151 The Law Society of NSW, while supporting ‘the 
tenor’ of the proposal, also expressed the view that the court ought to be given a broad 
discretion of this nature.152  
                                                        
145  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007. 
146  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. 
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8.126 The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) expressed a preference for a ‘self-
executing’ mechanism, which would entitle a federal body to regard a privilege claim 
as having been waived if particulars were not provided on request.153 ASIC noted that 
the benefits of such a self-executing mechanism  
would be to increase the likelihood that claimants would more diligently comply with 
their obligation to provide particulars because they would not be provided with a 
second opportunity within which to satisfy that requirement. Further, it would avoid 
the costs and delays associated with litigation.154 
8.127 However, ASIC noted that the benefit of the ALRC’s proposal ‘is that it avoids 
the possibility that a person may lose their claim of … privilege through, for example, 
mere inadvertence’.155 
8.128 The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) opposed the 
proposal because it places the onus on a federal body to progress a matter when a 
claimant has failed to comply with a time limit. It submitted that: 
A preferable approach is to put the onus on the claimant to obtain a court order before 
the expiry of the time limit that extends the time for compliance. In the absence of 
such an order, once the time limit expires the investigative body may access the 
documents and privilege is lost.156  
8.129 The Hon John Hannaford opposed the proposal on the basis that ‘it introduced 
an unnecessary and additional step for all parties in resolving [privilege] claims’.157  
8.130 In DP 73, the ALRC expressed interest in hearing views about whether its 
approach needed to be modified in the context of search warrants—in particular, 
whether there is a stronger argument in that framework for a failure by a claimant to 
provide particulars within the requisite time frame to lead to the automatic 
consequence that an investigatory body can take possession of the documents in 
respect of which no particulars were provided. No views were offered in this respect. 
Failure by lawyer to certify claim on request 
8.131 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed a mechanism in federal client legal privilege 
legislation to deal with the failure by a lawyer to certify a claim for privilege upon the 
federal body’s request. The proposed mechanism involved: 
• the federal body informing a claimant of the lawyer’s lack of certification and 
the consequences of the failure to certify (as set out below); 
                                                        
153  Australian Crime Commission, Consultation LPP 47, Sydney, 26 October 2007. 
154  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. 
155  Ibid. 
156  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 101, 2 November 2007. 
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• allowing the federal body to apply for a declaration that unless the court 
otherwise orders, if certification is not made within the time provided by the 
court, the claim for privilege is not maintainable; and 
• allowing the person to apply to the court for a declaration that privilege applies 
despite the lack of certification.158 
8.132 A number of stakeholders submitted that they would support—or not oppose—
the proposal if it were modified to require a federal body first to notify the lawyer that 
it intends to inform the claimant of the lawyer’s failure to certify and to allow that 
lawyer an opportunity to respond.159 These stakeholders also submitted that any 
information provided by the federal body to the claimant concerning the lawyer’s 
failure to certify should also be copied to the claimant’s lawyer.  
8.133 Members of the South Australian Bar Association suggested that the proposal be 
modified to specify what the lawyer was certifying.160  
8.134 ASIC noted that an alternative approach to this proposal 
may be that a federal body should be entitled to regard the privilege claim as having 
been waived if certification has not, in the absence of a reasonable excuse, been 
provided. That approach would be to increase the likelihood that claimants would 
more diligently comply with their obligation to obtain and provide certification. 
Further, it would avoid the costs and delays associated with litigation.161 
8.135 However, ASIC noted that the benefit of the ALRC’s proposal is that it protects 
a person from losing a claim of privilege through mere inadvertence.162 
8.136 Other stakeholders, however, expressed opposition to the proposal on various 
grounds.163 The CDPP opposed it because it places the onus on a federal body to 
progress the matter, diverting resources from the investigation.164 APRA submitted that 
the proposal was unnecessary because certification does not resolve a dispute over 
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whether privilege applies.165 Hannaford also submitted that the proposal was 
unnecessary and would entail ‘wasted expenditure’.166 
ALRC’s views 
Establishing a procedure for the making of claims 
8.137 The ALRC considers that federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide a mechanism for the making of privilege claims in federal investigations. The 
ALRC’s proposed statute of general application provides an appropriate vehicle to 
establish uniform procedures for making claims.  
8.138 Court rules do not provide an appropriate vehicle for the making of privilege 
claims in federal investigations because there may not be any court proceedings on foot 
arising from an investigation—nor may there ever be. The experience of federal 
bodies—in particular the ACCC and ATO—suggests that guidelines of themselves are 
inadequate because, in the absence of legislative compulsion, some persons consider 
that they are justified in their refusal to provide particulars of their privilege claims. 
However, as discussed below, the ALRC considers that federal body policies have a 
role to play in complementing the proposed legislative scheme for making a claim of 
privilege.167 
8.139 The lack of clear and consistent practices surrounding the making of client legal 
privilege claims in federal investigations needs to be addressed. The absence of a 
process requiring transparent claims may encourage blanket claims, over-claiming 
privilege, over-masking or otherwise arguably inappropriate claims—thereby hindering 
the ability of federal bodies to access material relevant to their investigations. 
8.140 It is unsatisfactory that federal bodies may not be made aware of the fact that 
allegedly privileged material has been withheld from production. It is important for 
federal bodies to be able to satisfy themselves that claims of client legal privilege 
appear to have a proper basis. Increasing the transparency of claims may have the 
salutary effect of decreasing the likelihood of inappropriate claims—and therefore 
maximising the production of relevant non-privileged material to federal investigatory 
bodies pursuant to their coercive powers. It may also reassure such bodies that client 
legal privilege claims are being appropriately made. 
Obligations of federal bodies and claimants 
8.141 The mechanism for making a claim should set out the respective obligations of 
federal bodies and claimants. Federal bodies must give persons a reasonable 
opportunity to make a claim.  
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8.142 The ALRC considers that, in order to enjoy the benefit of an important right—as 
the ability to make a claim of client legal privilege is—claimants must be prepared to 
meet certain obligations in demonstrating their entitlement to exercise that right. Court 
discovery rules provide a precedent for creating obligations on those who make 
privilege claims to provide details of their claims. 
8.143 The ALRC agrees with the approach supported by a number of stakeholders that 
claimants should be required to provide details of privileged communications withheld 
from federal bodies. Under the ALRC’s approach, a person who does not produce 
documents to a federal body on the basis that they are subject to a privilege claim will 
nonetheless be required to provide particulars of that claim if the federal body so 
requests. Not every federal body in respect of the exercise of each of its coercive 
information-gathering powers will necessarily require particulars of privileged 
information withheld from production. Whether a federal body does so may depend on 
its nature, the particular investigation that it is undertaking, and the power that it is 
exercising. Accordingly, in order to achieve an appropriate degree of flexibility, the 
ALRC recommends that claimants be obliged to provide certain particulars of 
privileged communications only when a federal body has requested them.168  
8.144 Where particulars are requested, claimants should be required to specify the 
grounds on which privilege is claimed and the facts relied upon as giving rise to the 
claim. For example, it is envisaged that a relevant fact would be the capacity in which 
an in-house counsel was acting at the time of giving advice. 
8.145 In addition, where claims are made in respect of communications in documents, 
claimants, on the request of the federal body, should be required to describe the 
documents, either individually or by bundle, sufficiently to enable the document or 
bundle to be identified.169 Allowing for description by bundle in appropriate 
circumstances is consistent with the approach taken in court discovery rules. There is 
merit in the argument that the obligations to be imposed on persons responding to 
federal coercive powers concerning the particularisation of claims should not, as a 
general proposition, be more onerous than those required by court discovery rules. 
8.146 Taking into account views expressed in submissions and consultations, the 
ALRC agrees that there needs to be some guidance about the types of particulars that 
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would need to be given to satisfy the requirement of sufficiency of detail. The ALRC 
considers that the following details of written communications should be provided: 
• date of the document; 
• the nature of the document and the type of communication. This would entail 
describing, for example, whether the document is:  
• a letter of advice, 
• a file note of a conversation recording legal advice, 
• a draft affidavit, 
• a tax advice document, as defined in Recommendation 6–6, prepared by a 
professional accounting adviser, or 
• copies of any such documents; 
• the names and description of the position of the authors and recipients of the 
privileged communications. This would involve indicating that an author or 
recipient is, for example: 
• a partner of a specified law firm, 
• a solicitor employed in a specified law firm, 
• in-house counsel for a specified company, 
• a barrister retained to act for a particular client, or 
• the managing director of a particular company.  
8.147 The above approach places external lawyers and in-house counsel on the same 
footing. Communications prepared by in-house counsel will need to be indicated—as 
will communications prepared by solicitors or barristers.  
8.148 As noted above, in DP 73 the ALRC proposed that where a federal body 
requested particulars of a claim, a claimant had to provide sufficient details about the 
independence of any in-house counsel who had prepared or was involved in 
communications the subject of a privilege claim. This approach is consistent with that 
adopted in Telstra Corporation Limited v Minister for Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts (No 2) by Graham J, who noted that Telstra had not led any 
evidence  
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to establish the role which the various legal practitioners performed within Telstra. In 
particular, no evidence has been advanced to disclose the measure of independence of 
the legal practitioners in question and their ability to provide impartial legal advice, 
given the roles that they have had to perform.170 
8.149 However, taking into account the views expressed in submissions and 
consultations, the ALRC is persuaded that details of the independence of in-house 
counsel should not be required, as a matter of course, whenever a federal body requests 
particulars of a claim. The appropriate focus is on eliciting the grounds of the claim, 
which would entail an articulation of the dominant purpose of the creation of the 
communication, and the facts relied upon for making the claim. However, if 
independence becomes an issue in a particular case, a federal body should have scope 
to test the issue.  
8.150 A federal body should equally be able to request particulars of privilege claims 
in respect of oral communications. This is especially important to federal bodies, such 
as ASIC, which have the power to examine persons on oath or affirmation. If a federal 
body requests particulars of claims made in respect of oral communications, the 
claimant should provide details of the date, time, parties to, location and means by 
which the communication took place. 
8.151 The ALRC’s approach also addresses concerns expressed about the making of 
blanket claims. Where a federal body requests particulars of privilege claims, they will 
have to be provided. 
8.152 The ALRC’s views about the consequences of a person failing to provide 
particulars are addressed separately below. 
Verification and certification 
8.153 Where a person makes a privilege claim in a federal investigation, and a federal 
body has requested particulars of that claim, the federal body, if it so chooses, should 
be able to require the person to verify his or her claim on oath or affirmation. This is 
consistent with the obligations imposed on claimants in court discovery processes.  
8.154 In addition, where a person is legally represented in a federal investigation or 
has otherwise received advice in relation to making a privilege claim, the federal body 
may request that the lawyer certify that, having reviewed the documents the subject of 
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a privilege claim, in his or her opinion, based on the client’s instructions, there are 
reasonable grounds for the making of the claim.  
8.155 The ALRC is of the view that there is merit in allowing a federal body to request 
certification of privilege claims without first having to request particularisation of the 
communications over which privilege is claimed. A theme that emerged in the Inquiry 
was that relationships of trust develop between certain federal regulators and the 
lawyers who typically represent the regulated community. In these instances, a federal 
body may choose not to request the preparation of particulars of privileged 
communications, a process that may be time consuming, and which, in the context of 
particular investigations may be relatively uncontroversial. However, the federal body 
may nonetheless choose to satisfy itself that, where documents have been withheld 
from production on the grounds of privilege, proper consideration has been given to the 
basis of the privilege claims by requiring certification by lawyers.  
8.156 Equally, where a federal body seeks particulars of a privilege claim, it may not 
always need that claim to be verified or certified. Whether it does so may depend on a 
number of factors, including the nature of the investigation, and the person who is the 
subject of the coercive information-gathering power. Therefore, to achieve an 
appropriate degree of flexibility, the ALRC recommends that claimants and their 
lawyers be required to verify and certify claims only where the federal body has 
requested them to do so. As discussed below, it may be appropriate for policies on the 
making of privilege claims of individual federal bodies to address the circumstances in 
which those bodies will request verification or certification of claims.171 
8.157 It is the ALRC’s view that the verification and certification processes serve the 
salutary function of focusing attention by claimants and their lawyers on the merits of 
the claims for privilege—increasing the likelihood that possibly inappropriate claims 
are eliminated at an early stage.172  
8.158 In certifying that, based on the client’s instructions, there are reasonable grounds 
for a privilege claim a lawyer, in effect, will also be expressing the view that: 
• none of the documents the subject of the claim are subject to the fraud and crime 
exception to the privilege; and 
• if portions of documents are privileged, a claim has been made only in relation 
to those specific portions.173 
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8.159 Verification and certification may engender trust on the part of a federal body as 
to the legitimacy of the claims being made—thereby possibly reducing the need to 
dispute privilege claims.  
8.160 The model for making privilege claims recommended by the ALRC recognises 
the proposed extension of client legal privilege to tax advice provided by professional 
accounting advisers in response to the coercive powers of the Commissioner of 
Taxation.174 However, it only allows lawyers to certify such claims—recognising that 
advice about the ‘dominant purpose’ of a communication is legal advice which a 
professional accounting adviser is not qualified to give, unless that person is also a 
lawyer. As noted in Chapter 6, the meaning of the dominant purpose under the tax 
advice privilege will derive from the common law doctrine of client legal privilege. 
Similarly, whether the tax advice privilege has been waived, or whether the fraud and 
crime exception applies to it, will be determined by common law principles, in respect 
of which accountants are not qualified to give legal advice. 
8.161 The ALRC notes the opposition expressed by accounting bodies about lawyers 
certifying tax advice documents prepared by professional accounting advisers. To the 
extent that opposition is expressed on the basis that certification is within the skills of 
accounting advisers, the ALRC’s view remains that, because, as a matter of law, 
professional accounting advisers are not qualified to provide legal advice about client 
legal privilege, it is inappropriate for them to certify such claims. That is the central 
and essential reason for requiring certification to be undertaken by lawyers. Arguments 
about the comparative ethical and disciplinary regimes of accountants and lawyers are 
not pertinent in this context. A highly ethical professional accounting adviser, subject 
to a strict professional disciplinary regime, remains nonetheless unqualified to give 
legal advice about the doctrine of privilege. However, the existence of high ethical 
standards and an appropriate professional disciplinary regime are relevant in the 
context of professional accounting advisers being the initial ‘gatekeepers’ to the claim 
being made, especially where a federal body does not request a lawyer to certify 
privilege claims made in respect of tax advice documents.175 
8.162 Further, as emphasised elsewhere in this Report, the intended beneficiaries of 
the ALRC’s recommended extension of client legal privilege to certain tax advice 
documents prepared by professional accounting advisers are the clients who obtain 
such advice—not the accountants who provide it. Therefore, in this particular context, 
arguments about placing accountants and lawyers on the ‘same footing’ are beside the 
point. 
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8.163 The ALRC’s views on the consequences of a lawyer failing to provide 
certification are set out separately below. 
Waiver 
8.164 Taking into account support expressed in submissions and consultations, the 
ALRC remains of the view that federal client legal privilege legislation should make it 
clear that providing a description of documents or a bundle of documents in 
accordance with legislative requirements will not of itself amount to a waiver of client 
legal privilege.  
8.165 However, the ALRC envisages that the details provided should be able to be 
used by a federal body to dispute the claim. 
Time limits  
8.166 It is impossible for legislation to specify a time period within which persons in 
all federal investigations making a claim for privilege are to provide particulars of 
privileged documents, or are to verify or certify such claims, where requested by 
federal bodies.  
8.167 Each federal body should have the discretion to set reasonable time frames for 
the provision of particulars of privileged information, or the verification or certification 
of such claims, depending on the circumstances of each particular request for 
information. The types of factors that might be considered in determining a reasonable 
time frame include:  
• the number of documents that a claimant is required to review; 
• the need to access and identify electronically-stored documents;  
• whether the information is required pursuant to the exercise of a search warrant 
(or a search without warrant);  
• the urgency and seriousness of the investigation being conducted by the federal 
body;  
• any adverse effect on the claimant and the claimant’s resources in responding to 
an urgent request; and 
• the time frame for production of documents pursuant to the coercive power. 
8.168 The above factors are not intended to be exhaustive. The final factor mentioned 
recognises that persons subject to coercive information-gathering powers may be faced 
with competing deadlines. There may be a deadline for the production of information 
sought under a particular power—whether the deadline is statutorily imposed or 
determined at the discretion of the federal body—in addition to the deadline imposed 
  
 8. Practice and Procedure 411 
 
by the federal body for the provision of particulars of privileged information (where 
such particulars have been requested).  
8.169 From a practical perspective, federal investigatory bodies presumably would 
want to have access to non-privileged information as soon as possible—in order to 
advance their investigations. The production of non-privileged information should not 
be delayed by requirements to provide particulars of privileged information. Therefore 
the ALRC envisages that, in general terms, the time limit set by a federal body for the 
provision of particulars of privileged information would not be earlier than the time 
limit set for compliance with the power. 
8.170 A privilege claimant may require a greater period of time in order to sort 
through voluminous material in order to identify that which must be produced and that 
over which client legal privilege may be claimed. In such circumstances, it remains 
open to the federal body to seek to negotiate with the claimant to produce non-
privileged material in stages as and when it is identified as not being privileged.  
Failure by claimant to provide particulars or to verify a privilege claim 
8.171 A claimant may fail to comply with a federal body’s request to provide 
particulars by not providing any particulars, or by providing, in the federal body’s 
view, inadequate particulars.  
8.172 The claimant’s failure may be due to a range of reasons. The time frame 
designated by the federal body in the first instance may have been unrealistic; the 
claimant may be unrepresented and not understand the nature of the obligation to 
provide particulars; or, more cynically, the claimant may be aware that the particulars 
will not support his or her claim, or he or she is seeking to frustrate or delay the federal 
investigation.  
8.173 In broad terms, the same can be said of a person’s failure to verify a claim. The 
claimant may not understand the obligation to verify or may be unprepared to verify a 
claim which he or she knows to be ill-founded. 
8.174 Because the failure to provide particulars or to verify a claim may be due to a 
range of reasons, it is necessary to have a process that can deal with failure in a flexible 
manner, depending on the particular circumstances. An automatic self-executing 
mechanism which deprives a person of the right to claim privilege in the absence of 
having provided particulars when requested by a federal body has the appeal of being 
time and cost efficient. However, it may operate unjustly, causing persons to lose the 
benefit of an important privilege through no fault of their own or because of mere 
inadvertence.  
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8.175 Therefore the ALRC is of the view that federal client legal privilege legislation 
should provide that where a person fails to comply with a federal body’s request to 
provide particulars of communications in respect of which privilege is claimed or to 
verify such claims the federal body may apply for a declaration that privilege is not 
maintainable unless particulars or verification of the claims are provided forthwith or 
within a designated time determined at the discretion of the court.  
8.176 The ALRC does not seek to detract from the court’s broad discretion not to 
make the declaration sought. The court may have regard to a range of factors in 
determining what is reasonable—including the time that the federal body gave the 
claimant to provide the particulars, the urgency of the federal body’s inquiry, and the 
quantity of documents in respect of which particulars or verification are sought. The 
court may order a timetable for the particulars to be provided in stages. For example, 
particulars relating to documents about a certain transaction under investigation may be 
ordered to be produced by a particular date; and particulars relating to documents 
relating to another transaction under investigation by the federal body may be ordered 
to be produced by a later date. 
8.177 However, under this approach, it would be open to the court to consider that the 
time frame originally provided by the federal body to provide particulars was 
reasonable, and in the absence of justification by the claimant for why he or she did not 
provide any particulars within that time, to order the claimant to provide the details 
forthwith—which could effectively mean an order for production within 24 hours.  
8.178 If a person fails to produce the particulars within the time frame designated by 
the court, the court’s declaration that the privilege claim is not maintainable would take 
effect. This would mean that the legislation containing the coercive power would have 
the effect of requiring production of the documents (in respect of which a non-
maintainable claim had been made) to the federal body (assuming those documents fell 
within the scope of the power). 
8.179 While the ALRC’s recommendation has taken into account stakeholders’ views 
that it should also allow a federal body to apply for a declaration where a claimant fails 
to verify a claim, it must be stressed that this is merely an option available to a federal 
body. A federal body may opt not to seek a declaration in such circumstances. For 
example, where particulars have been provided to the federal body, but not verified as 
requested, the federal body is likely to have enough information upon which to decide 
whether it wishes to challenge a privilege claim—the information being the particulars 
provided plus the fact of non-verification. If the federal body decides to challenge the 
privilege claim, rather than press for a non-conclusive verification of the claim, it may 
prefer to proceed directly to the dispute resolution processes discussed later in this 
chapter.176 The ALRC envisages that on a cost/benefit analysis, the benefits of seeking 
                                                        
176  See Rec 8–11. 
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a declaration concerning a failure to verify would only outweigh the costs where the 
failure to verify is accompanied by a failure to provide particulars.  
Failure by lawyer to certify claim on request 
8.180 A lawyer may fail to certify a client’s legal privilege claim for a number of 
reasons. At one end of the spectrum, he or she may be negligent or reckless. At the 
other end, he or she may have genuine reservations about a client’s claim that properly 
preclude him or her from certifying that there are reasonable grounds for the making of 
the claim.177 It is important that any process seeking to address the failure of a lawyer 
to certify a claim does not prejudice a claimant who has engaged a negligent lawyer. 
8.181 Further, it must be emphasised that a federal body that has requested 
certification of privilege claims—in the terms set out in Recommendation 8–3—may 
not wish to press for certification where it has not been provided. For example, in 
circumstances where particulars have been provided to the federal body, it may have 
enough information upon which to make a decision whether to dispute any privilege 
claim. The fact that a claim has not been certified on request may be a persuasive 
factor in a federal body’s decision to dispute a claim. It would be open under the 
ALRC’s recommendation for a federal body to proceed directly to the dispute 
resolution processes, discussed later in this chapter.178 So, for example, pursuant to 
Recommendation 8–11, the federal body would have the option of notifying the 
claimant that it disputes a claim and that the claimant has 14 days (or such other time 
agreed to or ordered by the court) within which to commence proceedings to establish 
the claim. Such an approach recognises that certification of claims is not conclusive of 
whether or not privilege applies, and also allows the federal body, where it considers 
appropriate, to shift the onus back onto the claimant to establish the claim. 
8.182 However, if a federal body wishes to pursue the issue of a lack of certification of 
privilege claims, the ALRC considers that this should involve the following steps: 
• If the federal body is aware of the identity of the claimant’s lawyer, it should 
notify the lawyer that it intends to inform the claimant of the lawyer’s failure to 
certify.  
• The federal body should inform the claimant that the lawyer has not certified 
some or all of the claims, if it appears to the federal body that the claimant may 
not be aware of this. In addition, the federal body should inform the claimant 
about the consequences of non-certification. In the ALRC’s view, the 
consequences should be that: 
                                                        
177  Ch 9 discusses the proposed consequences of a lawyer making a certification without reasonable grounds. 
178  See Rec 8–11.  
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• the federal body may apply to the court for a declaration that, unless the court 
otherwise orders, if certification is not made within the time provided by the 
court, the claim for privilege is not maintainable; and  
• the claimant may apply to the court for a declaration that privilege applies 
despite the lack of certification. 
8.183 Further, if a federal body is to be given legislative sanction to request 
certification of privilege claims by lawyers, there should be disciplinary consequences 
for a lawyer who fails to certify a privilege claim, on the request of a federal body, in 
the absence of reasonable grounds.179 Reasonable grounds for failure to certify would 
include that the lawyer did not believe that there was a proper basis for the making of 
the claim and could therefore not certify them. In addition, there should be disciplinary 
consequences for lawyers who certify privilege claims in the absence of reasonable 
grounds.180 
Recommendation 8–3 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide a mechanism for the making of privilege claims in federal 
investigations. Those provisions should include a requirement that persons be 
given a reasonable opportunity to claim privilege, and if a federal body requests 
particulars of privileged communications not produced pursuant to a coercive 
information-gathering power, that: 
(a)  the person specify: 
 (1)  the grounds on which client legal privilege is claimed; and 
 (2)  the facts relied upon as giving rise to the claim;  
(b)  where claims are made in respect of communications contained in 
documents:  
 (1)  the person making the claim describes the documents or in the case 
of a bundle of documents of the same or similar nature, describe 
each bundle, sufficiently to enable the document or bundle to be 
identified including details of the following: 
  (i)  date of the document; 
                                                        
179  This is discussed in Ch 9. 
180  This is discussed in Ch 9. 
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  (ii)  the nature of the document and the type of communication 
(for example tax advice documents, defined in 
Recommendation 6–6, prepared by a professional 
accounting adviser should be indicated); and 
  (iii)  the names and positions of the authors and recipients of the 
communications (for example, X—partner in Y Law Firm; 
B—in-house counsel for C Limited); 
 (2)  if a federal body so requests: 
  (i)  the particulars of the privileged documents and the basis for 
the claims are to be verified on oath or affirmation by the 
person making the claim; and/or 
  (ii)  where the person is legally represented in the federal 
investigation or has otherwise received legal advice in 
relation to making a claim for privilege, the person’s lawyer 
is to certify that having reviewed the documents the subject 
of a privilege claim, that in his or her opinion, based on the 
client’s instructions, there are reasonable grounds for the 
making of the claim. A federal body may request such 
certification by a lawyer in the absence of requesting 
particularisation of the communications over which 
privilege is claimed; and 
(c)  where the claims are made in respect of oral communications, the person 
making the claim should provide details of the date, time, parties to, 
location and means by which the communication took place. 
Recommendation 8–4 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
specify that providing a description of the documents or bundle of documents in 
accordance with legislative requirements of itself will not amount to waiver of 
the privilege. 
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Recommendation 8–5 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
specify where a federal body has requested particulars of documents subject to a 
claim for privilege, or the verification or certification of privilege claims, those 
particulars, verification or certification are to be provided to the federal body 
within the time frame defined by that body, which must be reasonable having 
regard to the circumstances of each particular request. The types of factors that 
may be relevant include: 
(a)  the number of documents that a claimant is required to review; 
(b)  the need to access and identify electronically-stored documents;  
(c)  whether the information is required pursuant to the exercise of a search 
warrant (or a search without warrant);  
(d)  the urgency and seriousness of the investigation being conducted by the 
federal body;  
(e)  the time frame for production of documents pursuant to the coercive 
power; and 
(f)   any adverse effect on the claimant and the claimant’s resources in 
responding urgently. 
Recommendation 8–6 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide that where a person fails to comply with a federal body’s request to 
provide particulars of communications in respect of which privilege is claimed 
or to verify such claims the federal body may apply for a declaration that 
privilege is not maintainable unless particulars or verification of the claims are 
provided to the court forthwith or within a designated time determined at the 
discretion of the court. 
Recommendation 8–7 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide that where a federal body requests that any claims for client legal 
privilege made by a person be certified by his or her lawyer (in the terms set out 
in Recommendation 8–3), and the lawyer fails to certify any or all of the 
privilege claims made by that person, if the federal body wishes to pursue the 
issue, the following steps apply: 
(a)  the federal body, if it is aware of the identity of the person’s lawyer, 
should notify the lawyer that it intends to inform the person of the 
lawyer’s failure to notify; 
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(b)  the federal body should inform the person that the lawyer has not certified 
some or all of the claims (if it appears that the person may not be aware 
of this fact) and of the consequences of failure to certify (as set out 
below); 
(c)  the federal body may apply to the court for a declaration that, unless the 
court otherwise orders, if certification is not made within the time 
provided by the court, the claim for privilege is not maintainable; and 
(d)  the person may apply to the court for a declaration that privilege applies  
despite the lack of certification. 
If the federal body does not wish to press the issue of failure to certify, it can 
invoke the dispute resolution processes set out in Recommendation 8–11. 
Unrepresented persons 
Background 
8.184 The ALRC has previously considered the particular difficulties faced by 
unrepresented litigants.181 In the context of this Inquiry, consideration needs to be 
given to the issues that arise in relation to persons who are unrepresented in the 
investigation process. In IP 33, the ALRC sought feedback about what these issues 
might be.182 
8.185 Coercive information-gathering powers may be exercised against persons who 
do not receive advice concerning the exercise of those powers or who are not 
represented. Persons may be unrepresented for a variety of reasons. For example, they 
may choose to act without representation or they may not be able to afford it. Such 
persons may have privileged information or documents but may not understand, or be 
aware of, their rights in relation to making a claim for privilege. That is, they may not 
be aware of whether a claim for client legal privilege is a reasonable excuse for not 
producing information to a federal body pursuant to a coercive power.  
8.186 Sussex Street Community Law Service Inc submitted that: 
                                                        
181  See, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice 
System, ALRC 89 (2000), Ch 5. See also Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: 
Sentencing of Federal Offenders, ALRC 103 (2006), Ch 13, which considered the situation of 
unrepresented persons at a sentencing hearing. 
182  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), Question 5–3. 
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An issue we face as a Community Legal Centre is the fact that there is a lack of access 
to justice for a large proportion of our community. When dealing with Centrelink a 
majority of their customers would not seek legal advice or assistance when faced with 
an investigation, so they are generally in the situation that they have not received legal 
advice in relation to their rights in an investigation.183 
8.187 The Taxation Institute of Australia submitted: 
There is no evidence which suggests that bodies exercising coercive information-
gathering powers are inclined to ‘go easy’ or to assist [an unrepresented] person in 
understanding their rights.184 
8.188 As a consequence of not knowing their rights, unrepresented persons may 
produce privileged material to a federal body in response to a coercive power—
including to a body that recognises that its statutory powers do not override privilege. 
Production in such circumstances may potentially prejudice a person’s position—
particularly where a federal body interprets the production of privileged material as 
constituting waiver. 
8.189 IP 33 noted that s 103(3) of the Taxation Administration Act 2003 (WA)185 
provides a model that could be applied in cases where privileged information is 
produced by a person who is unaware of his or her rights concerning the making of a 
claim for privilege. The section applies where no claim of privilege is made in respect 
of a document produced to the Commissioner of State Revenue, but it is apparent on 
examination of the document by the Commissioner or investigator that material in the 
document is, or is likely to be, protected by privilege. In those circumstances, it 
becomes the duty of the Commissioner or an investigator to separate the document 
from those in respect of which no claim is made and to refrain from using the 
document for any purpose.186 
8.190 There is precedent for investigatory bodies addressing in guidelines the receipt 
of material considered to be subject to a claim for client legal privilege where no claim 
is made. The Serious Fraud Office, in the United Kingdom, for example, sets out in its 
Operational Handbook a procedure to be followed in such cases: 
If no [client legal privilege] claim has been made but there is doubt as to the status of 
the material, the case controller should ask the Divisional Assistant Director to 
appoint a [Serious Fraud Office (SFO)] lawyer unconnected with the case to examine 
the material and advise on its status.  
If [client legal privilege] status is confirmed, the material must be returned 
immediately to the person entitled to it. 
If it appears that the material might be covered by [client legal privilege] but the SFO 
lawyer is unable to confirm the status of the material without obtaining further 
                                                        
183  Sussex Street Community Law Service Inc, Submission LPP 15, 30 May 2007. 
184  Taxation Institute of Australia, Submission LPP 54, 15 June 2007. 
185  This section is discussed in more detail at [8.243] below. 
186  See also Taxation Administration Act 2003 (WA) s 103(2). 
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information, the Case controller must alert the person entitled to the material and seek 
an agreed method of resolution.187 
8.191 Section 120 of the uniform Evidence Acts protects confidential communications 
and confidential documents made by an unrepresented litigant for the dominant 
purpose of preparing for or conducting that litigation. There is no equivalent statutory 
protection given to confidential communications and documents made by an 
unrepresented person in preparing for examinations or interviews conducted as part of 
federal investigations or in preparing to comply with other types of coercive 
information-gathering orders.188 IP 33 sought information from federal bodies about 
whether, as a matter of practice, they ever seek such material from unrepresented 
persons as part of their investigation processes.189 The ALRC did not receive any 
information in this regard. 
Submissions and consultations 
8.192 As discussed above in the section dealing with notification of application of 
privilege, there was some support in submissions and consultations in response to IP 33 
for requiring federal bodies exercising coercive information-gathering powers to notify 
persons about whether or not client legal privilege applies to the exercise of those 
powers.190  
8.193 Some stakeholders addressed the issue of informing persons about their right to 
seek legal assistance. Sussex Street Community Law Service Inc supported a 
requirement that investigatory bodies, as a matter of natural justice, inform a person 
under investigation that they have a right to legal assistance.191 The Law Society of 
NSW submitted that: 
It would seem unnecessary to impose a regime which requires people to obtain legal 
advice and incur legal costs unnecessarily if the treatment of the privilege is non-
contentious.192 
8.194 There was some support for a model based on s 103(3) of the Taxation 
Administration Act 2003 (WA), to address the production of privileged material by 
                                                        
187  United Kingdom Government Serious Fraud Office, Operational Handbook <www.sfo.gov. 
uk/handbook/> at 15 August 2007. 
188  As noted by the Australian Council of Trade Unions, there is equally no statutory protection where parties 
are represented by non-lawyers, such as industrial officers: Australian Council of Trade Unions, 
Submission LPP 88, 1 November 2007 
189  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), [5.20]. Issues concerning the production of documents to a federal body relating to the 
representation of a client in the investigation process are discussed in Ch 7. 
190  BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance, Submission LPP 21, 1 June 2007; B McKillop, M Kumar and 
F Beaupert, Consultation LPP 16, Sydney, 21 May 2007. 
191  Sussex Street Community Law Service Inc, Submission LPP 15, 30 May 2007. 
192  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
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unrepresented persons.193 The Law Society of NSW submitted that it was a ‘useful’ 
model;194 although the Law Council noted that: 
There is currently little practical experience or feedback about how this section may 
operate in practice. … The efficacy of the procedure would depend to a large extent 
on the expertise of the investigator in determining what may be privileged.195 
8.195 The Law Society of NSW also submitted that: 
Regardless of whether a legislative model can be agreed, agencies should be required 
to produce uniform guidelines setting out their requirements and a process for review 
by the person or entity coerced.196  
8.196 Although not in the specific context of addressing the particular needs of 
unrepresented persons, the NSW Bar Association submitted that uniform protocols for 
federal investigatory bodies should include a provision that:  
where it reasonably appears to the responsible officer within the federal investigative 
agency that client legal privilege may exist in relation to a document or 
communication coming into the hands of the agency then the agency must take 
reasonable steps to notify the client (either directly or through an available lawyer for 
the client) and give that client the opportunity to claim privilege before further 
inspecting or using the document.197 
8.197 NSW Young Lawyers expressed support for a provision protecting the 
confidential communications and documents prepared by an unrepresented person in 
preparing for examinations or interviews conducted in federal investigations or in 
preparing to comply with other types of coercive information-gathering powers.198 
8.198 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that federal bodies should develop and publish 
their policies and procedures for addressing apparent unintentional disclosures by 
unrepresented persons of material likely to be subject to a claim of client legal 
privilege, particularly the circumstances in which they recognise such persons should 
be given an opportunity to seek legal advice about whether to claim or waive the 
privilege.199 The scope of the proposal was limited to federal bodies with coercive 
information-gathering powers, the exercise of which raise, or are likely to raise, the 
issue of the application of client legal privilege. 
                                                        
193  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 12 June 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission 
LPP 40, 1 June 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
194  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
195  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
196  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
197  New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. 
198  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 12 June 2007. 
199  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 8–8.  
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8.199 This proposal received support in submissions and consultations.200 For 
example, the Australian Financial Markets Association submitted that it was ‘fair and 
reasonable’;201 and ASIC supported the development of such policies and procedures 
‘once the application of client legal privilege to the information-gathering powers of 
federal bodies has been clarified’.202  
8.200 Allens Arthur Robinson supported the proposal, but submitted that it should be 
extended to clients who are represented, on the basis that ‘inadvertent disclosures by 
lawyers are not unheard of and could, in certain circumstances, significantly prejudice 
the interests of a client’.203 The Law Council also submitted that legislation should 
provide that an unintentional disclosure does not lead to waiver.204  
8.201 APRA, on the other hand, opposed the proposal. It submitted that: 
It is very rare that persons responding to APRA would not have legal representation 
or the means to retain legal representation. Accordingly APRA considers the 
development and publication of such policies and procedures to be an unnecessary 
diversion of resources.205 
8.202 The AFP submitted that it would object to a legislative requirement to publish 
its policies and procedures on any issue.206 
ALRC’s views 
Preventing unintentional disclosure of privileged material by unrepresented 
persons 
8.203 The ALRC considers that other recommendations made in this Report will be of 
particular benefit in preventing the unintentional disclosure of privileged material by 
unrepresented persons. These include, in particular, the recommendations requiring 
federal bodies to notify persons about whether client legal privilege applies to the 
exercise of a coercive power or the voluntary production of information.207  
8.204 The ALRC also makes a number of recommendations directed to the 
development and publication of policies by federal bodies with coercive information-
gathering powers. One of those recommendations is aimed at policies in relation to 
                                                        
200  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Australian Financial Markets Association, 
Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 
2007; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. 
201  Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007. 
202  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. 
203  Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission LPP 107, 5 November 2007. 
204  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007. 
205  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007. 
206  Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007. 
207  See Recs 8–1, 8–2. 
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notifying persons that they may wish to seek independent legal advice about 
responding to a coercive power—which could include advice about the application of 
the privilege to a particular communication—or, if applicable, seek legal 
representation.208 Such policies should address the circumstances in which federal 
bodies will give such notice. Relevant factors may include:  
• whether the person the subject of the power is the subject of the investigation;  
• whether the person the subject of the power is known to be unrepresented;  
• the type of power being exercised; 
• the nature of the investigation; and  
• whether the statute conferring the power confers a right to legal representation 
in an interview or examination.209 
Addressing unintentional disclosure of privileged material by unrepresented 
persons 
8.205 The ALRC considers that there may be situations in which the receipt of 
privileged material from an unrepresented person—in respect of which no claim for 
privilege is made—places an obligation on the federal body to take reasonable steps to 
contact the person to allow that person a reasonable opportunity to seek legal advice 
about whether to claim or waive the privilege.  
8.206 The ALRC is of the view, however, that it would be unduly prescriptive and 
onerous to place such a requirement on all federal bodies in all instances—without 
regard to the particular circumstances of each case. For example, considerations of 
fairness may not require a federal body to contact an unrepresented person to allow 
him or her an opportunity to seek legal advice where: 
• the federal body notified the person that: 
o client legal privilege applied to the exercise of its coercive information-
gathering power; and 
o he or she could seek independent legal advice or legal representation; 
• the unrepresented person is not the target of the federal body’s investigation; 
and 
                                                        
208  See Rec 8–22. 
209  See, eg, Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 23. 
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• the privileged information produced by the unrepresented person does not 
prejudice that person’s position. 
8.207 Consequently, the ALRC supports a flexible approach, requiring federal bodies 
with coercive information-gathering powers—the exercise of which raise or are likely 
to raise the issue of the application of client legal privilege—to develop and publish 
their policies concerning the manner in which they deal with apparent unintentional 
disclosures of privileged material by unrepresented persons. The policies should 
address the circumstances in which they recognise that such persons should be given 
an opportunity to seek legal advice about whether to claim or waive privilege.  
8.208 The ALRC is not persuaded that there is a need for a legislative provision to 
state that unintentional disclosure does not amount to waiver.210 The common law 
provides a suitable vehicle to define the parameters of waiver of privilege—both within 
and outside the context of federal investigations. 
Extension of privilege in s 120 Evidence Act 
8.209 The ALRC does not make any recommendation to protect the confidential 
communications and documents of unrepresented persons in preparing to comply with 
federal investigatory powers. As a matter of principle, it is difficult to reconcile such an 
approach with the underlying rationale for client legal privilege.211  
Recommendation 8–8 Federal bodies with coercive information-
gathering powers—the exercise of which raise, or are likely to raise, the issue of 
the application of client legal privilege—should develop and publish their 
policies and procedures for addressing apparent unintentional disclosures by 
unrepresented persons of material likely to be subject to a claim of client legal 
privilege, particularly the circumstances in which they recognise such persons 
should be given an opportunity to seek legal advice about whether to claim or 
waive the privilege. 
Third parties  
Background 
8.210 Different issues may arise in relation to privilege depending upon from whom 
information is compelled. As noted in Chapter 4, depending on the circumstances, 
information may be compelled not only from persons suspected of wrongdoing, but 
                                                        
210  Waiver is discussed in Ch 3.  
211  See Ch 2.  
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also from persons or entities who happen to have information or documents that may 
be relevant to an investigation into the conduct of others. For example, information or 
documents may be sought from a person’s lawyer, accountant, service providers, 
employer, business associates, friends or family.  
8.211 Where the information is sought from a person’s lawyer, that lawyer is likely to 
be in a comparatively sound position to facilitate the making of a privilege claim on 
behalf of his or her client, where appropriate. However, where a person other than a 
person’s lawyer—such as a person’s relative (X)—holds documents belonging to 
another (Y) that may record privileged communications, questions arise as to whether: 
• the giving of the information by Y to X waived the privilege;  
• X can inadvertently waive Y’s right to claim privilege;212 
• X is aware that any documents in his or her possession may be privileged; and 
• X is in a position to take steps to protect Y’s privileged information. 
8.212 Key issues will include the circumstances in which a person came to hold the 
documents of another and the relationship between the two persons.213 
8.213 The ability of a person holding documents on behalf of another to take steps to 
protect privileged information may be restricted by statutory secrecy provisions. In 
some cases a person who is the subject of a coercive information-gathering power is 
prohibited from disclosing that fact. For example, a person may be prohibited from 
disclosing the fact that he or she has been required to produce documents to the 
ACC214—although a lawyer may make a disclosure for the purpose of obtaining the 
agreement of another person to the lawyer answering a question or producing a 
document at an examination.215 
                                                        
212  This issue was identified by the Law Council: see Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 
2007. 
213  R Desiatnik, Submission LPP 24, 1 June 2007. 
214  Proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia between the ACC and MM and DD concern notices issued 
by the ACC as part of ‘Project Wickenby’—a cross-agency taskforce investigating tax fraud and money 
laundering—to an accountancy firm that was prohibited from notifying its clients that their files had been 
seized because of the ACC’s secrecy provisions. On 19 December 2007, the Federal Court held that the 
notices issued by the ACC were not invalid simply by reason of the fact that clients of the accountancy 
firm were not afforded the opportunity of asserting privilege in respect of documents required by the 
notices to be produced. Nor was any such notice invalid simply by reason of the fact that the Examiner 
who decided to issue it did not have regard to the possibility that a person other than the recipient of it 
may be the holder of the privilege: MM v Australian Crime Commission [2007] FCA 2026, [45].  
215  See Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) s 29A. Section 29B(1) provides that failure to comply 
with a non-disclosure order carries a maximum penalty of $2,200 or imprisonment for one year. 
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8.214 In Rio Tinto Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation, Sundberg J stated:  
It may be that a party to whom privileged documents are provided, in circumstances 
that are not inconsistent with the maintenance of the privilege, has a general or limited 
right to assert that privilege on behalf of any person. …  
Where a document which is privileged, or alleged to be privileged, in the hands of the 
client for whom it was prepared, is then provided to a third party, the party claiming 
privilege bears the burden of proving that the provision of that document to the third 
party did not waive privilege. … An ex post facto request by the client for the third 
party to maintain the privilege does not discharge the burden.216  
8.215 Dr Sue McNicol has expressed the view that a person other than the holder of 
the privilege can claim the privilege. 
The only person who can waive the privilege is the ‘holder’ of the privilege. The 
holder of the privilege is, however, not necessarily the person who claims, invokes or 
exercises the privilege.217 
Submissions and consultations 
8.216 While submissions and consultations in response to IP 33 identified the issues 
concerning the compulsion of material from third persons, few of them suggested any 
reform options. The AGS submitted that: 
there must be a proper limit to what action a federal body can reasonably be expected 
to take in anticipation of the possibility that information or documents which the body 
is seeking through the exercise of coercive powers are subject to client legal privilege. 
This is regardless of whether the person in whose favour the privilege subsists is the 
holder of the information … or whether the holder be some other person.218 
8.217 The Law Society of NSW suggested that there be penalties imposed on federal 
bodies where they used privileged information without giving an opportunity for a 
claim of privilege to be made.  
8.218 Others expressed the view that a federal body should not take unfair advantage 
of a privilege holder in these circumstances,219 and that fairness could require the 
claimant to be notified that potentially privileged information had been sought and 
provided an opportunity to make a privilege claim.220  
8.219 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that federal client legal privilege legislation 
should provide that, other than in covert investigations, where a federal body receives 
                                                        
216  Rio Tinto Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 235 ALR 127, [26]–[27]. 
217  S McNicol, Law of Privilege (1992), 13. See also 21, 467. 
218  Australian Government Solicitor, Submission LPP 50, 13 June 2007. 
219  E Magner, Consultation LPP 17, by phone, 22 May 2007. 
220  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. 
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apparently privileged information from a person other than the privilege holder (the 
notice recipient)—pursuant to the exercise of a coercive power that does not abrogate 
client legal privilege—the federal body should take reasonable steps to give the 
privilege holder an opportunity to establish that privilege had not been waived by the 
privilege holder’s provision of the information to the notice recipient.221 
8.220 This proposal received some support in submissions and consultations.222 The 
Australian Financial Markets Association submitted that it  
placed a fair and reasonable onus on federal bodies to ensure that appropriate 
protection and opportunity to claim privilege is afforded to a privilege holder who 
may not be aware that privileged information is being disclosed during [an] … 
investigation.223  
8.221 However, it also expressed the view, as did Westpac Banking Corporation 
(Westpac), that there should be a presumption that privilege has not been waived and 
that the onus should be on the federal body to prove otherwise.224 
8.222 The Law Council and the Law Society of NSW expressed strong opposition to 
the exclusion of covert investigations from the scope of the proposal.225 However, they 
both supported the principle of requiring a federal body to take reasonable steps to give 
a privilege holder an opportunity to establish that privilege has not been waived by the 
privilege holder’s provision of the information to the notice recipient.226  
ALRC’s views 
Pre-production obligations 
8.223 The ALRC’s recommendation to require federal bodies to notify persons about 
whether client legal privilege applies to the exercise of a coercive power may assist in 
alerting the recipients of notices required to produce documents belonging to another 
of the ability to claim privilege in relation to the production of those documents.227 For 
example, if the recipient of a notice is a firm of accountants with an in-house counsel, 
that counsel could undertake to identify potentially privileged information belonging to 
a client that falls within the terms of the notice, and, where not legislatively prohibited 
from doing so, seek instructions from the client in relation to making a claim. 
                                                        
221  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 8–9. 
222  For example, Confidential, Submission LPP 108, 14 November 2007; National Legal Aid, Submission 
LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 
31 October 2007;  
223  Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007. 
224  Ibid, Westpac Banking Corporation, Submission LPP 85, 1 November 2007. 
225  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, 
Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. 
226  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, 
Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
227  See Rec 8–1. 
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However, not all ‘third party’ notice recipients will possess comparable levels of legal 
knowledge.  
Post-production obligations—covert investigations 
8.224 Different considerations come into play once a federal body receives potentially 
privileged information from a person other than the holder of the privilege in 
circumstances where a claim has not been made. In particular, complex issues arise 
where:  
• a federal body is undertaking a covert investigation; 
• potentially privileged information belonging to a covert target is produced 
pursuant to a coercive power by a person other than the target; 
• the person producing the information is prohibited by secrecy provisions from 
notifying the target about the production of documents—or to give the target an 
opportunity to claim privilege; and 
• the federal body considers that notifying the target to allow an opportunity to 
claim privilege would be likely to prejudice the investigation.  
8.225 The ALRC is of the view that reforms to practice and procedure cannot 
adequately or completely address such circumstances, and that the exigencies of covert 
investigations should be one of the relevant factors considered by the Australian 
Parliament in deciding whether to abrogate client legal privilege in a particular case.228  
8.226 Taking into account views expressed on Proposal 8–9, the ALRC now considers 
that federal bodies should not be given a blanket exemption in all covert investigations 
from the requirement to give privilege holders an opportunity to claim privilege when 
they receive apparently privileged information from a person other than the privilege 
holder or the privilege holder’s lawyer. The mere fact that an investigation is covert 
may not, of itself, warrant exemption. Regard should be had to the particular 
circumstances of each covert investigation. For example, where the privilege holder is 
not a target of a covert investigation, nor closely affiliated with the target, a federal 
body may consider that there is an appropriate point in the timespan of the 
investigation where allowing that person an opportunity to claim privilege would not 
prejudice the investigation. However, the legislation should recognise that there may 
be circumstances where it would be reasonable for a federal body to take no steps. 
Relevant factors to be considered in this regard include those of the type listed at 
[8.224] above, which address the exigencies of covert investigations.  
                                                        
228  See Recs 6–1, 6–2. Abrogation is discussed in Ch 6. 
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Post-production obligations—overt investigations 
8.227 In overt investigations there is a stronger case for ensuring that privilege holders 
are given an opportunity to establish their claims in circumstances where a federal 
body compulsorily obtains their privileged information from other persons (the notice 
recipients). While the provision of the privileged information by privilege holders to 
the notice recipients may have resulted in the waiver of the privilege, this is not 
necessarily the case—for example, where the notice recipient is merely a storage 
provider.  
8.228 In the ALRC’s view, in such circumstances a federal body should be required to 
take reasonable steps to allow privilege holders an opportunity to establish that their 
privilege was not waived by the giving of the privileged information to the notice 
recipients. The ALRC considers that such an approach is consistent with the concept of 
a ‘model investigator’. Such an obligation may also act as a safeguard in ensuring that 
federal bodies do not unfairly issue notices to parties with the specific intention of 
accessing information that, if sought from the privilege holder, would be likely to be 
subject to a claim for privilege. 
8.229 In overt investigations there ought not to be any prohibitions on the notice 
recipient seeking instructions from the privilege holder about any privilege claims prior 
to producing documents to the federal body. Where such a course of action is taken by 
the notice recipient, it will be unlikely, or at least less likely, that the federal body will 
receive from the notice recipient the privilege holder’s privileged information. 
8.230 In circumstances where privilege holders establish that privilege was not waived 
by the provision of privileged information to the notice recipients, the production by a 
notice recipient of the privileged information to the federal body should not prevent the 
privilege holder from being entitled to relief, for example, in the form of an injunction 
restraining the federal body from using the privileged information or adducing it in 
evidence.229 
8.231 The ALRC is not persuaded that there is a need to legislate in relation to the 
onus of establishing waiver. The common law is an appropriate vehicle for the 
enunciation of such principles generally—whether within or outside the context of 
federal investigations. 
                                                        
229  See, by analogy, Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v George Weston Foods Ltd (2003) 
129 FCR 298. 
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Recommendation 8–9 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide that, where a federal body receives apparently privileged information 
from a person other than the privilege holder (the notice recipient) or the 
privilege holder’s lawyer, pursuant to the exercise of a coercive power that does 
not abrogate client legal privilege the federal body should take steps that are 
reasonable in the circumstances to give the privilege holder an opportunity to 
establish that privilege had not been waived by the privilege holder’s provision 
of the information to the notice recipient. The legislation should recognise that 
there may be circumstances where it would be reasonable for a federal body to 
take no steps. Relevant factors to be included in this regard include: 
(a)   the nature of the investigation, in particular whether or not it is covert; 
(b)   whether the privilege holder is a covert target of the investigation; and 
(c)   whether the federal body considers, on reasonable grounds, that notifying 
the privilege holder to allow such an opportunity would be likely to 
prejudice the investigation. 
Resolving privilege disputes 
Background 
Practices of federal bodies 
8.232 Many federal bodies do not have any standard procedures for resolving privilege 
claims. This is sometimes due to the fact that issues of client legal privilege do not 
typically arise in their investigations. A number of federal bodies informed the ALRC 
that no claims of privilege had been made in their investigations in their corporate 
memory,230 nor had they ever challenged a claim for privilege asserted in respect of the 
exercise of their coercive powers.231  
8.233 Medicare Australia stated that it was aware of only one case in which privilege 
was raised during the execution of a search.232 Similarly, the Inspector-General of 
                                                        
230  See, eg, Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority, Submission LPP 45, 6 June 2007; 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, Submission LPP 17, 1 June 2007; Australian Quarantine and 
Inspection Service, Submission LPP 16, 29 May 2007. 
231  See, eg, Australian Government Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Submission LPP 71, 29 June 2007; 
Comcare, Submission LPP 64, 14 June 2007; Centrelink, Submission LPP 35, 17 July 2007; Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Submission LPP 28, 4 June 2007; Australian 
Communications and Media Authority, Submission LPP 20, 29 May 2007. 
232  Medicare Australia, Submission LPP 6, 10 April 2007. 
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Intelligence and Security stated that he was aware of only one instance in which client 
legal privilege was an issue in the context of the powers under s 18 of the Inspector-
General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth).233 
8.234 Comcare informed the ALRC that it has no current procedure for resolving 
claims because, to date, this has been unnecessary.234 The National Offshore Petroleum 
Safety Authority stated that, in its short period of existence, it had not been challenged 
by privilege issues in its major investigations.235 
8.235 AUSTRAC submitted that: 
Reflecting the absence of any challenges on the ground of client legal privilege, 
AUSTRAC has not established practices and procedures to deal with such a challenge 
should it arise in response to the exercise of a coercive information-gathering power, 
nor does it have any policies or manuals that set out its practice in relation to client 
legal privilege. However, as AUSTRAC progressively implements the [anti-money 
laundering/counter-terrorism financing] reforms and mounts an expanded compliance 
audit program across a broader range of reporting entities, it will keep the matter of 
client legal privilege under close review.236 
8.236 Only a very few federal bodies appear to have formal policies and practices 
concerning the resolution of privilege disputes.237 Notably, the ATO has developed and 
published guidelines concerning procedures to be adopted in relation to resolving 
claims for client legal privilege made in response to the exercise of its information-
gathering powers. The ATO Manual summarises the law relating to the ATO’s 
statutory powers for gaining access to information and describes how the ATO 
exercises those powers.  
8.237 The ATO Manual encourages a consultative approach to resolving claims of  
privilege. Tax officers are to work with claimants to develop a procedure for resolving 
privilege claims.238 Further, tax officers are encouraged to consult generally with a 
person before exercising notice powers—which may result in negotiation to resolve 
privilege issues before a notice is sent.239 
8.238 The ATO Manual identifies an inspection process as a means of resolving 
claims for privilege. The process allows for the ATO and the claimant each to 
                                                        
233  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission LPP 22, 1 June 2007. 
234  Comcare, Submission LPP 64, 14 June 2007. 
235  National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority, Submission LPP 23, 1 June 2007. 
236  Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, Submission LPP 31, 4 June 2007. 
237  Search warrant guidelines containing such dispute resolution models are addressed separately below. 
Some federal bodies stated that they were prompted by the ALRC Inquiry to develop policies or review 
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238  See Australian Taxation Office, Access and Information Gathering Manual <www.ato.gov.au> at 
23 August 2007, [6.6.9]. 
239  See Ibid, [6.6.12]. 
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nominate a person to inspect documents and agree whether or not privilege applies. 
The ATO has devised an Inspection Agreement template.240 
8.239 Where the ATO decides to resist or refuse a claim for privilege, some of its 
options are: 
• instituting proceedings for injunctive or declaratory relief; 
• seeking independent third party review or arbitration; or 
• resolution by an independent mediator.241 
8.240 In addition, as mentioned above, the ATO Guidelines—agreed to between the 
Commissioner of Taxation and the Law Council—address the exercise of the ATO’s 
access powers at lawyers’ premises in circumstances where a claim of client legal 
privilege is made.242 
8.241 Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (ITSA) has produced a document 
entitled Official Receiver Best Practice Statement, which sets out the procedure to be 
followed where a claim for privilege is made in respect of the exercise of certain of the 
Official Receiver’s coercive powers under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). In relation 
to powers under s 77A to access books and premises, the document sets out the 
following procedure: 
Where the occupier claims that books are subject to legal professional privilege, the 
owner of the books should, in the presence of the Official Receiver, place them in 
envelopes or boxes and seal them, and give them to the Official Receiver. The 
Official Receiver cannot determine whether the claim is validly raised. 
In those circumstances, the Official Receiver will retain the sealed records and make 
arrangements with the parties for the claim to be determined by the Court.243 
Statutory procedures 
8.242 Given that federal legislation conferring coercive powers is usually silent on the 
issue of privilege, it is rare for such legislation to make provision for the procedures to 
be adopted in resolving claims for privilege. One notable exception is the Royal 
Commissions Act 1902 (Cth), which is discussed in Chapter 5. 
                                                        
240  See Ibid, Ch 6. 
241  See Ibid, [6.6.38]. The ATO considers that Australian Government Solicitors or a firm of solicitors would 
be suitable third parties. 
242  See Ibid, App B. 
243  Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, Official Receiver Best Practice Statement—Exercise of Official 
Receiver’s Powers to Assist Trustees (2007), [2.12]. See also [3.11], which is expressed in similar terms 
in relation to the Official Receiver’s powers under Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 77C. 
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8.243 An example of a state provision which sets out a procedure for the resolution of 
privilege claims is s 103 of the Taxation Administration Act 2003 (WA).244 That 
provision: 
• requires a person to produce an ‘official document’ to the Commissioner of 
State Revenue or an investigator when required to do so, whether or not the 
document would be subject to client legal privilege; 
• requires the documents the subject of a claim to be separated from other 
documents and to be retained in a sealed container; 
• prohibits the Commissioner or investigator from viewing, accessing or 
otherwise dealing with the privileged material;  
• empowers the Commissioner or the person who claims privilege to apply to the 
Supreme Court or a judge for a declaration that privilege does or does not apply 
to the documents provided;  
• empowers the Commissioner to apply to the Supreme Court or a judge for an 
order to extinguish privilege where it applies; and 
• requires that privileged documents be returned to the person making the claim 
where the court declares that privilege applies or refuses to make an order to 
extinguish it. 
Issues and problems 
Delay, costs, lack of uniformity and clarity 
8.244 Central concerns raised in this Inquiry are the significant delays and costs in 
resolving client legal privilege claims245 and the lack of clear, uniform and expeditious 
processes to deal with privilege disputes—which have adverse impacts on the subjects 
of coercive powers as well as on the efficiency of federal investigations. These central 
concerns were seen to be interrelated—for example, delays are partly attributed to the 
fact that there is a lack of clear and expeditious processes. 
8.245 The Law Council expressed the view that: 
The development of effective practices and procedures to resolve privilege claims is a 
more appropriate response to [federal] agency concerns regarding the use of [client 
legal privilege] rather than modifications to, or abrogation of, [the privilege].246 
8.246 The ACCC expressed concern about the lack of an effective procedure for 
adjudicating client legal privilege claims at the non-curial stage: 
                                                        
244  This provision is also considered at [8.189] above. 
245  Issues of delay caused by privilege claims are discussed in Ch 6. 
246  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
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At present, there is no forum, other than a court, where the proper basis for a claim 
can be determined. Therefore, even where there is a basis for considering that a claim 
for privilege has been improperly made, the delay caused by disputing the claim can 
significantly frustrate investigations.247 
8.247 The AICD submitted that a key problem for its members is 
that a claim for privilege is likely to result in protracted negotiations with the 
investigatory body or involve legal proceedings, both of which, particularly the latter, 
are likely to be highly expensive and time consuming.248 
8.248 The CDPP gave an example of a case where, following an execution of a search 
warrant, documents in respect of which privilege were claimed were held at the Federal 
Court registry on the basis that the applicants had to commence action establishing 
their privilege claim within a certain period of time.  
No action in relation to legal professional privilege was commenced and the 
documents remained in the Federal Court Registry for years, denying the investigators 
access to the documents. Eventually, the investigators sought access to the documents 
and the applicants made no attempt to enforce their claim of [privilege]. The 
documents were used in the trial of [three] accused for conspiracy to defraud the 
Commonwealth. All [three] were convicted. 
In this case it appears that there was a strong argument that [privilege] did not actually 
apply to the documents because [they] were brought into existence to facilitate the 
fraud. This issue was never determined by the court because the applicants did not 
commence an action in the Federal Court to uphold their claim to [privilege].249 
Onus of establishing claim 
8.249 Part of the lack of clarity in resolving disputes centres around issues of onus of 
proof. Submissions and consultations revealed that there was some disagreement 
among stakeholders in relation to which party bears the onus where a federal body 
disputes a claim of client legal privilege.250 
8.250 In the guidelines governing search warrants agreed to by the Law Council and 
the AFP in 1997, the onus is on the person who claims client legal privilege to institute 
proceedings within a set time to establish the privilege claim.251  
                                                        
247  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 75, 14 August 2007. 
248  Australian Institute of Company Directors, Submission LPP 43, 8 June 2007. Similar concerns were 
expressed by the Taxation Institute of Australia: see Taxation Institute of Australia, Submission LPP 54, 
15 June 2007. 
249  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 61, 12 June 2007. 
250  This is discussed further below. 
251  See Australian Federal Police and Law Council of Australia, General Guidelines Between the Australian 
Federal Police and the Law Council of Australia as to the Execution of Search Warrants on Lawyers’ 
Premises, Law Societies and Like Institutions Where a Claim of Legal Professional Privilege is Made 
(1997), [31]–[33]. 
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8.251 In relation to disputed claims made in ATO investigations, the ATO submitted 
that: 
Some legal practitioners have mistakenly argued that the [ATO] bears a burden to 
disprove a claim for [privilege].252 
Alternative models 
8.252 In IP 33, the ALRC sought feedback about procedures that would be effective in 
resolving privilege claims and, in particular, the practicalities of using alternative 
dispute resolution models—such as recourse to an independent third party—in order to 
expedite the resolution of privilege claims.253 IP 33 also asked whether such alternative 
models would be inappropriate for any particular investigations or in respect of any 
federal body, such as a Royal Commission.254 
8.253 In relation to the use of alternative dispute resolution schemes, consideration 
must be given to the fact that Chapter III of the Constitution precludes anyone other 
than a judicial officer from exercising judicial power.255 The concept of judicial power 
is affected by many variables, which makes it incapable of exhaustive definition.256 In 
Nicholas v The Queen, Gaudron J stated that: 
The difficulties involved in defining ‘judicial power’ are well known. In general 
terms, however, it is that power which is brought to bear in making determinations as 
to rights, liabilities, powers, duties or status put in issue in justiciable controversies, 
and in making adjustment of rights and interests in accordance with legal standards.257 
8.254 A decision about whether or not a communication is privileged involves the 
determination of a party’s right to seek the protection granted by the privilege. If a 
party other than a judicial officer were to make such a decision, it would appear that it 
could not be binding on the parties for constitutional reasons.258  
8.255 In AWB Ltd v Cole, Young J stated that he did not doubt that a Royal 
Commissioner could make a non-binding decision concerning a claim for privilege. 
Where a Royal Commissioner rejected a privilege claim, his or her ruling would 
provide the foundation for an application to be made to the court for an appropriate 
declaration or injunction.259  
                                                        
252  Australian Taxation Office, Submission LPP 65, 22 June 2007. 
253  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
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255  See Australian Law Reform Commission, The Judicial Power of the Commonwealth: A Review of the 
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Limitation periods 
8.256 The ACCC stated that it is not infrequent for restrictive trade practices matters 
to come to its attention ‘well into, and sometimes close to, the expiry of the limitation 
period for commencing action’.260 In such cases it could not risk the expiry of the 
limitation period by challenging privilege claims—although a successful challenge 
would have allowed it to obtain access to any material the subject of an improper 
claim.  
8.257 The ACCC expressed concern that targets of its investigations had made 
inappropriate privilege claims as a means of exploiting the fact that the limitation 
period had nearly expired—thereby forcing the ACCC not to commence proceedings at 
all or to commence them without the benefit of the best possible evidence to support its 
case.261 
Submissions and consultations  
Addressing delay 
8.258 There was strong support in submissions and consultations in response to IP 33 
for the establishment of ‘fast-tracking’ court arrangements to hear privilege-related 
matters on short notice.262 Suggestions ranged from establishing special listing systems 
within the existing court structure to establishing a special practices court to deal with 
privilege matters. For example, the NSW Bar Association submitted that: 
Federal and state Courts could be approached to further extend the procedures now 
being made available whereby Judges can hear and determine claims at short 
notice.263 
8.259 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that the Federal Court and the Supreme Court of 
each state and territory should have appropriate arrangements in place to cater for 
hearing applications on short notice concerning disputes about client legal privilege 
claims in federal investigations.264 
                                                        
260  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. 
261  Ibid. 
262  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007; New South Wales 
Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007; National Australia Bank Limited and others, 
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264  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 8–10. 
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8.260 This proposal received widespread support.265 For example, the Law Council 
submitted: 
The Law Council supports the use of courts to adjudicate and protect the existing law 
of client legal privilege and would welcome the opportunity to provide further input 
into any consultative process established in response to Proposal 8–10 for developing 
appropriate arrangements with the courts.266 
8.261 The Law Society of NSW supported the proposal ‘without necessarily 
conceding that the current arrangements are inappropriate’.267 
Establishing a procedure for resolving disputes 
8.262 In response to IP 33, there was support amongst stakeholders for a dispute 
resolution process involving referral of a disputed privilege claim to an independent 
third party (or parties),268 with some stakeholders submitting that it would be 
appropriate in some circumstances,269 and others suggesting that consideration be 
given to making such a referral compulsory.270  
8.263 Dr Ronald Desiatnik submitted that consideration be given to establishing a 
body of persons with expertise in client legal privilege to sit for set periods or on an ad 
hoc basis to deal with disputed privilege claims.271 The NSW Bar Association 
submitted that barristers could be made available on short notice to act as arbitrators on 
privilege claims.272 
8.264 Some stakeholders made suggestions about the type of model that might be 
adopted. For example, the ATO submitted that legislation could prescribe a process for 
resolving privilege disputes, such as the appointment of an external expert to assess 
whether documents are privileged.  
                                                        
265  Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007; National Legal Aid, Submission 
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In the past taxpayers have entered into written agreements with the [ATO] that in the 
event of a dispute an external expert (considered suitable by both sides) will be 
engaged to examine documents subject to a claim of privilege. The external expert 
will provide an assessment of whether documents are ‘privileged’, ‘not privileged’ or 
whether he or she is unable to make an assessment of whether the documents are 
privileged. Both parties then have a seven day period in which to commence 
declaratory proceedings in the Federal Court if they disagree with the expert’s 
determination. If neither party commences proceedings within that timeframe the 
expert’s decision is treated as final. This process is useful because it allows the parties 
to resort to the Federal Court if necessary, but also offers an alternative (and 
sometimes quicker) means of resolving a dispute over whether documents are 
privileged.  
The [ATO] considers that it [is] worth exploring whether it would be beneficial for 
legislation to prescribe a dispute resolution mechanism along these lines. Such a 
mechanism may enable [client legal privilege] claims to be resolved quickly and 
efficiently.273  
8.265 ASIC suggested a model for dispute resolution where a federal body disputes a 
privilege claim, including, among others, the following features: 
• a claimant could elect to submit to a non-binding determination of a privilege 
claim by an independent Senior Counsel or commence court proceedings to 
establish its claim; 
• if a claimant fails to take the above action it would be taken to have waived its 
claim;  
• a claimant and a federal body could each agree to abide by the decision of the 
Senior Counsel but would not be bound to do so; 
• if Senior Counsel makes a finding that a document is not privileged and the 
claimant declines to be bound, then failure by the claimant to institute 
proceedings within a defined time will result in the claim being waived; and 
• costs of the independent determination should be on a ‘costs follows the event’ 
basis.274  
8.266 The Law Council submitted that a consultative approach should be adopted for 
resolving privilege disputes and that, where possible, federal bodies should seek to 
negotiate with the affected party an agreed procedure for resolution. It supported a 
process whereby an independent third party could be engaged to determine the claim, 
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and that upon receiving the view of the third party, each party would have seven days 
to commence proceedings seeking declaratory orders from a superior court in relation 
to whether the material is privileged.275 
8.267 Some stakeholders expressed opposition to the use of alternative dispute 
resolution models to resolve privilege disputes in the context of Royal Commissions, 
on the basis that it would be inappropriate.276 
8.268 The CDPP expressed opposition to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
processes for privilege claims in any federal investigations. 
The first [problem] is that this process still requires that the material over which the 
claim is made is removed from the investigation until the issue is resolved through an 
ADR process which delays the investigation, even if the ADR process might 
ultimately be quicker than resolving the issues in the court. The second [problem] is 
that the decision made out of the ADR process is not binding and may lead to further 
court action being initiated to resolve the claim.277 
Onus  
8.269 The ATO submitted that there should be a ‘mandated process’ for claiming 
client legal privilege that places the onus of proof on the claimant to prove that 
privilege attaches to a communication.278 
8.270 In contrast, the Law Council submitted that the onus of disputing a claim should 
be on the federal body, except where it is necessary for a claimant to raise client legal 
privilege by way of defence for a prosecution for failure to comply with a notice 
exercising a coercive power. It stated: 
The Search Warrant Guidelines were agreed between the Law Council and the AFP in 
1990, and since that time the application of [privilege] to agency investigations has 
become clearer. Since Daniels’ confirmation of [privilege] as a fundamental right, the 
Law Council no longer considers it appropriate that [privilege] should be taken to be 
abandoned if a claimant does not institute proceedings within three working days. … 
the onus of disputing [privilege] ought to be on the agency. Alternatively, if the 
current procedure is to be maintained, then reasonable time (say 14 days) should be 
allowed.279 
Proposal in DP 73 re dispute resolution procedure 
8.271 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that federal client legal privilege legislation 
should provide that, where a federal body (other than a Royal Commission), disputes a 
privilege claim (after having received particulars of the documents in respect of which 
a claim of privilege is made in answer to the exercise of a coercive power): 
                                                        
275  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
276  Ibid; Hon T Cole, Consultation LPP 9, Sydney, 1 March 2007. 
277  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 61, 12 June 2007. 
278  Australian Taxation Office, Submission LPP 65, 22 June 2007. 
279  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
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• a claimant should be given the opportunity within a defined time to agree to an 
independent review mechanism to resolve the claim; 
• where a claimant does not agree to have the claim assessed by an independent 
reviewer or reviewers, the claimant must commence proceedings in a superior 
court within 14 days seeking a declaration that the disputed material is subject to 
client legal privilege; 
• the federal body may also commence proceedings within 14 days but the onus of 
establishing client legal privilege is on the claimant; and 
• where the claimant fails to commence proceedings, the federal body will be 
entitled to regard the claim as having been waived, in the absence of special 
circumstances that negate this inference.280 
8.272 Some stakeholders expressed unqualified support for this proposal.281 The 
Australian Financial Markets Association, for example, submitted that the proposed 
procedure was ‘reasonable and adequate’.282 Other stakeholders made submissions on 
the content of the proposal. Key points that were made include: 
• A federal body should be required to give written notification to a claimant of 
the fact that it disputes a claim.283 
• It is unnecessary to give a claimant an initial period of time within which to 
consider solely whether to submit to an independent review process. A claimant 
should be given a single time period within which to decide whether to opt for 
the independent review process or to commence proceedings.284 
• The proposed time period of 14 days within which a claimant has to commence 
proceedings to establish a claim could, in some circumstances, be too short, 
                                                        
280  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 8–11. The features of the independent review mechanism, to be included in a model 
scheme, are discussed separately below. 
281  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Australian Financial Markets Association, 
Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission 
LPP 92, 26 October 2007. The AFP submitted that, although it was in favour of the abrogation of 
privilege in federal investigations, it would not object to the proposed measure: Australian Federal Police, 
Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007. 
282  Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007. 
283  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. 
284  Confidential, Submission LPP 108, 14 November 2007; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. ASIC submitted that the time given to the claimant 
should ‘commence on the first business day that immediately follows the date on which the claimant 
receives written notification from the federal body that it disputes the claimant’s privilege claims’: Ibid. 
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particularly if there is a large number of documents to consider. The time frame 
should be open for agreement between the claimant and the federal body or 
there should be scope to have the time frame determined by the court.285 For 
example, it was suggested that a claimant should be given 14 to 21 days ‘for the 
purposes only of the court making an order as to the time in which the 
substantive proceedings should be commenced by the claimant’.286 
• A federal body should also have the discretion to commence proceedings to 
challenge a claim without first having the claim assessed by an independent 
reviewer.287 There may be circumstances where claimants would seek to use the 
preliminary option of independent review as a means of delaying the 
investigation, with no intention of accepting an adverse decision.288 
• Entitling the federal body to regard a client legal privilege claim as having been 
waived where the claimant fails to commence proceedings is ‘unnecessarily 
harsh’ and could have ‘serious consequences’ for a claimant. In these 
circumstances waiver should be determined by the court.289 
8.273 Whistleblowers Australia did not address the ALRC’s proposal, but instead 
submitted that ‘a Legal Privileges Commission supported by an appropriate 
organisational structure and legislation’ be established to consider any claims for client 
legal privilege. It suggested that ‘the Office of the Legal Privileges Commissioner may 
best be located as a sub unit of the Ombudsman’s office’.290 
Need for uniform procedures 
8.274 In response to IP 33, there was support in submissions and consultations for 
federal bodies to adopt uniform procedures or protocols for dealing with privilege 
claims.291 
8.275 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that relevant federal bodies (other than Royal 
Commissions) should develop and publish procedures in relation to the resolution of 
                                                        
285  Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission LPP 107, 5 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission 
LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007; 
Allens Arthur Robinson, Consultation LPP 43, Sydney, 24 October 2007. 
286  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, 
Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. 
287  Confidential, Submission LPP 108, 14 November 2007; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 
Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007. 
288  Confidential, Submission LPP 108, 14 November 2007. 
289  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, 
Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. Compare, however, the ACC’s support for the ‘self-executing’ 
mechanism proposed by the ALRC: Australian Crime Commission, Consultation LPP 47, Sydney, 
26 October 2007. 
290  Whistleblowers Australia, Submission LPP 77, 4 November 2007. 
291  See, eg, Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority, Submission LPP 45, 6 June 2007; 
New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, 
Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
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disputed privilege claims, and that such procedures should, as far as practicable, be 
uniform.292 The ALRC also proposed that the Attorney-General’s Department, in 
consultation with relevant federal bodies, should establish a model procedure for 
resolving disputed privilege claims in federal investigations.293 
8.276 Both these proposals were generally supported in submissions.294 APRA 
supported the proposals subject to the recognition within the procedures 
of the different circumstances and resources of the natural and legal persons who may 
be subject to that agency’s coercive information-gathering powers.295  
8.277 Both the Law Council and the Law Society of NSW submitted that the 
procedures of federal bodies and the proposed model procedure should be developed in 
consultation with relevant stakeholders, including ‘the Law Council and its constituent 
bodies’296 and ‘private legal representatives’.297 
8.278 Members of the South Australian Bar Association expressed the view that 
legislation should require federal bodies to publish the proposed procedures.298 
However, the AFP submitted that it would object to the introduction of any legislative 
requirement to publish its policies and procedures on any issue.299  
8.279 In DP 73, the ALRC expressed interest in hearing views about where the 
uniform model should be located, and in particular whether the proposed model should 
be located in legislation.300 Very little feedback was received from stakeholders on this 
issue. Members of the South Australian Bar Association expressed the view that 
consideration should be given to placing the model procedure in legislation.301 
                                                        
292  See Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, 
DP 73 (2007), Proposal 8–12. 
293  See Ibid, Proposal 8–13. 
294  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 
Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007; Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission LPP 95, 
2 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Australian 
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297  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. 
298  Members of the South Australian Bar Association, Consultation LPP 38, Adelaide, 17 October 2007. 
299  Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007. 
300  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), [8.211]. 
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Features of the model scheme 
8.280 In DP 73, the ALRC made a detailed proposal, setting out the features of a 
model procedure for the resolution of federal client legal privilege claims, which 
covered the following areas: 
• allowance for a federal body to adopt a flexible approach to the mechanism used 
to resolve the claim; 
• notification to the claimant of the availability of an independent review process; 
• allowance for a reasonable time limit for the claimant to decide whether or not 
to agree to submit to independent review; 
• provision for the appointment of a mutually acceptable independent reviewer or 
reviewers to make a non-binding determination of the claim—although the 
parties could agree to accept the assessment as binding; 
• assessment by the reviewers of the claims, upon the signing of confidentiality 
agreements; 
• provision for either party to seek declaratory relief within seven days (or another 
period agreed to), upon receiving the assessment of the independent review;  
• the consequences of an independent review’s assessment of documents as: 
privileged, partly privileged and not privileged; 
• the payment of costs of the independent reviewer(s), with a presumption that 
costs be shared equally, although the parties could decide otherwise; and 
• the payment of costs of court proceedings in accordance with court rules.302 
8.281 This proposal received general support in submissions and consultations from 
lawyers and federal bodies.303 For example: 
• APRA supported the proposal in principle but submitted that a federal body 
should have the discretion to commence proceedings to challenge a claim 
without first having the claim assessed by an independent review.304 
                                                        
302  See Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, 
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2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007; Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 92, 26 October 2007; Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007. 
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• The Law Council and the Law Society of NSW generally agreed with the 
proposed model, and each submitted that: 
Consideration also needs to be given to circumstances where the entity in possession 
of privileged documents is not the only entity with the right to assert privilege. …  
The procedure should be amended to make clear that, in the procedural process, if a 
client legal privilege claimant is required to use a privileged document to establish 
that another document is privileged, disclosure of the document in that context does 
not constitute waiver of privilege in relation to that document.305 
• The AFP submitted that, although it objected to client legal privilege applying in 
federal investigations, it would support a pre-court independent review but not a 
court-ordered review. 
The AFP would be in favour of the establishment of a pre-court independent review 
process to which contested claims may be referred where there is consent. 
The AFP concurs that any assessments undertaken by a pre-court review process 
should be non-binding, with the option that the parties may elect for it to be binding. 
…  
The AFP would object to any proposal for legislative provisions empowering a court 
to make orders for a matter to undergo external review, or for a third party to be 
engaged by the court for any purpose in the course of proceedings concerning a 
challenge to a privilege claim.306 
8.282 Some stakeholders specifically opposed the proposed distribution of costs of an 
independent review, and submitted that a ‘costs follow the event’ model was 
preferable.307 For example, Allens Arthur Robinson expressed the view that there 
should be ‘an element of costs protection’ for clients, where, notwithstanding that they 
have provided particulars and certification of claims, a federal body disputes those 
claims and the claims are found to be made out.308 ASIC expressed the view that a 
presumption that the costs be shared equally ‘would reduce the incentive for the parties 
to limit the number and extent of disputed privilege claims’.309 
8.283 Other key points that were made in submissions concerning the model scheme 
included: 
                                                        
305  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, 
Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. 
306  Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007. 
307  Allens Arthur Robinson, Submission LPP 107, 5 November 2007; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. 
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• The procedure would be improved by requiring the independent reviewer to 
provide a draft determination concerning the documents he or she has reviewed. 
The parties should then be allowed to make submissions ‘if they so choose as to 
any documents for which they submit a different characterisation should 
apply’.310 It was submitted that this approach ‘is likely to reduce costs and 
instances of court proceedings in circumstances where they may be a relatively 
simple explanation as to why a document should be privileged’.311 
• To address the risk that the independent review process could take a 
considerable period of time, it would be desirable if the federal body had the 
power to impose a deadline from the outset and to revise that deadline only if 
satisfied of the need to do so.312 
• The procedure should provide for the possibility that a federal body may wish to 
challenge an independent review’s assessment that a document is partly 
privileged.313 
• A claimant should be obliged to provide access by the independent reviewers to 
any other information or documents necessary to determine whether client legal 
privilege applies. It was submitted that this was necessary because ‘it may often 
be difficult for an independent reviewer to assess whether legal privilege applies 
solely by reference to the documents which contain the relevant 
communications’.314 
• The model procedure would need to be modified in circumstances where the 
privilege holder is a third party on whose behalf the claimant has asserted 
privilege.315 
• There may be tension between the flexibility proposed here and the uniformity 
proposed in Proposal 8–12.316  
8.284 The CDPP made the general observation that: 
The proposed procedure [for making and resolving claims] presents benefits in terms 
of clarity and consistency. However, we are concerned that its effectiveness will 
largely be limited to bona fide claims. It is reasonable to expect that persons who 
make client legal privilege claims with the intention of delaying and frustrating an 
investigation will also attempt to subvert the resolution process and take advantage of 
any opportunity to cause delay.317 
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Limitation periods 
8.285 The ACCC submitted that legislation should provide that where a claim for 
privilege is the subject of a challenge, limitation periods should cease to run until the 
claim is resolved.318  
8.286 The ACCC expressed the view that it was neither appropriate nor practical for 
its suggested suspension of the limitation period to be applied to private applicants who 
may be affected by the same conduct being investigated by the ACCC, and who may 
also wish to commence proceedings seeking damages against the persons being 
investigated by the ACCC.319 It noted that the determination of limitation periods could 
differ between proceedings taken by the ACCC and those taken by private applicants.  
8.287 The ACCC also expressed the view that insofar as it investigates potentially 
unlawful conduct and later takes representative proceedings in respect of that conduct, 
persons on whose behalf proceedings are taken would benefit from any suspension of 
the limitation period obtained by the ACCC.320 
8.288 In contrast, the Law Council submitted that if extensions of limitation periods 
are to be allowed, then it should be open to the court to grant extensions ‘regardless of 
which party makes an application, if it is in the interests of justice’.321 
8.289 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that federal client legal privilege legislation 
should enable superior courts to authorise the extension of a limitation period where a 
federal body intends to challenge a privilege claim, if granting the extension is in the 
interests of justice.322 
8.290 This proposal received support in submissions.323 However, both the Law 
Council and the Law Society of NSW expressed concern that the proposed approach 
could lead to abuses of process by federal bodies.324 The Law Council submitted: 
the proposal may enable federal bodies to seek an extension of the limitation period 
by manufacturing a privilege dispute whenever insufficient diligence has been 
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employed in readying a case for filing. This concern is supported by the fact that some 
federal bodies have filed cases very close to the expiry of the limitation period (when 
no privilege dispute was involved) and subsequently needed to replead because the 
state of the pleadings was such that they were liable to be struck out.325 
8.291 In addition: 
• the Law Society of NSW expressed concern that the proposal created 
uncertainty about when a limitation period expires;326 and 
• the Law Council expressed the view that the proposal was unnecessary if, under 
the ALRC’s proposed disputed resolution mechanism (as set out in Proposal 8–
11), the federal body will be able to commence proceedings within 14 days to 
force a determination of the issue.327 
ALRC’s views 
Addressing delay 
8.292 Given the considerable concerns expressed about the delays occasioned by 
attempting to resolve privilege claims, the ALRC considers that it is important that the 
Federal Court and the Supreme Courts of each state and territory have appropriate 
arrangements in place to cater for hearing applications on short notice concerning 
disputes about client legal privilege claims in federal investigations.  
8.293 The types of applications that a court should be able to deal with expeditiously 
include the following: 
• where a federal body applies for declaratory relief following a person’s failure 
to provide particulars of client legal privilege claims (see Recommendation 8–
6); 
• where either a federal body or the person making the privilege claim applies for 
declaratory relief following the failure by a lawyer to certify a privilege claim 
(see Recommendation  8–7); and 
• where there is a dispute about a privilege claim, including where a party has not 
accepted the assessment of the claim by an independent review and seeks a court 
determination.328 
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Need for uniformity 
8.294 The ALRC considers that there should be a substantial degree of uniformity of 
approach in resolving claims for client legal privilege in federal investigations. 
However, to require absolute uniformity across all federal bodies in the event of all 
disputed claims—regardless of the circumstances of the case, or the attitudes of the 
party involved in a dispute—appears unrealistic. 
8.295 The ALRC is of the view that, in order to balance the competing needs for 
uniformity and flexibility, a multifaceted response involving legislative and policy 
change is required. First, a minimum legislative framework for the resolution of claims 
(discussed below) should be contained in federal client legal privilege legislation. This 
also will assist in achieving clarity. Second, policies about resolving privilege disputes 
should be individually developed by federal bodies—to meet the exigencies of their 
particular circumstances—but they should be based on a model procedure (the 
recommended features of which are addressed below).  
8.296 The ALRC does not recommend that this approach be adopted for Royal 
Commissions. As stated in Chapter 5, the Royal Commissions Act now includes a 
procedure for the resolution of privilege claims. The procedure applicable to Royal 
Commissions is not one the ALRC considers to be appropriate for other federal bodies 
insofar as it would require production of a disputed document to the federal body in 
order for the federal body to decide whether or not to accept the claim for privilege. 
While it may be appropriate for Royal Commissioners—who are usually retired 
judges—to assess whether or not a document is privileged in the context of an 
independent inquiry to discover the truth329—it is not, in the ALRC’s view, appropriate 
for members of other federal bodies or government departments to make such an 
assessment—particularly where those bodies have enforcement functions. 
Recommended legislative framework 
8.297 The ALRC considers that federal client legal privilege legislation should 
establish a minimum framework for the resolution of privilege disputes—to be 
complemented by the policies of federal bodies in this regard. In particular, there is a 
need for clarity concerning the onus of establishing a privilege claim, and for the 
dispute resolution process to accommodate an independent review mechanism.  
8.298 Therefore, in the ALRC’s view, taking into account the views expressed in 
submissions and consultations in response to DP 73, federal client legal privilege 
legislation should provide that where a federal body (other than a Royal Commission) 
disputes a privilege claim (after having received details of the documents in respect of 
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which a claim of privilege is made in answer to the exercise of a coercive power), there 
be a system in place for resolving the dispute with the following attributes: 
(a)  Where the federal body disputes a client legal privilege claim, it should be 
required to give written notification of that fact to the claimant. 
(b)  The federal body should have the option of offering the claimant an opportunity 
to agree to an independent review process. The ALRC considers that there may 
be various legitimate reasons why a federal body may not wish to have a claim 
referred to an independent review. For example, where the dispute involves 
complex matters of legal principle, such as consideration of the applicability of 
the fraud and crime exception to privilege, the federal body may prefer to obtain 
a binding judicial determination on the issue. In addition, a federal body may 
have reasonable grounds to believe that a particular claimant has no intention of 
accepting an adverse decision of an independent review and is likely to use that 
process as a mechanism for delay. The grounds for such a belief may be based 
on the federal body’s previous dealings with that claimant, for example. 
(c)  The ALRC is persuaded that offering a claimant a time period within which to 
consider only whether to agree to an independent review process is likely to 
cause unnecessary delay. The ALRC also acknowledges that the legislative 
mechanism must be flexible enough to deal with circumstances where a 14 day 
period would be an unreasonably short time for a claimant to commence 
proceedings. Therefore, if the federal body decides to give the claimant an 
opportunity to agree to an independent review process, the ALRC considers that 
a claimant should be given 14 days (or such other time agreed to by the parties) 
to either: 
• agree to an independent review mechanism; or  
• commence proceedings in a superior court to establish the claim; or 
• commence proceedings seeking an order from the court concerning the time 
in which the substantive proceedings determining the claim should be 
commenced by the claimant.330  
(d)  Where a claimant does not agree to have the claim independently assessed, the 
onus should be on the claimant to commence proceedings to establish the claim. 
Casting the onus on a federal body to disprove the claim would place the body 
in the difficult position of trying to prove a negative. Evidence relating to the 
circumstances in which a document was created is obviously more likely to be 
within the knowledge of the claimant. However, the ALRC’s recommendation 
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in this regard is not intended to affect the current onus that a federal body bears 
in proving that a document is subject to the fraud or crime exception.  
(e)  Where the federal body decides not to offer a claimant the opportunity to agree 
to an independent review mechanism, it should notify the claimant that it has 14 
days (or such other time agreed to by the parties) to commence proceedings in a 
superior court to: 
• establish the claim; or 
• seek an order from the court concerning the time in which the substantive 
proceedings determining the claim should be commenced by the claimant. 
(f)  A federal body also should have the option of commencing proceedings within 
the 14 day period or such other period ordered by the court, but in such a case, 
the onus of establishing the claim should remain on the claimant.  
(g)  Where the claimant fails to commence proceedings within the required time the 
federal body will be entitled to regard the claim as having been waived, in the 
absence of special circumstances that negate this inference. For example, the 
inference might be negated if the claimant subsequently establishes that an 
emergency, ‘act of God’, accident or illness precluded him or her from 
commencing proceedings. The ALRC does not consider this outcome to be 
harsh because, by this stage, the claimant: 
• would have received notification of the fact that the federal body disputes 
the claim;  
• may have had an opportunity to agree to an independent review process in 
circumstances where the federal body offered that option; 
• would have had an opportunity to negotiate an extension of the 14 day 
period with the federal body, bringing to its attention the factors warranting 
such an extension;  
• in the absence of an agreement concerning an extension with the federal 
body, could have sought a court order extending the time within which to 
commence the substantive proceedings. 
In any event, the claimant will be able to negate the inference where special 
circumstances exist. This approach addresses the problem of recalcitrant 
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claimants or those aiming to frustrate federal investigations by doing nothing to 
advance their claims upon being notified that those claims are disputed. 
8.299 This process will be activated only where a federal body disputes a claim 
following the claimant’s provision of particulars of that claim. As discussed above, the 
ALRC has recommended a separate scheme where a claimant fails to provide 
particulars of the claim. 
Development of individual policies and the model scheme 
8.300 Only those federal bodies which have coercive information-gathering powers 
the exercise of which raise, or are likely to raise, the issue of the application of client 
legal privilege should develop policies and procedures about the resolution of privilege 
claims. This would apply, for example, to major regulators like ASIC and the ACCC. 
However, the ALRC considers that it would be too prescriptive to impose a legislative 
requirement that such federal bodies develop and publish the requisite procedures.  
8.301  As far as practicable, the procedures to be developed should be uniform. In this 
regard, the policies of relevant federal bodies should be based on a model procedure. 
Federal bodies may wish to seek input from stakeholders in relation to their proposed 
procedures, but that is a matter for them. 
8.302 The ALRC considers that the development of a model procedure for resolving 
disputed privilege claims in federal investigations should be driven by the Attorney-
General’s Department, in consultation with relevant federal bodies. The ALRC does 
not make a recommendation about where the model procedure should be located, 
especially given the absence of stakeholders’ views on this issue. As indicated in 
DP 73, apart from legislation, the possibilities include to locate it in the Australian 
Government Investigation Standard—which is not a publicly available document—or 
to require federal bodies to prepare a ‘stand-alone’ model protocol in this regard.331 
The ALRC tends to the view that the latter option is preferable in the interests of 
transparency, accountability and clarity. 
Features of the recommended  model scheme  
8.303 The ALRC considers that there are several important features that the model 
procedure for resolving disputed privilege claims should include and these are set out 
below. Some features have been deleted, added or modified to take into account views 
expressed in submissions and consultations on the model proposed in DP 73. 
8.304 The first point to make is that in recommending a model procedure, the ALRC is 
not intending to dissuade federal bodies and parties from otherwise negotiating a 
resolution of the dispute. 
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Discretion to offer opportunity to agree to independent review process 
8.305 For the reasons discussed at [8.298 (b)] above, the ALRC is of the view that a 
federal body that disputes a claim should have the discretion to offer the claimant an 
opportunity to agree to an independent review process. There may be legitimate 
reasons why a federal body may decide against offering this process to a particular 
claimant or in particular circumstances. 
8.306 Where the federal body does not offer the claimant an opportunity to agree to an 
independent review process, the procedures set out in Recommendation 8–11 apply.332 
Those procedures include, for example, a requirement that the federal body notify the 
claimant that it has 14 days (or such other time agreed to) to commence proceedings to 
establish the claim or to seek a court order concerning the date by which it is to 
commence substantive proceedings. 
Notification of independent review process and time frame 
8.307 Where the federal body decides to offer the claimant an opportunity to agree to 
an independent review process, it should notify the claimant of the availability and 
features of the process and inform the claimant of the statutory time period of 14 days 
within which to indicate whether to agree to that process. This time limit can be varied 
by agreement of the parties.333  
Voluntary participation in independent review process 
8.308 A claimant who is offered an opportunity to participate in an independent 
review process has the option of declining that offer. Some stakeholders expressed the 
view that there should be a compulsory reference to a third party. However, the ALRC 
considers that there are some philosophical and practical problems associated with 
forcing persons to submit to an independent review process. If persons are compelled 
to submit to a process to which they would otherwise not have been subject, then there 
is a real risk that they will ignore the outcome of that process and automatically seek 
resolution via court proceedings. In such circumstances, in order to avoid the delay and 
costs of an independent review process, it would be better for such persons to 
commence court proceedings from the outset to establish their claims. 
                                                        
332  Rec 8–11 is set out below. 
333  See Rec 8–11. 
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Nature of independent review 
8.309 The independent review can be carried out by one or more persons. If the parties 
cannot agree to one person carrying out the review, they may be more comfortable 
with a model—similar to that adopted by the ATO—whereby each party nominates an 
independent person to conduct the review. Independent reviewers should have 
appropriate legal qualifications. Their level of seniority and whether they are sourced 
from the bar, government, legal practice, the retired ranks of the bench or elsewhere, 
should be a matter for the parties. Constitutional considerations necessitate that any 
assessment given by the independent reviewers cannot bind the parties.334 However, 
the claimant and federal body may agree to accept the assessment as binding.  
Assessment by independent reviewer 
8.310 The model process should set out the mechanics of the assessment. Upon 
signing a confidentiality undertaking, those conducting the independent review should 
be given access to the documents containing the communications in dispute and should 
assess each as falling in one of the following categories: 
• privileged; 
• partly privileged; 
• not privileged; or 
• unable to make an assessment. 
8.311 The ALRC is reluctant to impose a mandatory requirement that the independent 
reviewer provide a draft determination concerning the documents he or she has 
reviewed and give the parties an opportunity to make submissions at that stage. Of 
course, the parties may agree to that course of action in a particular case—especially 
where they have agreed that the determination is to be binding. However, as a general 
proposition, in order to avoid delays, it would be preferable for the parties to provide 
the independent reviewer with submissions and any other relevant information 
concerning the categorisation of the communications prior to the assessment being 
made. 
Treatment of additional information provided to independent review 
8.312 The ALRC is not persuaded by the submission that, in addition to the documents 
containing the communications the subject of a privilege claim, a person should be 
required to provide an independent reviewer with access to any other information or 
document necessary to determine the claim. The ALRC has reservations about 
                                                        
334  Constitutional considerations are discussed above in the section on ‘Alternative models’. 
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compelling a person to produce such other documents to an independent review 
process, which is voluntary in nature. 
8.313 However, the ALRC considers that a reviewer should be allowed to request 
access to such documents and that a claimant can voluntarily grant such a request or 
provide such documents on his or her own initiative. Presumably a claimant who wants 
to establish his or her claim will do so. Where the claimant does produce access to 
privileged communications not in dispute, in order to establish that a communication in 
dispute is privileged, the disclosure of the non-disputed privileged communications 
should not be taken as constituting waiver.  
Consequences of independent review 
8.314 The model process should set out the consequences of the assessment of an 
independent review—covering both situations where the parties have, or have not, 
agreed to accept the assessment as binding. 
8.315 Where the parties have not agreed to accept the assessment as binding, either 
party should have seven days or such other period agreed to, within which to 
commence proceedings seeking declarations from a superior court in relation to 
whether the documents are privileged. The ALRC has nominated a seven day time 
limit having regard to the fact that the ATO’s current dispute resolution process allows 
parties seven days to commence declaratory proceedings where they disagree with the 
determination of an external expert. 
8.316 If an independent review’s assessment is that a document is privileged, a 
claimant should be entitled to retain possession of the document unless the federal 
body obtains a declaration within the required time frame that the document is not 
privileged. 
8.317 If an independent review’s assessment is that a document is partly privileged, 
the claimant should mask those parts of the document assessed to be privileged and 
produce the remainder of the document to the federal body, unless the claimant seeks 
declaratory relief within the required time frame. A federal body also may seek a 
declaration within the required time frame that the parts of the documents assessed to 
be privileged are not privileged. 
8.318 If an independent review’s assessment is that a document is not privileged, the 
claimant should produce the document to the federal body, unless the claimant seeks 
declaratory relief within the required time frame. 
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Costs of independent reviewers 
8.319 The model procedure should address payment of the costs of the independent 
reviewers only, and not the parties’ legal costs. The aim is to provide a potentially 
cheaper alternative to litigation.  
8.320 Determining who should bear the costs of an independent reviewer or reviewers 
is a difficult issue. There are vast differences in the economic resources available to 
claimants who may wish to participate in an independent review process. While 
meeting the hourly costs of a Senior Counsel appointed to be a reviewer may not be an 
issue for large corporations, it is or may be beyond the means of many individuals or 
small businesses. Any costs model should therefore retain an appropriate degree of 
flexibility to cater for varying circumstances, and, in particular, allow a federal body 
the discretion to meet the entire costs in appropriate circumstances, or a higher 
proportion of the costs than would be allocated if a ‘costs follow the event’ model were 
applied. 
8.321 The ALRC notes that some stakeholders supported the costs of an independent 
review to be allocated on a ‘costs follows the event’ model—so that a claimant would 
be required to pay the costs of a review only to the extent that the review found that 
documents the subject of a privilege claim were not, in fact, privileged.  
8.322 If a ‘costs follow the event’ model were to be adopted, however, the claimants 
in such disputes would not know up-front the estimate of costs that they would be 
expected to meet. This could be a disincentive to their agreeing to participate in an 
independent review process. It may be preferable for claimants to have a degree of 
certainty about the costs that they are expected to pay—especially if, in the event of a 
court challenge to the reviewer’s assessment, the claimant becomes potentially liable to 
pay additional court costs. Further, the ‘costs follow the event’ model does not 
recognise that: 
• Where claims are not made out, a claimant may nonetheless have had reasonable 
grounds for making the claim. Therefore it is not necessarily appropriate that he 
or she should bear the costs of the review for having resisted challenge to the 
claim. 
• Where claims are made out, a claimant could have averted the need for a 
challenge in the first place by providing the federal body with fuller particulars 
of the claim. Therefore it is not necessarily appropriate that a federal body 
should bear the costs of the review for having challenged the claim. 
8.323 The ALRC is therefore of the view that where an independent review takes 
place, the parties may agree on who is to pay the costs of the reviewers, but the 
ordinary presumption should be that the costs will be shared equally. Sharing the 
burden of costs also recognises that each party has an interest in resolving the dispute. 
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An independent reviewer may recommend how those costs should be distributed but 
such a recommendation would not be binding. 
Court costs 
8.324 Liability for costs for any court proceedings are to be determined by the courts 
in accordance with their rules. For example, under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 
2005 (NSW), the general rule is that costs follow the event, unless it appears to the 
court that some other order should be made.335 
Third parties 
8.325 The model procedure may need to be modified to cater for circumstances where 
the claimant is not the privilege holder and has made the claim on behalf of the 
privilege holder. 
Limitation periods 
8.326 The ALRC considers that there are valid concerns expressed by the ACCC 
about the potential for limitation periods near expiry to act as barriers to the challenge 
of privilege claims and to be exploited by targets of investigations. Such concerns need 
to be addressed.  
8.327 The ALRC considers that granting an automatic suspension of a limitation 
period each time a privilege claim is challenged is unnecessary. Not every case where 
there is a challenge will need the limitation period to be suspended—for example, if 
the limitation period is six years and a federal body challenges a privilege claim in the 
first year of that period. 
8.328 Automatic suspensions of limitation periods may also have undesirable 
consequences. If there are no limits to the number of challenges that a federal body can 
make in the course of an investigation, conceivably there could be a number of 
automatic suspensions granted, which could blow out a limitation period beyond what 
is reasonable—adversely affecting those who are the targets of federal investigations. 
8.329 Consequently, the ALRC considers that a more discretionary mechanism should 
be adopted. The ALRC remains of the view that federal client legal privilege 
legislation should enable superior courts to authorise the extension of a limitation 
period where a federal body intends to challenge a client legal privilege claim, if 
granting the extension is in the interests of justice.  
                                                        
335  Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 42.1. 
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8.330 Other recommendations made by the ALRC in this Report concerning dispute 
resolution processes may render it less likely that a federal body will need to apply for 
an extension of the limitation period. In any event, the fact that a court can only grant 
the extension in the interests of justice provides appropriate protection against any 
cynical attempt by a federal body to apply for an extension for improper purposes.  
8.331 The ALRC does not consider that it is either necessary or appropriate to decide 
in the context of this Inquiry whether courts should be able to grant extensions of the 
limitation period to persons other than federal bodies.  
Recommendation 8–10 The Federal Court and the Supreme Court of each 
state and territory should have appropriate arrangements in place to cater for 
hearing applications on short notice concerning disputes about client legal 
privilege claims in federal investigations. 
Recommendation 8–11 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide that, where a federal body (other than a Royal Commission) disputes a 
privilege claim (after having received particulars of the documents in respect of 
which a claim of privilege is made in answer to the exercise of a coercive 
power): 
• The federal body should be required to give written notification of the 
fact that it disputes the claim. 
• The federal body, in its discretion, may decide to offer the claimant an 
opportunity to agree to an independent review mechanism. If the federal 
body so decides, it should notify the claimant that it has 14 days (or such 
other time agreed to by the parties) either to: 
 (a)  agree to an independent review process; or 
 (b)  commence proceedings in a superior court seeking  
  (i)  a declaration that the disputed material is subject to client 
legal privilege; or  
  (ii)  an order concerning the time within which the substantive 
proceedings determining the claim should be commenced 
by the claimant. 
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• Where the federal body decides not to offer the claimant an opportunity 
to agree to an independent review mechanism, it should notify the 
claimant that the claimant has 14 days (or such other time agreed to by 
the parties) to commence proceedings in a superior court seeking:  
 (a)  a declaration that the disputed material is subject to client legal 
privilege; or  
 (b)  an order concerning the time within which the substantive 
proceedings determining the claim should be commenced by the 
claimant. 
• The federal body may also commence proceedings within 14 days or such 
other period ordered by the court but the onus of establishing client legal 
privilege is on the claimant. 
• If the claimant  
 (a) does not agree to an independent review mechanism when offered 
and fails to commence proceedings; or 
  (b)  is not offered an opportunity to agree to an independent review 
mechanism and fails to commence proceedings; 
the federal body will be entitled to regard the claim as having been waived, in 
the absence of special circumstances that negate this inference. 
Recommendation 8–12 Federal bodies (other than Royal Commissions) 
with coercive information-gathering powers—the exercise of which raise, or are 
likely to raise, the issue of the application of client legal privilege—should 
develop and publish procedures in relation to the resolution of disputed privilege 
claims. Such procedures should, as far as practicable, be uniform. (See 
Recommendations 8–13 and 8–14). 
Recommendation 8–13 The Attorney-General’s Department in 
consultation with federal bodies with coercive information-gathering powers—
the exercise of which raise, or are likely to raise, the issue of the application of 
client legal privilege—should establish a model procedure for resolving disputed 
privilege claims in federal investigations. 
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Recommendation 8–14 Where a federal body disputes a privilege claim, 
the model procedure for resolving the claim (referred to in Recommendation 8–
13) should include the following features: 
(a)  A federal body should have a discretion to offer the claimant an 
opportunity to agree to an independent review process to resolve the 
dispute. 
(b)  Where the federal body does not offer the claimant an opportunity to 
agree to an independent review process, the procedures set out in 
Recommendation 8–11 are to apply. 
(c)  Where the federal body decides to offer the claimant an opportunity to 
agree to an independent review process, it should notify the claimant of 
the availability and features of the process, and of the statutory time 
period of 14 days (or such other time agreed to by the parties) for 
indicating agreement to submit to the review process (see 
Recommendation 8–11). 
 (d)  The claimant may agree to the engagement of a mutually acceptable 
independent reviewer or reviewers (with appropriate legal qualifications) 
to make a non-binding assessment of the claim, although the claimant and 
federal body may agree to accept the assessment as binding. 
(e)  Upon signing a confidentiality undertaking, those conducting the 
independent review should be given access to the documents containing 
the communications in dispute and should make an assessment of each in 
one of the following categories:  
 (i) privileged; 
 (ii) not privileged; 
 (iii) partly privileged; or  
 (iv) unable to make an assessment. 
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(f)  The claimant may provide the independent review with access to 
privileged communications not in dispute in order to assist in establishing 
that a communication in dispute is privileged. This may be done on the 
claimant’s initiative or otherwise voluntarily at the request of those 
conducting the independent review. In these circumstances, the disclosure 
of the non-disputed privileged communications does not constitute 
waiver. 
(g)  Upon receiving the assessment of the independent review, where the 
parties have not agreed to accept the assessment as binding, either party 
may within seven days (or another period agreed to by the parties) 
commence proceedings seeking declarations from a superior court in 
relation to whether the documents are privileged. 
(h)  If the independent review’s assessment is that a document is privileged, 
the claimant is entitled to retain possession of the document unless the 
federal body, having sought declaratory relief within the required time 
frame, obtains a declaration that the document is not privileged. 
(i)   If the independent review’s assessment is that a document is partly 
privileged, the claimant should mask those parts that are assessed to be 
privileged and produce the remainder of the document to the federal 
body, unless the claimant seeks declaratory relief within the required time 
frame. A federal body may also seek a declaration, within the required 
time frame, that the parts of the document assessed to be partly privileged 
are not privileged. 
(j)   If the independent review’s assessment is that a document is not 
privileged, the claimant should produce the document to the federal body, 
unless the claimant seeks declaratory relief within the required time 
frame. 
(k)  If an independent review process takes place, the parties may agree on 
who is to pay the costs of the reviewers but the ordinary presumption is 
that the costs will be shared equally. A federal body may, in its discretion, 
agree to meet the entire costs or a higher proportion of the costs. The 
independent reviewer may make a non-binding recommendation about 
how costs should be distributed. 
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(l)   Liability for costs for any court proceedings are to be determined by 
courts in accordance with their rules. 
Recommendation 8–15 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
enable superior courts to authorise the extension of a limitation period where a 
federal body intends to challenge a privilege claim, if granting the extension is 
in the interests of justice. 
Electronic material 
Background 
8.332 Information the subject of a coercive power may be held in electronic form—for 
example on computers, disks, blackberries and mobile phones.336  
8.333 Electronic files can be ‘live’, deleted, or exist in partial form as ‘file 
fragments’.337 ‘Live’ or ‘active’ files are files that are visible to the computer operating 
system. Deleted files are former ‘live’ files that have been marked by the operating 
system for deletion and to be overwritten—but can be accessed and retrieved by 
computer forensic specialists.338  
8.334 The compulsory production or seizure of voluminous electronic material, in 
itself, has been described as problematic. The Law Society of NSW submitted that: 
It is self-evident that significant problems can arise, for example, upon the seizure of 
computers (including laptops) and the ability of those computers to store thousands of 
documents and records. Where that equipment is necessary for the day-to-day 
operational business, its detention for significant periods needs to be properly 
regulated. …  
Generally, it is the experience of lawyers that obligations on citizens (including 
corporations) to disclose electronic material (be it in the context of discovery in civil 
litigation, or in respect of responding to subpoenas or search warrants) can be 
extremely onerous, time-consuming and expensive.339 
                                                        
336  The ATO has specific policies and procedures in relation to obtaining electronically-stored information: 
see Australian Taxation Office, Access and Information Gathering Manual <www.ato.gov.au> at 
23 August 2007, Ch 5.  
337  A file fragment has no marker, such as a header or a footer and, as such, it is not possible to ascertain 
where such a file begins or ends. All fragments are treated as ‘unallocated space’ and privileged material 
may be contained in such space: J Forsyth of <e.law> australia, ‘Presentation to Australian Law Reform 
Commission on Computer Forensics’ (Paper presented at ALRC, Sydney, 29 May 2007).  
338  Ibid. 
339  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
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8.335 Similarly, the Corporate Tax Association expressed concerns about 
the highly onerous nature of information requests relating to electronically held 
information, which can be extensive and pervasive throughout large business 
organisations.340 
8.336 It is relevant to note, by analogy, that the NSW Supreme Court has introduced 
new rules for the discovery of documents in certain proceedings in the Equity Division, 
which require discovery of documents in electronic form. Significantly, the rules allow 
lawyers to discover documents: 
• without the need to go through the information in detail to categorise it into 
privileged and non-privileged information; and 
• without prejudice to an entitlement to subsequently claim privilege over any 
information that has been discovered and is claimed to be privileged.341 
Seizure of electronic material during searches 
8.337 The guidelines that are attached to Commonwealth search warrants about 
managing client legal privilege claims during the execution of a warrant do not 
specifically refer to electronically-stored information.342  
8.338 Several cases illustrate that the production or seizure of material held on 
computer drives and disks presents different practical considerations from the seizure 
of paper records. The AFP—or other investigator—may need to examine a hard drive 
for specific keywords in such a manner as to ensure that the data on the computer 
system are not altered during the examination process.343 The process may involve the 
AFP taking an image of a hard drive.344  
8.339 Seamus Byrne, Director of Forensic Technology, Vincents Chartered 
Accountants, stated that, in addition to creating a forensic image of a hard drive, 
an emerging practice in the specialised field of computer forensics provides the 
opportunity to seize selected ‘active files’ stored on a hard drive or other electronic 
                                                        
340  Corporate Tax Association, Submission LPP 32, 4 June 2007. See also Australian Institute of Company 
Directors, Submission LPP 43, 8 June 2007. 
341  Supreme Court of New South Wales, Practice Note No SC Eq 3—Supreme Court Equity Division: 
Commercial List and Technology and Construction List, 30 July 2007, [29.4.1]–[29.4.2]. See also 
M Priest, ‘Discovering Ways to Cut High Legal Costs’, Australian Financial Review (online), 21 July 
2007, <www.afr.com>. 
342  Search warrant guidelines are discussed below.  
343  See Kennedy v Baker (2004) 135 FCR 520, [25]–[27]. A write-blocking device enables a hard drive to be 
accessed without alteration: J Forsyth of <e.law> australia, ‘Presentation to Australian Law Reform 
Commission on Computer Forensics’ (Paper presented at ALRC, Sydney, 29 May 2007). 
344 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3L allows the use of electronic equipment at search premises to copy evidential 
data onto a disk, tape or other device and authorises the removal of the device from the premises.  
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storage media by creating a forensically-acceptable image (or copy) of specified files 
(logical forensic imaging). …  
An additional emerging practice is to create a forensically-acceptable forensic image 
whilst a computer is still in operation (live forensics). The method, as opposed to 
traditional computer forensics, allows for [electronically-stored information] 
contained on one or more computers on a computer network to be searched for 
relevance and seized with minimal disruption to the operations of the computers 
involved.345 
8.340 Byrne noted that there was uncertainty associated with claims for privilege over 
information contained in deleted files. 
It is currently unclear as to whether a diligent legal practitioner can and/or should 
make a claim [in respect of] information which … isn’t readily accessible by [the] 
client, but is likely [to be] accessible by [federal investigatory bodies] with use of 
their … specialist computer forensics personnel. 
 … it is arguable whether privilege would be waived … or whether the information 
would continue to be protected under inadvertent disclosure or another related 
exception.346 
8.341 ASIC also noted a number of difficulties associated with the seizure of 
electronic material during searches. 
Where documents have been held in electronic form and have been the subject of 
search warrants there has been uncertainty about: 
(i)  the rights and obligations of the executing officer and the privilege claimant in 
relation to potential privilege claims over electronic documents during the 
execution of a warrant; and 
(ii)  whether documents subject to privilege claims may be removed or seized 
where they are contained in a digital media that contains other material 
covered by the search warrant but which is not claimed to be privileged. 
Given the large number of documents that are often stored on electronic devices and 
the fact that they cannot often be quickly identified and retrieved, it is not practically 
feasible to impose a requirement that a privilege claimant be entitled to identify all 
privileged material before the device can either be imaged or removed from the 
premises for further examination. 
It is also not practically feasible … to impose a requirement that allegedly privileged 
material not be copied if a copy is otherwise made of the electronic data. … 
Evidentiary considerations also operate in favour of copying all data that is contained 
on a digital media to ensure the data is accurately preserved.347 
                                                        
345  S Byrne, Submission LPP 19, 4 June 2007. 
346  Ibid. 
347  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. 
  
 8. Practice and Procedure 463 
 
8.342 In Kennedy v Baker (No 2), Branson J rejected a submission that the creation 
and removal from search premises of an imaged hard drive were unlawful because its 
contents included communications to which client legal privilege attached.348 
Resolution of claims 
8.343 Resolving privilege claims in respect of communications held in electronic form 
may present particular difficulties. It is possible for privileged documents to be 
electronically ‘tagged’ by a forensic computer examiner and hidden from view of the 
federal investigatory body.349 
8.344 In Oke v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, the parties had 
different views about the workability and enforceability of an agreement they had 
reached concerning the process to be undertaken by them in identifying disputed 
privileged material held on computer records, which had been seized under a 
Commonwealth search warrant. In 2005, Mansfield J noted that the process initially 
agreed to by the parties had commenced 12 months previously and that the task had 
only been partially completed. 
The task of identifying those documents and files on the computer records in respect 
of which there is a disputed claim to privilege so that the dispute may be determined 
by the Court is a very large one. There are apparently some hundreds of thousands of 
documents and files on the computer records.350 
8.345 In 2007, in related proceedings, Mansfield J noted that:  
attempts to agree upon and implement an efficient and effective procedure to identify 
which, if any, contents of the laptop computer [were] in fact the subject of legal 
professional privilege, and so are not capable of being seized under the … warrant, 
have to date been unsuccessful.351  
Submissions and consultations on reform options 
Legislative clarification 
8.346 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that federal client legal privilege legislation 
should provide that where information which may be subject to a claim for client legal 
privilege is stored on the same electronic medium as non-privileged information that 
falls within the scope of a Commonwealth search warrant: 
                                                        
348  Kennedy v Baker (No 2) (2004) 138 FCR 414, [16]. 
349  J Forsyth of <e.law> australia, ‘Presentation to Australian Law Reform Commission on Computer 
Forensics’ (Paper presented at ALRC, Sydney, 29 May 2007). 
350  Oke v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police [2005] FCA 1363, [18], [32]. In a later case, the 
execution of the warrant in this matter was held to be unlawful: see Oke v Commissioner of Australian 
Federal Police (2007) 168 A Crim R 503. 
351  Oke v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2007) 168 A Crim R 503, [109]. 
464 Privilege in Perspective  
(a) the executing officer is not precluded from copying or imaging that medium and 
causing it to be removed from the premises for further inspection; and 
(b) such copying or imaging does not amount to a waiver of privilege.352 
8.347 In DP 73, the ALRC also expressed interest in hearing views from stakeholders 
about introducing any other necessary safeguards if the proposed legislative 
clarification were to be implemented. In particular, the ALRC asked whether it is 
necessary and appropriate to preserve expressly a person’s ability to seek judicial relief 
in relation to any proposed imaging of an electronic medium—despite the existence of 
relevant non-privileged information stored on that medium—in circumstances where 
the imaging is disproportionate to the needs of the investigation.353 
8.348 The ALRC’s proposal received general support.354 For example, the AFP 
submitted that  
[it] would support any measure that maintains an investigator’s ability to copy or 
image an electronic medium in its entirety in circumstances where such might contain 
both privileged and non-privileged information. The nature of electronic evidence, 
and the amount of electronic material that could be contained within one single 
medium, means that any constraint on this capacity would be a significant 
impediment to the organisation’s ability to conduct investigations.  
The AFP would strongly object to the addition of any restrictive aspect (in terms of 
quantity or otherwise) being added to the proposed provisions.355 
8.349 National Legal Aid submitted that it was supportive of the proposal that copying 
does not amount to waiver, ‘but is concerned that the documents which may be subject 
to a claim for client legal privilege be independently held until the privilege can be 
ascertained’.356 
8.350 Similarly, the Law Council and the Law Society of NSW supported the view 
that copying or imaging should not amount to waiver.357 They also agreed that, in the 
circumstances outlined in the proposal, the executing officer could copy or image the 
medium and cause it to be removed from the premises. However, they objected to the 
                                                        
352  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 8–16. 
353  Ibid, [8.256]. An example of disproportionality might be if it could be shown that the electronic medium 
in question contained only a discrete number of relevant non-privileged documents that were capable of 
being provided in hard copy or in otherwise readable form, and a large number of privileged documents. 
354  Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007; Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 
Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. 
355  Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007. 
356  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007. 
357  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, 
Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. 
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medium being inspected ‘prior to the entity that owns the privilege being given an 
opportunity to inspect the medium and claim privilege’.358  
The copying or imaging … should provide protection against the possible destruction 
of evidence, but it should not allow the federal body to examine privileged material. 
The procedure for managing this limitation could be included in the ESI Guidelines 
referred to in Proposal 8–17.359 
8.351 Byrne and Geoffrey Lambert agreed with the proposal in principle, and stressed 
the fact that Commonwealth search warrants, unlike other coercive-information 
gathering powers, inherently provide for search and seizure (or removal) powers.360 
They submitted that legislation should provide appropriate safeguards to ensure that 
any data copying or imaging is 
undertaken in a manner proportionate to the nature of the investigation and the 
severity of operational disruption to be incurred by the entity under investigation.361 
Development of policies 
8.352 In IP 33, the ALRC asked whether policies and procedures governing the 
execution of Commonwealth search warrants need to be amended specifically to 
address claims for privilege in respect of documents stored electronically.362 
8.353 In response to IP 33, there was support in submissions and consultations for 
procedures governing access powers of federal bodies—including search warrant 
powers—to be amended specifically to address privilege claims in respect of 
electronically-stored information,363 and to be publicly documented.364  
8.354 The Law Council submitted that such processes should make it clear that a 
person should be able to claim client legal privilege despite any potential or actual 
seizure or imaging of data by an investigator.365 
                                                        
358  Ibid. 
359  Ibid. 
360  S Byrne and G Lambert, Submission LPP 102, 5 November 2007. 
361  Ibid. 
362  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), Question 5–5. 
363  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007; Taxation Institute 
of Australia, Submission LPP 54, 15 June 2007; National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 52, 13 June 2007; 
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8.355 The ATO submitted that: 
The development of any mandatory process for claiming [client legal privilege] 
should include processes that are capable of being applied in respect of … electronic 
materials.366 
8.356 The Law Society of NSW submitted that: 
The policies and procedures governing the execution of Commonwealth search 
warrants need to be consistent irrespective of the mechanism used to store documents. 
… Policies and procedures need to place the holder or the person with control of the 
documents in a position of responsibility so that future claims of out-of-jurisdiction 
arguments cannot be entertained. The policies and procedures that exist, or as 
modified to take account of electronic storage, must be regularly monitored as new 
technologies and electronic processes develop.367  
Proposal concerning guidelines for electronically-stored information subject to 
search and seizure powers 
8.357 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that guidelines addressing the resolution of client 
legal privilege claims in respect of electronically-stored information (the ESI 
Guidelines) be developed by the Law Council of Australia, the AFP, CDPP, and 
relevant accounting professional bodies, in consultation with (a) federal bodies that 
possess search and seizure powers; and (b) computer forensic experts. The ALRC 
proposed that the ESI Guidelines:  
• be adaptable for searches;  
• should be provided to persons at the time a Commonwealth search warrant is 
executed; and  
• should, as far as possible, be consistent with the processes for dealing with the 
resolution of privilege claims in respect of information in paper form.368 
8.358 This proposal was generally supported in submissions and consultations.369 For 
example, the Law Council agreed that guidelines should be established and that the 
Law Council should be a consulting entity.370 It also made suggestions in relation to 
the content of the guidelines. 
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To avoid a federal body being able to examine privileged material that it obtains 
through the copying or imaging of a medium the following procedure could be 
employed. Two copies of the medium are made, with one being given to the claimant 
and the other being held by an independent third party. The claimant can then 
examine the copy of the medium to identify potentially privileged material. The 
potentially privileged material can then be subject to the procedure outlined in 
Proposal 8–3 [re making claims]. The same material is to be deleted from the second 
copy and that copy provided to the federal body for it to access.371 
8.359 Byrne and Lambert stated that liaison between the Law Council, the AFP and 
other relevant bodies ‘is essential’.372 They submitted that input also be sought from 
‘experienced legal practitioners who possess demonstrated technical and practical 
working knowledge of ESI and the relevant legal framework’.373 They also suggested 
that the guidelines cover: 
• the placement of the seized data in the safe custody of an independent third 
party, with the claimant allowed an opportunity to identify privileged 
communications; 
• the secure erasure of data identified as privileged; and 
• allowance for the court to order inspection and examination on a ‘without 
prejudice’ regard for privilege where the claimant so requests because the 
‘burden of ascertaining privilege is too great in comparison with the time and 
costs reasonably likely to be incurred in the process’.374 
8.360 ASIC submitted that the ALRC needed to clarify that the proposal intended only 
to deal with policies and procedures in respect of Commonwealth searches.375 
Proposal concerning guidelines for electronically-stored information subject to other 
coercive information-gathering powers 
8.361 Electronically-stored information may be subject to coercive information-
gathering powers other than search and seizure—such as powers to access, inspect and 
copy. In recognition of this fact, the ALRC proposed in DP 73 that relevant federal 
bodies with coercive information-gathering powers should develop and publish 
policies and procedures in relation to managing and resolving claims for privilege in 
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respect of electronically-stored information.376 The ALRC proposed that the policies 
and procedures should, as far as possible, be consistent with the processes for dealing 
with the resolution of privilege claims in respect of information in paper form.377 
8.362 This proposal was generally supported in submissions,378 with one exception.379 
Westpac submitted: 
Given that so much information is now stored electronically Westpac is concerned 
that the wording of this Proposal undermines the effectiveness of and the detailed 
consideration that has been given to formulating all of the other proposals dealing 
with managing and resolving claims for privilege. In our view the policies and 
procedures developed by federal bodies for electronically-stored information must be 
consistent with the processes for dealing with information contained in paper form.380 
Other suggestions for reform 
8.363 In response to IP 33, Byrne submitted that electronically-stored information, as 
potential evidence, should be searched and seized by federal bodies with the use of 
specialist computer forensic personnel. 
To date, only a very small number of computer forensic specialists within Australian 
[federal investigatory bodies] have had relevant training and experience in both 
logical forensic imaging and live forensic methods to seize [electronically-stored 
information].381 
8.364 Byrne also submitted that logical forensic imaging may be a feasible alternative 
in non-hostile situations when a federal body is certain that only a specific amount of 
active electronic files on a hard drive need to be seized—as opposed to an entire hard 
drive.382  
ALRC’s views 
Legislative clarification 
8.365 The ALRC is of the view that legislative clarification is warranted to address the 
concerns identified by stakeholders in relation to the uncertainty concerning: 
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• the legality of seizing or imaging hard drives containing both non-privileged 
seizable information and information potentially subject to a privilege claim; 
and 
• any consequential waiver in the event of such seizure or imaging. 
8.366 The ALRC considers that federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide that an officer executing a Commonwealth search warrant is not precluded 
from (a) imaging an electronic medium that contains non-privileged information that 
falls within the scope of a Commonwealth search warrant in circumstances where 
potentially privileged information is stored on the same medium; and (b) removing that 
medium from the premises. This is consistent with the approach taken by Branson J in 
Kennedy v Baker (No 2).383 
8.367 The legislation should also provide that the imaging of the medium, of itself, 
does not amount to a waiver of privilege—thereby preserving the holder’s right to 
make a claim. 
8.368 The ALRC did not receive sufficient feedback on implementing legislative 
safeguards concerning the imaging of hard drives to enable it to formulate a 
recommendation in this regard. However, based on the views that were expressed, the 
ALRC is not persuaded that there is a need for legislative safeguards such as ensuring 
proportionality of imaging—although this could appropriately be addressed in policies 
and guidelines.  
Development of policies and guidelines 
8.369 The ALRC considers that policies and procedures governing the execution of 
Commonwealth searches—whether pursuant to a warrant or not—should be developed 
to address specifically the handling of claims for privilege in respect of documents 
stored electronically.  
8.370 In the ALRC’s view, such policies should be developed by key stakeholders 
involved in executing, advising on, or responding to, Commonwealth search and 
seizure powers—namely the Law Council, the AFP, the CDPP and—in recognition of 
the proposed extension of the privilege—relevant accounting professional bodies.384  
8.371 It is important that such guidelines be developed in consultation with federal 
bodies who possess search and seizure powers, and computer forensic experts. Such 
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guidelines could address, for example, the handling of privileged information 
contained on an imaged medium, including privileged information in deleted files; the 
electronic ‘tagging’ of privileged information; and where appropriate, the deletion or 
return of privileged information that has been imaged by a federal investigatory body. 
The guidelines also might place an onus on the privilege claimant to deliver to a 
federal body, in readable form, non-privileged electronic information. However, the 
guidelines should be consistent with the processes for dealing with privilege claims in 
respect of information in paper form.  
8.372 The guidelines should be provided to persons the subject of a Commonwealth 
search at the time a search warrant (or search without warrant) is executed.385 
8.373 Because electronically stored information may be subject to coercive 
information-gathering powers other than search and seizure powers, the ALRC 
considers that federal bodies with coercive information-gathering powers—the exercise 
of which raise, or are likely to raise the issue of the application of client legal 
privilege—should develop and publish policies and procedures in relation to managing 
and resolving claims for privilege in respect of electronically-stored information.  
8.374 For example, such policies could address the circumstances—if any—in which a 
federal body would: 
• negotiate the production of electronic material without prejudice to the ability of 
a person, the subject of a coercive power, to make a subsequent claim for 
privilege—that is, adopt a model similar to that of the NSW Supreme Court in 
the context of discovery; and 
• adopt each of the different types of forensic imaging available. 
8.375 Taking into account the concerns expressed by Westpac, the ALRC has 
reformulated the recommendation to provide that the requisite policies and procedures 
must be consistent with the processes for dealing with the resolution of privilege 
claims in respect of information in paper form. It was never the ALRC’s intention that 
the standards to be imposed in respect of electronically-stored information be lower 
than those imposed in respect of information in paper form. Rather, the ALRC sought 
to emphasise that the procedures to be devised concerning electronically-stored 
information will need to cater for different practical considerations and challenges 
arising from information held in that form. 
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Recommendation 8–16 Federal client legal privilege legislation should 
provide that where information which may be subject to a claim for client legal 
privilege is stored on the same electronic medium as non-privileged information 
that falls within the scope of a Commonwealth search warrant: 
(a)  the executing officer is not precluded from copying or imaging that 
medium and causing the copy or image to be removed from the premises; 
and 
(b)  such copying or imaging does not amount to a waiver of privilege. 
Recommendation 8–17 There is a need for guidelines addressing the 
resolution of client legal privilege claims made in response to search and seizure 
powers in respect of electronically-stored information (ESI Guidelines). The 
Law Council of Australia, the Australian Federal Police, the Commonwealth 
Director of Public Prosecutions, and relevant accounting professional bodies in 
consultation with (a) federal bodies that possess search and seizure powers and 
(b) computer forensic experts, should devise the ESI guidelines. The ESI 
Guidelines should be adaptable for use at searches of premises of lawyers and 
accountants, other premises and searches of the person, and should be provided 
to persons at the time a Commonwealth search warrant is executed. The ESI 
Guidelines should be consistent with the processes for dealing with the 
resolution of privilege claims in respect of information in paper form. 
Recommendation 8–18 Federal bodies with coercive information-
gathering powers—the exercise of which raise, or are likely to raise, the issue of 
the application of client legal privilege—should develop and publish policies 
and procedures in relation to managing and resolving claims for privilege in 
respect of electronically-stored information. The policies and procedures should 
be consistent with the processes for dealing with the resolution of privilege 
claims in respect of information in paper form. 
Search warrant guidelines 
Background 
8.376 The practicalities of answering a notice to produce documents (where the 
recipient of the notice is in control of the process of searching for those documents) is 
markedly different from the execution of searches or the on-site inspection of 
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documents by federal bodies (where representatives of those bodies play a role in 
controlling the process of gathering information). In the latter case, there may be a 
conundrum insofar as the inspector or investigator is not entitled to seize privileged 
material but may need to look at it first, in order to determine that it cannot be 
seized.386 
8.377 In his dissenting judgment in Baker v Campbell—a case concerning the 
application of privilege to a Commonwealth search warrant—Brennan J stated: 
If the privileges which affect the obligation to testify or to produce documents in 
judicial proceedings are to be engrafted upon and to modify powers conferred on 
investigative agencies, some procedure for determining the validity of a claim of 
privilege has to be devised.387 
Execution of warrants at premises of lawyers 
8.378 In 1997, a protocol establishing Guidelines between the AFP and the Law 
Council (the AFP Guidelines) came into effect concerning the execution of 
Commonwealth search warrants on the premises of lawyers, law societies and similar 
institutions.388 The AFP Guidelines are specifically concerned with the procedures to 
be adopted where a claim for privilege is made, and aim to ‘negate or reduce the risks 
of documents which may be subject of legal professional privilege being seized’.389 
The AFP Guidelines, in part, provide that: 
• an officer executing a search warrant at the premises of a lawyer or Law Society 
is to invite the lawyer or representative of the Law Society to cooperate in the 
search; 
• where the lawyer or Law Society refuses to cooperate, the executing officer is to 
advise that: 
 (1)  the search will proceed and that this may entail a search of all files and 
documents; and 
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 (2)  a document will not be seized if, on inspection, the executing officer 
considers that it falls outside the terms of the warrant or is privileged; 
• where the lawyer or Law Society agrees to cooperate with the search team: 
 (1)   the executing officer is to give them the opportunity to claim privilege in 
respect of any documents identified as potentially falling within the 
warrant; 
 (2)  if a claim for privilege is made the lawyer or Law Society is to indicate 
the grounds upon which, and in whose name, the claim is made;  
 (3)  documents the subject of a privilege claim are to be placed by the lawyer 
or the Law Society in a sealed container;  
 (4)  a list of the documents the subject of a claim is to be prepared;  
 (5)  the list and container are to be endorsed to the effect that the parties agree 
that the warrant has not been executed in respect of those documents; 
 (6)  the documents are to be given forthwith into the custody of the magistrate 
or justice who issued the warrant or another independent party, pending 
resolution of the disputed claim; 
 (7)  where proceedings to establish the privilege claimed have been instituted 
the documents are to be delivered into the possession of the Registrar of 
the Court in which the proceedings are commenced; and 
 (8)  where proceedings to establish privilege have not been instituted within 
three working days of the delivery of the documents into the possession 
of the third party,390 or where the parties have agreed about the disclosure 
of all or some of the documents, the parties shall ask the third party to 
release to the executing officer all of the documents or only those agreed 
upon. 
8.379 Shortly after the AFP Guidelines came into effect they were the subject of some 
criticism.391 In 1998, McNicol observed that ‘although the [AFP] Guidelines generally 
seem to have worked in practice, there are still several unresolved issues’,392 including: 
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• the AFP Guidelines, contrary to their objective, do not preserve privilege insofar 
as they proceed on the basis that warrants will issue in terms which encompass 
privileged documents;393 
• the AFP Guidelines are not rules of law and any breach or violation will have 
‘little or no sanction attached to it in practical or legal terms’;394 
• a question arises as to why all documents for which privilege is claimed have to 
be placed in a sealed container instead of only the ones where the claim is 
contentious;395 and 
• the role of the third party seems negligible because the AFP Guidelines suggest 
that the documents held by the third party are not actually read by the third party 
but are ultimately delivered to the Registrar of the Court or released to the 
executing officer, depending on the circumstances.396 
Execution of warrants at other premises 
8.380 Documents the subject of client legal privilege can fall within the scope of 
search warrants executed at premises other than those of a lawyer or law society. In 
these circumstances, search warrants may have a notice attached to them headed 
‘Claims for Legal Professional Privilege: Premises other than those of a Lawyer, Law 
Society or Like Institution’ which sets out a procedure for claiming client legal 
privilege.397 The procedure, which is to be followed to the extent that it is possible to 
do so, similarly provides for the placing of documents subject to a claim in a sealed 
container; the listing of those documents; and the delivery of the list and container to a 
third party pending resolution of the claim. One difference is that the person claiming 
privilege has four—rather than three—working days after delivery of the documents to 
the third party in which to commence proceedings to establish the privilege claimed.398 
Execution of search warrants on a person 
8.381 Documents the subject of a claim for client legal privilege can fall within the 
scope of a search warrant executed on a person. Warrants to search persons obtained 
by ASIC pursuant to s 3E of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) have a document attached to 
them entitled ‘Claims for Legal Professional Privilege: Searches of the Person’ which 
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sets out the procedure to be followed where a person, the subject of a search, makes a 
claim.399  
8.382 The procedure allows an officer to look at each document briefly, without 
reading its contents, to assess whether it appears likely that the document contains 
privileged information. The procedure provides that: 
• the officer is to return the document if satisfied that it is not relevant or that it is 
clearly covered by client legal privilege;  
• the officer is entitled to seize the document if of the view that it is clearly not 
covered by client legal privilege; and 
• where the officer decides the document is relevant but cannot form a view about 
whether it is privileged, he or she is to ask the person to agree to a set procedure 
for resolving the claim. That procedure also provides for the listing of the 
documents, the placing of the documents in an envelope or sealed container; and 
the delivery of the list and container to a third party pending resolution of the 
claim. 
Submissions and consultations 
8.383 In IP 33, the ALRC sought feedback about whether existing search warrant 
guidelines were working in a satisfactory manner.400 
8.384 The AGS submitted that the AFP Guidelines arguably represented the most 
effective way of dealing with procedural difficulties arising from privilege claims 
made in the context of search warrants.401 Some stakeholders suggested changes to the 
AFP Guidelines and other search warrant guidelines—including matters that should be 
added—but nobody suggested that they should be dispensed with or were 
fundamentally inadequate.  
8.385 The Law Society of NSW submitted that: 
Other than anecdotally, it is a safe assumption that the execution of federal warrants 
on law firms and the like is highly contentious and needs careful attention. For 
example, the manner in which a law [firm’s] files can be seized (for example by 
ASIC), the period during which they are detained and the accessibility of the 
information particularly of the third parties contained in them is largely unknown. The 
mere fact that it is ‘unknown’ must raise concerns as to whether there are appropriate 
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procedures being followed. The process needs to be somewhat more transparent after 
seizure, and the rights of the concerned parties better identified.402  
8.386 The Law Council submitted that: 
A Commonwealth investigatory agency may possess search and seizure powers but 
offer no publicly available information about how these powers will be used in 
practice, including its approach to [privilege] claims during the execution of search 
warrants. 
In these circumstances [and subject to certain qualifications] … it [is] appropriate for 
such a … body to follow the relevant AFP Guidelines—for either lawyer’s or non-
lawyer’s premises—when executing a search warrant and dealing with [privilege] 
claims. A copy of the relevant guidelines should also be annexed to the warrant.403 
8.387 The Law Council also submitted that some form of alternative dispute resolution 
process should be included in search warrant guidelines. As noted above,404 the Law 
Council submitted that the onus of disputing a claim should be on the federal body 
or—if the current regime is to be maintained—that a claimant should be given a 
reasonable time (such as 14 days) to institute proceedings to establish its claim. 
8.388 ASIC submitted that search warrant guidelines should address: 
• the making of claims in respect of electronic material;405  
• the circumstances in which blanket claims are or are not acceptable; and 
• the uncertainty about whether the AFP Guidelines apply to the execution of 
search warrants on non-legal premises insofar as those premises contain the 
workspace of in-house counsel.406 
Proposal re AFP Guidelines 
8.389 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that the AFP and the Law Council should revise 
the AFP Guidelines to:  
(a)  refer to the proposed method of making a claim, as set out in the proposed 
federal client legal privilege legislation; 
(b)  allow the claimant an opportunity to agree to an independent review mechanism 
to resolve the claim; 
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(c)  state that the AFP Guidelines apply to any part of non-legal premises that 
contain the work space of in-house counsel; and 
(d)  refer to the procedures for making and resolving claims in respect of 
electronically-stored information.407 
8.390 In DP 73, the ALRC noted that if its proposal for persons to be given 14 days to 
commence proceedings to establish their claim were to be implemented, this would 
necessitate a change to search warrant guidelines insofar as they allow claimants only 
three or four days to commence proceedings. The ALRC expressed interest in hearing 
views from stakeholders—particularly federal investigatory bodies—about the impact 
of this proposed extension of time in the context of claims arising from the execution 
of search warrants.408 
8.391 The ALRC’s proposal was generally supported in submissions.409 In addition, in 
consultation, the AFP did not oppose an approach that would allow persons to be given 
14 days (or such other time agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court) to 
commence proceedings to establish their claim. This approach was premised on the 
view that allowing claimants a longer period of time than they currently had to 
commence proceedings would be likely to lead to the formulation of well-considered 
claims, and reduce the risk of blanket claims being made.410  
Proposal concerning other search warrant guidelines 
8.392 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that the CDPP, in consultation with relevant 
federal bodies that possess search warrant powers, should amend the documents 
attached to Commonwealth search warrants concerning the execution of warrants on 
non-legal premises and on the person to: 
(a)  refer to the proposed method of making a claim, as set out in the proposed 
federal client legal privilege legislation; 
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(b)  allow the claimant an opportunity to agree to an independent review process; 
and 
(c) refer to the procedures for making and resolving claims in respect of 
electronically-stored information.411 
8.393 This proposal was generally supported in submissions.412 
8.394 In recognition of the proposed extension in DP 73 of client legal privilege to 
‘tax advice’ given by professional accounting advisers, the ALRC also proposed that 
the AFP, ATO and legal and accounting professional bodies should negotiate 
guidelines concerning the execution of search warrants on the premises of professional 
accounting advisers in circumstances where a claim of client legal privilege is made.413 
The ALRC proposed that the guidelines should include the matters referred to in 
[8. 393(a)–(c)] above.  
8.395 This proposal was generally supported in submissions,414 including by 
representative legal bodies that did not support the proposed extension of client legal 
privilege to ‘tax advice’ prepared by professional accounting advisers.415  
ALRC’s views 
AFP Guidelines and guidelines in relation to other premises and searches of the 
person 
8.396 The ALRC considers that it is important for persons whose premises or person 
are the subject of a Commonwealth search warrant to be provided with guidelines 
about the procedures to be adopted in making and resolving a claim for privilege. Such 
guidelines should be attached to search warrants executed by all federal investigatory 
bodies. The immediacy and circumstances of a search increase the significance of 
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ensuring that affected persons are informed up-front about the protocols to be adopted 
in protecting their rights concerning privilege.  
8.397 The ALRC is of the view that other recommendations made by the ALRC 
concerning practice and procedure necessitate changes to the AFP Guidelines and to 
the guidelines concerning the search of non-legal premises and the person. In 
particular, all search warrant guidelines should be amended to: 
• refer to the proposed method of making a privilege claim—to be set out in the 
proposed federal client legal privilege legislation;416 
• reflect the fact that a federal body may, in its discretion, offer a claimant an 
opportunity to agree to an independent review mechanism.417 Where this 
opportunity is afforded, search warrant guidelines should refer to the model 
procedure for resolving a claim, which should include the features set out in 
Recommendation 8–14;  
• where the claimant is not offered, or does not agree, to participate in an 
independent review process, the claimant is to be allowed 14 days (or such other 
time agreed to by the parties) either to commence proceedings in a superior 
court to establish the claim or to seek an order concerning the time in which the 
substantive proceedings determining the claim should be commenced by the 
claimant; and 
• refer specifically to the procedures for resolving client legal privilege disputes in 
respect of electronically-stored information—see Recommendation 8–17. 
8.398 In order to promote clarity and certainty of approach, the AFP Guidelines should 
be amended to state that they apply to any part of non-legal premises that contain the 
work space of an in-house counsel. 
Premises of professional accounting advisers 
8.399 In view of the proposed extension of client legal privilege to ‘tax advice’ given 
by professional accounting advisers in the context of the exercise of coercive 
information-gathering powers by the Commissioner of Taxation,418 the ALRC 
considers that guidelines need to be developed to address the execution of search 
warrants at the premises of such advisers. In the ALRC’s view, the guidelines should 
be developed by the AFP, the ATO and legal and accounting professional bodies. 
                                                        
416  See Rec 8–3. 
417  See Rec 8–11. 
418  See Rec 6–6. 
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Recommendation 8–19 The Australian Federal Police and the Law 
Council of Australia should revise the General Guidelines between the 
Australian Federal Police and the Law Council of Australia as to the Execution 
of Search Warrants on a Lawyers’ Premises, Law Societies and Like Institutions 
in Circumstances where a Claim of Legal Professional Privilege is Made to: 
(a)   refer to the proposed method of making a claim, as set out in the 
proposed federal client legal privilege legislation (see 
Recommendation 8–3); 
(b) refer to the model procedure for resolving a claim in circumstances where 
the federal body decides to offer the claimant an opportunity to agree to 
an independent review process. The process to be adopted should meet 
the minimum requirements set out in Recommendation 8–14; 
(c) state that, where the claimant is not offered the opportunity, or does not 
agree, to participate in an independent review process, the claimant is to 
be given 14 days (or such other time agreed to by the parties) to either 
commence proceedings in a superior court to (i) establish the claim or (ii) 
seek an order concerning the time within which the substantive 
proceedings determining the claim should be commenced by the 
claimant; 
(d)  refer to the procedures for making and resolving claims in respect of 
electronically-stored information (see Recommendation 8–17); and 
(e) state that the Guidelines apply to any part of non-legal premises that 
contain the work space of in-house counsel. 
Recommendation 8–20 The Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions, in consultation with relevant federal bodies that possess search 
warrant powers, should amend the following documents which are attached to 
Commonwealth search warrants: Claims for Legal Professional Privilege: 
Premises other than those of Lawyer, Law Society or Like Institution (Non-
Legal Premises Notice) and Claims for Legal Professional Privilege: Searches 
of the Person, to include the matters referred to in Recommendation 8–19(a)–(d) 
above. 
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Recommendation 8–21 The Australian Federal Police, the Australian 
Taxation Office and legal and accounting professional bodies should negotiate 
guidelines concerning the execution of search warrants on the premises of 
professional accounting advisers in circumstances where a claim of client legal 
privilege is made. The guidelines should include the matters referred to in 
Recommendation 8–19(a)–(d) above. 
Other policies and procedures 
Background 
8.400 Many of the recommendations in this chapter are directed towards increasing 
transparency in the approach taken by federal bodies to client legal privilege by 
requiring that such bodies develop and publish their policies and procedures in relation 
to a number of aspects of privilege.419 The ALRC’s approach is premised on the view 
that obligations of federal bodies concerning privilege arise at various stages, namely, 
before a privilege claim is made, when it is made and after it is made. 
8.401 The ARC, in its draft report on the coercive information-gathering powers of 
federal bodies, has recommended that: 
Agencies should keep written records of the situations where the privilege applies, 
especially if it is waived. Agency guidelines should be developed in the area of 
privilege. Topics covered should include the procedures to be adopted by agencies in 
responding to a claim for privilege and the nature and effect of a waiver of 
privilege.420 
8.402 Some federal bodies have internal policies and procedures that address client 
legal privilege claims but these are not always apparent, transparent or accessible. The 
ATO’s policies on privilege—which are accessible on its website—are a notable 
exception.421 As discussed above, those policies are set out in the ATO Manual. The 
ATO Guidelines on exercising access powers on the premises of lawyers are also 
published and accessible, being an appendix to Chapter 6 of the ATO Manual.  
8.403 In Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties in 
Australia (ALRC 95), the ALRC made recommendations that regulators develop and 
publish guidelines or policies in a number of areas including: enforcement policies; 
penalty-related settlements; enforceable undertakings; publicity; and leniency and 
                                                        
419  See, eg, Recs 8–2, 8–8, 8–12, 8–18. 
420  Administrative Review Council, Government Agency Coercive Information-Gathering Powers [Draft 
Report] (2007), Principle 16. 
421  See also Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, Practice Notes, 1 May 2007, [59]–[60]. 
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immunity.422 For example, a number of benefits were identified in requiring regulators 
to develop and publish enforcement policies, some of which may equally be applicable 
to a requirement that bodies publish policies about privilege. These benefits included:  
• improving the understanding of the regulated community as to what compliance 
requires;  
• accountability and transparency in the exercise of discretionary governmental 
power;  
• consistency in enforcement decision making;  
• guidance to regulator staff;  
• a coordinated approach with other regulators and agencies; and 
• the accumulation of expertise.423 
Submissions and consultations 
8.404 In IP 33, the ALRC asked whether federal bodies exercising coercive 
information-gathering powers should be required to develop and publish policies in 
relation to: informing persons of their position concerning privilege; the procedures to 
be adopted in making and resolving claims for privilege; and managing and recording 
documents or communications received in respect of which a claim for privilege has 
been made.424 
8.405 In response to IP 33, there was strong support in submissions and consultations 
for the development and publication of such policies,425 with some stakeholders 
                                                        
422  See Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative 
Penalties in Australia, ALRC 95 (2002), Rec 10–1 (enforcement policies); Rec 16–1 (penalty-related 
settlements); Rec 16–3 (enforceable undertakings); Rec 16–4 (publicity); Rec 17–1 (leniency and 
immunity). 
423  See Ibid, Ch 10, especially [10.60]. In order to accommodate concerns that some regulators had 
concerning the publication of their policies, the ALRC also suggested the development of internal 
enforcement guidelines that are not required to be published if it is considered necessary to supplement 
the publicly available guidelines.  
424  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), Question 5–7. 
425  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007; Taxation Institute 
of Australia, Submission LPP 54, 15 June 2007; National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 52, 13 June 2007; 
Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority, Submission LPP 45, 6 June 2007; Law Society 
of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007; Corporate Tax Association, Submission LPP 32, 
4 June 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007; R Desiatnik, Submission 
LPP 24, 1 June 2007; BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance, Submission LPP 21, 1 June 2007.  
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specifically supporting the ATO’s practices in this regard.426 For example, BHP 
Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance submitted that the publication of procedures  
in a manner readily accessible to the public will … assist in raising awareness of the 
procedures and ensuring that they are adhered to.427 
8.406 The Law Council submitted that: 
Publishing guidelines will increase understanding by all parties about what is 
involved in the investigatory process, improve accountability and transparency in how 
those powers are exercised and lead to consistent practices in resolving situations 
where documents or communications do, or may, become the subject of claims for 
[privilege].428 
8.407 As noted elsewhere in this chapter, there was general support for procedures to 
be uniform.429 
8.408 Some stakeholders submitted that it was important that the policies of federal 
bodies include giving persons notification about their ability to seek legal advice, legal 
representation or legal aid. For example, Desiatnik submitted that: 
What[ever] information is given it should be prefaced with the warning that it is 
subject to whatever legal advice the recipient may wish to obtain.430 
8.409 Fitzroy Legal Service submitted it should not be left to individual federal bodies 
to develop policies about all aspects of client legal privilege. It submitted that 
overarching federal legislation should set out: 
• the procedures to be followed when potentially privileged information is seized; 
• how potentially privileged information will be handled by the organisation;  
• which independent third party (court or otherwise) will determine whether the 
information is privileged; 
• that documents will be returned if a claim for privilege is successful.431 
8.410 It also submitted that it ‘would be beneficial for [federal bodies] to articulate 
policies so long as they were consistent with [the] legislative structure’.432 
                                                        
426  See, eg, Corporate Tax Association, Submission LPP 32, 4 June 2007; Fitzroy Legal Service, Submission 
LPP 29, 4 June 2007. 
427  BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance, Submission LPP 21, 1 June 2007. 
428  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
429  See, eg, Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority, Submission LPP 45, 6 June 2007; 
Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
430  R Desiatnik, Submission LPP 24, 1 June 2007. 
431  Fitzroy Legal Service, Submission LPP 29, 4 June 2007. 
432  Ibid. 
484 Privilege in Perspective  
8.411 However, publication of policies was not uniformly supported. Officers from the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) expressed concerns that 
publication of ASIO’s policies would have an adverse impact on its operational 
activities.433 
8.412 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that federal bodies with coercive information-
gathering powers—the exercise of which raise or are likely to raise, the issue of the 
application of client legal privilege—should develop their policies and procedures in 
relation to:  
(a) notifying persons that they may wish to seek independent legal advice 
concerning their response to a coercive power or, if applicable, seek legal 
representation; and 
(b)  making claims for privilege—which should be consistent with the proposed 
legislative procedures.434 
8.413 This proposal was generally supported in submissions.435 For example, ASIC 
expressed support for the development of such policies and procedures ‘once the 
application of client legal privilege to the information-gathering powers of federal 
bodies has been clarified’.436  
8.414 The Law Council and the Law Society of NSW supported the proposal and also 
submitted that consideration 
needs to be given to circumstances where the entity in possession of the privileged 
documents is not the only entity with the right to assert privilege. Federal bodies 
should direct entities to consider this possibility, especially when they are dealing 
with unrepresented persons.437 
8.415 APRA objected to the proposal on the basis that: 
The institutions and persons the subject of APRA’s notices are large enough and 
sophisticated enough to seek legal advice in responding to an APRA information-
                                                        
433  Officers from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Inspector-General of Security and 
Intelligence, Consultation LPP 34, Sydney, 26 June 2007. 
434  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, DP 73 
(2007), Proposal 8–22. 
435  National Legal Aid, Submission LPP 106, 5 November 2007; Australian Financial Markets Association, 
Submission LPP 95, 2 November 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 
2007; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007; Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007. The AFP submitted that it would not 
object to this proposed measure: Australian Federal Police, Submission LPP 115, 29 November 2007. 
436  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 84, 31 October 2007.  
437  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 94, 1 November 2007; Law Society of New South Wales, 
Submission LPP 93, 31 October 2007. 
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gathering power and so APRA should not be required to develop and publish the 
procedures referred to in the proposal.438 
ALRC’s views 
8.416 The articulation of transparent and accessible policies by federal bodies on 
various aspects of client legal privilege has an important role to play—whether by 
itself or as a complement to the ALRC’s proposed federal client legal privilege 
legislation—in addressing issues of clarity, accountability and fairness.  
8.417 In addition to the other recommendations made in this chapter, which require 
relevant federal bodies to develop and publish various policies about specific aspects of 
privilege, the ALRC remains of the view that federal bodies should also develop and 
publish their policies and procedures in relation to: 
• notifying persons that they may wish to seek independent legal advice 
concerning their response to a coercive power or, if applicable, seek legal 
representation; and 
• making a claim for privilege.439 
8.418 The ALRC also considers that federal bodies that possess coercive powers that 
abrogate or modify client legal privilege should be required to develop and publish 
additional policies and procedures concerning the management, recording and return of 
privileged information produced to them. The ALRC’s recommendation in this regard 
is set out in Chapter 7.440  
8.419 The ALRC recognises that there are aspects of policy and procedure that federal 
bodies may wish not to publish for sensitive operational reasons. This may be the case 
in particular with a federal body such as ASIO—especially in relation to the exercise of 
its covert powers. In some cases, it may be appropriate for an abridged version of a 
policy to be made public. In other cases, federal bodies with oversight powers—such 
as the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security—should satisfy themselves that 
the federal bodies which they oversee have appropriate internal policies about privilege 
in place.  
Notification about independent legal advice 
8.420 As discussed above, the ALRC has recommended that federal bodies should be 
required to notify persons about whether client legal privilege applies to the exercise of 
                                                        
438  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission LPP 91, 1 November 2007. 
439  These are addressed separately below. 
440  See Rec 7–7. 
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a particular coercive power. However, it is not the responsibility of a federal body to 
advise a person about whether client legal privilege attaches to any particular 
communication falling within the scope of a notice issued under a coercive power. This 
is properly the subject of independent legal advice. The policies of federal bodies 
should address the circumstances in which they will give notification about seeking 
independent legal advice in responding to a coercive power, including, where 
applicable, seeking legal representation.  
8.421 The ALRC acknowledges that it may not always be strictly necessary for a 
federal body to notify a person or institution of their ability to seek legal advice—for 
example where a federal body, such as APRA, deals regularly with large institutions 
known to seek legal advice as a matter of course when responding to coercive 
information-gathering powers. However, in the ALRC’s view, that does not absolve 
federal bodies that have dealings with well-resourced or ‘sophisticated’ notice 
recipients from developing transparent policies articulating the circumstances in which 
they will give the requisite notification. One cannot presume that every subject of 
every coercive information-gathering power of a particular federal body would fail to 
benefit from being notified of the ability to seek legal advice. 
8.422  As discussed above, relevant factors may include: whether the person the 
subject of the power is the subject of the investigation; whether the person the subject 
of the power is known to be unrepresented; the type of power being exercised; the 
nature of the investigation; and whether the statute conferring the power confers a right 
to legal representation in an interview or examination.441 Moreover, a federal body 
ought to consider the desirability that, in conducting its investigations, its behaviour 
accords with that expected of a model investigator.  
Making claims for privilege 
8.423 Policies about making claims for privilege should be consistent with the 
proposed legislative procedure for making a privilege claim. They could address, for 
example, the circumstances in which a federal body will request particulars, 
verification, and certification of client legal privilege claims made in response to the 
exercise of coercive information-gathering powers.  
Recommendation 8–22 Federal bodies with coercive information-
gathering powers—the exercise of which raise, or are likely to raise, the issue of 
the application of client legal privilege—should develop and publish their 
policies and procedures in relation to: 
                                                        
441  See discussion above on unrepresented persons. 
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(a)  notifying persons that they may wish to seek independent legal advice 
concerning their response to a coercive power or, if applicable, seek legal 
representation; and 
(b)  making claims for privilege—which should be consistent with the 
proposed legislative procedures. 
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Introduction 
9.1 The ALRC has heard allegations that lawyers have at times ‘overstepped the 
mark’ in relation to claims that certain communications are the subject of client legal 
privilege. In the Issues Paper, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies 
(IP 33) and the Discussion Paper, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory 
Bodies (DP 73), the ALRC raised a number of questions in relation to claims of 
privilege being made for the purpose of frustrating investigations.  
9.2 The misuse of privilege claims as a tactic for delay or obstruction may be seen 
to contradict the very purpose of administration of justice that privilege is said to 
serve.1 Misuse of privilege also goes against a lawyer’s duty to the court by frustrating 
                                                        
1  See Ch 2. 
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court process and the administration of justice.2 As the Law Council of Australia (Law 
Council) commented, lawyers have a duty to the court 
to ensure that claims of [client legal privilege] are soundly based. This is part of their 
duty not to assist in an abuse of process or in misleading the court. A claim for 
[privilege] that is made without merit, to cause delay or obstruction, is an abuse of 
process.3 
9.3 Similarly, NSW Young Lawyers stated that: 
A lawyer engaging in [improperly claiming client legal privilege] risks undermining 
the reputation of the legal profession as a whole and reduces the confidence of 
litigants in the Court system.4 
9.4 The appropriate framework for making and resolving claims of client legal 
privilege is considered in Chapter 8. Ways to deter—and punish—alleged misuse or 
abuses of privilege claims are the principal subject of this chapter.  
The question of abuse 
Examples of alleged abuse 
9.5 Three examples may be used to illustrate the challenges posed in identifying 
alleged abuse of client legal privilege claims: the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) 
Royal Commission;5 the British American Tobacco litigation;6 and Seven Network Ltd 
v News Ltd.7 While only the first example concerns client legal privilege claims in the 
context of a federal investigatory body, all three attracted media and public attention to 
the issue of alleged ‘overreaching’ in relation to lawyers’ practices more generally. 
9.6 During the AWB Royal Commission, Commissioner Cole expressed some 
concerns regarding AWB’s claims for client legal privilege, since: 
• the Royal Commission repeatedly sought a complete list from AWB of all 
documents not produced on the basis of a privilege claim, and this list was never 
provided;8  
• AWB finally conceded that many documents for which privilege had been 
claimed were no longer claimed to be privileged;9 and  
                                                        
2  Confidential, Submission LPP 48, 12 June 2007. 
3  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007, [318]. 
4  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 12 June 2007, 14. 
5  T Cole, Report of the Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme (2006); AWB v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30.  
6  McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd [2002] VSC 73; British American Tobacco 
Australia Services Ltd v Cowell (2002) 7 VR 524; British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v 
Cowell (2003) 8 VR 571. 
7  Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 142. 
8  T Cole, Report of the Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme (2006), [7.42]. 
9  Ibid, [7.55]. 
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• AWB’s claims for privilege significantly delayed completion of hearings.10 
9.7 Commissioner Cole stated that: 
The claim for legal professional privilege [by AWB] in respect of the Project Rose 
brief to Mr Tracey QC, abandoned on day 62 of the hearings, resulted in great delay 
and expense to the Inquiry. Had AWB produced the brief earlier, with most of the 
relevant documents contained in it, the course of this Inquiry would have been 
different, and its duration and expense much less. Whatever may be said about legal 
professional privilege flowing from the skill of compiling a brief, it is plain that the 
original documents copied in the brief were all material to this Inquiry, would have 
had to be produced in response to notices, and would, after the expenditure of 
significant time and money, be compiled by the Inquiry to give a chronological 
picture of the involvement of AWB and its officers in the payment of monies by way 
of trucking fees. Had there been frankness or real cooperation on the part of AWB, 
most material documents could have been produced in November 2005.11 
9.8 The second example arises in the tobacco litigation context. A former legal 
counsel for British American Tobacco Australasian Services (BATAS) gave evidence 
that BATAS and its lawyers had participated in a ‘contrivance’ to hide evidence behind 
client legal privilege. 
BATAS would give [its lawyers] copies of its documents (including those that might 
harm it if discovered in litigation) ostensibly for legal advice. The originals would be 
destroyed under the document retention policy while [the lawyers] kept the copies but 
claimed that they were protected by privilege.12 
9.9 At first instance, Eames J held that the process of discovery ‘was subverted’ by 
BATAS and its solicitor, ‘with the deliberate intention of denying a fair trial to the 
plaintiff’.13 It was not a strategy, he said, ‘which the court should countenance’. In such 
circumstances he held that it was an outcome that could not be cured and the ‘only 
appropriate order’ was to strike out the defence and to enter judgment for the 
plaintiff.14  
9.10 The Victorian Court of Appeal held, however, that the decision at first instance 
was flawed and allowed the defendant’s claim of client legal privilege.15 This meant 
that the documents had not properly been admitted into evidence and thus the basis of 
Eames J’s conclusion—that there was a deliberate strategy to destroy disadvantageous 
documents—even if correct, could not stand.16 
                                                        
10  Ibid, [7.57]. 
11  Ibid, [7.64]. 
12  C Parker and A Evans, Inside Lawyers’ Ethics (2007), 220. 
13  McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd [2002] VSC 73, [385]. 
14  Ibid, [385].  
15  British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Cowell (2002) 7 VR 524. 
16  McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd [2002] VSC 73, [131]. 
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9.11 Although the outcome of the appeal was to put the documents back behind the 
cloak of privilege, the fact that the contents had been revealed brought certain practices 
into the spotlight. The dispute is now the subject of continuing litigation.17 
9.12 The third example similarly arose in the context of discovery—Seven Network 
Ltd v News Ltd.18 The applicant’s claim for access to certain documents in this case 
was resisted on the basis of client legal privilege. The documents in question had been 
prepared by in-house counsel for News Ltd and the central issue was the ‘dominant 
purpose test’—had the documents been prepared for the dominant purpose of giving 
legal advice?19  
9.13 The privilege claim originally covered around 300 documents in an affidavit 
sworn by the Chief General Counsel for News Ltd. By the time of the hearing, nearly 
seven months later, the claims with respect to approximately one third of the 
documents had been withdrawn and verifying affidavits were set aside. 
9.14 Tamberlin J was critical of News Ltd’s conduct of the discovery process. 
The importance of the availability of documentation to parties in litigation, 
particularly in litigation on the scale of the present case, and the public interest in the 
courts making fully informed decisions by reference to documentary records, requires 
scrupulous compliance with the requirements of the [Federal Court Rules] and the 
accepted principles for discovery and the assertion of privilege. … The Court must be 
able to rely on diligent compliance with its orders and this is reflected in the 
requirement that the solicitor must give a certificate.20 
9.15 Tamberlin J rejected the privilege claim with respect to all but four of the 
documents and described the initial claim as ‘substantially excessive’.21 In such 
circumstances he awarded costs on an indemnity basis against News Ltd.22  
9.16 These three examples prompt the questions to be considered in this chapter—do 
any, or all, of the practices highlighted by the examples take client legal privilege 
beyond its legitimate bounds and into the area of misuse or abuse and, if so, what 
should be the appropriate responses?  
9.17 That some response is required is evident. As the Law Council commented: 
‘lawyers who knowingly make excessive claims of [client legal privilege] do a great 
disservice to the justice system and the legal profession and should be subject to 
sanctions’.23 
                                                        
17  For example, McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd [2007] VSC 216. 
18  Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 142. 
19  See Ch 3. 
20  Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 142, [22]. 
21  Ibid, [42]. 
22  Ibid, [44]. 
23  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
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9.18 Associate Professor Adrian Evans also commented on the importance of 
responding to the concerns expressed by Commissioner Cole in the AWB Royal 
Commission. 
Commissioner Cole carefully criticised not the actual claim of privilege by AWB over 
the edited minutes of its Board Meetings, but the public wisdom in the decision to 
make the claim of privilege at all. Cole was referring to the effect on the public 
reputation of AWB that it would seek to use privilege to keep secret its Board 
Minutes. This observation captures the community cynicism that privilege claims per 
se are conspicuously associated with deceit, commercial exploitation and criminal 
behaviour. I don’t think the position is as bad as that, but the perception does justify 
this reference.24 
9.19 The challenge for the ALRC was to disentangle the issues of perception of abuse 
from those of valid practice and to assess what should be appropriate responses to 
actual instances of, for example, ‘deceit, commercial exploitation and criminal 
behaviour’.25 The difficult issue of weighing up when an expansive claim of privilege 
becomes an improper one also is compounded by potential breadth of a test which 
requires the assessment of the ‘dominant purpose’ of the communications in question.26 
The extent of the problem of abuse 
9.20 A major problem identified in relation to claims of client legal privilege is the 
delay that such claims may generate for investigations by federal investigatory bodies. 
In IP 33, the ALRC sought comment on the use of such claims as a tactic for delay or 
obstruction.27 
9.21 In analysing the submissions and consultations, comments about procedural 
delay—and appropriate ways to resolve it—needed to be distinguished from the use of 
delay as a tactic to obstruct investigations. The general issue of delay is considered in 
Chapter 6. Ways to improve transparency in the making of claims and processes to 
avoid delay and the resolution of claims are recommended in Chapter 8. 
9.22 The ALRC considers that the combination of improvements, recommended 
throughout this Report, should make a significant contribution towards the reduction of 
delay. The recommendations will also facilitate a more cooperative environment in 
which federal investigatory bodies are able to seek and obtain information, with or 
without the specific exercise of coercive information-gathering powers, by: 
                                                        
24  A Evans, Submission LPP 4, 27 March 2007. 
25  Ibid. 
26  See Ch 3. 
27  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), Question 7–6. 
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• clarifying whether client legal privilege is abrogated or not, in the first place—
hence avoiding litigation of the kind in The Daniels Corporation International 
Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (Daniels);28 
• providing a clear framework for the provision of information to persons the 
subject of coercive information-gathering powers;29 
• making explicit the information that persons the subject of coercive information-
gathering powers need to provide, where they seek to make a claim of client 
legal privilege;30 and 
• establishing an effective framework for the resolution of disputes concerning 
client legal privilege.31 
9.23 If these recommendations are implemented, the extent of the perceived problem 
of abuse may be significantly reduced. The comments in submissions and consultations 
need to be considered, therefore, with such recommendations in mind. 
Submissions and consultations 
9.24 A common theme in the submissions and consultations was the difficulty in 
establishing when a claim of client legal privilege amounts to abuse. Where a lawyer is 
testing the boundaries of the doctrine of privilege with an arguable case, this is 
different from making a hopeless claim as a tactic in order to frustrate or delay an 
investigation. Issues in relation to client legal privilege are not necessarily 
straightforward. The disagreement between Eames J and the Victorian Court of Appeal 
in the British American Tobacco litigation as to what amounted to a waiver of 
privilege, is a significant illustration in point.32 A rejected claim of client legal 
privilege, therefore, is not necessarily an improper one.33 
9.25 The difficulty of proving bad faith was emphasised, for example, in the 
submission of the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD): 
The privilege is that of the client not the lawyer. ‘Bad faith’ can be difficult to 
determine. A claim of privilege may be made in good faith on the basis that the claim 
is arguable. Lawyers have a professional duty towards their client to put their case. If 
a claim for privilege fails, AICD is concerned that it may be all too easy to claim bad 
faith. To impose penalties and sanctions may place the person, particularly a client, in 
                                                        
28  The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(2002) 213 CLR 543. See Ch 5.  
29  See Ch 8. 
30  See Ch 8. 
31  See Ch 8. 
32  McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd [2002] VSC 73; British American Tobacco 
Australia Services Ltd v Cowell (2002) 7 VR 524. 
33  See, eg, G Healy and A Eastwood—Freehills, Consultation LPP 30, Sydney, 12 June 2007; Regulatory 
lawyers of Clayton Utz, Consultation LPP 13, Sydney, 15 May 2007. 
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a position of ‘double jeopardy’ having lost the claim for privilege and subject to the 
consequences that flow from that.34 
9.26 The New South Wales (NSW) Bar Association considered that abuse is likely to 
arise in particular areas: 
(a) over-claiming—in the sense that the decisions are made to claim privilege on an 
overly cautious or inexperienced basis leading to some of the claims, upon 
examination, being found to be unsustainable, but with proceedings delayed in 
the meantime; 
(b) lack of transparency in the making of claims—parties not providing a full list 
with separate identification of the various privilege documents until being 
pressed to do so, again delaying resolution of proceedings; 
(c) over-use of masking of documents for privilege; 
(d) (probably most rarely) warehousing or privileging.35 
9.27 The practice of ‘masking’—sometimes described as ‘redaction’—involves the 
obscuring of those parts of documents that are claimed to be subject to client legal 
privilege. According to the NSW Bar Association, ‘masking’ most frequently occurs 
not in respect of primary privilege claims, but in respect of secondary, or derivative 
claims: a summary of legal advice in one sentence in a 10-page board paper; extracts 
of a conversation with a solicitor in a client’s longer file note etc. 
[It] is likely to be the product either of an attempt to widen a privilege claim 
inappropriately or of a caution bred of a lack of understanding about how 
appropriately to mask a document.36  
9.28 ‘Warehousing’ and ‘privileging’ of documents, referred to above, are described 
as follows: 
‘Warehousing’ is the act of placing prejudicial documents in the hands of third parties 
and beyond the power of a party to litigation on the understanding that such 
documents may be retrieved by the party ‘by the grace and favour of the third party’. 
‘Privileging’ is the act of placing prejudicial documents ‘in the hands of lawyers 
under cover of spurious requests for legal advice so as to permit a claim for privilege’. 
This may be done by labelling otherwise non-privileged documents ‘for the purpose 
of legal advice’ and providing the documents to a lawyer purportedly for the purpose 
of seeking legal advice. 37 
9.29 The purpose of such practices is ‘to enable a party to place prejudicial 
documents beyond the reach of litigants’.38  
                                                        
34  Australian Institute of Company Directors, Submission LPP 43, 8 June 2007. See also Fitzroy Legal 
Service, Submission LPP 29, 4 June 2007. 
35  New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid, citing Re Mowbray: Brambles Australia Ltd v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd 
[2006] NSWDDT 15, [12]. 
38  New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. 
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9.30 The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) also drew 
attention to the tactic of potential over-claiming through the making of ‘blanket claims’ 
during the course of investigations and the inherent dangers of such practice. 
The ACCC’s practical experience shows that ordinary Court procedures which apply 
in relation to dealing with claims of legal professional privilege can be ‘gamed’ to 
seriously stifle or lengthen an investigation by, for example, making a blanket claim 
of legal professional privilege.39 
9.31 A key issue is whether notorious examples, such as those that arose in the AWB 
Royal Commission, are isolated ‘one-offs’, or are actually examples of a much bigger 
problem. A number of submissions and consultations queried the extent of the alleged 
problem in relation to actual misuse of client legal privilege claims. The Law Society 
of NSW commented that: 
A brief review of reported and unreported NSW cases has not turned up an instance to 
date of professional disciplinary action having been taken against a solicitor or 
barrister on such a basis.40 
9.32 Similarly, the NSW Bar Association suggested that: 
To the extent privilege is thought to have been misused before federal investigative 
agencies, for example as per the Cole Report, there is no evidence of a widespread 
problem, certainly not one sufficiently widespread to commend to anyone radical 
changes to the privilege.41 
9.33 While the NSW Bar Association identified the practices of ‘warehousing’ and 
‘privileging’ as troubling, it commented that there was no evidence available to it to 
suggest that these practices were widespread.42  
9.34 Conversely, the ACCC expressed concern that it is very difficult to determine 
whether the abuse is more than ‘occasional’, noting that: 
It should not be accepted as axiomatic that legal professional privilege is only 
occasionally abused in the absence of reliable evidence to support this. There have 
been rare occasions where the ACCC has been made aware of inappropriate privilege 
claims because of particular unique circumstances. … Of course, the fact that it is 
only on rare occasions that such abuse is able to be uncovered by the ACCC does not 
support the proposition that it only occurs on rare occasions.43  
                                                        
39  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. ASIC also raised 
concerns in relation to blanket claims—particularly in relation to electronically stored information—and 
the delays that this causes for investigations: Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 
Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007. See also Australian Taxation Office, Submission LPP 65, 22 June 
2007. The issue of ‘blanket claims’ is considered in Ch 8. 
40  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. 
41  New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. See also I Temby, Submission 
LPP 72, 19 July 2007.  
42  New South Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007. 
43  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission LPP 53, 13 June 2007. The ACCC cited 
a number of illustrations of difficulties it had in identifying improper claims of privilege having been 
made, and the difficulties it has in verifying claims of privilege. This is discussed further in Ch 8. 
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ALRC’s views 
9.35 While there is no clear evidence of chronic abuse of claims of client legal 
privilege, there is evident distrust on the part of federal investigatory bodies that claims 
are not being made legitimately in some cases.  
9.36 It should be noted, however, that as it is in the very nature of client legal 
privilege that communications are kept confidential—and never made known to 
anyone other than the lawyer and client involved—it is difficult to gauge the extent of 
any actual abuse. Federal investigatory bodies are, therefore, necessarily reliant on the 
integrity of lawyers in asserting claims of client legal privilege. 
9.37 It is the ALRC’s view that if co-operation and trust were improved in relation to 
the making and resolving of claims through the procedures suggested in Chapter 8, the 
scope for suspicion of abuse on the part of federal investigatory bodies would be 
minimised.  
9.38 The introduction of more transparent processes, does not, however, address the 
issue of ‘gaming’, or using privilege claims as ‘a tool to impede’,44 which may take the 
practice into the area of alleged abuse. This is considered further below. 
Responding to abuse 
9.39 In IP 33, the ALRC queried whether professional disciplinary action should 
follow in cases where a lawyer has maintained a claim for client legal privilege 
improperly as a tactic for delay or obstruction.45  
9.40 The rules of conduct of state and territory law societies and bar associations 
cover various aspects of practice; and the Legal Profession Acts in each state and 
territory set out the definitions of conduct that may lead to disciplinary action.46 
Legal Profession Acts 
9.41 While each state and territory has its own legislation, regulations and rules 
concerning the legal profession, in recent years the Commonwealth, state and territory 
attorneys-general have endorsed comprehensive model provisions as the basis for 
consistent national laws.47 The structure of the model legislation was influenced by the 
work of the National Legal Profession Model Laws Project, involving the Law Council 
                                                        
44  Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission LPP 61, 12 June 2007. 
45  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), Question 7–6. 
46  Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT); Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW); Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) 
Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld); Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA); Legal Profession Act 1993 (Tas); 
Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic); Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA). See also Standing Committee of 
Attorneys-General, National Legal Profession Model Bill (2006). 
47  See Law Council of Australia, Framework for a National Legal Services Market: National Legal 
Profession Model Reforms (2005). 
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and its constituent bodies working closely with the Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General.48 In addition to setting out a uniform standard for law degrees and practical 
legal training, the model provisions include uniform definitions of unsatisfactory 
professional conduct and professional misconduct. NSW, Victoria, Queensland, the 
Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) have implemented the 
model legislation in each jurisdiction’s respective Legal Profession Act and 
regulations.49 
9.42 Under the Model Legal Profession Act, ‘unsatisfactory professional conduct’ is 
defined as including: 
conduct of an Australian legal practitioner occurring in connection with the practice 
of law that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of 
the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian legal 
practitioner.50 
9.43 ‘Professional misconduct’ is defined as including: 
(a) unsatisfactory professional conduct of an Australian legal practitioner, where the 
conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a 
reasonable standard of competence and diligence; and 
(b) conduct of an Australian legal practitioner whether occurring in connection with 
the practice of law or occurring otherwise than in connection with the practice of 
law that would, if established, justify a finding that the practitioner is not a fit 
and proper person to engage in legal practice.51 
9.44 Examples of conduct capable of constituting ‘unsatisfactory professional 
conduct’ or ‘professional misconduct’ are also set out, including ‘conduct consisting of 
a contravention of this Act, the regulations or the legal profession rules’.52 
Case examples 
9.45 A case which is instructive in relation to the possible application of the existing 
disciplinary frameworks to an alleged abuse of a claim for client legal privilege is 
Clough v Queensland Law Society Inc.53 The solicitor, Clough, supplied information in 
the course of litigation that was incomplete and incorrect.54 The Solicitors’ Complaints 
                                                        
48  Ibid, 2. The constituent bodies of the Law Council include the Law Society of NSW, ACT Bar 
Association, Bar Association of Queensland, Law Institute of Victoria, Law Society of the Northern 
Territory, Law Society of South Australia, Law Society of Tasmania, Law Society of Western Australia, 
NSW Bar Association, Northern Territory Bar Association, Queensland Law Society, the Victorian Bar 
and Western Australian Bar Association. 
49  Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW); Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld); 
Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT); Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT). 
50  Law Council of Australia, National Practice—National Legal Profession Model Bill & Model 
Regulations <www.lawcouncil.asn.au/natpractice/currentstatus.html> at 30 November 2007, Model Bill, 
cl 4.2.1. 
51  Ibid, cl 4.2.2 (1). 
52  Ibid, cl 4.2.3 (a). 
53  Clough v Queensland Law Society Inc [2002] 1 Qd R 116. 
54  Ibid, [3] (Pincus JA). 
 9. Ensuring Professional Integrity—Education and Accountability 499 
Tribunal of Queensland suspended him from practice for a period of 12 months and 
required him satisfactorily to undertake a legal education program in civil litigation 
prior to his applying to have his practising certificate restored. Clough appealed from 
this ruling. The Attorney-General and the Law Society also appealed on the basis that 
the penalty was inadequate and sought to have Clough removed from the roll of legal 
practitioners altogether. 
9.46 The Law Society considered that although Clough was not dishonest, he had 
been guilty of ‘malpractice and/or professional misconduct and/or unprofessional 
conduct or practice’ in relation to the disclosure of certain documents in relation to a 
matter in the District Court.55  
9.47 In considering the appeal, Muir J commented that:  
To supply false and misleading material to a solicitor on the other side of the record 
and to the solicitor’s client, was to conduct the case unfairly and to fall short of, to a 
substantial degree, the standards of professional conduct observed or approved by 
members of the profession of good repute and competency. The conduct thus went 
beyond mere negligence and amounted to unprofessional conduct.56 
9.48 Clough erred in relation to the extent of the required disclosure in the relevant 
action. The Tribunal ‘found actions and statements which might have been regarded as 
chicanery to be honest but mistaken’.57 The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, 
leaving the original penalties imposed by the Tribunal to stand, but required Clough to 
pay the costs of the appeal. 
9.49 Another example is Guss v Law Institute of Victoria Ltd.58 The Full Tribunal of 
the Legal Profession Tribunal had found Joseph Guss guilty of misconduct in a 
professional capacity, cancelled his practising certificate as a solicitor and prevented 
him from applying for another certificate for three years. Guss appealed to the Court of 
Appeal of Victoria. 
9.50 The matter arose out of litigation in which Guss’s wife had sued Geelong 
Building Society for damages in relation to the Society’s conduct as mortgagee in 
selling certain property. Guss was in possession of a facsimile of a survey plan of the 
subject property and failed to produce it on discovery. He argued that the document 
was subject to privilege. Maxwell P distinguished between ‘discovery’ and 
‘production’: 
The misconduct with which Guss was charged, and which was found proved, was 
constituted by his failure to make discovery of the documents. Discovery and 
production are, of course, separate steps. Privilege, if it exists, is relevant only to 
production. It does not affect the obligation to make discovery of relevant documents, 
                                                        
55  Ibid. 
56  Ibid, [73]. 
57  Ibid, [5]. 
58  Guss v Law Institue of Victoria Ltd [2006] VSCA 88.  
500 Privilege in Perspective 
that is, to disclose that they were in the plaintiff’s possession or control. This he failed 
to do. Whether a claim for privilege against production of the documents might have 
been sustained is a quite separate question.59 
9.51 The Full Tribunal of the Legal Profession Tribunal considered that Guss’s 
failure to discover the survey was a ‘very serious instance of misconduct’:60 
This issue is failure to discover or disclose. The fact is the facsimile plans were and 
remained in the possession of Guss and not disclosed. 
There is really no necessity to state the obvious. It is asserted in the interests of justice 
that full disclosure be made of all the documents related to the issues in the case. 
In that regard, it is relevant that a solicitor is an officer of the Supreme Court with a 
duty not to obstruct the interests of justice.61 
9.52 The Court of Appeal of Victoria agreed: 
It is difficult to overstate the importance to the administration of justice of the 
paramount duty of a legal practitioner not to mislead the court. Where there is any 
conflict, or risk of conflict, between that duty and what the practitioner perceives to be 
his/her duty to the client, the duty to the court must always prevail. Nowhere is the 
risk of conflict more likely to arise than in relation to the obligation to make 
discovery. …  
For a practitioner to do what Guss has been found to have done—knowingly to 
withhold a relevant document and to stand silent while counsel engaged on behalf of 
his client made in open court what he (Guss) alone knew to be a false statement about 
the non-existence of such a document—is rightly to be viewed as very serious 
conduct. As counsel for the Law Institute submitted to the Tribunal, the conduct 
found proved went to the heart of the administration of justice.62 
9.53 These cases illustrate that a lawyer may come within the realm of 
‘unsatisfactory professional conduct’ or ‘professional misconduct’ under the applicable 
disciplinary regimes. Under the relevant disciplinary legislation, the lawyer may be 
subject to a range of consequences. In NSW, for example, penalties may include: a 
caution; conditions imposed on a practising certificate; a fine of up to $75,000; and 
removal from the roll.63 
9.54 The ability to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer is also wide. For 
example, in NSW, ‘every person’ has the right to complain about the conduct of 
lawyers to the relevant legal professional association or the independent Legal Services 
Commissioner.64 The term ‘lawyer’, in this context, applies to those lawyers who hold 
practising certificates as well as to those who do not.65 
                                                        
59  Ibid, [16]. 
60  Ibid, [36]. 
61  Ibid, quoting the Legal Profession Tribunal. 
62  Ibid, [39], [40]. 
63  Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) ss 540(2), 562. 
64  Ibid s 494(2)(a). 
65  Ibid s 5. The term ‘legal practitioner’ applies to those who hold practising certificates: s 6. 
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9.55 The Law Council noted that in some cases where misconduct is suspected, 
judges have referred the matter directly to the relevant legal services regulator, citing 
Linfox v Yates as a specific instance.66 Hence, if a federal investigatory body considers 
that a lawyer has abused a claim of client legal privilege it would be open for the body 
to make a complaint about the lawyer to a legal services regulator.67 
Specific penalty provisions 
9.56 There are also examples, however, of specific legislative provisions dealing with 
abuse of client legal privilege. Section 103(9) of the Taxation Administration Act 2003 
(WA), for example, provides that: 
A person, either personally or on another’s behalf, who claims that legal professional 
privilege applies to a document, information or relevant material and who knows, or 
ought to know at the time that claim is made that it is false, misleading, or without 
substance, commits an offence. 
Penalty: $20000.68 
9.57 A more general example of provisions imposing penalties on lawyers and clients 
for intentionally thwarting court processes is seen in the Crimes (Document 
Destruction) Act 2006 (Vic). This legislation created a new criminal offence—in direct 
response to the British American Tobacco litigation in Victoria.69 Where documents or 
other things are reasonably likely to be required in any ongoing or potential future legal 
proceedings, a person who knows this and destroys or conceals them with the intention 
of preventing their use in a legal proceeding is guilty of an indictable offence. 
9.58 In other jurisdictions such matters may be considered under general legal 
profession rules. For example, in NSW, the inappropriate destruction of documents is 
proscribed by Rule 177 of the Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW). 
9.59 In the context of this Inquiry, the question remains whether specific penalties are 
needed—such as the provision in Western Australia—or whether the existing general 
disciplinary regimes are adequate.  
Submissions and consultations 
9.60 In IP 33, the ALRC sought comment on whether professional disciplinary action 
should follow, and what penalties should be imposed, where there was an abuse of a 
                                                        
66  Linfox v Yates [2004] NSWSC 943; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
67  In its submission in response to DP 73, however, the ATO noted that agencies may have secrecy 
provisions which may prevent their being able to do so: Australian Taxation Office, Submission LPP 81, 
29 October 2007. See discussion below. 
68  Taxation Administration Act 2003 (WA) s 103 is discussed in detail in Ch 8. 
69  For example, in introducing the Second Reading of the Bill in the Legislative Assembly, the Attorney-
General, the Hon RJ Hulls, stated that ‘the bill responds to important issues that arose in the recent case 
of McCabe in the Victorian Court of Appeal’(British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Cowell 
(2002) 7 VR 524): Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 16 November 2005, 2181 
(R Hulls—Attorney-General). 
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claim of client legal privilege.70 The ALRC also sought information on whether 
professional disciplinary action has ever been taken against a lawyer for improperly 
maintaining a claim for client legal privilege; and whether the threat of professional 
disciplinary action might act to inhibit lawyers from providing proper representation to 
their clients.71  
9.61 The general thrust of submissions and consultations in response to IP 33 was 
that disciplinary action should follow an abuse of a claim of client legal privilege.72 
The principal disagreement was about how this should occur. On the one hand, it was 
argued that there are sufficient avenues for dealing with misuse within the existing 
disciplinary framework for lawyers; on the other, there were arguments that there 
should be a specific penalty regime to deal with alleged misuse of privilege claims. 
There were also comments about the impact that such a penalty regime might have in 
relation to the lawyer-client relationship.  
Are existing disciplinary frameworks adequate? 
9.62 Many submissions pressed the view that existing disciplinary frameworks are 
adequate to deal with situations of alleged misuse of claims of client legal privilege, or, 
as a Committee of the Law Society of NSW put it, that issues regarding abuse of client 
legal privilege claims are just a ‘subset’ of broader issues concerning lawyers’ ethical 
responsibilities.73  
9.63 The Law Council noted that heavy sanctions already are provided for under the 
Legal Profession Acts in each state and territory. In its view, such sanctions should be 
regarded as ‘sufficient’: 
the present sanctions available for abuse of [client legal privilege], namely rules of 
Court, professional disciplinary rules or (in some jurisdictions) prosecution, are 
adequate and … no further provisions are required.  
The Courts already have discretionary power to award costs against counsel and 
solicitors where costs are incurred improperly, without reasonable cause, are wasted 
by undue delay, or by any other misconduct or default by the legal practitioner, e.g. 
                                                        
70  Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 
(2007), Questions 7–6, 7–7, 7–8. 
71  Ibid, [7.90]. 
72  For example, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission LPP 70, 29 June 2007; 
Australian Taxation Office, Submission LPP 65, 22 June 2007; Victoria Legal Aid, Submission LPP 55, 
14 June 2007; Taxation Institute of Australia, Submission LPP 54, 15 June 2007; National Legal Aid, 
Submission LPP 52, 13 June 2007; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 12 June 2007; New South 
Wales Bar Association, Submission LPP 41, 5 June 2007; National Australia Bank Limited and others, 
Submission LPP 30, 4 June 2007; Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007; 
R Desiatnik, Submission LPP 24, 1 June 2007; I Turnbull, Submission LPP 18, 3 June 2007. 
73  New South Wales Law Society Litigation and Practice Committee, Consultation LPP 23, Sydney, 
28 May 2007. 
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Federal Court Rules, Order 62, rule 9(1); Rules of the Supreme Court of Victoria, 
Rule 63.23.74  
9.64 The Law Society of NSW submitted, similarly, that: 
There is absolutely no evidence to show that existing systems of professional conduct, 
regulation and discipline, the law of contempt and the Court’s jurisdiction to impose 
costs orders on legal representatives personally, are anything other than adequate, 
appropriate and well adapted to deal with such concerns.75 
9.65 NSW Young Lawyers also drew attention to the scope of existing disciplinary 
frameworks for lawyers: 
Lawyers are required to adhere to minimum ethical standards in practice and complete 
an ethics course as part of their practical legal training requirements entitling them to 
practice. 
If client legal privilege is improperly claimed over a communication as a tactic for 
delay it would be well understood by the lawyer that they have engaged in conduct 
that falls outside minimum ethical standards required in the practice of law. 
The conduct of a lawyer who knowingly engages in conduct that falls outside 
minimum ethical standards in the practice of law should be considered professional 
misconduct.76 
9.66 Victoria Legal Aid supported the ‘appropriate use of complaints and disciplinary 
procedures’.77 National Legal Aid also endorsed this view.78 
9.67 It was also submitted that the same rules should apply to all lawyers and, in 
particular, to in-house counsel, who may not hold practising certificates.79 
9.68 The NSW Bar Association endorsed the application of professional disciplinary 
sanctions where improper claims are made, but also made express suggestions as to 
amendments that could be made to professional disciplinary rules to ensure that such 
claims are caught more readily. It specifically suggested80 
a separate professional rule stipulating obligations in respect of privilege claims 
which would provide greater clarity as to the specific content of a practitioner’s duty 
to the court, and would focus for practitioners the serious and substantive nature of a 
claim to privilege.81 
                                                        
74  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. See also Victoria Legal Aid, Submission 
LPP 55, 14 June 2007; A Brown—Law Society of New South Wales, Consultation LPP 15, Sydney, 
21 May 2007. 
75  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007.  
76  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission LPP 49, 12 June 2007. 
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9.69 The NSW Bar Association further spelled out the form that such amended rules 
could take. For example, the amendment proposed for solicitors was as follows: 
A.  For solicitors: 
Revised Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 1995, Rule A.15AA: 
A practitioner must ensure that any advice which he or she gives to his or her client in 
respect of making or maintaining a claim of client legal privilege in respect of a 
communication, and any such claim made or maintained, is supported by reasonable 
grounds. 
When making or maintaining a claim to client legal privilege on behalf of a client, the 
senior practitioner who is responsible for the provision of the service or a principal of 
the practice must certify that each claim is supported by reasonable ground(s) and, to 
the extent possible, must identify the ground(s) for each claim. 
In determining whether a claim to client legal privilege is supported by reasonable 
ground(s), a practitioner must have regard to the content of the document, the 
existence or otherwise of any contemporaneous records made by the author of the 
communication to the effect that it is considered to be privileged, and any factual 
matters bearing upon the creation of the communication, including the purpose(s) of 
the author and recipient or both. 
In making partial claims of privilege in respect of communications in or recorded in a 
document, a practitioner must mask only those portions of the document the 
disclosure of which would result in the substance of privileged communications being 
revealed.  
For the purposes of this Rule, ‘client legal privilege’ has the meanings ascribed to that 
term at sections 117–119 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), as amended from time to 
time; and other terms as defined in the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), as amended 
from time to time have the same meanings in this rule.82 
9.70 Concerns were expressed, however, about whether the present disciplinary 
procedures ever actually ‘caught’ lawyers who had abused client legal privilege claims. 
Andrew Brown, in-house counsel for the Law Society of NSW advised that, to his 
knowledge, there had never been a case of professional disciplinary action taken 
against a lawyer for improperly maintaining a claim for client legal privilege.83 The 
ALRC heard also that there was research suggesting no such cases in Queensland.84 
9.71 The absence of professional disciplinary action in circumstances of alleged 
abuse of client legal privilege claims may be because there is no basis for complaint; 
or, where there is, that complaints are not being made. Dr Christine Parker pointed out 
that professional disciplinary action is usually prompted by a complaint from clients 
and, in the case of client legal privilege, it is more likely to be that the client is being 
protected ‘too well’. She suggested that, if federal investigatory bodies considered that 
                                                        
82  Ibid. A similar rule was proposed for barristers. 
83  A Brown—Law Society of New South Wales, Consultation LPP 15, Sydney, 21 May 2007. 
84  C Parker, Correspondence, 14 September 2007. Clough v Queensland Law Society Inc [2002] 1 Qd R 
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there were cases of suspected abuse of client legal privilege claims, the agencies 
themselves should invoke the existing complaints mechanisms against lawyers. 
If regulators such as the ATO, federal police etc could cooperate with the professional 
[disciplinary bodies] in such circumstances to provide evidence, then there would be 
more likelihood of successful disciplinary action—which in turn would provide a 
signal to the profession as to the ethical conduct expected.85  
9.72 Parker also drew attention to the particular problem of triggering the application 
of the disciplinary provisions in the context of in-house counsel as 
the client does not have any incentive to complain, and even if they do have 
complaints about their lawyer, they don’t need to use the disciplinary system because 
they are employing the lawyer and can therefore control or discipline them in other 
ways.86  
9.73 The behaviour of in-house counsel is, therefore, only going to come to the 
attention of the disciplinary authorities if a complaint is made by ‘other lawyers 
working with them on the case’, ‘the other side (ie the investigatory agency and/or its 
lawyers’, a judge; or the disciplinary authority investigates the lawyer’s conduct of its 
own motion. Parker commented, however, that the latter course of action has particular 
obstacles, as disciplinary bodies 
would find it difficult to get access to information—by definition—because of the 
privilege claims, especially where the complaint involves a lawyer inside a large 
company represented by a big law firm because they are set up and resourced to deal 
mostly with complaints about service from individual clients about individual lawyers 
(mostly in smaller law firms). They do not have the resources and capacity to manage 
these more complicated investigations with the level of legal ‘firepower’ likely to be 
arrayed against them on the other side.87 
9.74 Parker advocated that federal investigatory bodies develop ‘a protocol of 
informing the relevant professional disciplinary authority’.88 She also suggested that 
judges—and lawyers themselves—ought to take the initiative in making complaints to 
disciplinary bodies where they consider that a lawyer has acted unethically.89 
Notwithstanding the issues concerning the activation of the existing professional 
disciplinary provisions, Parker preferred such an approach of dealing with alleged 
abuses of privilege claims to one of ‘proliferating penalty provisions in legislation in 
other areas’: 
That approach can be used in a tactical or political way to scare off lawyers from 
representing their clients fearlessly, and it seems better to deal with allegations of 
lawyer misconduct within the disciplinary regime that is specifically set up to deal 
with that issue appropriately.90 
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9.75 Where current disciplinary frameworks apply, however, the Australian 
Government Solicitor (AGS) added a note of caution about disciplinary action being 
initiated by federal investigatory bodies: 
Investigatory bodies must respect the role of lawyers in properly protecting clients’ 
rights and interests. Like in any other context, the investigatory body could make a 
complaint about a lawyer’s conduct to the relevant legal profession disciplinary 
authority. The making of client legal privilege claims with no real foundation might 
well, in the particular circumstances, constitute unprofessional conduct. However, to 
be seen to be acting responsibly itself, the investigatory body would need to have 
some sound basis in the circumstances for submitting that the lawyer’s conduct was 
unprofessional.91 
Should specific penalties apply? 
9.76 In IP 33, the ALRC asked whether a person who makes or maintains a claim for 
client legal privilege in bad faith, either personally or on another’s behalf, should be 
made liable to penalties, whether criminal, civil or administrative.92 Section 103(9) of 
the Taxation Administration Act 2003 (WA), set out above, was cited as an example.  
9.77 The Law Council explained that s 103(9) was introduced ‘to counter the 
perceived problem of serious abuses of client legal privilege by legal practitioners’.93 
At the time it was introduced, the Law Council gave qualified support to its 
introduction, ‘as a measure preferable to abrogation’.94  
9.78 The Law Society of Western Australia opposed the introduction of this 
provision and attempted to have it removed from the Taxation Administration Bill 
2001 (WA).95 It submitted to the Attorney General of Western Australia that there had 
been no instances of such mischief.96 The Law Society also submitted that client legal 
privilege is a client’s fundamental common law right and that the creation of a penalty 
provision could result in lawyers adopting a ‘safety first’ attitude by refraining from 
claiming the privilege to avoid the possibility of prosecution or professional 
disciplinary proceedings.97 
9.79 The Law Council argued that the example of the Western Australian provision 
should not be followed, now that more general provisions were available: 
The Law Council notes that the Taxation Administration Act provision precedes the 
now existing legal services regulatory regime. Given that clearly adequate remedies 
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now exist for the abuse of [privilege] … the Law Council does not support specific 
penalties directed at abuse of [client legal privilege].98  
9.80 However, in the event that specific penalties were to be introduced, the Law 
Council made suggestions about what might be included: 
rather than automatically making claiming [client legal privilege] an offence if a 
practitioner ‘ought to have known’ that the privilege was unavailable, each case 
should be considered on its facts. For example, the failure to be aware that the 
privilege was unavailable might be explicable on a basis such as lack of legal 
knowledge, incompetence or carelessness, rather than deliberate abuse of process, in 
which case it should not attract as heavy a pecuniary penalty as those provided for by 
the Taxation Administration Act 2003 (WA). In addition, as IP 33 notes, the law of 
privilege has developed and evolved over time, partly due to the inclination of the 
legal profession to test its boundaries. A blanket penalty to catch practitioners who 
‘ought to have known’ that [client legal privilege] did not apply may unnecessarily 
deter exploration of the boundaries of [client legal privilege].99  
9.81 The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) argued that 
‘there are sound reasons for imposing penalties on lawyers who make bad faith 
claims’.100 Having affirmed a view of the doctrine of client legal privilege as a 
‘fundamental human right’,101 Dr Ronald Desiatnik commented that: 
It has risen from the ranks of other evidentiary laws to achieve post-graduate status 
while retaining its under-graduate evidentiary qualifications. As such, any assertion or 
maintenance of the privilege in bad faith by a lawyer, or the lawyer’s properly 
informed client, should carry a mandatory civil penalty, and a discretionary criminal 
sanction.102 
9.82 In support of introducing specific penalties, ASIC pointed to the effect that ‘bad 
faith’ claims had in relation to investigations: 
Costs are incurred by privilege claims that are made in bad faith, (including money, 
impeding the effective administration of justice and reducing timely and effective 
regulation).103  
9.83 The ACCC recommended a regime of sanctions on lawyers ‘responsible for 
spurious claims’: 
Such sanctions could range from costs orders against the lawyers personally through 
to disciplinary measures imposed by the relevant professional body. More serious 
sanctions would be reserved for those lawyers who misstate material facts in support 
of the claim for privilege.104 
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9.84 The issue of the application of penalties to persons other than lawyers was also 
remarked upon. The Australian Tax Office (ATO) assumed that ‘a person’ (as referred 
to in IP 33)105 is a broad category and it could include ‘the client who is claiming 
[client legal privilege], his or her legal representative, or any other person making a 
claim for [client legal privilege] on his or her behalf’.106  
9.85 In relation to penalising non-lawyers, ASIC commented that: 
For privilege claims made by non-lawyers who have not received legal advice in 
relation to them, it is likely to be difficult to establish that the claims have been made 
in bad faith and that they warrant the imposition of penalties. In view of the 
complexity of the law relating to client legal privilege and the fact that lawyers may 
experience difficulty in readily assessing whether a claim of privilege is available, it 
may be considered overly harsh to expose non-lawyers to the risk of penalties for 
invalidly claiming the privilege.107  
9.86 Some submissions included specific recommendations about the kinds of 
penalties that might be imposed, for example, ‘providing for the making of costs orders 
for unreasonable privilege claims and criminal penalties for bad faith privilege 
claims’.108 The ATO suggested that: 
Costs could be ordered against a person who makes an improper claim for [client 
legal privilege] where litigation is on foot or, as suggested in the ALRC Issues Paper 
33, there may be some form of criminal sanction. It may also be worth exploring the 
introduction of some form of evidentiary or administrative sanction against a person 
who makes or maintains a claim for [client legal privilege] in bad faith. For example, 
in the tax context an administrative penalty could perhaps be linked to the amount of 
revenue involved in a particular case.109 
9.87 A number of submissions commented that a regime of specific sanctions 
directed to alleged abuse of client legal privilege claims would have a chilling effect in 
relation to legal practice and that this would operate to the detriment of clients and the 
operation of the legal system. 
9.88 For example, Keith Kendall commented that ‘introducing sanctions for any 
assertion of client legal privilege is likely to create more problems than it solves’.110  
Introducing sanctions for deemed abuses of client legal privilege is likely to produce a 
new problem, being the inhibition of the provision of the legal advice itself. How is a 
legal adviser to know in advance whether an assertion of privilege will lead to 
sanctions? This is likely to create conflicts of interest for the legal adviser, in that the 
legal adviser will have to temper pursuing their client’s case as vigorously as possible 
with a concern for their own professional standing. This could lead to a situation in 
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which legal advisers are reluctant to assert privilege for fear of the sanctions. This 
could then lead, later, to professional negligence claims should the client later find out 
that a privilege claim could have been sustained, but damaging communications were 
nevertheless disclosed.111 
9.89 Victoria Legal Aid expressed a similar concern about the detrimental effect on 
the relationship between lawyers and clients that a penalty regime may produce: 
… there is a real risk that such steps could be used to encourage lawyers to not assert 
rights which they should by asserting on behalf of clients or on behalf of the 
legitimate expectations and rights of the persons entitled to the benefit of privilege in 
respect of communications.112 
9.90 The Law Society of NSW warned that: 
This question is somewhat like suggesting that a person who pleads ‘not guilty’ but 
who is ultimately found ‘guilty’ should not only be found guilty of the crime for 
which they have been prosecuted but also be found to have been guilty of the second 
crime of pleading ‘not guilty’. Generally, a person should not be afraid to mount an 
argument on the basis that, if the argument is lost, they are exposed to an allegation 
that they have put forward an argument in bad faith. That exposure makes a person 
reluctant to put forward an argument and works against the proper right to invoke 
privilege particularly in a case where privilege is arguable but not clear cut.113 
9.91 The AICD noted that any ‘additional requirements’—on top of existing 
professional standards and obligations—may deter lawyers ‘from providing frank 
advice’.114 
9.92 The AGS expressed concerns about how coercive information-gathering powers 
may be perceived if a penalties regime were introduced for the misuse of claims of 
client legal privilege. 
There would be a danger that sanctions against improper claims may be portrayed as 
oppressive, and bring the coercive powers themselves into some disrepute as 
needlessly draconian. A failure to sustain a claim to client legal privilege before the 
courts would in the ordinary course be visited with a costs order against the claimant. 
The prospect of this is always going to act as some disincentive to the making of 
claims for privilege that lack foundation.115 
9.93 Problems in the application of a penalties regime were also identified in some 
submissions. The ‘challenge’, as one submission put it, ‘will be to prove that the claim 
was asserted or maintained in bad faith’:  
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This is because assessing whether a claim [of privilege is valid] is not always clear. 
This factor also supports the position that Commonwealth investigatory bodies should 
publish clear guidelines on when a person can assert and maintain privilege.116 
9.94 Kendall also identified a range of practical issues in relation to a penalties 
regime: 
In particular, who would decide what constitutes bad faith? Even if such an arbiter 
could be decided upon, there would need to be some predetermined yardstick by 
which bad faith could be measured. Deciding such matters only with the benefit of 
hindsight is unsatisfactory in a context where serious penalties are being considered. 
Anything other than a reliable objective measure would create an element of 
uncertainty that is likely to affect the provision of legal advice.117 
9.95 In view of such difficulties, the Fitzroy Legal Service submitted that: 
Rather than seeking to impose disciplinary penalties, we feel that it would be more 
appropriate for lawyers to be fully instructed about the ethics of claiming privilege, if 
this is not already the case.118 
9.96 In DP 73, the ALRC expressed the view that utilising existing disciplinary 
frameworks that apply to lawyers was a more preferable avenue for dealing with 
alleged instances of misuse or abuse of claims of client legal privilege than the 
introduction of a provision like s 103(9) of the Taxation Administration Act 2003 
(WA).119 
9.97 The Law Council supported this overall approach and strongly opposed the 
development of any form of statutory penalty for lodging or maintaining a claim of 
privilege negligently or in ‘bad faith’: 
It is clear that the courts have appropriate powers to sanction such conduct, 
demonstrated by Clough v Queensland Law Society Inc and Linfox v Yates. While 
clarity may assist the public in identifying unethical conduct and reporting it to the 
Law Society or legal services regulator, each case is different and must be considered 
according to the relevant facts. The appropriate penalty in each case could vary, from 
personal costs orders against a negligent practitioner, orders that the practitioner 
undertake education or training in client legal privilege, or more serious action in 
cases where serious misconduct, or a pattern of behaviour, is in evidence. 
The Law Council is also concerned that any amendment to the rules of conduct should 
not affect or curtail:  
• the capacity of lawyers to represent their client’s interests and  
• the important role of legal practitioners in exploring the limits of the law.120 
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Clarifying disciplinary frameworks 
9.98 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that state and territory legal professional 
associations should clarify their professional conduct rules to provide specific guidance 
about a lawyer’s ethical duties with respect to making and maintaining a claim of client 
legal privilege.121 This was consistent with the ALRC’s preference to rely on existing 
disciplinary frameworks. 
9.99 The ATO agreed that ‘the existence of measures to ensure the professional 
integrity of lawyers in relation to privilege is extremely important’ and, in principle, 
agreed with this proposal.122 ASIC also supported this proposal as ‘potentially assisting 
in reducing the extent to which client legal privilege may be invalidly claimed’.123 
9.100 The Law Council, however, indicated that there had been ‘mixed responses’ 
from its constituent bodies—all state and territory law societies and bar associations.124 
Rather than such matters being dealt with by state and territory legal professional 
associations, the Law Council submitted that any amendment to professional conduct 
rules should be effected through the Law Council’s Model Conduct Rules and hence 
would be ‘better considered and advanced by the Law Council through its Model Rules 
Working Group’.125 Subject to this, however,  
the Law Council does not oppose a proposal that State and Territory Law Societies 
and Bar Associations clarify a lawyer’s ethical duties with respect to client legal 
privilege under professional conduct rules, provided this does not mandate any form 
of offence or penalty.126 
9.101 The Law Council considered that, in view of the operation and ongoing work of 
the Model Rules Working Group, and the fact that this group had not had the 
opportunity to consider the proposals in DP 73, 
a preferable approach would be for the ALRC to abstain from direct recommendations 
requiring amendments to Legal Profession Professional Conduct Rules or legal 
professional bodies’ continuing legal education programs until proper consideration 
can be given to the circumstances facing organisations in different jurisdictions.127 
9.102 The Law Society of NSW, while affirming its commitment ‘to continually 
monitoring and, where appropriate, improving the Solicitors’ Rules and other ethical 
guidelines for its members—including in relation to the making of claims for client 
legal privilege’—did not consider this proposal ‘either necessary or appropriate’: 
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the Solicitors’ Rules will be amended as and when necessary to reflect changes in the 
law and the community’s expectations of legal practitioners in New South Wales, 
without the need for intervention by the Commonwealth government.128 
9.103 NSW Young Lawyers also affirmed the existing framework for practitioners and 
disagreed ‘that practitioners require specific guidance about their ethical duties with 
respect to client legal privilege’ or ‘that changes need to be made to specifically 
address client legal privilege in regard to the professional conduct rules’. 
Legal practitioners operate under very strict ethical guidelines, underpinned by their 
overriding duty of candour to the court. For a practitioner to make a claim for 
privilege knowing that it is misleading, inaccurate or wholly unfounded, is clearly a 
breach of those high ethical standards. 
The potential penalties currently in place for unprofessional conduct or professional 
misconduct are sufficient to deal with practitioners who make spurious client legal 
privilege claims. Dishonesty is regarded as extremely serious in the legal profession 
and punishable by fines, suspension or striking off. The maintenance of a spurious 
claim for privilege is a dishonest assertion of privilege over a document and should be 
punishable.129 
9.104 As the ALRC proposed in DP 73 that clients have the benefit of privilege in 
relation to tax advice,130 some submissions suggested that appropriate disciplinary 
mechanisms also should apply to tax advisers. The ATO, for example, submitted that 
it is … essential that there are appropriate mechanisms to ensure that tax advisers 
maintain professional integrity.131  
Initiating complaints 
9.105 In DP 73, the ALRC noted Parker’s suggestion that regulators themselves 
should cooperate with professional disciplinary bodies to ensure that inappropriate 
conduct was being identified and punished accordingly.132  
9.106 The ATO agreed with Parker’s statement that if regulators (such as the ATO) 
were to provide evidence to a professional disciplinary body then there would be more 
likelihood of successful disciplinary action, but there were obstacles for the ATO in 
doing so: 
We are constrained by our current taxation secrecy provisions, such as section 16 of 
the [Income Tax Assessment Act 1936], from referring a lawyer who makes a false or 
misleading claim for [client legal privilege] to his or her professional body. We 
cannot necessarily refer inappropriate conduct to a relevant professional association 
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and hence, in most circumstances the association would remain unaware of that 
inappropriate conduct.133 
9.107 Given the obstacle of such secrecy provisions—and any others that might apply 
in relation to other federal bodies—the ATO submitted that such provisions would 
need to be amended ‘to allow federal investigatory agencies to refer a lawyer to his or 
her professional association’.134 
9.108 A complaint against a lawyer with respect to a claim of client legal privilege 
also may be made by, for example, other lawyers, or a judge. NSW Young Lawyers 
submitted: 
It is understandable that proving that a client legal privilege claim is spurious or 
dishonest would be very difficult. In this regard, complaints should be made by 
judges, fellow practitioners and clients.135 
9.109 The Australian Corporate Lawyers Association (ACLA) was concerned about 
singling out the actions of in-house counsel for attention and submitted that: 
Considerations in relation to a lawyer’s behaviour … should apply to all lawyers, not 
just in-house lawyers—as is currently the case. … ACLA would seek to make further 
submissions if there were proposals to treat in-house lawyers differently to other 
practitioners.136 
9.110 The Law Council also expressed a concern in relation to complaints that may be 
initiated without proper foundation—and particularly where such complaints were 
made by federal bodies: 
[The] ALRC should recommend that the federal client legal privilege legislation 
contain penalties for federal agencies where it is found that an agency or its legal 
adviser has lodged a complaint against a practitioner for misconduct in relation to a 
client legal privilege claim, which is without foundation and appears designed to 
place undue pressure on the party claiming privilege.137 
Failing to certify 
9.111 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that state and territory legal professional 
associations should clarify their professional conduct rules to provide that a 
certification of a claim that documents are privileged,138 without reasonable grounds, is 
an example of conduct that contravenes the relevant professional conduct rules. This 
proposal received limited responses in submissions. 
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9.112 The AFP, ASIC and APRA supported or agreed with the proposal, without 
making any specific comments.139 
9.113 Both the Law Council and the Law Society of NSW submitted comments in 
relation to the certification process itself—these are considered in Chapter 8—as well 
as on the proposal with respect to the consequences of a failure to certify on reasonable 
grounds. Both bodies pointed to the ‘very serious consequences’ for a legal practitioner 
under the professional conduct rules and queried  
whether the gravity of a failure by a legal practitioner to satisfy him/herself that there 
are reasonable grounds for the making of a claim for client legal privilege requires 
that the practitioner be exposed to such serious professional consequences.140 
9.114 The Law Council and the Law Society of NSW also urged a more flexible or 
discretionary approach with respect to the application of disciplinary rules to cases of 
alleged abuse of client legal privilege claims, as currently applied in relation to 
certificates given by solicitors under s 347 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) 
concerning reasonable prospects of success in litigation.141 
This would permit either the Court or the legal professional associations to regulate 
legal practitioners with due regard to the gravity of failures to satisfy themselves that 
there are reasonable grounds for the making of claims for client legal privilege, 
without the draconian result of disciplinary action following as a matter of course in 
the instance of such failures.142 
9.115 The Law Council submitted that such an approach ‘would accord with the 
underlying rationale for regulating such conduct’.143 
ALRC’s views 
9.116 The ALRC’s view is that the major problems identified in relation to claims of 
client legal privilege are best addressed through a more transparent and expeditious 
framework for the making and assessing of claims,144 complemented by better 
education of lawyers to inculcate a far greater understanding of the nature of, and 
responsibilities in relation to, the making of privilege claims.145  
9.117 The ALRC remains of the view that the best strategies for addressing alleged 
instances of misuse or abuse of claims of client legal privilege are to clarify and 
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enhance the existing disciplinary frameworks that apply to lawyers to ensure that cases 
of actual abuse are appropriately caught and punished. This is considered preferable to 
introducing a provision like s 103(9) of the Taxation Administration Act 2003 (WA). 
The ALRC considers that client legal privilege is best seen as one aspect of a lawyer’s 
overall ethical responsibilities—and misuse of claims punished as such—rather than 
singling out privilege for specific attention on its own, except as an illustration of 
broader ethical duties. 
9.118 It is also evident, however, that such strategies may not cover all areas of 
alleged abuse. Professional disciplinary frameworks have the most potent impact 
where a person may lose his or her practising certificate. In appropriate cases the 
practising certificate may be cancelled and conditions imposed upon any application 
for renewal, and so on.146 If a lawyer does not have a practising certificate, he or she 
may still be removed from the roll of the relevant courts, in addition to whatever other 
penalties may be imposed under the relevant legal professional legislation.  
9.119 The ALRC agrees with submissions that recommended that the professional 
conduct rules of the relevant legal professional associations should be clarified to make 
the obligations with respect to client legal privilege much more obvious as examples of 
the broader ethical responsibilities of lawyers. The ALRC acknowledges that in some 
cases professional conduct rules already may provide specific—and appropriate—
guidance with respect to a lawyer’s ethical duties generally, and specifically in relation 
to client legal privilege. Insofar as any such rules currently do not, legal professional 
associations should ensure that they include such guidance. To this extent the ALRC 
considers that a general recommendation—applicable to all state and territory legal 
professional associations—is necessary. Moreover, where the ALRC previously 
proposed that legal professional associations should ‘clarify’ the relevant rules to 
provide specific guidance in relation to client legal privilege claims, the ALRC is now 
of the view that such associations should ‘ensure’ that the rules provide the appropriate 
level of guidance. This recognises that some rules may already do so and does not 
impose any additional burden. 
9.120 Further, it is the ALRC’s view that, if the procedure of certification proposed in 
Chapter 8 is implemented, certification by a lawyer without reasonable grounds also 
should be listed as an example of conduct that may contravene the relevant conduct 
rules.147 Similarly, if a lawyer fails, without reasonable grounds, to certify a privilege 
claim—where requested to do so by a federal investigatory body—such conduct should 
be listed as an example of conduct that may contravene relevant conduct rules. 
9.121 The ALRC recognises the role that the Law Council’s Model Rules Working 
Group has played in relation to the development of the Model Rules for Professional 
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Conduct and considers that this body may well guide the content and implementation 
of the model rules once developed. The recommendation in relation to action by state 
and territory legal professional associations in no way seeks to derogate from any role 
the Working Group may have in this regard.  
9.122 It should also be noted that the ALRC does not seek to derogate from the court’s 
inherent power to control its own processes and to deal with abuse of process when it 
arises. 
Recommendation 9–1 State and territory legal professional associations 
should ensure that their professional conduct rules provide specific guidance 
about a lawyer’s ethical duties with respect to making and maintaining a claim 
of client legal privilege. 
Recommendation 9–2 State and territory legal professional associations 
should clarify their professional conduct rules to provide that examples of 
conduct that contravenes the relevant rules may include: 
(a)   a certification that there are reasonable grounds for making a privilege 
claim—in line with Recommendation 8–3—without reasonable grounds; 
or 
(b)  a failure to certify a privilege claim, without reasonable grounds. 
Legal education 
9.123 Legal education refers to both the legal knowledge and competencies required to 
qualify a person to be admitted to practice as a lawyer; and the continuing legal 
education of lawyers, both mandatory and voluntary. The rules governing admission to 
practise as a lawyer in all jurisdictions require the attainment of approved academic 
qualifications and satisfactory completion of approved practical legal training 
requirements.148 The rules governing practising certificates also stipulate certain 
requirements in relation to continuing legal education.149 A concern, in this context, is 
whether there is sufficient training—in all respects—in relation to legal ethics and 
professional responsibility, and specifically in relation to the responsibilities in making 
claims of client legal privilege.  
9.124 In discussing the ethics of corporate lawyers, Parker and Evans, state: 
Ethically unreflective corporate lawyering can sometimes occur not so much because 
of failures of personal ideals as because of narrow legalistic training and culture that 
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do not equip corporate lawyers to know how to put ethics into action … or even to 
recognise ethical issues when they arise.150 
9.125 In its review of the federal civil justice system, the ALRC found that insufficient 
attention is given to training Australian lawyers in legal ethics and professional 
responsibility.151 In the final report of that inquiry, Managing Justice: A Review of the 
Federal Civil Justice System (ALRC 89) (2000), the ALRC stated that education and 
training clearly play a critical role in shaping legal culture.152 A healthy professional 
culture is ‘one that values lifelong learning and takes ethical concerns seriously’.153  
Academic qualifications 
9.126 In all states and territories, the minimum academic requirements comprise 11 
areas of study (known as the ‘Priestley Eleven’). In NSW, for example, these are set 
out in Schedule Five of the Legal Profession Admission Rules 2005 (NSW). Client 
legal privilege may fall within several of the listed areas in these Rules: 
• civil procedure;154 
• evidence;155 and 
• professional conduct.156 
Practical legal training requirements 
9.127 The Australasian Professional Legal Education Council (APLEC), in 
conjunction with the Law Admissions Consultative Committee, developed a set of 
‘Competency Standards for Entry Level Lawyers’ (Competency Standards) as part of 
the project towards uniform admission rules across Australia.157 These provide the 
backdrop for the Uniform Admission Rules and the translation of these into state and 
territory provisions. 
                                                        
150  C Parker and A Evans, Inside Lawyers’ Ethics (2007), 217. 
151  See Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Federal Civil Justice System, DP 62 (1999), 
Ch 3. 
152  Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System, 
ALRC 89 (2000), Ch 2. 
153  Ibid, [2.3]. 
154  Legal Profession Admission Rules 2005 (NSW) sch 5, Civil Procedure, under topic 6, ‘Obtaining 
evidence—discovery of documents, interrogatories, subpoena and other devices’. 
155  Ibid, Evidence, under topic 3, ‘Privilege’. 
156 Ibid, comprising ‘Professional and personal conduct in respect of practitioner’s duty: (a) to the law, (b) to 
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fellow practitioners’.  
157  Australasian Professional Legal Education Council and the Law Admissions Consultative Committee, 
Competency Standards for Entry Level Lawyers (2000/2002) Australasian Professional Legal Education 
Council <www.aplec.asn.au> at 30 November 2007. The document may be downloaded from the APLEC 
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9.128 The Competency Standards require that, at the point of admission, each 
applicant must provide evidence of having achieved the requisite competence in 
designated ‘Skills, Practice Areas and Values’, the latter of which stipulates ‘Ethics 
and Professional Responsibility’.158 
9.129 The Revised Uniform Admission Rules recommend that students seeking 
admission as lawyers should have to achieve standards of competency in ten of 15 
designated areas of practical legal training, one of which is ethics and professional 
responsibility.159  
9.130 In NSW, for example, Rule 96 requires that the course of practical training 
includes ‘evidence of attainment of competencies’ in listed areas, including ‘Values—
Ethics and Professional Responsibility’.160 
9.131 A synopsis of the competencies is then set out in the Sixth Schedule of the Legal 
Profession Admission Rules 2005 (NSW). Client legal privilege may broadly fall 
within the following listed areas of competency required of an entry level lawyer: 
• civil litigation practice; 
• criminal law practice; and 
• ethics and professional responsibility.161 
9.132 The last topic is described in some detail, including eight specific elements: 
• acting ethically; 
• discharging the legal duties and obligations of legal practitioners; 
• complying with professional conduct rules; 
• complying with fiduciary duties; 
• avoiding conflicts of interest; 
• acting courteously; 
• complying with rules relating to the charging of fees; and 
                                                        
158  Ibid. 
159  New South Wales Office of the Legal Services Commissioner, Lawyer Regulation in Australia: 
Admission <www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/pages/lra_admission> at 13 April 2007. 
160  Legal Profession Admission Rules 2005 (NSW) r 96. 
161  Ibid sch 6. 
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• reflecting on wider issues.162 
9.133 The duties and obligations of legal practitioners include the duty: 
• of confidentiality;  
• to act competently and to maintain competence; 
• to act honestly; 
• not to mislead the court; and  
• not to pervert the course of justice or the due administration of justice.163  
Continuing legal education  
9.134 The rules in each jurisdiction prescribe that, for the maintenance of practising 
certificates, a specified number of continuing legal education units be completed. 
9.135 The Continuing Professional Development Rules 2007 (Vic), for example, 
require that each year a practitioner must complete at least one unit (the equivalent of 
one hour of face to face training) in each of four fields, one of which is ‘Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility’. An example of a topic that may be included within this 
field is the ‘difference between the duty of confidentiality and legal professional 
privilege’.164 
9.136 In NSW, the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Rules stipulate that a 
practitioner, unless exempted by the Council of the Law Society, must complete a 
required number of points each year.165 To be eligible under the rules, a course must 
be: 
• of significant intellectual or practical content and must deal primarily with 
matters directly related to the practice of law; 
• conducted by persons who are qualified by practical or academic experience in 
the subject covered; and 
• relevant to the practitioner’s immediate or long term needs in relation to the 
practitioner’s professional development and to the practice of law.166 
                                                        
162  Ibid. 
163  Ibid, ‘Explanatory Note’, at the end of the section on ‘Ethics and Professional Responsibility’. 
164  Continuing Professional Development Rules 2007 (Vic) r 5.2(b); App A. 
165  Law Society of New South Wales, Revised Professional Conduct and Practice Rules, Solicitors Rules; 
New South Wales Solicitors’ Rules , pt 42. 
166  Law Society of New South Wales, Revised Professional Conduct and Practice Rules, Solicitors Rules, 
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9.137 Unless specifically required of a particular practitioner as a condition of his or 
her practising certificate, however, the compulsory areas set out in the Legal 
Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) do not include ‘Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility’.167  
Submissions and consultations 
9.138 In IP 33, the ALRC asked whether there are sufficient systems in place to ensure 
that lawyers are properly informed about their professional ethics and responsibilities 
in relation to the making and maintaining of claims of client legal privilege;168 and 
what is the best way of ensuring lawyers are properly informed about their professional 
ethics and responsibilities in relation to: (a) making and maintaining claims of client 
legal privilege; and (b) identifying privileged communications at the time of 
creation.169 
9.139 Submissions and consultations endorsed the importance of educating lawyers 
thoroughly about their ethical responsibilities in relation to client legal privilege 
claims—and agreed that this would help deal with some of the perceived problems. 
ASIC, for example, commented that: 
initiatives that promote the education of lawyers concerning their legal and ethical 
obligations in making and maintaining privilege claims will potentially assist in 
reducing the extent to which legal privilege may be invalidly claimed.170 
9.140 This view also was clearly put in other submissions.171 While the emphasis was 
principally upon post-admission education, some comments also focused upon pre-
admission issues. 
9.141 Consultations with legal academics evidenced a strong commitment to the 
importance of ethics in the law curriculum. It was suggested that best practice in 
ethical education is that ethical matters be embedded throughout the law school 
curriculum as they arise, rather than having, for example, a single ethics unit. It was 
admitted, however, that it is challenging to find the best place, or places, to achieve 
this.172 If privilege is included as part of an ethics component taught in first year, the 
                                                        
167  The compulsory areas are: the principles of equal employment opportunity; the law relating to 
discrimination and harassment; occupational health and safety law; employment law; and the 
management of legal practice consistent with such matters: Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW), 
r 176(1). 
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172  Academics of the Law School of the Australian National University, Consultation LPP 27, Canberra, 
1 June 2007; B McKillop, M Kumar and F Beaupert, Consultation LPP 16, Sydney, 21 May 2007; 
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students may find it very confusing because they have little knowledge of the law at 
that stage.173 
9.142 Legal academics also considered it important to try to inculcate a ‘resilience’ in 
law students—so that, for example, as practitioners they would be able to cope with 
‘the culture of law firms’ and to deal with the requests of ‘powerful partners’ or 
clients.174 
9.143 Parker commented that:  
Privilege really is one of those areas where the clients, the courts and the community 
are completely and utterly dependent on lawyers fulfilling their ethical obligations 
properly. This must be one area where it is particularly important that aspiring 
lawyers understand that their own conduct will be crucial in making sure the rationale 
of the privilege is met properly.175 
9.144 NSW Young Lawyers emphasised the importance of taking a multi-faceted view 
of education. 
The ethics components taught, as part of the practical legal training courses that 
individuals have to undertake to become a legal practitioner, should include a strict 
curriculum to ensure that individuals are clearly aware of their ethical obligations in 
relation to claims of client legal privilege. 
The professional conduct committees of the various legal bodies should play a role in 
ensuring lawyers are properly informed about their professional ethics and 
responsibilities in relation to making and maintaining claims of client legal privilege. 
Professional conduct committees can do this by providing advisory services to 
practitioners who are unsure whether their particular circumstances would allow them 
to maintain a claim of client legal privilege so as to encourage only proper claims of 
client legal privilege. Such services should be actively promoted and lawyers should 
be strongly encouraged to use those services when in doubt as to making or 
maintaining a claim of client legal privilege.176 
9.145 The Law Council also reinforced the need for effective continuing professional 
education for all practitioners. It commented that: 
It is important for the legal profession to have effective educational systems in place 
to ensure that all practitioners, no matter how inexperienced or senior they may be, 
keep up to date with their professional ethics and responsibilities. The Law Council 
considered that this method is the best way to ensure that practising lawyers are 
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informed about their professional and ethical obligations in relation to both making 
claims of privilege and identifying privileged communications.177 
9.146 The Law Council provided a number of examples of how client legal privilege 
issues have been emphasised in continuing legal education schemes in Victoria, NSW 
and Queensland. For example, it cited the ‘pro-active approach’ of the Law Institute of 
Victoria, which has provided six seminars in the last three years on the subject and the 
example of a seminar on client legal privilege run in conjunction with the ATO. This 
seminar involved ‘a panel of experienced practitioners and ATO staff, exploring how 
[client legal privilege] claims made as part of an ATO investigation were resolved in 
practice’.178 
9.147 In relation to the mandatory continuing legal education requirement in NSW, the 
Law Society of NSW submitted that, while it was ‘not aware of deficiencies in the 
method of training lawyers or in the requirements for continuing legal education’,  
[it] would not oppose giving consideration to modifying mandatory Continuing Legal 
Education (CLE) requirements, so that a solicitor must attend a minimum number of 
seminars over a specifically regulated period on the subject of legal client privilege 
and the associated obligations of lawyers in claiming privilege on behalf of clients.179 
9.148 The Law Council reported that the ethics strategy in Queensland was ‘still in its 
infancy having begun in 2006’ and that ‘the current strategy has an early intervention 
approach which focuses on establishing ethical sensitivity and decision-making skills 
from law school on through admission’.180 
9.149 The NSW Bar Association considered that education was crucial in relation to 
specific practices where errors of judgment were easily made. A particular example 
given was about the dangers of ‘over-masking’, where, it was submitted, guidelines 
could be published in the Law Society Journal and the Bar News ‘in order to inculcate 
improved masking practices’.181 
9.150 Other educational strategies identified in submissions were the provision of 
advisory bulletins on a continuing basis to practitioners and the availability of 
                                                        
177  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. See also Victoria Legal Aid, Submission 
LPP 55, 14 June 2007; Taxation Institute of Australia, Submission LPP 54, 15 June 2007. 
178  Law Council of Australia, Submission LPP 26, 4 June 2007. 
179  Law Society of New South Wales, Submission LPP 40, 1 June 2007. The Taxation Institute of Australia 
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information through dedicated officers or telephone ‘hotlines’ to assist in providing up 
to date, practical information in relation to ethics and professional responsibilities.182 
9.151 The Law Council drew attention to the Ethics Rulings of the Law Institute of 
Victoria’s Ethics Committee, which are published in the monthly Law Institute Journal 
and detailed on the Institute’s website with other ethical information and guidance.183  
9.152 There was support for continuing education of other kinds as well—not merely 
those associated with the renewal of practising certificates. This is particularly relevant 
where lawyers do not hold practising certificates, which may be the case, for example, 
with some in-house counsel. ACLA noted that 
Regardless of any changes that may be recommended in the law, there is a need for 
the ongoing education of lawyers and others in regard to law and practice and relevant 
ethical requirements in this area. ACLA has been—and will continue to be—active in 
promoting programs of this kind for all in-house counsel and expects to do so in the 
future.184 
9.153 A specific example of such ongoing education is ACLA’s manual, Ethics for In-
house Counsel, which includes a section on ‘best practice guidelines’ in relation to 
privilege. This states: 
In-house counsel: 
• have an obligation to ensure that their organisations are aware of the 
conditions under which privilege will apply or could be claimed 
• have a duty to advise employees within their organisation that they are not 
and cannot be their personal legal adviser in any situation where that could 
conflict with their duty to represent the organisation itself. They should 
advise such employees to take separate representation 
• must always keep in mind who is the client? Counsel should regard the 
organization itself as the client 
• may make a claim for privilege if a case for privilege exists but not if it is 
clearly known that the privilege has in fact been lost. 185 
9.154 A further strategy suggested by National Legal Aid was the introduction of 
‘appropriate induction courses’ by employers, which  
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would assist to reinforce and contextualise the professional ethics studies undertaken 
at university. Continuing professional development programs should also address 
issues relating to professional ethics and responsibilities.186 
9.155 An improvement in the internal review practices of law firms also was 
advocated. Parker suggested that best practice internal monitoring within law firms 
would include undertaking an ‘ethical audit or review’, to ensure that each work team’s 
claims of privilege were appropriately made.187 Professional associations could 
usefully be involved in identifying and disseminating law firm best practice in this 
area. 
9.156 A specific question in IP 33 concerned whether communications should be 
identified as privileged at the time of creation. NSW Young Lawyers responded that: 
Obvious difficulties may arise where lawyers, under the pressures of time, are put in a 
position of determining whether certain communications are privileged. Therefore, 
identifying privileged communications at the time of creation is usually a matter of 
practice for most lawyers. 
However lawyers should be made aware of their professional responsibilities in 
identifying privileged communications at the time of creation through the ethics and 
professional conduct committees of their law society or institute on a regular basis.188 
9.157 While identifying communications as privileged at the time of their creation is 
good practice, it is not necessarily a straightforward exercise—particularly in the 
context of the ‘dominant purpose’ test.189 Peter Brereton commented that: 
It is often very difficult, or impossible, to determine whether a document is privileged 
merely by looking at it, particularly applying the dominant purpose test. Even with the 
benefit of speaking with the author and the recipient of the document it can be 
difficult to determine whether a document reflects a privileged communication. The 
challenge can be especially acute in the context of communications involving in-
house counsel and also where there is a lengthy gap between the time of the 
communication and the time when the question of privilege arises. These difficulties 
mean that there is a wider area in which minds can legitimately differ about whether a 
document is privileged than we would like to think. 
The most important time for giving attention to the question of privilege is at the time 
of communication. Lawyers should ensure that a privileged communication is marked 
as privileged and be equally vigilant to ensure that only privileged communications 
are so marked. This is a discipline that is important for all lawyers, but is of special 
significance for in-house counsel.190 
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Requirements for admission to practice 
9.158 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that university and other legal education 
programs on legal ethics and professional responsibility forming part of the required 
areas of knowledge for admission purposes, should include specific consideration of 
the ethical responsibility of lawyers in relation to claims of client legal privilege.191 
The ALRC also proposed that the legal ethics requirement forming part of the practical 
legal training competencies in rules governing admission to practice as a lawyer should 
include the responsibility of lawyers in relation to client legal privilege claims.192  
9.159 Submissions were generally supportive of these proposals.193 National Legal 
Aid added that: 
The earlier in their law courses students are introduced to the ethical responsibilities 
of lawyering the more likely an ethical approach will be inculcated in them. Students 
need to understand the ethical context in which laws operate at the time that they 
study those laws.194 
9.160 While supportive of the proposal that the requirements for admission to practice 
should include a specific consideration of the ethical responsibility of lawyers in 
relation to client legal privilege claims, the Law Council emphasised the role of state 
and territory admission authorities and the Council of Australian Law Deans. 
In some jurisdictions the requirements for legal ethics training and admission to 
practice are set by the various Legal Professional Admission Boards and, accordingly, 
the Law Council suggests that the ALRC seek the views of those bodies in relation to 
this proposal. 
The successful completion of a Graduate Practical Legal Training course is a 
requirement for admission in most Australian jurisdictions. The Australasian Practical 
Legal Education Council (APLEC) has developed Competency Standards for Entry 
Level Lawyers. These Competency Standards provide a blueprint for the content and 
standard of PLT courses in Australia. The Competency Standards for ‘Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility’ do not specifically address client legal privilege, but do 
require students to show competence in ‘discharging the legal duties and obligations 
of legal practitioners’. The ALRC may wish to raise this proposal with APLEC.195   
Continuing legal education 
9.161 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed that continuing legal education programs should 
include a regular review of the law and responsibilities in relation to the making and 
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maintaining of a claim of client legal privilege.196 This was generally supported in 
submissions.197 
9.162 The Law Society of NSW objected, however, to what it saw as the 
‘interventionist’ nature of the proposal. 
The Law Society is very committed to ensuring that the mandatory continuing legal 
education scheme in New South Wales sets a standard for continuing education that 
ensures that its members are continually equipped with appropriate knowledge to 
practise properly. This scheme includes mandatory seminars on ethics and 
professional responsibility. The mandatory continuing legal education scheme will be 
amended as and when necessary to reflect changes in the law and the community’s 
expectations of legal practitioners in New South Wales, without the need for 
intervention by the Commonwealth government.198 
9.163 National Legal Aid supported the proposal, noting that ‘a regular review only is 
proposed, rather than an imposition of particular programs’.199 
9.164 ACLA agreed with the emphasis on continuing legal education and commented: 
ACLA is proactive and focused on educating in-house lawyers on ethics and other 
professional responsibilities, as it potentially impacts in-house jobs in a very 
fundamental way. 
At ACLA we will continue to focus significant training on client legal privilege. The 
training deals with the ‘black letter’ aspects of privilege, but also the important 
interpersonal skills necessary to deal with international clients.200 
9.165 Parker suggested that education and ethical guidelines about privilege should 
include information about independence of in-house counsel.201 
9.166 In DP 73, the ALRC also proposed that professional associations should issue to 
their members ‘best practice’ notes from time to time, about the law and 
responsibilities in relation to making and maintaining a claim of client legal 
privilege.202 This received general support in submissions, with some qualifications.203 
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9.167 The Law Society of NSW was opposed to this proposal, however, ‘on the basis 
that it creates unnecessary regulation of the Law Society’s activities’: 
The Law Society is very committed to ensuring that mandatory continuing legal 
education scheme in New South Wales sets a standard for continuing education that 
ensures that its members are continually equipped with appropriate knowledge to 
practise properly. As well, publications issued by the Law Society such as the Law 
Society Journal and ‘Monday Briefs’, which are sent to each member either in print or 
electronically, cover issues of ethics and professional responsibility on a regular 
basis.204 
Integrity and tax advisers 
9.168 In DP 73, the ALRC proposed the extension of the protection of client legal 
privilege to tax advice.205 This led the ATO to suggest that there should be safeguards 
to ensure the professional integrity of tax advisers, similar to those proposed with 
respect to lawyers. 
This issue does create some potential difficulties because, unlike lawyers, there is no 
compulsion of a registered tax agent to be a member of a professional association. 
Also, unlike lawyers, tax advisers have no overarching obligations as officers of the 
court. For these reasons, there may not be adequate means for ensuring tax advisers 
are accountable for misuse of the tax advice statutory privilege. 
The Tax Office notes that the ALRC has proposed that a claim that a document is a 
tax advice document may be required to be certified by a lawyer. However, we would 
be more comfortable if there was some direct oversight of the professional integrity of 
accountants involved in tax privilege claims. A lawyer who was asked to certify a 
claim would inevitably be reliant on what the relevant accountant told them. 
Therefore, we consider that mechanisms to ensure that the integrity of accountants is 
maintained would also be appropriate.206 
9.169 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA) submitted that 
accountants—and not only lawyers—ought to be allowed to certify a claim to 
privilege, where such certification had been requested by a federal body under 
Proposal 8–7. In this context, the ICAA noted the professional codes that apply to tax 
advisers and submitted that 
Whilst we acknowledge that lawyers, being officers of the court, are governed under a 
strict professional conduct and disciplinary frameworks, accountants and tax agents 
are also subjected to similar regimes … [and] are subjected to a professional code of 
conduct and if these are breached, disciplinary sanctions apply. The new proposed 
legislative framework for tax practitioners contains a more comprehensive code of 
conduct and a wider range of disciplinary sanctions. In addition members of 
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professional bodies, such as the Institute, have to abide by a more strict code of ethics 
and associated disciplinary regime.207  
ALRC’s views 
9.170 The ALRC’s view is that there is considerable scope for improving the various 
levels of legal education to identify client legal privilege issues more particularly—
both prior to and after admission to practice—to ensure a better understanding of the 
obligations of lawyers in relation to privilege claims within the context of a lawyer’s 
overall ethical responsibilities to the court.  
9.171 For example, the stipulation in the requirements as to the legal knowledge for 
admission to practice that ‘privilege’ be covered under the topic of Evidence, should be 
amended to include an express reference to ethical obligations in relation to, inter alia, 
making claims that communications are the subject of client legal privilege. This level 
of particularity also should be included in relation to the competencies specified for 
practical legal training; in mandatory continuing legal education requirements; and in 
relevant specialist accreditation training. 
9.172 Legal professional associations should utilise a range of communication 
strategies to identify and publicise best practice in relation to client legal privilege 
claims—and ethical issues more generally—and support their members through the 
provision of advisory services, such as the existing telephone ‘hotlines’. 
9.173 As discussed in Chapter 6, the ALRC recommends that client legal privilege 
should apply also to tax advice documents provided by independent professional 
accounting advisers.208 Further, in Chapter 8, the ALRC recommends that, where a 
federal body so requests, a claimant may be required to have a claim of client legal 
privilege certified by a lawyer.209 The consequence of these recommendations is that, 
while the tax advice may attract privilege, the independent professional accounting 
adviser is not able to provide the certification, if required by a federal body. However, 
as a federal body may not require certification of the claim of privilege, the 
independent professional accounting adviser may act in a gate-keeping role in relation 
to the making of the claim. Therefore, while the ALRC does not consider it 
appropriate, in the context of this Inquiry, to make recommendations about the 
continuing education and disciplinary frameworks applicable to professional 
accounting advisers, the ALRC agrees, of course, that it is best practice to ensure that 
such advisers maintain high standards of professional integrity. Moreover, given the 
importance of the gate-keeping role—if the tax advice privilege were to be adopted—
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accounting bodies should provide appropriate education and training on an ongoing 
basis, with respect to the operation of the tax advice privilege. 
Recommendation 9–3 University and other legal education programs on 
legal ethics and professional responsibility that are accepted for admission 
purposes should include specific consideration of the ethical responsibility of 
lawyers in relation to making and maintaining a claim of client legal privilege.  
Recommendation 9–4 The study of legal ethics requirement found in 
state and territory rules and Uniform Admission Rules governing admission to 
practice as a lawyer should include the responsibility of lawyers in relation to 
making and maintaining a claim of client legal privilege. 
Recommendation 9–5 Continuing legal education programs (including 
those required for the maintenance of a current practising certificate) should 
include a regular review of the law and responsibilities in relation to the making 
and maintaining of a claim of client legal privilege. 
Recommendation 9–6 Legal professional associations should issue to 
their members ‘best practice’ notes from time to time, about the law and 
responsibilities in relation to making and maintaining a claim of client legal 
privilege. 
  
 Appendix 1. Table of Legislation 
 
Commonwealth legislation containing coercive information-
gathering powers 
 
Federal body1 Commonwealth legislation 
Australian Building and Construction 
Commissioner 
Building and Construction Industry 
Improvement Act 2005 
Australian Crime Commission Australian Crime Commission Act 
2002 
Surveillance Devices Act 2004 
Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 
Australian Commission for Law 
Enforcement Integrity 
Law Enforcement Integrity 
Commissioner Act 2006 
Surveillance Devices Act 2004 
Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 
Australian Communications and Media 
Authority 
Broadcasting Services Act 1992 
Interactive Gambling Act 2001 
Radiocommunications Act 1992  
Telecommunications Act 1997 
Telecommunications (Consumer 
Protection and Service Standards) Act 
1999 
                                                        
1  The name of departments and agencies used in this Report were current as at 1 December 2007 prior to 
the issue of the Administrative Arrangements Order on 3 December 2007. 
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Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission  
Trade Practices Act 1974 
Australian Customs Service Customs Act 1901 
Australian Energy Regulator National Electricity (South Australia) 
Act 1996 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) The legislation listed for the AFP is 
by way of example only. There are 
numerous acts containing, for 
example, AFP powers of search and 
seizure 
Crimes Act 19142 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
Surveillance Devices Act 2004 
Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 
Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority 
Fisheries Management Act 1991 
Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority Australian Maritime Safety Authority 
Act 1990 
Occupational Health and Safety 
(Maritime Industry) Act 1993 
Navigation Act 1912 
Australian Pesticides and Veterinary 
Medicines Authority 
Agricultural and Veterinary 
Chemicals (Administration) Act 1992 
Agricultural and Veterinary 
Chemicals Code Act 1994 
                                                        
2  A number of other federal investigatory bodies have powers of search and seizure under the Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth) s 3E.  
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Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA) 
Banking Act 1959 
Insurance Act 1973 
Australian Quarantine Inspection Service Australian Meat and Livestock 
Industry Act 1997 
Export Control Act 1982 
Imported Food Control Act 1992 
Quarantine Act 1908 
Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) 
Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 
Corporations Act 2001 
Insurance Contracts Act 1984 
APRA, ASIC Life Insurance Act 1995 
Retirement Savings Accounts Act 
1997 
Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act 1993 
Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation 
Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 
Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 
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Australian Taxation Office Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 
1986 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
Product Grants and Benefits 
Administration Act 2000 
Petroleum Resources Rent Tax 
Assessment Act 1987 
Superannuation Contributions Tax 
(Assessment and Collection) Act 1997 
Superannuation Contributions Tax 
(Members of Constitutionally 
Protected Funds) Assessment and 
Collection Act 1997 
Superannuation Guarantee 
(Administration) Act 1992 
Taxation Administration Act 1953 
Termination Payments Tax 
(Assessment and Collection) Act 1997 
Australian Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Centre 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-
Terrorism Financing Act 2006 
Financial Transaction Reports Act 
1988 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau Transport Safety Investigation Act 
2003 
Centrelink A New Tax System (Family 
Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 
Farm Household Support Act 1992 
Social Security Act 1991 
Social Security (Administration) Act 
1999 
Student Assistance Act 1973 
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Child Support Agency Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 
Child Support (Registration and 
Collection) Act 1988 
Civil Aviation Safety Authority Civil Aviation Act 1988 
Comcare Asbestos-Related Claims 
(Management of Commonwealth 
Liabilities) Act 2005  
Occupational Health and Safety Act 
1991 
Safety, Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 1988  
Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
Commonwealth Ombudsman Ombudsman Act 1976 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry 
Wheat Marketing Act 1989 
Department of Defence and the Australian 
Defence Force 
Defence Act 1903 
Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 
Department of Environment and Water 
Resources 
Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
Department of Health and Ageing: 
Aged Care 
Aged Care Act 1997 
Department of Health and Ageing: 
Therapeutic Goods Administration 
Therapeutic Goods Act 1989  
Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship 
Migration Act 1958 
Gene Technology Regulator Gene Technology Act 2000 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 
1975 
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Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission Act 1986 
Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia Bankruptcy Act 1966 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
Inspector of Transport Security Inspector of Transport Security Act 
2006 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security Act 1986 
Inspector-General of Taxation Inspector-General of Taxation Act 
2003 
Medicare Australia  Medicare Australia Act 1973 
Migration Agents Registration Authority Migration Act 1958 
National Offshore Petroleum Safety 
Authority 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 
1967 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner Privacy Act 1988 
Royal Commissions Royal Commissions Act 1902  
Workplace Ombudsman Workplace Relations Act 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 2. List of Submissions 
 
 
Name Submission Number Date 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Submission LPP 111 6 Nov 2007 
Allens Arthur Robinson Submission LPP 107 5 Nov 2007 
Attorney General’s Department of New 
South Wales 
Submission LPP 14 9 May 2007 
Australasian Compliance Institute Submission LPP 79 26 Oct 2007 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited; BHP Billiton Limited; Foster’s 
Group Limited; National Australia Bank 
Limited; Orica Limited; Telstra Corporation 
Limited; The Shell Company of Australia 
Limited; Westpac Banking Corporation; 
Zinifex Limited 
Submission LPP 30 4 June 2007 
Australian Commission for Law 
Enforcement Integrity 
Submission LPP 69 20 July 2007 
Australian Communications and Media 
Authority 
Submission LPP 20 29 May 2007 
Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission 
Submission LPP 2 
Submission LPP 53 
Submission LPP 75 
Submission LPP 92 
14 Mar 2007 
13 June 2007 
14 Aug 2007 
26 Oct 2007 
Australian Corporate Lawyers Association Submission LPP 66 
Submission LPP 83 
22 June 2007 
31 Oct 2007 
Australian Council of Trade Unions Submission LPP 88 1 Nov 2007 
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Australian Crime Commission Submission LPP 8 29 June 2007 
Australian Customs Service Submission LPP 56 13 June 2007 
Australian Federal Police Submission LPP 115 29 Nov 2007 
Australian Financial Markets Association Submission LPP 67 
Submission LPP 95 
22 June 2007 
2 Nov 2007 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority Submission LPP 37 5 June 2007 
Australian Government Department of 
Health and Ageing 
Submission LPP 51 17 July 2007 
Australian Government Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship 
Submission LPP 46 
Submission LPP 73 
12 June 2007 
4 July 2007 
Australian Government Inspector of 
Transport Security 
Submission LPP 7 9 May 2007 
Australian Government Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner 
Submission LPP 71 29 June 2007 
Australian Government Office of the Gene 
Technology Regulator 
Submission LPP 68 25 June 2007 
Australian Government Solicitor Submission LPP 50 
Submission LPP 113 
13 June 2007 
5 Nov 2007 
Australian Institute of Company Directors Submission LPP 43 8 June 2007 
Australian Pesticides and Veterinary 
Medicines Authority 
Submission LPP 45 6 June 2007 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Submission LPP 74 
Submission LPP 91 
6 July 2007 
1 Nov 2007 
Australian Quarantine and Inspection 
Service 
Submission LPP 16 29 May 2007 
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Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 
Submission LPP 5 
Submission LPP 70 
Submission LPP 84 
29 Mar 2007 
29 June 2007 
31 Oct 2007 
Australian Taxation Office Submission LPP 65 
Submission LPP 81 
22 June 2007 
29 Oct 2007 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis 
Centre 
Submission LPP 31 4 June 2007 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau Submission LPP 34 28 May 2007 
BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance Submission LPP 21 1 June 2007 
Business Coalition for Tax Reform Submission LPP 63 
Submission LPP 96 
19 June 2007 
2 Nov 2007 
S Byrne Submission LPP 19 4 June 2007 
S Byrne and G Lambert Submission LPP 102 5 Nov 2007 
Centrelink Submission LPP 35 17 July 2007 
S Cirillo and R Withana Submission LPP 9 10 May 2007 
Civil Liberties Australia (ACT) Inc Submission LPP 86 1 Nov 2007 
P Clay and V Tekic Submission LPP 11 30 April 2007 
Comcare Submission LPP 64 14 June 2007 
Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions 
Submission LPP 61 
Submission LPP 101 
12 June 2007 
2 Nov 2007 
Commonwealth Ombudsman Submission LPP 47 12 June 2007 
Confidential Submission LPP 48 12 June 2007 
Confidential Submission LPP 60 18 June 2007 
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Confidential Submission LPP 103 5 Nov 2007 
Confidential Submission LPP 108 14 Nov 2007 
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy 
Union (Construction and General Division) 
Submission LPP 90 1 Nov 2007 
Corporate Tax Association Submission LPP 32 
Submission LPP 100 
4 June 2007 
2 Nov 2007 
CPA Australia Ltd Submission LPP 44 
Submission LPP 98 
14 June 2007 
2 Nov 2007 
R Desiatnik Submission LPP 24 1 June 2007 
A Evans Submission LPP 4 27 Mar 2007 
Federation of Community Legal Centres 
(Vic) Inc 
Submission LPP 38 5 June 2007 
Fitzroy Legal Service Submission LPP 29 4 June 2007 
S Goodwin Submission LPP 112 12 Nov 2007 
Grant Thornton Association Inc Submission LPP 97 2 Nov 2007 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority Submission LPP 17 1 June 2007 
J Hannaford, Examiner, Australian Crime 
Commission 
Submission LPP 114 19 Nov 2007 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission 
Submission LPP 28 
Submission LPP 99 
4 June 2007 
2 Nov 2007 
Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia Submission LPP 62 
Submission LPP 105 
20 June 2007 
5 Nov 2007 
Insolvency Practitioners Association Submission LPP 109 6 Nov 2007 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security 
Submission LPP 22 1 June 2007 
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Inspector-General of Taxation Submission LPP 13 16 May 2007 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia 
Submission LPP 1 
Submission LPP 25 
Submission LPP 82 
Submission LPP 89 
14 Mar 2007 
4 June 2007 
31 Oct 2007 
1 Nov 2007 
Intellectual Property Research Institute of 
Australia 
Submission LPP 104 
Submission LPP 117 
5 Nov 2007 
14 Dec 2007 
K Kendall Submission LPP 57 31 May 2007 
S Laver Submission LPP 110 7 Nov 2007 
Law Council of Australia Submission LPP 26 
Submission LPP 94 
4 June 2007 
1 Nov 2007 
Law Society of New South Wales Submission LPP 40 
Submission LPP 93 
1 June 2007 
31 Oct 2007 
Medicare Australia Submission LPP 6 10 April 2007 
National Institute of Accountants Submission LPP 59 
Submission LPP 87 
20 June 2007 
1 Nov 2007 
National Legal Aid Submission LPP 52 
Submission LPP 106 
13 June 2007 
5 Nov 2007 
National Offshore Petroleum Safety 
Authority 
Submission LPP 23 1 June 2007 
D Nelson Submission LPP 42 
Submission LPP 78 
9 June 2007 
19 Oct 2007 
New South Wales Bar Association Submission LPP 41 5 June 2007 
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New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties 
Inc 
Submission LPP 39 5 June 2007 
NSW Young Lawyers Submission LPP 49 12 June 2007 
 Submission LPP 116 1 Nov 2007 
R O’Connor Submission LPP 36 5 June 2007 
C O’Donnell Submission LPP 10 
Submission LPP 80 
16 May 2007 
26 Oct 2007 
Office of the Australian Building and 
Construction Commissioner 
Submission LPP 33 4 June 2007 
QBE Insurance Group Submission LPP 58 18 June 2007 
T Sim Submission LPP 3 5 Dec 2006 
T Smyth and C Strauch Submission LPP 12 30 May 2007 
Sussex Street Community Law Service Inc Submission LPP 15 30 May 2007 
Taxation Institute of Australia Submission LPP 54 15 June 2007 
I Temby Submission LPP 72 19 July 2007 
K Thompson Submission LPP 76 7 Sept 2007 
I Turnbull Submission LPP 18 3 June 2007 
Victoria Legal Aid Submission LPP 55 14 June 2007 
Westpac Banking Corporation Submission LPP 85 1 Nov 2007 
Whistleblowers Australia Submission LPP 77 4 Nov 2007 
M Wyles Submission LPP 27 4 June 2007 
 
 Appendix 3. List of Consultations 
 
 
Name Location 
Academics, Law School, University of Western Australia  Perth 
Allens Arthur Robinson Sydney 
Australian Bankers’ Association  Sydney 
Australian Corporate Lawyers Association Sydney; Melbourne 
Australian Crime Commission Sydney 
Australian Federal Police Canberra 
Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department Canberra 
Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service Sydney-Canberra  (by 
phone) 
Australian Taxation Office Sydney 
R Baxt, Freehills  Sydney 
Justice P Bergin, Supreme Court of New South Wales Sydney 
A Black, Mallesons Stephen Jaques Sydney (by phone) 
S Bennett, Sparke Helmore Lawyers Sydney 
G Bloomfield, V Holmes, L Honcope, P Spender, College of 
Law, Australian National University  
Canberra 
A Brown, Law Society of New South Wales Sydney 
The Hon T Cole Sydney 
R Desiatnik Sydney 
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Justice G Eames, Supreme Court of Victoria Melbourne 
Federation of Community Legal Centres (Vic) Inc Melbourne 
Justice T Gray, Supreme Court of South Australia Adelaide 
G Healy and A Eastwood, Freehills Sydney 
Insolvency Practitioners Association Sydney 
Institute of Chartered Accountants and representatives of 
Deloitte Touche & Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KPMG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Sydney 
D Jackson QC, J Sheahan SC, and R Kelly Sydney 
Law Council of Australia Canberra 
Law Society of Western Australia Perth 
Litigation Law and Practice Committee, Law Society of 
New South Wales  
Sydney 
E Magner, School of Law, University of New England Sydney-Armidale (by 
phone) 
Chief Justice W Martin, Justice N Owen, Supreme Court of 
Western Australia 
Perth 
Justice R McDougall, Supreme Court of New South Wales Sydney 
B McKillop, M Kumar and F Beaupert, Faculty of Law, 
University of Sydney 
Sydney 
Members of the South Australian Bar Association Adelaide 
Members of the Victorian Bar Melbourne 
Members of the Western Australian Bar Association Perth 
New South Wales Bar Association Sydney 
New South Wales Public Defenders Office Sydney 
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Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions 
Canberra 
Office of the Legal Services Commissioner Sydney 
Officers from the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security 
Sydney 
C Parker, Law School, University of Melbourne Sydney 
Regulatory lawyers of Clayton Utz  Sydney 
J Segal Sydney 
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AAT Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
AAT Act Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)  
ABA American Bar Association 
ABCC Office of the Australian Building and Construction 
Commissioner 
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ACC Australian Crime Commission 
ACC Act Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) 
ACCC Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
ACLA Australian Corporate Lawyers Association 
ACLEI Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 
ACMA Australian Communications and Media Authority 
ACS Australian Customs Service 
ACT Australian Capital Territory   
ACTU Australian Council of Trade Unions 
ADR Alternative dispute resolution 
AER Australian Energy Regulator 
AFMA Australian Fisheries Management Authority 
AFP Australian Federal Police 
AFP Act Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) 
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AFP Guidelines General Guidelines Between the Australian Federal Police 
and the Law Council of Australia as to the Execution of 
Search Warrants on Lawyers’ Premises, Law Societies and 
Like Institutions Where a Claim of Legal Professional 
Privilege is Made (1997) 
AGS Australian Government Solicitor 
AIC Australian Intelligence Community 
AICD Australian Institute of Company Directors 
ALRC Australian Law Reform Commission 
ALRC 26 Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence, ALRC 26 
(1985) 
ALRC 38 Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence, ALRC 38 
(1987) 
ALRC 95 Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation: 
Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties in Australia, 
ALRC 95 (2002) 
ALRC 102 Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission and Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 102 (2005) 
AML/CTF Act Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing 
Act 2006 (Cth) 
AMSA Australian Maritime Safety Authority 
AMSA Act Australian Maritime Safety Authority Act 1990 (Cth) 
AM & S Europe AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European 
Communities [1983] 1 QB 878 
APLEC Australasian Professional Legal Education Council 
APRA Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
APRA Act Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth) 
APVMA Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority 
AQIS Australian Quarantine Inspection Service 
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ARC Administrative Review Council 
ARC Act Asbestos-Related Claims (Management of Commonwealth 
Liabilities) Act 2005 (Cth) 
ASC Australian Securities Commission (now the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission) 
ASC Act  Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 (Cth) (since 
repealed) 
ASIC Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
ASIC Act Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 
(Cth) 
ASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
ASIO Act Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) 
ATO Australian Taxation Office 
ATO Guidelines Guidelines agreed between the Commissioner of Taxation 
and the Law Council of Australia in relation to the exercise 
of the ATO’s access powers at lawyers’ premises in 
circumstances where a claim of client legal privilege is made  
ATO Manual Australian Taxation Office, Access and Information 
Gathering Manual 
ATSB Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
AUSTRAC Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
AWB Australian Wheat Board 
AWB Royal 
Commission 
Inquiry into AWB and the Oil-for-Food Programme 
BATAS British American Tobacco Australasian Services 
BCII Act Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 
(Cth) 
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Caltex Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty 
Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477 
Carter Carter v The Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davy and 
Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121 
CASA Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
CCBE Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European 
Union  
CDPP Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CFMEU Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 
Civil Liberties 
Australia 
Civil Liberties Australia (ACT) Inc 
Companies Code Companies (New South Wales) Code 
CSA Child Support Agency 
CSDA Act Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency Act 1997 (Cth) 
Daniels The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 
543 
Dawson Review Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices 
Act (2003) 
DHS Department of Human Services 
DIAC Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
DOTARS Department of Transport and Regional Services 
DPP Act Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) 
DSD Defence Signals Directorate 
Edward Report The Professional Secret, Confidentiality and Legal 
Professional Privilege in the Nine Member States of the 
European Community (1976) 
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EPBC Act Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 (Cth) 
ESI Guidelines Guidelines to cover the resolution of client legal privilege 
claims in respect of electronically-stored information  
Esso Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation 
(1999) 201 CLR 49 
EU European Union 
Fish Report Regulated Legal Professionals and Professional Privilege 
within the European Union, the European Economic Area 
and Switzerland, and Certain Other European Jurisdictions 
(2004) 
FTR Act Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth) 
GM Genetically modified 
GMOs Genetically modified organisms 
GTR Gene Technology Regulator 
HREOC Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
HREOC Act Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 
(Cth) 
ICAA Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia 
IGIS Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 
IGIS Act Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 
(Cth) 
Ingot Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity 
Capital Markets Ltd (2006) 67 NSWLR 91 
IP 33 Australian Law Reform Commission, Client Legal Privilege 
and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP 33 (2007)  
IPRIA Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia 
IRS Internal Revenue Service (US) 
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ITS Inspector of Transport Security 
ITSA Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia 
JSCCS Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities 
Law Council  Law Council of Australia 
LEIC Act Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth) 
MARA Migration Agents Registration Authority 
McNulty 
Memorandum 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
(2006) (US) 
Medicare  Medicare Australia 
Morgan Grenfell R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of 
Income Tax [2003] 1 AC 563 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
NOPSA National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority 
NSW New South Wales 
NSWLRC New South Wales Law Reform Commission  
OGTR Office of the Gene Technology Regulator 
OHS Act Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 (Cth) 
OITS Office of the Inspector of Transport Safety 
OPC Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
OWS Office of Workplace Relations 
Pratt Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 
207 ALR 217 
Propend Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance (1997) 188 
CLR 501 
PTA Public Transport Authority 
PWC PricewaterhouseCoopers 
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Pyneboard Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 
152 CLR 328 
QLRC Queensland Law Reform Commission 
RCASIA Royal Commission on Australia’s Security and Intelligence 
Agencies (established by Letters Patent on 17 May 1983 and 
concluded in 1984) 
SCAG Standing Committee of Attorneys-General  
SRC Act Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1998 (Cth) 
TGA Therapeutic Goods Administration 
TG Act Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) 
Thompson 
Memorandum 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
(2003) (US) 
TPA Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States 
VLRC Victorian Law Reform Commission 
Westpac Westpac Banking Corporation 
Westpac Westpac Banking Corporation v 789TEN Pty Ltd [2005] 
NSWCA 321 
WRA Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) 
Yuill  Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales v Yuill 
(1991) 172 CLR 319 
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Administrative Appeals Tribunal ............................................................1.15, 3.53–3.66 
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Auditors............................................................................................................3.41–3.48 
AUSTRAC  See Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC)   
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Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI)........4.20–4.28, 5.145 
Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA).......................4.184–4.190 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) ........................4.35–4.43 
Australian Crime Commission (ACC) 
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position on privilege .......................................................................5.75, 6.147, 6.177 
Australian Customs Service .........................................................................4.160–4.166 
Australian Defence Force (ADF) .................................................................4.199–4.201 
Australian Energy Regulator (AER) ............................................................4.202–4.203 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) ......................................................................4.13–4.19 
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Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) ................................4.176–4.178 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) ...............................4.198, 4.214–4.218 
Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority .........................4.135–4.141 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 
functions and powers ...................................................................................4.53–4.61 
position on privilege ...........................................................................5.48–5.49, 5.64 
Australian Quarantine Inspection Service (AQIS) .......................................4.171–4.175 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
functions and powers ..........................................................................3.46, 4.44–4.52 
position on privilege .............................................................5.50–5.61, 5.67, 7.4–7.9 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) 
functions and powers ...................................................................................4.78–4.87 
position on privilege .............................................................................................5.68 
Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 
and copies of documents.......................................................................................3.79 
and tax advisers........................................................................................6.224–6.231 
functions and powers ...................................................................................4.68–4.75 
position on privilege ....................................................................................5.62–5.63 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) ................4.62–4.67 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) ...............................................4.219–4.225 
AWB Royal Commission............................. 1.6–1.7, 3.30, 5.19–5.20, 5.146, 6.40–6.43 
 
CDPP  See Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP)   
Centrelink.....................................................................................................4.107–4.111 
Child Support Agency (CSA) ......................................................................4.235–4.238 
Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA).....................................................4.208–4.213 
Civil law.......................................................................................................3.135–3.154 
Claiming the privilege 
dispute resolution.....................................................................................8.232–8.331 
practices .......................................................................................................8.55–8.66 
problems ......................................................................................................8.67–8.85 
reform options............................................................................................8.86–8.183 
third parties ..............................................................................................8.210–8.231 
unrepresented persons..............................................................................8.184–8.209 
Client legal privilege 
abolition ...................................................................................................2.105–2.108 
abrogation of  See Abrogation   
abuse of  See Abuse of the privilege   
against third parties..................................................................................7.170–7.206 
claims of  See Claiming the privilege   
definition......................................................................................................3.10–3.11 
for advice relating to an investigation............................................................7.3–7.30 
for corporations....................................................................3.92–3.106, 7.161–7.162 
 Appendix 5. Index 557 
 
harmonisation 
of legislation........................................................................................5.127–5.172 
of uses of privileged information ........................................................7.132–7.136 
history ..........................................................................................................3.13–3.27 
in common law  See also Daniels case; Yuill case  .....................................5.24–5.78 
in existing legislation ...................................................................5.9–5.10, 5.14–5.21 
Corporations Act ....................................................................................3.41–3.48 
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)...............................................3.38–3.43, 3.50, 3.52–3.63 
uniform Evidence Acts ................................................................................3.3–3.5 
in new legislation............................................... 5.67–5.126, 5.93–5.99, 5.110–5.120 
limbs .......................................................................... 2.7, 2.24–2.34, 2.91, 3.29–3.40 
modification  See Modification of the privilege   
need for clarification..................................................................5.22–5.23, 5.27–5.28 
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procedure 
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in new legislation........ 5.14–5.21, 8.175–8.179, 8.271, 8.329, 8.346, 8.365–8.368 
rationale  See Rationales for the privilege   
Coercive information-gathering powers 
description...............................................................................................................1.2 
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